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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the forms and processes of interaction 
that ~ ~ c u r r in the organisation and management of projects. It takes 
as its empirical focus of enquiry the situation in the UK construc-
tion industry; and uses, as its database, five case studies of 
medium to large-scale, 'one-off' construction projects. 
The literature on project organisation and management is 
reviewed, with attention directed towards the phenomenon of matrix 
forms of organisation and related processes of management. A 
critique is developed which assesses the implications of inter-
organisational linkages in the coordination and control of project 
task work. This critique forms the basis for a model of construction 
organisation and management from which a series of propositions are 
derived for empirical investigation. 
Five case studies of construction projects, explored l o n g i t u d i ~ ~
nally a n ~ ~ using qualitative research techniques, are described and 
analysed. The main finding to emerge from the study is that: the more 
there is a need for a more 'flexible' administrative arrangement and 
approach towards managing work that is complex, uncertain and inter-
dependent, the less likely this is in fact to occur, to the extent 
that 'contractual' considerations inform the parties' approaches. This 
is contingent upon three sets of features: the form and basis of the 
relationship, and its meaning to those involved; the broader 
relationship between the organisations concerned (eg their goals, 
resources); and the internal setting within each organisational group • 
. The implications of the findings for models of project and matrix 
organisation are assessed. A recommendation is made for the more 
explicit and separate treatment of. interorganisational relationships, 
due to the differential motivational basis underlying interaction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study aims to investigate the forms and processes of 
interaction that occur in the organisation and management of 
projects. In doing so, it specifically focuses upon the 
organisation and management of construction projects, and takes 
five illustrative case studies of medium to large scale, one-off 
construction projects as its database., 
, Background to the Research 
In recent years, a good deal of attention has been directed, 
by organisational and management theorists and researchers, towards 
the operating characteristics of various types of project-based 
forms of organisation. This attention has stemmed from a long-
standing and broader interest in studying the effects of environmental 
constraints and contingencies upon the internal structure and 
functioning of organisations. The contingency framework that has 
been adopted over the last twenty years or so for investigating 
features of the growth, functioning and development of organisational 
forms in general, has also formed the central plank in attempts to 
chart features of the functioning and development of project 
organisations. These are characterised by the, fact that their 
mainstream activities are project-centred, and that such activities 
are commonly undertaken in increasingly "turbulent" (Emery and 
Trist 1965) market and technological task environment conditions. 
This line of enquiry has taken as its starting point the 
i 
particular idiosyncratic features of project taskwork: specifically, 
the fact that project tasks involve f r e ~ u e n t l y y large, one-off 
products, custom-built to specifications supplied by an external 
(client) body; and that the pattern of activity in the performance 
of project taskwork is essentially 'cyclical' in nature. These 
defining characteristics distinguish project-based forms of activity, 
from the types of production activity found in more recurrent and 
stable settings, and suggest a point of departure from the 
investigation of organisational and managerial phenomena in more 
'traditional' types of setting (eg manufacturing, retailing) • 
. 
The undertaking of project tasks by organisations is, of course, 
by no means a recent development. Indeed, the focus of this study 
is upon one sector of industrial activity - construction - which 
has historically been project-oriented in its organisation and 
management of work. What explains the more recent interest in 
organisational developments with respect to projects, is the 
increasingly common tendency for project taskwork to be performed 
in conditions characterised by high rates of technological change. 
The investigation of project 'systems' of organisation dovetails 
with, and to a large extent derives from, a more general interest, 
in the field of organisational theory and research, in characteristics 
of forms of organisation operating in technologically complex and 
uncertain task environments (eg Burns and Stalker 1961). Project 
organisations operating in this type of environment are encompassed 
within the broad cluster of types of organisations labelled by 
Mintzberg (1979) as "adhocracies". More specifically, such project 
organisations have been identified as those in which some form and 
ii 
degree of "matrix" organisation and management is the norm 
(eg Knight 1977; Galbraith 1971, 1973, 1977; Kingdon 1973). The 
contingency framework essentially specifies that there is 'no one 
best way to organise', and that the effective organisation of work 
is contingent upon the requirements posed by the nature of the task 
being undertaken. In mainstream organisational theory and research 
such a framework has led to examining the impact of, among other 
things, levels of task uncertainty, upon the internal structure 
and functioning of organisations (eg Burns and Stalker 1961, 
Lawre.nce and Lorsch 1967). In the theory and research upon project-
based forms of organisation, the impact of such conditions, coupled 
with the idiosyncratic nature of project-based activity, has 
formed the basis for the examination of the distinctive character-
istics of firms undertaking project work in c o m p ~ x x and dynamic 
task environments. The consequent effects of complexity and 
change across two significant dimensions of the task being performed 
(ie i;ts technology and markets), has formed the backdrop for 
studying the distinct type of organisational complexity found in 
such settings. 
The literature upon complex project organisations, and in 
particular, upon dual or 'matrix' systems of management in the 
performance of project taskwork, is extensive. At the same time, 
however, its empirical underpinnings are somewhat lean, and many 
of the propositions established from models.of matrix management 
in complex project organisations remain to be tested. Furthermore, 
the types of situations in which such phenomena have been 
investigated till now have been mainly highly particular and 
iii 
idiosyncratic. Despite a plethora of interest, and a catalogue 
of recommendations, the growing body of theory in this area has 
seldom been taken as the basis for more extensive and systematic 
exploration of the range of propositions that are derived. 
Moreover, the history of research into such phenomena has itself 
been of a somewhat idiosyncratic and specific nature. Firstly, 
the models proposed have emerged from highly specific examples 
in practice of complex project 'systems' (such as the NASA Apollo 
project of the 1960's (eg Kingdon 1973»). Secondly, research has 
tended to focus almost in its entirety upon high technology 
endeavours in large-scale proj ect undertakings. Thirdly, the 
frame of reference employed in the research has commonly been 
'action-centred' (eg Argyris 1972), and the propositions established 
highly normative in character, reflecting the aim of influencing 
the strategic choice of design options faced by organisations 
concerned (cf Child 1972). Important findings and themes have 
emerged from this area of research. However, these factors have 
combined to militate against the comparative examination of such 
tendencies: both between such types of organisation and those found 
in other forms of industrial activity; and, more importantly 
for this study, between such types of project-based forms of 
organisation and others operating in perhaps qualitatively or 
quantitatively distinct types of project environment. The highly 
contingent basis for research in such settings is recognised and 
acknowledged. However, the very focused field of research into 
such areas has made difficult the comparative examination of broad 
similarities and differences across different types of project-based 
activity. 
iv 
The intention in this study is to explore characteristics 
of the forms and processes of interaction found in the organisation 
and management of projects, focusing specifically upon the case of 
construction projects. The aim will be to assess the applicability 
of the theoretical constructs of matrix and project management in 
a setting which receives comparatively little attention in this 
respect, but which is often singled out as a type of setting in which 
the existence of a complex and dynamic task environment is the 
norm (eg Higgin and Jessop 1965, Crichton 1966). Indeed, for a 
. sector of industrial activity that occupies such a prominent 
position within this and other economies,1 and which is marked by 
its distinctive and interesting organisational characteristics, 
there has been a comparative paucity of research undertaken in ~ ~ by 
social scientists interested generally in the structure and 
functioning of complex organisations. Its distinctive characteristics 
have perhaps rather separated it out as a 'special case', rather than 
.as a sector of activity that yields potentially fruitful comparisons 
and contrasts with other types of industrial setting (eg manu-
.facturing). A sizeable body of literature exists based upon theory 
and research undertaken by those specifically interested in 
construction management phenomena. However, generally speaking, 
although the overlap between these three broad areas has been 
extensive, rarely have those areas of interest sufficiently 
dovetailed in such a way that would allow a potentially important 
cross-fertilisation of ideas. 
v 
2 The Construction Industry 
The construction industry is a large and highly diverse sector 
of industrial activity. It ranges from the construction of multi-
million pound power plants, through the construction of large 
residential and non-residential buildings, to the small scale 
renovation or repair of existing facilites. It encompasses 
different types of work: from the construction of buildings for 
residential and non-residential use; to the laying of roads and 
other infrastructure facilities; to the installation in buildings 
of services (heating, lighting, ventilation, plumbing, etc). It 
also ranges in type from new construction to the repair and 
° t ~ ~ ° to °lOtO 2 maln enance o. e x ~ s s lng facl 1 ~ e s . . Public sector expenditure 
accounts for a significant proportion (some 60%) of total 
expenditure on new and remedial vorks,3 indicating further the 
importance of public sector clients to the industry as a whole. 
It is not the intention in this thesis to address characteristics 
of the industry at a more aggregated sectoral level, since the focus 
of this study is much more 'microscopic' - focusing upon patterns 
of interaction in the management of specific construction projects. 4 
However, one important characteristic of the nature of the industry 
must needs be mentioned here since it has an important bearing upon 
the main thrust of this thesis. Specifically ~ t t is that the 
organisation and management of construction projects involves, to 
varying degrees, inter-linkages between a variety of different 
types of organisation involved to varying degrees and in varying 
ways throughout the total project 'cycle'. In p a r t i ~ u l a r r the 
vi 
industry is characterised by an historical split between those 
organisations involved in, respectively, the design and construction 
of project work. 5 In addition, the industry is one in which the 
phenomenon of subcontracting sections of the work is a widespread 
mode of operation. 6 For the purposes of this study, the important 
point to bear in mind here is that the choice of the project as 
the unit of analysis for investigation, makes central the need ~ o o
focus upon interorganisational relationships in the management of 
project work. A more detailed discussion of the circumstances in 
construction in this respect is returned to in Chapter 3 below. 
3 Thesis Outline 
The plan for the remainder of this thesis is as follows. 
In Chapter 1, theories and findings from investigations of organ-
isational and managerial patterns and processes in complex project 
organisational settings are presented and discussed, with a view 
to identifYing broad themes, and comparisons and contrasts in the 
literature. In Chapter 2, a critique of this literature is 
developed. Specific attention is directed here towards the empirical 
findings obtained and the characteristics of the research strategies 
employed in investigating such phenomena. Following this, attention 
is directed towards the potential impact of two sets of contingency 
factors that receive comparatively little direct and systematic 
attention in the literature: namely, organisational size and inter-
organisational dependencies and relationships. The argument 
developed in the latter respect forms the central crux of this thesis. 
It is that students of matrix, project-based forms of organisation 
vii 
rarely systematically explore the potential impact of external 
relationships in the management of project work. In not doing 
so, a potentially significant source of explanation for variation 
in the patterns and processes of interaction observed internally 
is possibly lost. Furthermore, that external relationships mark 
a point of departure in the investigation of interorganisational 
as opposed to organisational, processes of management in a project 
setting. 
In Chapter 3, the issues raised and discussed in the first 
two chapters are related more specifically to the characteristics 
of work and organisation found in a construction project setting. 
Following this, in Chapter 4, the issues raised in Chapters 1 and 
2,and related to the c o n ~ t r u c t i o n n project situation in Chapter 3, 
are developed into a discussion of the potential impact of various 
sets of factors upon the forms and processes of managerial action 
that may be expected to occur in the setting discussed here. In 
the first part of Chapter 5, this discussion is crystallised into 
a model of forms and processes of interaction in a construction 
project management setting, from which a series of propositions 
are derived and presented. 
The second part of Chapter 5 outlines in .some detail the 
research strategy pursued in this study. The strategy employed and 
the details of the methodology are given, together with broad 
descriptions of the case stUdies investigated here, sampling, access 
and fieldwork. Particular stress is laid upon these issues due to 
the essentially exploratory nature of the research and its 
viii 
manifestation in a longitudinal, case study approach, heavily 
reliant upon the use of qualitative techniques for data collection 
and analysis. 
In Chapters 6 to 10, each of the case studies undertaken is 
described in detail. Chapter 11 broadly compares and contrasts 
the cases according to the dimensions of interest to the study, 
while Chapter 12 turns more fully to an analysis of the data 
with respect to observed patterns and processes of organisation 
and management in the context of the situations as depicted and 
compared in Chapter 11. In Chapter 13, a discussion of the findings 
in relation to the earlier theoretical statements is undertaken. 
The thesis concludes with a brief summary and conclusion of the 
research and its implications in Chapter 14. 
ix 
Footnotes 
1 Estimates suggest the industry conciriues to account for 6% - 7% 
of annual GDP, and employs in the region of 9% - 10% of the 
total workforce (Source: "House's Guide to the Construction 
Industry" 7th ed, 1979-80), Whitefriars Press; London, 1981). 
2 For a fuller definition, see Order XX of the Standard 
Industrial Classification, HMSO, 1981. Repair and maintenance 
of existing facilities accounts for some 40% in total output 
within the industry (Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, 
HMSO, August 1982. 
3 Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, HMSO, August 1982. 
4 The interested reader is referred to Fleming (1980), for 
example, for a discussion of characteristics of the industry 
in ter.ms of levels of industrial concentration, employment 
patterns, etc. Also to House's Guide to the Construction 
Industry (op cit, Ch 12). 
5 Such a split is manifested in the fact that organisations 
undertaking 'design' activities (eg-architectural partnerships) 
are defined under a separate section of the SIC (namely, 
Div 8, Group 837, Class 8370), despite the complementarity 
of the functions performed in the total project undertaking. 
For a description of the position of these professional groups 
within the industry, and their role in the total design-
construction project process, see, for instance, House's 
Guide to the Construction Industry (op cit, Ch 13). 
6 See, for instance, Bresnen et al (1985) •. An. additional and 
related phenomenon is the extensiveness of the number of 
small firms within the industry. In 1980, for instance, 
80% of the registered firms in the industry employed fewer 
than seven people, and only .125% employed over 600 
(Source: Private Contractors' Construction Census, 1972-80 
Dept of the Environment, HMSO, London 1981). For the reasons 
for the continued importance of the small scale sector, see 
for instance, Fleming (1980). 
CHAPTER ONE 
PROJECT AND MATRIX FORMS OF ORGAlTISATION 
1 • 1 Dual StructUres 
Recent studies of the organisational forms established for the 
management of project work have taken as their starting point the 
premise that firms face dual' pressures stemming from the characteristics 
of their task environments. On the one hand, there is a need to 
structure the organisation in such a way as to allow for the orientation 
of activities towards the achievement of specific, but non-recurring, 
project objectives. Typically, the type of work involved consists of 
the construction (and/or design) of series of medium to large scale, 
one-off, custom-built products - each for a distinct client, and each 
to be built over a relatively short period of time. These sources of 
variation in the type of products being built make it important for 
the organisation to have the capacity to be able to respond to diversity 
and change in product market conditions, and to achieve a level of 
interdepartmental co-ordination consistent with the achievement of 
short-term project objectives. On the other hand, there is a need 
for the firm to establish a structure and modus operandi that allows 
for the maintenance and development of its distinct functional specialisms. 
This both to achieve the benefits - through economies of scale - of 
specialisation (Galbraith 1973, 1977), and to help ensure the survival 
of the firm in the long run. Typically, the latter point relates to 
firms operating in conditions of rapid technological change (eg Kingdon 
1973 .. Sayles and Chandler 1971).t' An orientation towards specific 
projects and clients which is consistent with short-term commercial 
success, is balanced with the need for the firm to develop its specialist 
technical support capacity in a variety ot specialisms in order to 
maintain or improve its competitive position in the long-run. ~ h e e NASA 
Apollo programme of the 1960's, which has been the subject of a good 
1.1 
deal of organisational research,' has served as one prominent example 
of the explicit adoption of a complex organisational form to accommodate 
this dual orientation. Kingdon (1973), for instance, described the 
establishment of a matrix organisation in this context as a pragmatic 
response to the need to fulfill two sets of requirements: the client's 
need for unified direction of the project to avoid theM having to 
negotiate with a number of functional managers; and the contracted 
company's need to maintain its capacity for handling current and 
future projects in a fast-changing, high technology environment 
through the maintenance of strong specialist departments .//!Other 
, i 
descriptions of the same instance (eg Sayles and Chandler 1971) have 
drawn a similar broad distinction between project and functional 
orientations in this type of environment. And the need to strike a 
balance between close interorganisational collaboration and organ-
isationalautonomy __ B : I l ~ _ i n d e p e n d e n c e e has f O ~ : h ~ _ " ~ a c k d r c p p to. much' 
~ ! ~ . ~ : . , _ d i ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ f f . ~ ~ ~ ~ . i ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ n i s . a t i o ~ ~ ~ h i S S particular setting. 
More broadly-based models have'similarly focused attention upon 
the existence of diversity and change across two dimensions associated 
with the tasks being performed by the organisation. Most commonly, 
these are taken to be product market and technological conditions 
respectively (Galbraith 1971, 1973, 1977, Knight 1977, Sayles 1976). 
However, other dimensions have also been included: notably that 
related to the geographical dispersion of a firm's activities 
(cf Davis '974). The general ,point is that the traditional conception 
of the design of the organisation being based at anyone level upon a 
criterion, is , e x t ~ l d e d d to the prospect of it being based at 
anyone level u p o n f ~ r i t e r i a , , given the particUlar constellation 
\single 
{ " 
• \-..-__ -,r. • 
of task enV1ronment cond1t10ns facing the organisation. Thus, for 
1.2 
instance, the choice between technology, territory or time 
(Miller. 1959) - or product, process or place (Gulick and 
) h ' , t' 2, Urwick 1937 - as t e b a s ~ s s of organ1sa ~ o n , , 1S elaborated by the 
potential suitability of organising simultaneously across two 
dimensions (eg product and place). More broadly, some authors, 
following Williamson's (1975) and Chandler's (1962) historical 
perspectives have taken matrix organisation as representing a 
development and novel alternative to the traditional U- and M-forms 
of organisation (Davis 1974, Drucker 1974).3 
While the bulk of attention has tended to be directed towards 
matrix-type structures of organisation operating in high technology 
settings, this should not obscure the centrality of a dual orientation 
stemming from diversity and change across two dimensions as the 
defining characteristic of the conditions under which a matrix system 
is likely to emerge or be introduced. It is not high t e C h n 0 1 0 ~ ~ i 
per se that constitutes the rationale for matrix O r g a n i s a t i o n . / / R a t h ~ r r
it is the need to respond to two sets of complex and dynamic 
environmental conditions (one of which may be technological change) 
t'"" 
that forms the basis for a matrix system of management. /; Indeed the 
central theme of this study is the relevance of issues connected 
with the operation of matrix structures in an environment (ie 
construction) within which there is a need to achieve a_dual 
orientation, but at the same time in perhaps less complex and dynamic 
- ~ - - - - - - - - - -
settings - certainly with regard to the type of production technology 
employed. 
Most of the interest in matrix management in project systems 
has focused upon three main sets of issues: identifying the factors 
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that make a matrix a suitable form of organisation; identifYing and 
categorising the forms and types of matrix system found in practice; 
and identifYing (and seeking solutions to) the types of problems 
found in implementing and operating the form and which stem from, 
or are related to, its peculiar characteristics. Before looking in 
more detail at the third set of issues which form the basis for the 
propositions to be explored in this study in the construction setting, 
a review of the literature with respect to the rationale for and 
manifestations of matrix organisation will be undertaken. Following 
this review, in Chapter 2, a critique of the literature will be 
developed. In Chapter 3, the issues raised will be linked with the 
task and organisational characteristics of activity related to the 
design and construction of building projects. 
1.4 
1.2 ContingencY'Models'of Matrix Organisation 
As implied in the foregoing discussion, research into complex 
forms established for the management of project-based work, has been 
based considerably upon a contingency framework for the study of 
the development and operation of organisational structures. 4 The 
focus has been upon the tasks undertaken by the organisation and their 
resultant manifestation in a variety of models of organisation in 
which patterns of dual management are the norm. One of the earliest 
statements of the rationale for establishing a dual structure and 
its manifestation in a matrix form concentrated upon the type of task 
undertaken, focusing specifically upon the form of product produced 
and the associated production system employed: 
"It is when work performance is for specific project 
contracts that a matrix organisation can be used ;:".' ., 
effectively. If the market for a product is a single 
customer ••• the production emphasis changes to the 
completion of action for a specific work project instead 
of a flow of work on production programmes for product 
volume." 
(Mee 1964, p71) 
The emphasis upon unit, as opposed to large batch and process production 
(Woodward 1958, 1965) as a defining characteristic,continues in 
subsequent studies of the form, although the emphasis shifts towards 
general characteristics of the task being performed rather than 
focusing only upon the characteristic type of production system 
employed. In other words, unit production systems tend to be more 
closely associated with matrix organisation; but not all unit 
production systems exhibit features of a matrix organisation. The 
central concepts that have been used to explore the emergence of 
complex o r g a n i s ~ t i o p a l l forms such as the matrix h a v e ~ b e e n n the concepts 
of task u n c e r t a i n t y ~ ~ complexity and interdependence. An emphasis has 
" 
been placed upon examining the effects of these variables upon the 
managerial processes of planning, co-ordinating and controlling 
taskwork, and their implications for workunit structure and processes 
of problem-solving, communication and decision-making in a situation 
in which the close collaboration of specialists from a variety of 
separate groups or departments within the organisation is r e ~ u i r e d . .
The conceptual underpinnings of the approach stem back to the 
early conception of firms operating in increasingly "turbulent" 
environments (Emery and Trist 1965, 1969) and, in particular, to 
Thompson's (1967) analysis of organisations seeking to manage their 
dependency upon the environment by adopting strategies aimed at 
achieving a level of "closed-system logic" at the technical level 
(Parsons 1960). The former approach finds perhaps its strongest 
advocate in Kingdon's (1973) systems approach to the design of 
complex organisational forms. Galbraith's "information-processing 
model" (1973, 1977), based similarly upon a systems approach, also 
relates the profileration of complex structural forms to the nature 
of the organisation's environment via the nature of the tasks 
performed. It provides perhaps the most comprehensive statement of 
the organisational design options available given particular sets 
of task environment conditions that place a premium upon organising 
to achieve a dual orientation. 5 These authors share in common with 
Knight (1977) and others (eg Sayles 1976) the presumption that dual 
structures of management may at one level provide the means whereby 
the organisation can achieve both internal efficiency in the use of 
its resources and also the capability of dealing with the pressures 
associated with responding to individual projects' requirements and 
pressures. At another, and more operational level, that they allow 
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for the achievement of a sufficient level of co-ordination of activities 
and integration between subgroups (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) in conditions 
of high levels of task complexity and uncertainty and where levels of 
reciprocal interdependence (Thompson 1967, p54) between subtasks is high. 
Indeed, it is generally held that matrix]tanagement (in one form or 
-- --" - ~ , - -
another) offers a solution in certain circumstances to the problems faced 
by the organisation in achieving appropriate levels of "differentiation" 
and "integration" (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) in increasingly "turbulent" 
environments (Galbraith op cit). Sayles (1976) suggests further that 
variants of the form are in fact quite common in practice, and associated 
with the resolution of these divergent tendencies in certain types of 
industrial settings. 
1.2.1 'Organic' Patterns of Management 
The analysis of matrix and related systems of management is 
underpinned by two important sets of findings in organisational theory that 
have lent considerable weight to the contingency perspective. The first was 
the early study by Burns and Stalker (1966). In their study of 20 English 
and Scottish firms in the electronics industry. they discovered that a 
relationship existed between the degree of uncertainty facing the firms -
arising due to a high rate of technological change manifested in a high rate 
of change of product lines - and the efficacy of the form of organisation 
in operation in terms of the rate of innovation. From their findings, they 
derived a continuum stretching between two 'pure' models of organisation: 
the 'mechanistic' and 'organic' types. The former was characterised by 
. 
features of the classic bureaucracy described by Weber (1947). These 
included the specialisation of roles according to detailed subdivisions 
of the task to be performed; full formal specification of the technical 
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methods to be employed by functional role-holders and detailed 
descriptions of their formal rights and obligations; the existence 
of a hierarchical structure of control, authority and communication 
in which vertical interaction and 'top-down' decision-making were the 
norms; and an emphasis upon internal and position-based loyalty and 
affiliation. In contrast, the 'organic' model was characterised by 
the 'contributive' basis of knowledge and skills applied to the 
performance of the task of the concern as a whole;' the continual 
re-definition of individuals' functions and roles through interaction, 
and a broadening of the scope of role-holders' responsibilities; the 
existence of "network" systems of control, authority and communication 
- in which lateral interaction and the exercise of authority based 
upon expertise and specialist knowledge came to the fore; and 
a more 'cosmopolitan' outlook, wherein technical and professional 
loyalty and affiliation were more highly valued than loyalty to the 
6 firm or one's own department. These sets of characteristics yielded 
a variety of individual dimensions or variables along which firms 
would be expected to differ: the aggregated cluster of attributes 
identified in anyone situation would determine the relative location 
of the organisation on the continuum - whether firms tended towards 
the 'mechanistic' or 'organic' ends of the continuum. They found that 
the level of company performance achieved was related to the fit 
between environmental and structural characteristics: 'mechanistic' 
organisations tended to operate most effectively in task environments 
that were relatively static, routine and stable;'whereas 'organic' 
firms operated most effectively in uncertain, complex and changing 
task environments. (It has been the latter set of conditions that 
have prompted investigations of the matrix phenomemon.) Their 
other central finding pertained to the difficulties associated with 
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introducing and operating a form of organisation run on 'organic' 
lines. They found that the ability of firms to respond to more 
demanding conditions was constrained by the tendency for sectional, 
political and individual career interests to play an important 
part in the workings of the firm: 
"Neit;her political nor career preoccupations operate 
covertly, or even, in some cases, consciously. They 
give rise to intricate manoeuvres and counter-moves, 
all of them expressed through decisions, or in , 
discussions about decisions, concerning the organisation 
and the policies of the, firm. Since sectional interests 
and preoccupations with advancement only display them-
selves in terms of the working organisation, that 
organisation becomes more or less adjusted to serving 
the ends of the political and career system rather 
than those of the concern ••• These divert organisations 
from purposive adaptation." 
(Burns 1963, p20) 
Their observation was that such factors led to the perpetuation of 
outdated systems and to 'pathologies' in structure: rather than the 
organisation adapting by becoming more 'organic' in response to 
exogenous pressures, the tendency might well be for an essentially 
'mechanistic' organisation to be retained, with 'elaborations' to 
cope with external pressures being made and based upon "political 
and career system" criteria. 
With respect to the central finding of the association between 
task uncertainty and the requisite organisational form, other studies 
have since found similar tendencies towards a more 'organic' form 
. 
of workunit structure in conditions of task uncertainty (eg Duncan 
1972, Van de Ven et al 1974, 1976). Taken as a whole, the results 
confirm the expectations that greater task complexity and uncertainty 
require a correspondingly greater input of specialist expertise and 
information for problem-solving and decision-making proceoses 
, .9 
(Perrow 1967); that (perceived) task complexity (Van de Ven et al 1974) 
and, especially, task uncertainty - reflected in how often factors 
considered are subject to change, and how often new and different 
factors need to be taken into account (Duncan 1972) - affect decisional 
processes and in a manner consistent with that described in the 'organic' 
system; and that high levels of task uncertainty and complexity, 
coupled with greater subtask interdependence, are reflected in the 
tendency towards more flexible and participative structures of 
interaction (Van de Ven et al 1974, Hall 1968). Van de Ven et al (1974) 
for instance, found that where tasks are medium to high in perceived 
"difficulty" and high in perceived "variability" (or uncertainty) 
then "group modes" become appropriate for problem-solving and decision-
making processes. 
1.2.2 Differentiation and Integration 
The second major study investigated the effects of differential 
levels of task uncertainty upon subunits of the organisation. The 
investigation was by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) who conducted a 
comparative study of ten business firms operating in three separate 
industries: containers, food and plastics. These were taken as 
representative of three distinct types of environment, characterised 
by differences in the degrees of 'scientific'. 'techno-economic' and 
'market' uncertainty faced by each firm's research, production and 
sales departments respectively. 'Uncertainty' was scored according 
to the lack of clarity of information available, the uncertainty of 
causal relations in taskwork processes (Thompson's (1967) "cause-effect 
beliefs"). and the time span of definitive performance feedback. From 
their results, Lawrence and Lorsch sought to establish the appropriate 
states of "differentiation" and "integration" required for effective 
task performance under widely varying conditions, and to analyse how 
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these states were effectively achieved. They defined "differentiation" 
as: 
" ••• differences in the cognitive and emotional 
orientation among managers in different functional 
departments. " 
(ibid, p47) 
This meant not simply segmentation and specialisation of knowledge as 
a consequence of the degree of functional and role specialisation 
within the fir.m, but also attendant differences that arose in attitudes 
and behaviour. In particular they noted differences in orientation 
towards time, goals and interpersonal relations as well as variation 
in the formality of structure between departments. Divergent goal 
orientations have commonly been identified in studies of inter-
departmental working relationships within organisations (eg Blau and 
Scott 1964). Similarly differences in behavioural norms or, more 
generally, 'ways of working and thinking'. The impact of differential 
conditions upon the structural attributes of different departments 
within the same organisation has also received a good deal of attention 
(cf Hall 1968, 1977, Hage and Aiken 1969). Hall (1968) for instance, 
found that the degree of task diversity and predictability facing 
production and R&D departments respectively in a number of 
organisations corresponded closely to their structural attributes: the 
former were generally more 'mechanistic' in form, the latter more 
'organic'. Research into R&D departments has consistently pointed 
to distinctive 'organic' tendencies in the form and processes of 
interaction observed (eg Allen and Cohen 1969. Bergen 1975). 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) then went on to define "integra.tion" 
as: 
" ••• the quality of the state of collaboration that 
, • 11 
exists among departments that are required to achieve 
unity of effort by the demands of the environment." 
(ibid, p47) 
They found that, as the nature of the task being undertaken by the 
organisation increased in uncertaihty, there vas a need for a greater 
degree of specialisation to cope with the additional information and 
specialist knowledge needed to perform the task. At the same time, 
however, greater levels of subtask interdependence meant that a 
greater emphasis was also put upon achieving a high level of 
"integration" consistent with allowing for the greater technical and 
administrative complexity of the task. The two sets of requirements 
- to differentiate and integrate - while being complementary needs 
in conditions of increased task uncertainty, were also somewhat 
incompatible: the differences in orientation that occurred through 
differentiation associated with specialisation made integration between 
departments increasingly difficult to achieve. Relating these factors 
to the level of company performance across the three types of 
environment investigated, they found that a close relationship 
existed between the extent to which firms responded to environmental 
conditions and their ability to perform effectively within that 
context. Thus, high performing firms in uncertain environments (eg 
the plastics industry) managed to achieve high levels of both 
differentiation and integration. Given the contradictions posed by 
the two sets of requirements, their ability to perform effectively 
was ·conditioned by the establishment of appropriate "conflict-
resolution mechanisms" within the structure of the organisation. 
These served to enable the firms to achieve the high level of 
integration required amongst highly differentiated groups holding 
divergent perspectives or orientations. The specific mechanisms they 
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identified included, in all three industries, those found in a 
traditional bureaucratic structure (namely the managerial hierarchy, 
paper systems, and informal patterns of direct contact between 
departmental managers). However, in the least differentiated 
setting (the container industry) such mechanisms were effectively 
all that were needed. In the more uncertain setting of the food 
industry, where there needed to be greater differentiation, successful 
firms also made use of temporary cross-functional teams, and perhaps 
individual integrators whose role was to ensure cross-departmental 
collaboration. In the highly uncertain and highly differentiated 
setting of the plastics -industry, successful firms tended to go 
further, with the establishment of a permanent team structure and 
extensive use of individual integrators, and perhaps the establishment 
of a separate department geared towards the performance of this role. 
The mechanisms were c o n s e ~ u e n t l y y cumulative and contingent upon the level 
of task uncertainty faced and the c o n s e ~ u e n t i a l l tendencies towards greater 
functional differentiation and the greater cross-functional integration 
r e ~ u i r e d d for effective performance. 
1.2.3 Task Uncertainty/Interdependence and Dual Forms 
Studies of the class of organisation in which some form of dual 
management is the norm have relied extensively upon the phenomena 
described in these two studies. Levels of task uncertainty (and/or 
complexity) coupled with levels of interdependence between subtasks 
h a v ~ ~ been taken as the independent variables upon which the design 
of the organisation for effective performance is contingent. Attention 
has been directed towards both the more flexible structure and 
processes of interaction observed in task groups operating within 
matrix settings (the 'organic' model), and to the impact of 
differentiation and the structural imperatives this r e ~ u i r e s s to 
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achieve integration in more complex and unstable settings. Galbraith's 
(1971, 1973', 1977) model serves as one prominent and important example 
of this approach. He views the establishment of matrix organisation 
as the culmination of the organisation's attempts to manage its 
dependency upon the environment in conditions of increasing levels of 
task uncertainty. He defines task uncertainty as the difference 
between the amount of information r e ~ u i r e d d to perform a task and the 
amount of information already available to organisational members 
(ibid, 1977, p36). 
The view expressed by Galbraith and echoed in the works of 
other systems theorists exploring the field, is that the greater the 
amount of task uncertainty - this being a function of the diversity 
of outputs and input resources and the level of goal difficulty -
then the greater the amount· of information that needs to be processed 
by decision-makers during the course of taskwork in order to achieve 
a given level of performance. His thesis is that, as the level of 
task uncertainty facing the firm increases, so greater pressure is 
put upon the hierarchical system for managing exceptions during task 
execution. In this event, it becomes more difficult to solve problems 
and reach decisions within the confines and constraints of a 
traditional bureaucratic structure. This he categorises as "information 
overload" to which the appropriate response is the establishment of 
additional - but increasingly costly - mechanisms which free upper 
levels of management from excessive involvement in detailed operational 
decision-making and which, therefore, move the point of decision down 
to the level in the organisation at which the relevant information and 
expertise exists (ibid, 1973, p18)'. 
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It should perhaps be noted at this point that the specific focus 
upon informational requirements in c o m ~ x x and unstable settings is 
common to other systems models of dual management structures (ie 
Kingdon 1973, Sayles 1976) as well as that proposed by Galbraith. In 
focusing upon the organisation's or task group's ~ a p a c i t y y to process 
information' however, such approaches tend to narrow the scope of the 
meaning of uncertainty. While it is accepted that more information 
will undoubtedly be needed for decision-makers under conditions of 
uncertainty, this does not necessarily mean that lack of information 
per se is a sufficient measure of uncertainty. Nor does it give 
sufficient insight into the decisional processes involved. While 
"unstructured problems" (Simon and Shaw 1964, Vroom and Yetton 1973) 
requiring "non-programmed decisions" (March and Simon 1958, Simon 1960) 
may indeed be characterised by many unknowns with regard to alternative 
solutions, methods and/or parameters, this does not necessarily mean 
that the process of problem-identification, analysis, solution and 
implementation is directly related to the information-processing 
capacity of the workunit as Galbraith and others (eg Duncan 1972) 
suggest. The underlying assumption tends to be that with sufficient 
information available, the problems could be solved and decisions 
reached with recourse to an essentially computational strategy 
(Thompson 1967). However, in this more technical interpretation of 
the meaning of uncertainty, several important points tend to be 
missed (despite them being of recognised critical significance in 
subsequent analyses of decisional processes within the workunit group 
in complex structures). 
Firstly, lack of prior information and task uncertainty are by 
no means synonymous: it is quite possible to conceive of situations in 
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which there is sufficient information to deal with problems that may 
occur - the key factor is that their occurrence is largely unpredictable; 
conversely, that predictable potential problems have unknown solutions 
despite a plethora of information concerning their parameters and 
consequences. Secondly, and related to the processes involved, there 
is an implicit tendency to emphasise the quantitative as opposed to 
qualitative aspects of informational flow, and to downgrade more 
subjective and judgemental elements related to the notion of expertise 
and specialised knowledge - such as hunch, intuition and educated 
guesswork that may be involved in problem-solving exercises (Simon 
1960). On the first point, it is the selective importance of 
information with regard to problem-solving and decision-making 
processes rather than the amount of potentially. useful information 
available or needed that is critical. A common enough phenomenon is 
that of being 'snowed under' with information - facts and figures that 
are potentially relevant to solving the problem under investigation. 
In this case, it is the selection of qualitatively relevant 
information that acts as a stimulus in problem-solving and decision-
making that is the important factor. Related to this are the practical 
limits to the amount of information that can be handled and the 
decision where to draw the line in the search procedure depending on 
the marginal value of extra information to the problem-solving process 
(March and Simon 1958). On the second point, it is more likely to be 
prectsely those circumstances in which task uncertainty truly exists, 
that these 'subjective' factors come to the fore in problem-solving 
and decisional processes. Information may act as an aide to problem-
solving, but decisions may in the end need to be reached according to 
some more nebulous and subjective formulae. In models of decision-
making in complex organisations such as the matrix, such particularistic 
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facets of 'information-processing' behaviour tend somewhat to be glossed 
over in the search for a structure that provides a context within which 
the process as a whole becomes less problematic. It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to attempt to devise a more precise formulation of the 
concepts of task uncertainty, variability, predictability and complexity 
and to relate these to processes of information flow, or to discuss in 
any detail decision models bases upon these factors. However, it is 
important to note these limitations: focusing upon outstanding informational 
requirements can act only ~ s s a proxy for the more complex concept of task 
uncertainty (and related concepts such as variability) and tend to limit 
the conception of processes of problem-solving and decision-making to a 
class of activity in which computational formulae based upon 'hard', 
objective data is the likely norm. 
Galbraith's model'outlines four basic strategies to cope with 
greater task uncertainty, each of which have their associated costs and 
benefits. The first two - creating slack'resources, and creating self-
contained tasks - are geared towards reducing the level of information-
processing needed, and constitute 'defensive' options to cope with increasing 
levels of task uncertainty, (ibid, Chapter 3). The latter two - investing 
in informational (computer) systems, and the creation and extension of 
lateral relatiQas - are geared towards increasing the capacity of the 
organisation to process task-relevant information. They constitute more 
of an "adaptive" response to increasing levels of task uncertainty, (ibid, 
Chapters 4 and 5). It is the latter alternative - creating lateral 
relations - which forms the basis for the analysis of the more complex 
structure of roles and relationships found in matrix and related forms of 
organisation. According to Galbraith, the use of this strategy as opposed 
to more extensive applications of information system technology is more 
appropriate when the information required for decision-making is, to some 
degree, qualitative in form. For the firm operating in conditions in which 
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the range of inputs and outputs is highly diverse, and where goal 
performance is problematic and problems and events often unpredictable, 
he suggests that the appropriate strategic response consists of the 
promotion of extensive lateral relationships at the technical level. 
This would allow pertinent information and expertise to be brought 
in where it was needed, and help achieve the requisite levels of 
co-ordination or integration between departments, groups or individuals 
involved in tightly-coupled and interdependent work processes. The 
mechanisms he suggests to achieve these aims (looked at in more detail 
below), range from direct contact between line managers and the 
establishment of co-ordinating committees, through the setting up of 
ad hoc task force groups or semi-permanent team structures, to the 
use of more permanent mechanisms. The latter encompass the use of 
integrators and, finally, matrix organisation (ibid, pp18-19). The 
fully-blown matrix system involves the legitimisation and explicit 
structuring of lateral relationships in the form of dual reporting 
relationships and a corresponding dual control system. 
A similarly strong emphasis upon the profusion and legitimisation 
of lateral relations at the operational level, and its manifestation in 
the complex dual structural forms that are established or emergent 
is found in the work of other writers (Kingdon 1973, Sayles 1976, Sayles 
and Chandler 1971). Kingdon (1973) focuses upon the characteristics 
of ~ r k k in more advanced systems, where inputs' (eg raw materials) may 
be diverse and non-uniform, production processes lacking in standard-
isation and routineness, and where direct 'feedback loops' within the 
production system itself may be highly extensive (ibid, Chapter 2). 
He contrasts the technical and social system requirements of this 
situation - in terms of the boundaries of the task group, the greater 
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need for self-regulation and mutual adjustment, the wider spread of 
discretionary activity at the technical level, and the need for lateral 
interaction and subgroup co-ordination with reciprocally-interdependent 
tasks (Thompson 1967, p54) - with the constrictions and constraints 
inherent in a more traditional bureaucratic form of organisation. In 
particular, he stresses the role of 'technical level' participants 
in mediating environmental uncertainty in a situation in which the 
managerial and technical levels of the organisation (Parsons 1960) 
have become "fused" (op cit, 1973, Chapter 3). In other words, and 
following Thompson's scheme (1967, Chapter 2), the traditional role 
of management in 'mediating' environmental uncertainty and 'buffering' 
the technical system from its effects, becomes no longer separable 
from the role performed by technical level participants. The two roles 
are combined as a consequence of dependency upon the information and 
expertise held by technical level participants and the need for 
'within system' management of the production process. This is reflected 
in a greater degree of participation in decisional processes and more 
decentralised decision-making authority within the organisation as a 
whole. His thesis is that the more appropriate form of organisation 
recognises the inter-relationship between technical and social system 
characteristics in such a situation, by allowing for the operation of 
a more 'organic' system of interaction at the operational level. This 
would involve the recognition of the task group as the basic 
organisational unit; the spread of participatory influence in decisional 
. 
processes, with information and expertise rather than positional power 
forming the basis for authority; the development of relationships based 
on mutual confidence and trust, and involving 'negotiated interaction' 
amongst group members; and a greater reliance upon individual 
responsibility and self-control rather than external control. He 
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relies then on the criteria specified by Burns and Stalker ( 1 9 6 1 ) . N a m e i y ~ ~
"The organic form is appropriate to changing conditions, 
which give rise constantly to fresh problems and 
unforeseen requirements for action which cannot be 
broken down or distributed automatically arising from 
the functional roles defined within a hierarchic structure." 
(ibid, 1961 t P 121) 
Like Galbraith's scheme, the establishment of a 'mixed' or matrix 
organisational form is then predicated upon the need for the organisation 
still to fully utilize its human resources, and to provide a framework 
that allows for internal stability and efficiency in resource allocation 
(ibid, Chapter 2). According to Kingdon, the adoption of a more 
'organic' form in response to complex and uncertain technical conditions 
serves only to transform the environmental conditions faced by the 
organisation into less "turbulent" ones, and not to remove the effects 
of environmental constraints and contingencies entirely. The mechanisms 
of regulation external to the work group and hierarchical control 
consistent with a traditional bureaucratic structure are still deemed 
appropriate in coping with these latter sets of factors - notably 
internal patterns of resource allocation to achieve efficiency, and 
ensuring that wider organisational goals are brought fully into 
decisional processes. Hence the need for a structure that incorporates 
the dual design criteria of adaptability/operational flexibility and 
administrative efficiency/functional stability. 
The focuses of Kingdon's and Galbraith's approaches differ 
somewhat: the former focusing upon the set of conditions that might 
tend to be associated with the implementation and operation of an 
explicitly-structured matrix form of organisation - using data from 
a specific empirical example (ie the NASA Apollo programme); the 
latter adopting a broader approach that attempts to chart the logic 
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underlying the proliferation of more complex organisational 
for.ms that embody a dual design principle - and that may culminate 
in the establishment of an explicitly-structured matrix form. 
Nevertheless they and other authors share a broadly common conception 
of the task characteristics that serve as the defining criteria for 
the type of situation in which some for.m of matrix organisation may 
occur or be appropriate. In particular they identifY the complexity 
and uncertainty of task work perfor.mance and high levels of reciprocal 
interdependence between subtasks. These combine to produce a situation 
in which there is an inability to preplan work fully prior to task 
execution and where the high frequency of exceptions occurring and 
their often lack of predictability, together with problems of 
'variance-transmission' (Herbst 1974), require a good deal of 
information to be processed and a high level of 'negotiated 
interaction' during task execution (Kingdon 1973, Galbraith 1971, 
1973, 1977, Sayles 1976, Sayles and Chandler 1971, Knight 1977). 
Tight schedules, financial pressures and the importance of 'quality' 
parameters in the specification of the product combined with tightly-
coupled activities place a premium on the avoidance of delays in 
decision-making and of 'bottlenecks' o c c u r r i n ~ ~ such that decisions 
need to be reached at the point of proauction and activities need 
to be conducted in parallel - rather than, say, being able to rely 
upon inventories of stock or backlogs in production. 
They also share a broadly common conception of the requisite 
structure and processes of interaction at the operational level 
necessitated by the impact that these factors have upon the managerial 
processes of planning, co-ordinating, controlling and decision-making. 
Specifically, that the focal unit within the organisation becomes the 
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task or project group, comprised of staff from a number of different 
functional specialisms, whose interaction is intensive and 'negotiated', 
and where the locus of influence and degree of involvement shifts in 
relation to changing task requirements. Further, that the structural 
mode within which this 'organic' task group is contained is one in 
which decision-making authority is decentralised and where integrative 
mechanisms are employed to co-ordinate activities. This to achieve 
a sufficient representation of the interests of these specialists 
involved, to bring the wider organisational view to bear on decisional 
processes, and to help overcome the difficulties associated with 
functional differentiation (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). In Kingdon's 
scheme, the appropriate mechanism to achieve 'integration' and to avoid 
tendencies towards a variety of forms of de-coupling between groups 
which he terms "segregation,,7 relies in part upon the establishment 
of a Project Management function or role. A similar strategy is 
apparent in Galbraith's and other authors' descriptions of the integrator 
role (Galbraith 1973, 1977, Sayles 1976, Knight 1977, Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967b). The more profound solution, contingent upon task 
characteristics, is found in the prescription of a fully-explicit 
. matrix structure of roles and relationships. 
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1.3 ' Models of Matrix 'MAnagement 
The continuum described by Galbraith (1971) - ranging from 
pure 'functional' forms of organisation at one end, to pure 'project' 
forms of organisation at the other - has formed the basis for a more 
complete categorisation of different models of organisation that 
exhibit, to varying degrees, the characteristics just described. 
The now almost traditional grid or 'overlay' (Knight 1977) form of 
matrix organisation which occupies the midpoint on this continuum, 
is taken now to represent only one in a number of forms of 
organisation clustered around the centre of the continuum in which 
some form of dual management is a prominent feature. Indeed, 
attempts to describe what a matrix organisation actually is have 
often been confounded by lack of agreement concerning its precise 
form or the parameters for defining it. Knight (1976-7), for instance, 
points to the range of available definitions - from a functionally-
based task force system (Miller and Rice 1967, Mee 1964) to project 
organisation (Argyris 1972, Bergen 1975) - to conclude: 
It ••• overall agreement on the general meaning of 
matrix is accompanied by a good deal of disagreement 
concerning its practical embodiments ••• there are 
almost as many individual variants as there are 
examples. " 
(Knight 1976-7, p115) 
Sayles (1976) has made the additional point that matrix organisation 
may pot be such a new phenomenon, since it often 'evolves' to cope 
with the need to reconcile differentiation tendencies and the need 
to integrate activity. Gunz and Pearson (1977) have also 
noted the possibilities of implicit or incipient forms of matrix 
organisation, in contrast to the explicitly-adopted ones that have 
tended to be the main focus of enquiry. In a similar vein other 
1.23 
authors point to long-standing tendencies towards dual management -
particularly insofar as the role of professionals in organisations 
is concerned (eg Eccles, 1975). 
1 . _ ~ ~ t ~ S - . - n 9 7 ~ o r k , , based on a review of existing 
--t h e o r y ~ - a n ~ - - e m - p - l . ~ · r i c a l l evidence, proposes that the important 
characteriatic-Le-consider is instead the occurrence of forms of 
~ - " ' ~ ~ .. ", 
~ x x management (ibid-, - - p p i - : 1 T . - : _ , [ ~ i s t i n g u i s h e s s this by relating 
~ ~ ~. . . - , ~ ~ . J / I O ~ " ~ ~ ~
it to t h ~ ' ' ~ ~ r s t e ~ " - ; f f some form of organisation in which a dual 
orientation and associated dual relationships occur. This extends 
the meaning of matrix organisation beyond that encountered in 
the traditional grid model, and allows for the comparative 
description and evaluation of different models of matrix management 
derived from the multitude o ~ i c - - i n s t a n ~ t t comprise the 
empirical databank for theorists and researchers interested in the 
f o r m ~ e m P l O Y i n g g a continuum of matrix management across which 
are located several 'pure' forms of organisation, it also allows 
for the comparative evaluation of tendencies towards one end or 
the other, in much the same way that Burns and Stalkers' (1966) 
'organic-mechanistic' continuum allows for comparison without the 
need to specify exact location. Knight describes three basic models 
of matrix organisation arranged along the continuum suggested by 
Galbraith (1971), and according to the extent to which they 
r e p ~ e s e n t t differences in the 'balance' of influence between project 
managers on the one hand and functional manasers on the other. He 
labels these as the 'co-ordination', 'overlay' and 'secondment' 
m o d e l ~ r e p r e s e n t i n g g increasing levels of project management influence 
and power within the organisation Cop cit, Chapter 10). The 
'co-ordination' model corresponds to a situation in which project 
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staff are formally attached to, and work within, functional 
departments, but where procedural arrangements are instituted to 
ensure cross-departmental interaction and collaboration. Task team 
structures and the role of integrator, or project manager here are 
relevant, the model encompassing these non-matrix forms of 
organisation identified by Galbraith (1973). The 'overlay' model 
corresponds to the textbook version of matrix organisation, involving 
an extension of the integrator's influence upon task team members 
to a situation in which dual reporting and control relationships 
exist. The 'secondment' model is more project-orientated in form -
functional departments retaining some direct influence over task 
team members, but primarily performing a maintenance and service 
support role within an essentially project-based form of 
organisation. In this model, the influence of the project manager 
is extended to more direct line control over project team members. 
Functional departments provide the 'home base' for staff moving 
between projects, and undertake maintenance functions for staff 
involved in projects - such as career training and development. 
A comparable, albeit less p a r s i m o n i o u ~ ~ scheme is suggested by 
Sayles (1976), who identifies five basic models of matrix management 
which very in their degree of "systems" (ie task), as opposed to 
. .. 8 functlonal, orlentatlon. He, like Knight, views the matrix 
o r g ~ i s a t i o n n as typified by resource usage observably and directly 
controlled by two sets of managers (project and functional). He 
also takes the level of influence exerted respectively by these 
managers over project team members as the guiding criterion for 
defining the relative degree of ' s y s t e m ~ ~ or project orientation 
implicit in the structural form observed. A comparative description 
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of these models, and their relationships to Galbraith's original 
continuum is given is Figure 1.1. These approaches add considerably 
to an understanding of the matrix phenomenon. by allowing for the 
analysis of relative tendencies, without the necessity of having 
to relate e m p i r i c a l l y ~ d e r i v e d d findings from one particular 
organisation or setting to the plethora of variants of forms of 
matrix organisation recorded in the empirical literature. Indeed, 
Knight classifies many existing, empirically-derived models as 
'variants' of his three pure forms: the groups linked by project 
stages described by Bergen (1975), and Kingdon's 'work package' 
system he categorises as variants of his 'co-ordination' model -
their common characteristic being the secondary position of project 
managers with respect to their functional counterparts; the grid 
organisation with members performing dual roles (Gunz and Pearson 
1977), and Videlo's (1976) 'functional overlay' model he categorises 
as variants of the 'overlay' model - the common characteristics being 
-
a balanced orientation towards functional and project goals, with 
equality of influence and patterns of dual accountability; Kingdon's 
(1973) 'body shop' arrangement ~ d d Videlo's (1976) functionally-
located ,project task teams he categorises as variants of the 
'secondment' model - here primacy is attached to project objectives, 
and the influence of project managers is more extensive than that of 
• ~ , ' - > ' ' ~ ~ , ~ ~ • 
their functional counterparts. In all accounts, it is the 
c o m ~ a r a t i v e e influence of project and functional managers over project 
team members and their roles in this respect that form the nexus in 
the continuum of matrix types. Sayles (1976) for instance, describes 
seven basic managerial roles performed respectively by the tvo sets 
of managers to varying degrees across the spectrum of matrix 
management forms. These are operating responsibility, stabilising 
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(ie responsibility for approving certain technical decisions), 
auditing performance, offering technical advice, providing centralised 
support services, liaising between groups, and institutional 
management (or 'maintenance'). Thus, for instance, in a 'co-ordination' 
model setting, functional managers would retain operating responsibility 
and perform most of the remaining functions, the project managers 
primarily being involved in auditing project performance and liaising, 
or acting as intermediary and co-ordinator between groups. 
Knight's definition of a matrix organisation - like that of 
Sayles (1976) - is consequently more wide-ranging than that supplied 
by other authors who focus primarily upon the ' o v e r l ~ ' ' or grid 
structure (Galbraith op cit, Kingdon 1973, Mee 1964, Davis 1974, 
Drucker 1974). In defining matrix management he focuses upon the 
descriptive characteristics central to the operationalisation of the 
concept (ibid, pp6-7). Like all authors, he identifies some degree 
of dual line authority and/or direct influence over project team members 
as evidence of its existence. 'Functional authority' relationships 
(cf Koontz and O'Donnell 1980) would be included in this definition. 
However, the exercise of 'staff' authority would be excluded, since 
the exercise of influence based upon advice or information without 
the authority to prescribe courses of action does not constitute 
direct influence in the manner typified in traditional line 
r e l a ~ i o n s h i p s . . Indeed, some authors have gone'further, by suggesting 
that 'staff' roles and relationships as traditionally defined are not 
applicable to the characteristics of the types of organisation 
described here (eg Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, Davis 1974). Secondly, 
Knight suggests that, while dual authority and accountability 
relationships are necessary in any operational definition, they are 
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not a sufficient condition for describing a matrix: there needs to 
be some difference in the organisational basis underlying dual group 
membership (eg specialisation by function and by project). Thus, he 
defines the central criterion for identifYing a matrix as being 
evidence of a two-way division of labour, where team members are 
involved in two separate sets of activities: the one connected 
with their role within the project team; the other connected with 
their functional role. The remaining characteristics he cites relate 
to the task group being identifiable as the basic organisational unit -
such that the project or task determines the boundary for the group 
(Miller and Rice 1967); and the performance of the task involving 
concurrent and lateral interaction in working relationships amongst 
group members. 
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1.4 Themes from the Literature upon Matrix and Project Management 
Research into forms of matrix management in project settings 
has focused upon a number of broad themes. Most notably these have 
been: the relationship between t ~ ~ ~ t a s k ~ ~ p ' ' and the wider 
' - - - ~ ~ ~ . - - - - .. -._---- ~ - - - - - . ~ - - - -, 
organisation; characteristics of roles and relationships amongst 
.... - ~ _ _ _ _, '----..._<0 •• __ , '-,' , ' ..... ~ , , . ~ ~ •• A,. , ... ~ " . _ _ ~ , ~ ~ ... ...,.." .. ~ , , ~ ~.... " ' - . . . ~ ~__ 
~ ~ ? _ ~ r . . s s__ ~ _ f f __ t ~ ~ ~ _ t , ! 3 : , ~ ~ . t , I 2 , ~ _ t t and,the specific p r ( ) ~ l e m ~ . . a s s . o c i . ~ ~ e d , , ik ... s;:" 
}"wi th, the" ? ~ ~ r a t i o ~ ~__ o ~ _ a a ~ o r m m of .. o J : ' g a n i s ~ t i _ o n . . ,ill: , ~ h _ ~ ~ ? . s ~ m e . . ;fo.rm, of,. 
~ d ~ a l l management is the norm. The focus has been upon 'patterns of 
c : ~ ~ ' 0 i ~ ~ t i ~ ~ , ' \ . ~ ~ O r d i n a t i ~ ~ · ~ ~ d c o n t ' ; ~ - ~ d d upon processes of 
influence in a variety of forms in problem-solving and decision-
making activity. The aim of this section is to provide a brief 
overview of these themes and to highlight consistencies and contrasts 
in the literature. 
1.4.1 Team Relationships 
The first series of points to be made concern the issues noted 
with respect to less explicitly-structured models of matrix organisation 
than those described above. In particular, the problems of co-ordination 
and control for the organisation associated with the establishment 
of inter-disciplinary and/or inter-departmental'task forces or teams 
are seen both to offer insights into the types of problems encountered 
in more sophisticated organisational forms, and also a rationale for 
the adoption of a matrix form that is more explicitly-structured. 
The processes of co-ordinating and controlling inter-group activity 
and the effects of goal and power differentials between subgroups based 
in various departments has received considerable attention in the 
organisational literature (eg Lawrence and Lorsch 1972, Pfeffer 1981). 
Herbst (1974), for instance, has noted that the degree of "disruption" 
in 'WOrking relationships is not only determined by the "work relationship 
1.30 
pattern" (which he defines as the activity relationship, role 
differentiation and degree of task dependence), but also by 
characteristics of the goal-dependence relationship between groups: 
ie whether goals are shared, independent or 'unreciprocated supporting'. 
Thus, in a situation of task interdependence but independent goals, 
the relationship will be inherently unstable (Herbst 1974, p120). 
With respect to the impact of such factors in complex task 
environments, Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) concept of "differentiation" 
and the observation of the differential impact of the task upon role-
h o l d ~ r s ' ' power in interaction' (Crosier 1964, Thompson 1967) have 
formed the bases for more extended accounts of the processes involved, 
and the problems encountered, where "negotiated interaction"(Kingdon 
1973) amongst task team members becomes p r e r e ~ u i s i t e . . In such settings, 
difficulties in lateral contact and communication (eg withholding 
information, not understanding others' positions, competition, etc) 
have been well documented occurrences (Kingdon 1973, Sayles and 
Chandler 1971). Related research has also pointed to the effects of 
status barriers in reducing "team effectiveness" (Bridges et al 1968); 
and the problems of commitment associated with interdepartmental 
teamwork (Weiner 1970, Schein 1970). Research has further studied 
the problems for the individual suggested by the potential disparity 
between task and 'sentient' group boundaries (Miller and Rice 1967); 
a n d ~ h e e associated problems of reduced peer group interaction and the 
potential for 'professional obsolescence' engendered by the closer 
association with the task, as opposed to the professional/functional, 
group (Allen and Cohen 1969, Kingdon 1973, Sayles and Chandler 1971). 
At this point it. should be stressed that such problems are taken as not 
necessarily specific to forms of matrix or project organisation, but 
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characteristic of a wider range of circumstances in which lateral 
interaction or co-ordinated collateral working'relationships occur. 
At the same time the contexts of matrix and proj ect management have 
been ~ a r t i c u l a r l y y identified as those types of situation in which such 
~ r o b l e m s s would tend to'be more w i d e s ~ r e a d d and endemic. 
Galbraith's (1973, 1977) model supplies ~ e r h a p s s the clearest 
exposition of the impact of a situation in which the tasks to be 
performed are complex and uncertain; the problems to be solved are 
in large part unpredictable and "unstructured" (Simon 1960); and 
where they require the participative interaction of specialists, 
each of whom may hold different professional perspectives and 
orientations (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). He bases his distinction 
between team structures and integration/matrix management as means 
of coping with increased task uncertainty, on the proposition that 
higher levels of task uncertainty are associated with a differential 
impact upon subtasks which, therefore, affects the basis of the 
relationship between role-holders within the task group. This 
effect occurs both through differences in attitude or orientation 
associated with functional and role differentiation; and through 
differences in the "power" of individuals or groups that also arise 
( Galbraith 1973, Chapter 7)., ~ V i ith respect to the latter, he focuses 
particularly upon the greater relative power in interaction of 
indi-viduals and groups performing "uncertainti--absorbing functions" 
(March and Simon, 1958, pp164-6, Simon 1960, Thompson 1967) as 
leading to a situation in which the expert (French and Raven 1959) 
or informational (Pettigrew 1972) power exerted by them produces an 
imbalance in decisional processes and processes of co-ordination 
and communication and a tendency for decisions to be reached that 
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reflect narrower subgroup goals - rather than wider organisational 
goals with respect to the task being performed. 
If these factors are neither widespread nor significant, then 
Galbraith (1977) proposes that "effective" decisions can still be 
reached, and "information overload" kept to a minimum in the event 
of disagreemen\ within an essentially team-based structure. In 
such an event the team is left to reach its own decisions and resolve 
its own disputes, in which case a "bargaining" framework for interaction 
may emerge. A heavy reliance will also be placed upon the guiding 
influence of "unobtrusive controls" which control the premises for 
decision-making (March and Simon 1958; Simon 1965 p79, Perrow 1979 
p149), and norms of interaction or a 'climate' of decision-making 
which is conducive to such processes. 9 He also describes more 
'bbtrusive" mechanisms within the team-based setting aimed at 
controlling the large quantity of decisions taken at lower levels 
w i t ~ i n n the organisation, easing the processes of lateral interaction, 
and ensuring that the organisational viewpoint is brought into 
decisional processes. Firstly, that the team must obtain approval 
or ratification for decisions reached from a higher status individual 
(or group), who would also act as arbitrator in settling intra-team 
disputes. Secondly, that the "leadership" of the team would rest 
formally or informally with the individual group or section within 
the team whose goals were most congruent with the task goals being 
. 
pursued (Galbraith 1977, p p 1 2 6 - 7 ) ~ ~ Galbraith suggests two 
possibilities here: either the informal leadership function resides 
with the 'core' function - in civil engineering projects, for instance, 
this may be the design engineering staff; or it may pass from 
department to department as the range of relevant task conditions 
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alters. (Taking the same example, design engineers may pass over to 
construction engineers the role of "leadership" as the project moves 
from the drawing board onto the site.) Galbraith compares all these 
options with respect'to their implications for the process of 
decision-making in which "forcinglJ a decision may occur. He (like 
other authors) describes this as a "sub-optimal" form of decision-
making and conflict resolution in comparison with the more collabor-
ative and co-operative style leading to solutions based on concensus 
deemed "optimal" in an organic context (see also Sayles and Chandler 
1971, Kingdon 1973, Thamhain 1977 t Thamhain and Wilemon 1975). 
However, in the case of decisions 'forced' by one 'senior' individual 
or group whose goals most reflect those being pursued or whose 
contribution is more central, he regards this as preferable to the 
greater disruption that might otherwise occur. The more basic 
assumption here is that the existence of shared values, goals, 
orientations and power will serve to minimise the likelihood of 
such disputes and disagreements occurring. Or they will at least 
enhance the likelihood of their being resolved 'effectively'. 
However, it is the more disruptive tendencies associated particularly 
with the differential impact of the task upon role-holders' power -
and its association with increasing levels of task uncertainty and 
interdependence - that Galbraith views as prompting a move to more 
explicit structural mechanisms: ie the use of integrators and, 
ult ' t 1 ' .• 10 D'ff t·'al al 't t' ~ a a e y, matrlx organlsatlon. 1 eren 1 go s, orlen a lons 
and even values are seen to be compounded by the effects of subtask 
uncertainty upon the respective power of subgroups such that more 
explicit mechanisms of co-ordination and control are deemed suitable. 
1.4.2 Integrators 
Integrating roles are not an entirely new phenomenon. Indeed, 
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many of their attributes are similar to more traditional roles such 
as "chairperson", or "teamleader" (Patterson 1966). The distinguishing 
feature in more contemporary analyses of complex organisations has 
been the emphasis put upon integration as a spedalist function in 
itself - rather than as an adjunct to a more generalist management 
role (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967b, Maier 1967, Galbraith 1977, 
Knight 1977). Integrators (variously called 'project', 'product' 
or 'unit' managers), are appointed independently from those departments 
whose work is to be co-ordinated. They are given the authority, and 
are held accountable, for the co-ordination of task and organisational 
work across departmental boundaries. However, they do not possess 
the formal authority to direct the work of those who actually perform 
the tasks themselves. Instead they act as 'facilitators' or 'catalysts' 
or 'gate-keepers'. Wilemon and Gemmill (1971) have described them as 
being essentially "boundary dwellers". Sayles (1976) has described 
them as "decision-brokers". 
Research interest has centred upon the relationship between 
those occupying the role of integrator and functional managers and 
s t a f ~ ~ and, in particular, upon the bases of influence available to 
integrators given their comparative lack of formal authority with 
respect to functional managers. There is a general concensus on 
the types of influence or power associated with the effective 
p e r f ~ r m a n c e e of the integrator role. In particular the use of expertise 
(French and Raven 1959) and access to, or control over, relevant 
information (Pettigrew 1972) have been suggested as the principal 
requirements for the effective performance of the integrator role 
in the absence of positional authority (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967b, 
Maier 1967, Wilemon and Gemmill 1971, Sayles and Chandler 1971). 
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The presence of an integrator, particularly one who knows the workings 
of the 'uncertainty-absorbing function(s)' is seen as helping eliminate 
the possibility that someone with access to knowledge and information 
can use it as a source of power in bargaining (Lawrence and Lorsch 
196Tb, Galbraith 1977). Furthermore, interpersonal skills and 
influence based on referent power (French and Raven 1959) are also 
deemed to be pertinent bases of influence, by virtue of helping to 
ensure that confidence and trust in joint decision-making is achieved 
(Lawrence and Lorsch 196Tb, Maier 1967, Sayles and Chandler 1971).11 
In the absence of concensus or in the case of disagreement, the 
integrator is seen as the individual who may help in the achievement 
of compromise solutions (Kingdon 1973) •. 
Such an emphasis on bases of influence other than formal 
position power, reflects both the comparative weakness of the project 
manager's formal position vis-a-vis functional managers, but also the 
need to establish a role whose occupant has sufficient influence such 
that a 'balance' of influence (Davis 1974) between project and 
functional goals can be achieved. According to Knight, this does not 
represent the establishment of a 'power' e ~ u i l i b r i u m m based upon formal' 
authority, except in the very limited case of a pure 'overlay' model. 
Rather, it involves relat1ng the effective influence vested in 
the respect1ve roles to the aims to be achieved (Knight 1977, ch. 11). 
Knight suggests that the formal authority of the respective' managers 
will be distributed across the roles in proportion to the importance 
of the respective subgoals (Knight 1977). ~ h e e problem then is in 
establishing comparative total levels of influence based upon criteria 
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other than formal position which help ensure both that the comparative 
levels of influence correspond to the dual aims to be achieved, and 
that power imbalances do not adversely affect interaction processes. 
This in a 'pluralistic' setting (Sayles 1976), in which negotiation 
and bargaining may occur extensively. 
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1.4.3 'Leadership' in Matrix Management Settings 
In focusing upon the role of integrator in a project setting, 
a good deal of explicit and implicit attention has been given to 
their role as 'leader' of the task team group. Generally, the 
integrator is seen as a facilitator of interaction: one who allows 
the expression'of different groups' opinions and views; who 
encourages participative influence based upon the possession of 
relevant knowledge, expertise and information; who has sUfficient 
knowledge and awareness to understand others' positions and views, 
but not such as to dominate discussion. Above all, someone whose 
positional authority is low relative to that of other functional 
role-holders, and who exercises influence based upon dimensions 
other than that of formal authority (eg Galbraith, op cit). 
If one were to compare these stylistic dimensions with those 
identified in the theory and research on leadership in formal 
organisations, one would tend·to associate them with a set of 
behaviours that emphasise participative approaches ~ g g Yukl 1971, 
Vroom and Yetton 1973); interaction facilitation ~ g ' ' Bowers and 
Seashore 1966), or, more generally, "group maintenance" (eg Halpin 
and Winer 1957, Katz and Kahn 1951, Bales and Slater 1955); an 
emphasis upon interpersonal skills and orientations - or more 
broadly 'consideration structure' or 'supportive' and 'motivational' 
. 
styles ~ g g Hemphill and Coons 1957, House and Mitchell 1 9 7 4 ) ~ ~ and 
an approach that emphasises goals and goal achievement ~ S S Halpin 
and Winer 1957, House and Mitchell 1974, Bowers and Seashore 1966). 
This in contrast to a style or approach which is more directive, 
instrumental or authoritarian (eg House and Mitchell 1974, Vroom 
and Yetton 1973), and where initiating'and structuring activities 
and playing a significant part in the input of technical expertise 
are important characteristics ~ g g Bowers and Seashore 1966, Likert 
1961, Hemphill and doons 1957, Fleishman 1973). The 
exercise, however, is a difficult one, since organisational research 
into forms of matrix and project management is not particularly 
well-integrated with the field of leadership theory and research. 
In other words, the discussions just described are rarely 
articulated in any operationalisation of the concept'of 'leadership' 
as applied to the processes involved in such complex settings. This 
is not a problem specific to the study of matrix management: indeed, 
recent calls have been made for a much closer integration in 
general of organisational and leadership theory and research 
(Dubin 1,979, Melcher 1977 ). It is not the intention here to attempt 
to achieve this integration. Nor to attempt anything but the most 
generalised and superficial review of the vast literature upon 
leadership in organisations.12 However, it is useful to address 
some of the central issues raised in that extensive body of work 
since, it is argued here, they have important implications for 
studying the behaviour of integrators and the processes of 
'leadership' in which they are involved in the type of setting that 
is the central focus of this study. 
A consideration of stylistic differences on the part of 
managers in ' de jure leadership positions and their impact upon group 
performance and subordinates' satisfaction has dominated the field 
of leadership and research since the 1940's and, 1950's ~ e e e Kerr et a1 1974, 
Fleishman 1973). Further, since the seminal work of Fiedler 
(1967), a consideration of the impact of contingency factors in 
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moderating this broad relationship between leaders' styles and 
group/individual outcomes has played a central part in an 
understanding of leadership processes in organisational settings. 13 
The history of leadership theory and research has been dogged by 
problems of conceptualisation, operationalisation and measurement 
- manifested in the lack of any generally-held current theory to 
explain· leadership processes, and often confusing and contra-
dictory results (see Bryman 1986, Stogdill 1974). 14 However, most 
current competing models share certain broad characteristics and 
assumptions. Firstly, the lack of any firm and direct association 
between leaders' traits and performance . (Stogdill 1948). Secondly, 
the importance of 'followers' to an understanding of leadership 
processes (eg Yukl 1971, House and Mitchell 1974). This approach 
has been taken furthest in current studies of leadership based upon 
191 s-); and in the "path-goal" model wherein subordinates' 
expectations play a crucial part in understanding the motivational 
processes underlying leadership effects (House and Mitchell 1974, 
House and Dessler 1974). Thirdly, the importance of other situational 
variables (eg task complexity, position power, etc) as moderating 
factors in the potential association between leader behaviour and 
group/individual outcomes (Fiedler 1967, House and Mitchell 1974, 
Vroom and Y ~ t o n n 1973). This approach finds its fullest realisation 
in the recent interest expressed in factors that contribute towards 
a certain degree of 'situational control' and thereby act, in 
effect, as "SUbstitutes for leadership" (Kerr and Jermier 1978). 
As a broad working definition, leadership is conceptualised as a 
process of influence geared towards the attainment of group goals. 
Central to an understanding of the processes involved is the concept 
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of motivation: specifically an understanding of followers' perceptions 
and expectations (Vroom 1964, Lawler and Porter 1967) in relation 
to the intrinsic and extrinsic characteristics of the task being 
performed (Herzberg 1959). Also crucial is an understanding of 
the contingent impact of leader behaviour relating to characteristics 
of the setting in which leaders and followers interact. It is to 
a consideration of this latter set of factors in particular in a 
complex and uncertain project setting that this discussion now 
turns. 
The first point to be made is that the discussion of the 
requirements of the integrator in exercising leadership in a project 
setting owes much to the model proposed by Blake and Mouton (1964) 
in their "managerial grid" (in many instances a discussion of the 
orientation of project managers is in fact based directly upon 
this framework). The implicit (and of ten- explicit) expectation 
is that effective integrates exhibit both a high 'concern for 
results' and a high 'concern for people'. In other words that they 
are both strongly task-oriented and strongly relationship-oriented 
( Fiedler 1967). If this is the case':" that a "9,9" score 
( Blake and Mouton 1964) is the more appropriate - then one needs 
to ask to what extent this is possible, or even desirable, given 
the difficulties and inconsistencies reported in trying to achieve 
this· state ( Larson, Hunt and Osborn 1 976, Nystrom 1 978), and also 
general tendencies in the literature to regard these orientations 
as to some extent mutually exclusive (Fiedler 1967). Given in 
addition the difficulties in assuming any direct association 
between orientational predisposition and actual stylistic behaviour 
1.41 
one has further to ask in what way such orientations are translated 
into forms of behaviour that facilitate interaction. The matrix 
and project management literature is relativelY clear on what the 
integrator is expected to do. However it is rather less so in 
linking what they actually do do with the outcomes that are likely 
to be achieved given the circumstances faced. 
If the earlier interpretation of the appropriate 'styles' of 
interaction necessary is correct, then more extensive consideration 
needs to be given to these circumstances and their implications. 
In particular, if one accepts the importance of situational factors 
as moderators of the association between leader action and group 
performance/satisfaction, then the possibility is raised that what 
are deemed appropriate or requisite forms of behaviour are either 
inconsistent with the circumstances faced or, in practice, unlikely 
to achieve the results expected. Fielder's (1967) early contingency 
model, for example, related the efficacy of a task or relationship 
orientation to the degree of 'favourability' in the conditons within 
which formal leaders were expected to operate. The dimensions he 
looked at in this respect were the level of structuring of the 
task, the leader's position powerJand the quality of leader-group 
relations. His findings, developed in later research;5 were that 
leaders operating in highly favourable or highly unfavourable 
c i r ~ s t a n c e s s would tend to be most effective if they were task-
oriented; while relationship-oriented leaders would be most effective 
in moderately favourable conditions. Low favourability here would 
be associated with a relatively unstructured task, low position 
power and poor group relations. With the exception of this latter 
dimension, what is interesting about this model is the extent to 
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which the dimensions of 'unfavourability' correspond to precisely 
the types of circumstances found in a matrix setting. Task complexity 
and uncertainty, of course, are the raisons d'etre for such models. 
Lack of position power correspondingly becomes the requisite modus 
operandi. For instance: 
"Problems of motivation exist for the traditional 
vertical manager, but these problems are compounded for 
the Project Manager because the traditional leverages 
of hierarchical authority are not at his disposal ••• 
In the project environment, the real basis of a man's 
authority is his professional reputation among his 
peers and associates ••• his authority is a 
combination of de jure and de facto elements in the 
total project environment ••• (actual project authority 
is) the legal and personal influence that the Project 
Manager exercises over the scheduling, cost and 
technical considerations of the project." 
(Cleland and King 1975, pp302-5) 
If one accepts Fiedler's findings then, in contrast to expectations, 
a more directive approach in such circumstances would perhaps appear 
to be the most likely to achieve effectiveness.', Fiedler's research 
has long been the subject of intensive debate: centring largely 
upon the meaning and hence validity of the techn,ique (the "Least 
Preferred Coworker" sC,ale) used to measure leader orientation 
(cf Schreisheim and Kerr 1977). Consequently, the research has 
been heavily criticised on conceptual ~ d d methodological grounds, 
although a recent review has lent some support, to the consistency 
• 
and,credibility of the overall model and its results (Strube and 
Garcia 1981). 
Less controversial leadership models, however, have similarly 
focused upon the impact of task, structural and group situational 
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conditions. The more precisely-formulated "path-goal" theory of 
leadership (House and Mitchell 1974, House and Desslet 1974) 
contains similar, albeit more sophisticated, hypotheses. Namely, 
that given subordinates' expectations, certain types of less 
favourable conditions (eg high task complexity, high role ambiguity) 
may promote the efficacy of a more 'directive' or 'initiating' style 
of leadership. The somewhat particularistic normative model of 
Vroom and Yetton (1973), which focuses upon the participative 
dimension in decision-making, adds a further two factors of 
interest here. As well as identifying task characteristics and 
their implications for the reliance of the formal leader upon the 
expertise, knowledge and information provided by subordinates, 
they also identify the amount of.time available as a significant 
constraint, and also the extent to which acceptance of decisions 
by subordinates is an important factor. Interestingly, the amount 
of time available is regarded as a significant constraint upon the 
exercise of participatory influence. In a project environment, 
where deadlines are tight, and decisions need to be made quickly, 
such a factor may be of enhanced importance in constraining the 
ability of the 'leader' to act in what are deemed to be more 
appropriate ways. The likelihood of acceptance, on the other hand 
works the other way: the more important it is to gain acceptance 
(a factor made salient in a matrix or project management setting) the 
m o r ~ ~ appropriate is a more participative, and less directive or 
'autocratic', approach. Vroom and Yetton (1973, pp26-7) identify 
four acceptance factors (the criticality of committment to decisions; 
the prior probability of acceptance of autocratic decisions; 
s u b o r d i n a t e ~ ~ motivation with respect to task goals; and Bubordinates' 
disagreement over means) and suggest generally that: 
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"Acceptance becomes more critical as the effective 
execution of the decision requires initiative, 
judgement or creativity on the part of subordinates, 
or when one or more of the conditions necessary for 
obtaining compliance breaks down." 
(ibid, p27) 
The characteristics of the situation in a matrix setting clearly 
puts a premium upon the importance of acceptance - or rather, the 
extremely low prior probability that autocratic decisions taken 
by the integrator will be accepted: 
"It is this balancing act, by which technical decisions 
are made to reflect multiple considerations that takes 
most of the Project Managers time ••• (it) requires a 
capacity on, the part of the manager to put together an 
organisational mechanism within which timely and 
relevant decisions are likely to be reached, a 
conceptual scheme for "working" interfaces and for 
predicting where structural changes should be 
introduced if the response is inadequate, untimely or 
insubstantial. This is a highly dynamic, interactive, 
iterative and intellectually challenging concept of 
the managerial role ••• But for the most part he does 
not operate the structure; operations are handled 
by a variety of functional, live technical and 
contractor groups." 
(Sayles and Chandler 1971, pp208-12) 
If it is possible to equate the performance of the integrator role 
with the phenomenon of leadership in a project setting, then the 
centrality of acceptance alone would provide a SUfficient basis 
for the expectation that, generally speaking; a more participative 
style or approach would be appropriate to the achievement of 
objectives. The relative functional autonomy and independence 
of team members (and their leaders) suggest the necessity and 
desirability of a style of interaction that tends towards this 
end of the leadership nexus. 
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It is not the intention here to attempt to supply a broad 
framework for the integration of the models of leadership processes 
just described. The aim is rather to assess the implications of 
such contingency factors to the study of leadership processes in 
a situation - ie, a matrix setting -'in which these factors are 
generally held to be highly salient characteristics. The first 
point to be made here, is to note the possible contradictions 
facing the integrator in the performance of the 'leadership' 
role. One might suggest that the types of conditions described 
are highly "unfavourable'. To the extent that the necessary 
degree of acceptance required is high (and also lack of position 
power and a reliance upon team members' . expertise) , then one 
would expect the stylistic recommendations that pervade the 
matrix management literature to hold. On the other hand, however, 
other Characteristics of the situation - particularly tight 
deadlines, high task complexity and role ambiguity or conflict 
suggest the possible efficacy of an alternative,more directive 
style or approach'. The variety of models that exist in the diverse 
body of literature on leadership, makes it difficult to provide 
more precise, detailed and clear cut propositions concerning the 
likely outcome of leader behaviour. However, it should be 
apparent that the degree of variability in these situational 
conditions (both across and within the distinct dimensions 
identified) do make for a potentially more complicated understanding 
of the effects of different styles of interaction in the variegated 
(and changing) conditions that are faced. More specifically, 
for example, is the tendency towards a more 'participative' style 
(deemed necessary and desirable) in fact problematic when one 
considers the limits to the time available, the lack of a sufficiently 
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high degree of task structuring, and high levels of role ambiguity 
and/or c o n f l i c t ~ ~ If these factors are pervasive and salient 
(and the matrix management literature suggests clearly that they 
are), and to the extent that there is some inconsistency between 
styles of interaction (Nystrom 1978), then one would expect 
contradictions to emerge in the integrators' performance of their 
'leadership role' or in the effects of specific styles or 
approaches. At least one might expect some situations to arise 
in which preferred styles or aDproaches are either inconsistent 
with what is possible or what is required. In the constellation 
of factors that promote the efficacy of one type of approach or 
another, one might expect, depending upon specific circumstances 
and changes over time, that the more 'effective' integrator is one 
who is able to adapt and respond to these conditions - acting as 
a leadership 'chameleon', rather than maintaining a consistency 
in approach. 
The point here is not that the matrix literature is short on 
specifications of what types of behaviour are required in such 
complex settings. The literature is full of such specifications. 
The problem is that there is a tendency to address these require-
ments as a 'blanket' set of criteria, despite the potential 
effects of significant variation in circumstances (eg whether 
deAdlines are 'tight' or not), and change in these circumstances 
over time (eg given variation over the course of the project 
cycle). For a body of literature that emphasises a contingency 
approach, it is quite surprising to find that there is little 
systematic attention directed towards the potential impact of 
variation in contingencies in the study of leadership processes 
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in such complex settings. Such an omission would be acceptable 
if one were able to assume broad similarity across the types of 
situation i n v ~ s t i g a t e d d (and over time). 16 However the broad 
array of models of matrix management suggest this is not so. 
Moreover, the dimensions which form central planks in contingency 
models of leadership processes are precisely those dimensions that 
are the salient features in the move between one end of the matrix 
management continuum and the other. For example, differences 
between a 'co-ordination' and 'overlay' model may include higher 
levels of role ambiguity and conflict, greater project manager 
position power and a lower emphasis upon the need for acceptance 
(as opposed to compliance based upon authority) in the latter model 
as opposed to the former. While such variation is taken to 
correspond to significant differences in influence processes 
(including leadership) within the organisation, any potential 
qualitative impact upon the efficacy of different styles of 
interaction tends to be ignored. For example, as one moves towards 
an 'overlay' model, the importance of 'acceptance' may diminish as 
the integrators' relative influence increases, while levels of 
role ambiguity in a dualrepprting system may increase. Other 
things being equal, one might expect this to put a premium upon 
a more 'directive' or 'initiating' approach adopted by the 
i n t e ~ r a t o r r in interaction. 
The general point to be made here is that a broad concern in 
the literature with the complex and dynamic leadership role performed 
by the integrator in the range of settings in which some degree of 
matrix management is the norm, is offset by the tendency neither to 
address systematically the potentially diverse impact of the array 
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of dimensions that are salient, nor their variation·across the range of 
settings described. A second general point to be noted, and one hinted at 
in the above quotation by Sayles and Chandler (1971), concerns the impact 
of such factors when an external, as opposed to internal, matrix system of 
roles and relationships is the focus of interest. This point will be 
returned to in more detail in the following chapter. 
1.4.4 Dual Authority and Control 
As noted above, matrix organisation itself constitutes a 
further extension of the influence of integrators or project managers, 
such that dual authority and accountability relationships are 
formally recognised and legitimised. What is particularistic about 
. 
1:;he classic: matrix form is the waI t h ~ L i t t st!.uctura1!I embodies the 
c o n f l i £ ~ ~ of ; _ ~ t ~ r i t ~ t t inh§,.rept i ~ L l = L d u a . L a n L ' b a . l a I l c . . e c L o r i . e n t a : t i . Q I L . .
towards project and functional objectives. The conflict is i n t e r n a l ~ s e ~ _ _
rather than resolved, and manifested in the violation of the unity H _ __, __ ~ ~___._ 
of c o m m ~ d d p r i n c i p l ~ ~ deemed essential since Fayol. C o n s e ~ ~ e n t l ¥ _ , _ _
the resolution of conflicting objectives of adaptation and flexibility 
- - - ~ ~ ~ .... ~ ~ .. 
- of project integration and functional differentiation - provides 
Lnot only the raison d'etre of the matrix form, but also its main 
problem. Knight (1977) indeed views this dual structuring as the. 
inherent problem of matrix organisation as such. Other issues -
ie ~ h e e bases and balances in influence and authority, conflict in 
relationships and problems in decision-making)- constitute _ ~ ~ _ h i ~ . _ _
scheme non-inherent problems. They perhaps vary in degree and 
intensity compared to those described in less complex settings, but 
not in basic type. In practice he notes the tendency for problems to 
be resolved by 'tipping the power balance' one way or the other: a 
tendency which means the loss of the potential benefits of a balanced 
dual structure. (Knight (1976-7)' points to Kingdon's descriptions of 
the 'job shop' and 'work package' as illustrations of this tendency.) 
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The concensus in the literature is that the norms relevant to 
an 'organic' model of organisation pertain: not only in an explicit 
matrix form, but also in the less complex settings that have already 
been described. Briefly, these include: an emphasis upon network 
patterns of communication and lateral, 'negotiated' interaction; the 
replacement of the norm of influence based upon role and position 
power with one in which influence is based upon expertise and the 
possession of information relevant to problem-solving and decision-
making processes; involvement in organisational work with respect 
to the part played in the processes rather than the role of the 
i n d i v i d u a ~ g i v e n n unclearly defined jurisdiction (Kingdon 1973, 
Galbraith 1977); the adoption of a collaborative, as opposed to 
competitive, collusive, authoritarian or withdrawing stance in 
interaction; the assumption by individuals of a level of responsibility 
that exceeds their manifest, formal position power; and the 
acceptance of conflict in organisation relationships.1.7. At the same 
time the research undertaken (eg Kingdon 1973) points to the 
widespread problems in lateral interaction that tend to occur in such 
settings, and the difficulties in practice of maintaining such a form 
in which these norms can be achieved and successfully maintained. 
For the individual who is involved in this type of arrangement, the 
findings point consistently to, on the one hand, the positive benefits 
for job satisfaction stemming from wider participation and influence 
in ~ h e e task (eg Argyris 1971); but, on the other, the heightened 
potential for stress and anxiety. This latter is related to both the 
assumption of a level of responsibility greater than the level of 
authority available to them, and the peculiar characteristics of a 
dual structure in which role ambiguity and role conflict (Kahn et al 
1964) are potentially pervasive characteristics. 
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1.4.5 Antecedent Conditions 
Indeed the main thrust of the findings from studies of matrix 
and related forms of organisation relate to the individual's tolerance 
for, and acceptance of, uncertainty, ambiguity and conflict 
(Brayfield and Crockett 1955); and to the organisation's existing 
cultural norms as conditioning factors in the implementation and 
operation of a matrix form. Kingdon's (1973) central conclusion, 
for instance, is that a matrix form means a greater diffusion of 
responsibility among organisational members for task performance, 
but that there are strong forces that tend to (vertically) segment 
and (laterally) dissociate important task relationships within the 
organisation. 18 He focuses upon the 'social sophistication' 
required of organisational members in such settings, and his broad 
longer-term solution is given in the establishment of "management 
and organisational development" strategies aimed at adjusting the 
existing climate of interaction or the prevailing cultural norms 
associated with a more traditional form of organisation to one 
consistent with the new type of setting. The importance of such 
strategies, together with participative approaches in implementation 
and structural change is similarly emphasised by other authors 
(Argyris 1967, 1971, Sayles 1976, Galbraith op cit). The aim being 
to foster the shared values, mutual understanding, openness and 
collaborative stance felt by Kingdon to be the appropriate norms 
(ibid, Chapter 3). The problems of implementation due to both the 
incqnsistencies of styles adopted to manage the new form and the 
encountering of resistance in its introduction are focused upon by 
Argyris in particular (1967, 1971): 
" • •• the basic problem has been that a new form of 
organisation has been introduced in such a way as to 
make .difficulties inevitable, and that the leadership 
styles that executives use to administer matrix 
organisation, on the whole, compound the felony." 
(Argyris, 1967, p 3+) 
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While the more general issue of cultural inconsistency is described 
well by Sayles (1976): 
"Most traditional managers are accustomed to well-
defined tasks, single goals or goals that are multiple 
but compatible, clear and well-guarded jurisdiction, 
and requisite authority flowing from fixed plans. 
Matrix management, by contrast, is concerned with 
managers whose authority is limited in comparison 
with their responsibility. Matrix management leads to 
overdefined jobs in which there are more requirements 
than can possibly be met and conflicting goals that 
make trade-oft's between them continually necessary." 
(Sayles 1976, p16) 
Such factors make the introduction of the form contingent upon the 
nature of the pre-existing organisational culture (Kingdon 1973, 
Galbraith 1977, Knight 1977) .19 According to K I l ~ " j ~ e t : :
"It is a form of organisation which provides more scope 
than most, both for conflict and stress and for personal 
committment and creative collaboration. Much may depend 
on the existing organisational culture and on the ways 
in which the structure is introduced and operated." 
(op cit, p \!S) 
The theme of cultural compatibility or incompatibility is perhaps 
most systematically explored by Knight (1977). With recourse to 
Handy's (1976) three-fold classification of cultural types (ie 'task', 
'role' and 'power' cultures), he argues that existing 'task' cultures 
are those most conducive to the intrOduction and operation of a 
matrix scheme, and that organisational development approaches to its 
implementation and operation are only necessarily applicable in a 
situation in which levels of authority and responsibility are left 
. 
relatively undefined. Relating the pre-existing cultural 'type' 
to his three models of matrix management he suggests a number of 
possibilities. Thus, for instance, organisations with 'role 
cultures' will require a clear definition of authority, and 
accountability relationships in a matrix 'overlay' to facilitate 
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interaction. He, like Kingdon and Galbraith point here to the 
use of social analysis techniques in implementation (Rowbottom 19'77) 
and/or to some form of descriptive/prescriptive mechanism such as 
"responsibility charting" (Melcher 1967, Perham 1970, Cle land and 
King 1975). 'Power cultures' he suggests will be more conducive to 
the establishment of bases of influence other than position power, 
and consequently more suited to the move towards a 'co-ordination' 
model; 'task cultures' will be more appropriate to task-based 
systems, and hence suited to the 'secondcent' matrix model. 
To sum up briefly, there are two major points to be raised 
here. The first is that there is general agreement that problems 
in the implementation and operation of a matrix-type system are to 
some extent contingent upon the prevailing cultural characteristics 
of the organisation. Views vary on the extent to which adjusting 
to the existing situation or implementing a programme of change 
that also seeks to change preconceptions are appropriate strategem. 
However, the potential for a 'clash of cultures' is generally 
recognised. The second point is more general, and concerns the 
broad observation thA,t the successful operation of a matrix-type 
system relies extensively upon behaviour within that system. While 
a dual structure of management provides the context within which 
''WOrk is performed and decisions are taken, it is the reliance upon 
indi.vidual and group behaviour within that context that is the 
central characteristic in the operation of a dual system.20 
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Footnotes 
1 See Sayles and Chandler (1971), Kingdon (1973), vlilemon and 
Gemmill (J 971), Tha.mhain (1977), Thamhain and Wilemon (1975'>, 
Wilemon (1972), Wilemon and Cicero (1970). 
2 The list could be extended by the inclusion of other bases; 
eg client-basing. For a fuller list of alternatives see, 
for instance, Koontz and O'Donnell (1980). 
3 The association of the matrix form with high technology 
endeavours has led it to be included amongst those described 
in writings on 'contemporary' - ie late 20th century - types 
of organisation (Drucker 1974, Argyris 1967). Many of the 
characteristics of this form, discussed below, compare 
closely with those described and prescribed for organisations 
'of the future' (Bennis 1966). For a more down-to-earth 
review of the form and its location in the spectrum encompassing 
classical bureaucracy (Weber 1947) and 'adhocracy', see for 
example, Mintzberg (1979). 
4 The earliest statement of this approach was given by Woodward 
(1958) who, on the basis of findings from 100 manufacturing 
firms based in south-east England, 'differentiated according 
to their type of production system (unit and small batch; 
l a r g e b a t c ~ m a s s s production; process production) concluded 
that "There can be no one best way of organising a business" 
(ibid, p10), and that the effective organisation of work was 
contingent upon the production technology employed. This was 
in contrast to the school of thought that held that organisational 
principles were applicable to any situation (eg Fayol, urwick, 
Gulick and Brown); and in response to the identification of 
the universalistically applicable classic bureaucratic form 
(Weber 1947). This work, and subsequent developments (notably 
the Aston research programme begun in the late 1960's), will 
be returned to below. 
5 His later work (1977) extends the approach from a consideration 
of structural design to the design of sanctioning and information 
systems. 
6 For a more detailed but concise description of the range of 
characteristics of the 'mechanistic' and 'organic' models see 
Burns (1963, pp46-7). 
7 Kingdon (1973, Ch 4) identifies three forms of 'segregation' 
.which he defines as "maladaptive" models 'of behaviour in complex 
organisations and which he relates to the tendency for organisational, 
group and individual goals to diverge: firstly, "segmentation" - an 
attenuation of links between different levels of the managerial 
hierarchy; secondly, "fragmentation" - where ends arid means become 
confused and there is little goal continuity over time; and 
"dissociation" - corresponding to Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) 
version of the effects of lateral differentiation. 
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8 Dispersed systems matrix, product management, bipolar management, 
development projects'and internal consulting services, are the 
five models he identifies that represent increasing tendencies 
towards, the task. or project end of the' continu'lml. Bipolar 
management is the, model that corresponds to the traditional 'overlay' 
matrix model as defined by Knight. 
9 Galbraith also notes the strategies of interdepartmental transfer 
(Kanno 1968, Newport 1969),and varying the 'composition of the team 
with respect to 'core' and 'peripheral' members (Marquis 1969),as 
more conscious mechanisms to minimise the effects of functional 
differentiation and lack of continuity and committment respectively. 
10 Galbraith distinguishes also between the design of an integrator 
role and the more formal system in which "managerial linking roles" 
are established. The former is based upon shared values and goals 
amongst task team participants; whereas the latter is suitable in 
circumstances where values and goals are not shared. The 
"managerial linking role" is vested with the authority to approve 
decisions, control budgets, etc. 
11 These factors have been taken to be the appropriate criteria in 
the selection of the person to perform the role (Ziller, Stark 
and Pruden 1969). 
12 For a most concise and extensive review and critique of theory 
and research into leadership in organisation, see Stogdill (1974). 
13 It should also be noted that, coexisting with this interest in 
leadership processes in more structured settings, has been a 
continuing interest in patterns of informal and emergent leadership 
in more unstructured - usually laboratory - settings. This approach 
stems from the early work of Bales and colleagues (Bales 1950, 
Bales and Slater 1955))and finds more recent expression in studies 
undertaken by Limerick (1976a, 1976) among others. It also overlaps 
substantially with models of group processes based upon exchange 
theory (Homans'1958). Hollander and Julian's (1969) concept of 
the group leader's "idiosyncratic credit" in interaction for example, 
describes a developmental approach to leadership processes based 
upon exchange processes within the group; the general concern with 
"status" and status differentials within the group (eg Emerson 1962) 
marks out similar possibilities for the study of leader-member 
interaction. Due to the central concern with situational variables 
in this study, no specific attempt will be made to review this 
second stream of leadership theory and research. Other than to 
note, perhaps, the tendency for there to have been little attempt to 
:try to integrate theory and findings from'the two streams. Such a 
lack of overlap is manifested particularly in tendencies to have 
ignored or understated developmental aspects of leadership processes 
and the possibilities of emergent and informal leadership within 
formal organisations, in preference to concentrating upon the style 
or behaviour' of individuals occupying de jure 'leadership' positions 
within the organisation (Bryman 1986). 
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14 For a review of the problems of operationalisation and measurement 
with respect to the reliability and validity of the measures used 
in current major competing models of leadership, see Fleishman and 
Kerr (1977). 
15 See, for instance, Fiedler (1972, 1978), Fiedler and Chemers (1984), 
Foa, Mitchell and Fiedler (1971). 
16 Here, for instance, a more developmental framework for the study 
of processes of leader-follower interaction may be of relevance. 
17 The focus in this study is upon structural and behavioural 
characteristics. It should also be noted that a further set of 
norms are described in the design of information systems to complement 
the establishment of a matrix system. In particular, the design of 
a system that is specific to the 'technical level'Jwhich is focused 
upon problemrsolving and decision-making needs, and which is 
established separate from the system established for control and 
evaluation purposes)is prescribed (see Hedburg 1975, Hopwood 1977 
in Knight (1977». 
18 The approach. is similar, and indeed related, to Burns and Stalkers' 
(1966) description of 'mechanistic pathologies'. 
19 While beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be added that the 
other central contingent feature of Galbraith's scheme is the 
administrative cost of alternative design strategies. 
20 It should be noted that Galbraith. extends his model of organisational 
design to encompass the design of appropriate reward systems 
appropriate to such complex settings (op cit 1977). This topic is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Other authors have also focused 
upon the design of reward systems in complex settings and implications 
for motivation and job satisfaction (eg Weiner 1970, Schein 1970, 
Tuite et al 1972). 
CHAPTER TWO 
MATRIX MANAGEMENT'RESEARCH AND THEORY: SOME EMPIRICAL AND'CONCEPTUAL 
QUESTIONS 
The literature upon the structure and functioning of complex 
organisational forms has thus dealt extensively with a number of themes 
related to the peculiarity of these forms. Before turning to these 
issues in more detail, and relating them to characteristics of the 
network of intra- and inter-organisational relationships Characteristic 
of construction project organisations, it will be useful to relate the 
themes that emerge from the literature concerning the rationale for 
matrix organisation and its various manifestations to the broader base 
of literature that has emerged in contingency studies of organisation. 
In doing so, attention will be first directed towards the framework 
adopted in matrix research and the empirical basis of the models which 
have been established. Later on in the chapter, attention is addressed 
to two main series of issues that, it is argued, have implications 
for many of the propositions noted in Chapter 1. Firstly the association 
between technology, size and structural attributes is investigated. 
Following this, attention is directed towards the potential implications 
of an inter-organisational matrix management system. It is this 
latter aspect which is then more fully developed in the later 
distussion in Chapter 4. 
2.1 Research into "1atrix and Project Organisations 
The first point to be made concerns the highly prescriptive 
nature of much of the work in the field. The aim has commonly been 
2.1 
to assess the implications of task characteristics for the design 
of the organisation and to generate hypotheses concerning the' 
appropriateness of design strategies given the circumstances faced. 
This approach, involving the establishment of normative propositions 
based upon observed phenomena and their effects in matrix-type 
settings, is useful in that it concentrates attention upon the range 
of 'problems' in implementation and operation that may occur and 
their correlates. Indeed, making such forms work effectively 
and cataloguing lists of problems that may occur has provided scope 
for a number of articles in addition to the works described above 
(eg Davis and Lawrence 1978, Argyris1967, Hendry 1975, Perham 1970, 
Goggin 1974, Knight 1976). 
2.2 
In describing ~ ~ to 
implement a matrix Rtructure, Gunz and Pearson (1977) conclude by 
saying: 
"If this list (of steps to be taken) makes the process 
of designing a.nd introducing a matrix orga,nisation 
successfully s o u . ~ d d complex, time-con3uming and 
expensive, it will have accurately represented our views 
on the cubject." 
(ibid, p183) 
T11ere are two issues worthy of attention here c o n c e r n i n ~ ~ the empirical 
basis of many of the analyses undertaken. The first relates to the 
issue of performance. Knight (1976-7), for instance, has suggested 
that: 
"Given the fact that there is as yet no agreed 
definition of what constitutes a matrix organisation, 
that several types of bilateral and multilateral 
structure have been and are being tried, and that 
these tend to be introduced in situations of operational 
complexity and change, the circumstances for systematic 
investigation (as distinct from advocacy from' committed 
managers or social scientists) have hardly begun to 
exist." 
(ibid, p120) 
Little firm evidence has been presented to date. Such accounts that 
are given tend to discuss the form in terms of its 'advantages' or 
'disadvantages' (eg Davis and Lawrence 1978, Goggin 1974, Hendry 
1975) - rather than systematically investigate any association 
between the form adopted and company performance. This omission is 
perhaps not surprising given the widely-recognised problematic of 
measuring organisational performance in practjce and the multiple 
and partially-conflicting criteria subsumed under the concept of 
organisational effectiveness. 1 What is of further significance 
about assessing the performance of organisationo in which a dual 
orientation is the prime feature is the additional complexity 
introduced by virtue of this very feature. Knight (1977) has g o n ~ ~
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further than most in discounting unitary and 'objective' measures of 
overall performance (eg profit, cost), in proposing a five-fold 
classification scheme for assessing performance which he labels the 
"criteria of structural effectiveness" (ibid, Chapter 9). These 
include levels of efficiency aChieved; the ability of the firm to 
adapt to change over time; the level of control and accountability 
achieved; the level of co-ordination and integration achieved; and 
the 'social effectiveness' of the organisation - ie its ability to 
provide a context within which members' expectations and aspirations 
can be met. These recommendations by Knight certainly embrace what 
are generally regarded as the aims to be aChieved through establishing 
a more complex structural form. However, presented as such they 
provide at best only a checklist of criteria to be aimed at (greater 
efficiency and better co-ordination, etc). The inter-relationships 
amongst these variables a n ~ ~ in particular, their constituent components 
and their inter-relationships (eg meeting deadlines and budgets, job 
satisfaction and!stress) are not so clearly elucidated. Again this 
is perhaps not surprising given the complexity of the issue - and 
devising an adeg,uate model to ,study these factors is well beyond the 
scope of the present study. However What is noticeable is the 
implicit tendency to discount what may be crucial contradictions in 
performance criteria. The approach tends to be one of prescribing 
an organisational solution contingent upon task environment and 
other internal conditions (eg the situation in'the antecedent 
organisation) that will improve performance across the range of 
dimensions considered critical to the maintenance and development 
of the organisation. Problems in the operation of the firm with 
respect to these criteria are then taken to be aberrations and 
resolvable through the instigation of appropriate structural and 
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behavioural strategies that introduce 'checks and balances'. 
While the contradictions inherent in a dual orientated form of 
organisation are given considerable attention, their bases in the 
contradictory tendencies in performance criteria adopted, and the 
impact that such goals have upon performance at the operational 
level (Perrow 1967) are given somewhat less attention. 
A further and related quandary that pertains to the normative 
framework adopted in much of the analyses is that the highly 
contingent framework means that attempts to operationalise 
performance criteria - and not only the performance criteria 
themselves - must needs be organisation-'or firm-specific, so 
lessening the basis for comparison between cases. This is so, 
since the variety of structural forms by definition emphasise 
orientations towards different needs in highly diverse sets of 
circumstances. This point suggests a tautology in efforts to 
comparatively evaluate the performance of firms acting in diverse 
environments: given that the most effective form of organisation in 
a specific set of conditions is that which most readily ensures the 
achievement of the set of objectives made salient in those conditions, 
then the effective structures that are devised reflect various mixes 
of performance criteria. For example, if the need to adapt to 
changing circumstances is marginally of greater importance to the 
firm than achieving high levels of internal efficiency in the use of 
resources then the criteria used to evaluate that firm's success 
should reflect these relative weightings. However, even given this 
adjustment, it is impossible then to compare performance with the 
performance of another firm where the criteria for success are given 
equal weightings. Because if this is so, then it must by definition 
be because of the inter-relationship between task environment conditions 
and the internal structure. of the organisation that in turn make the 
two firms completely different animals. In other words: one is not 
comparing like with like. 
A more general point is that the approach commonly adopted not 
only emphasises inter-organisational differences from a normative 
perspective, but also often is based upon an action-centred organis-
ational development strategy in which initiating change within the 
organisation is a predominant concern (eg Argyris 1971). As such, 
much of the literature concerning matrix and related dual forms of 
organisation is based exclusively upon an empirical bedrock of data 
obtained from individual organisation'case study investigations, often 
in which programmes of structural change have been introduced. One 
implication of this is that there remain considerable difficulties in 
the comparative examination of matrix-type structures over a wide range 
of circumstances employing a standardised methodology. The models put 
forward by Galbraith and Knight in particular do lend themselVes to the 
establishment of hypotheses that may be tested over a range of firms 
ranging in their tendencies towards 'pure' hierarchical or project 
forms. However, such an exercise has so far been lacking. The 
difficulties described by Knight in categorising the variants of the 
model as described in practice, reflects' the peculiar difficulties of 
assimilating findings from research into a topic in which the history 
of researcq has made use of highly' individualistic data gleaned from 
specific cases that have been identified in practice. 
A second implication is that such cases have tended often to be 
those where the symptoms of matrix management have been highly visible, 
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and the structure more explicit (as with the NASA Apollo programme). 
Further.more, they have oftentimes been cases in which some form of 
action research geared towards change from ~ ~ more traditional 
bureaucratic structure to a matrix for.m has been the central intention 
(eg Argyris 1971). A consequence of this may have been that the 'net' 
that has been cast out to collect examples of matrix management in 
action may not have been cast.. very wide. Because of the focus 
upon large and highly visible instances (eg Apollo) and upon strategies of 
organisational development - both mainly with respect to firms 
operating in high technology fields - empirical attention has been 
directed towards those situations in which matrix organisation or one 
of its variants is most likely to (and shOuld?) occur. In other words, 
the cases have tended to define the scope for investigation of matrix 
forms, rather than taking the concept of matrix management as a 
variable to be investigated across a range of different types of 
organisation involved in the design and construction of l a r g ~ o n e - o f f , ,
customised projects. 
Such an approach is quite proper given the central concern in 
most of the literature with the strategic design options facing the 
firm as a consequence of complex and dynamic environmental conditions. 
It is particularly pertinent if an action frame of reference is being 
employed. However, the tendency to concentrate upon the strategic 
design options (and their implications for management) facing firms 
specialising in the manufacture of such types' of product and operating 
in observably complex and changing market and technological c o n d i t i o n ~ ~
provides perhaps only a partial view of the matrix phenomenon if one 
accepts the wider-ranging definitions supplied by Galbraith, Knight 
or S a y l e ~ ~ based as they are upon continua of relative orientations 
and associated influence and authority patterns. Given the 
centrality of these criteria to a definition of matrix management, 
the question is to what extent are these tendencies identifiable in 
firms operating in similar product markets, but perhaps less 
"turbulent;'environments. The preoccupation with technological 
conditions in particular may serve to obscure the relevance of 
matrix systems in more "low technology" settings. The converse to 
this argument, is that the occurrence of tendencies towards matrix 
management in more technologically-advanced fields may be overstated 
if there is no concurrent and parallel complexity and uncertainty 
in the structure and operation of output markets. The point, for 
example, about the electronics firms studied by Burns and Stalker 
(1966) was their comparative level of structuring of activities, and 
no evidence was given to suggest qualitative distinctions in the 
type of structure according to whether there existed multiple 
criteria for organising or not. The lack of such tendencies 
presumably reflects the greater homogeneity of product characteristics 
and specifications and the tendency for these products not to be 
produced in units or (very) small batches and custom-built for individual 
clients. 
The general point to be made here is that, in the absence of 
more extensive and oystematic enquiry into the matrix phenomenon on 
a comparative basis, it is difficult to know where to draw the 
dividing line between, and how to compare, the' situations found and 
catalogued in which a fully-fledged matrix system of roles and 
relationships has either developed or been introduced, and those 
situations in which tendencies towards matrix management may occur 
either formally or informally: not necessarily being widespread, but 
nevertheless significant for the operation of the organisation and 
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for the position of groups within it. The argument being pursued 
in this study is that the construction industry - by no means a high 
technology environment, but a project-based industry - is one in 
which matrix management is of particular relevance and interest • 
• 
2.2 Technology. Size and Structure 
The second main series of issues to be addressed in this 
chapter concern the inter-relationships between size, technology 
and structural variables. Namely, the models of matrix management 
observed or proposed focus their main attention upon direct-workflow 
related activities of the organisation: specifically the production 
process and also product design and process engineering. The common 
focus is upon the decision-making task team group operating at the 
'technical' level.within the organisation. The observation of a 
more decentralised, organic structure in this respect is consistent 
with more broadly-based findings that relate the occurrence of less 
routine task work with greater organisational complexity and the 
tendency towards 'organic' features being exhibited at operational 
levels. However, such findings have coexisted with considerable 
ambivalence concerning the association between characteristics and 
implications of the production system employed and the structure of 
the organisation as a whole when extended beyond the immediate focus 
upon the production process and task team group. 
2.2.1 Technology and Structure 
Woodward's (1958, 1965) early research focused in part upon 
firms employing unit and small batch production systems.2 She 
found that such firms exhibited fewer levels of authority and lower 
supervisory/labour ratios than firms employing the two other types of 
production system; and that such firms were characterised (as were 
those with continual process production) by lower spans of control 
at senior levels, less specialisation in management functions, and 
greater informality and flexibility in management procedures than 
those undertaking large batch and mass production operations. Her 
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results, however, were limited by their specific focus upon the type 
of production system employed. While, for instance, supervisory 
staff/labour ratios on the production line may indeed be systematically 
related to the type of system employed, it is not at all clear how 
such a pattern may be repeated - either at higher levels within the 
firm, or within departments not directly involved in managing the 
production workflow - such as sales, accounts, personnel and R&D 
« . ~ ~ ",I ( H i c k s o n ~ 1 9 7 1 , , Pugh 1973). Nevertheless a more broadly-based 
interpretation of the meaning of technology - incorporating not only 
'operations technology', but also 'materials technology' and the 
'knowledge' and expertise required to perform work (Hickson et al 1969) 
- has lent more weight to the technology-structure association. 
Employing Perrow's (1967) framework, Hage and Aiken (1969) for instance 
found that a relationship existed between the degree of work 
routineness and structural attributes. Hall (1962) found differences 
among subunits of organisations in their structural attributes and 
was able to 'relate these to technological differences: he observed 
that 'knowledge technology' employed in administrative work is as 
important an influence upon departmental attributes as the 'operations 
technology' is upon the attributes of production departments. (Parallel' 
findings in complex environments have been noted already.) 
However, later developments to the contingency model that have 
extended it to a wider range of possible predictor variables than 
technology per se, have tended to show the lack of any clearly 
discernible and consistent relationship. The research programme begun 
at Aston in the 1960' s serves as the most promiment example Ceg Hickson 
et al 1969, Pugh et al 1969a and b, Hic. ks 0 r'\ e.t 0.\ 1971, Child 1973).3 
The aims of the research programme were more macroscopic than the 
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interests pursued here and deserve brief mention. The programme was 
concerned with investigating the relationship between various aspects 
of the organisation's context (its technology, size, origin and 
history, charter, location, patterns of ownership and 'dependence') 
and its structural attributes. Using a multivariate approach, the 
latter were operationalised according to five main dimensions: 
levels of role specialisation; standardisation of rules and 
procedures; formalisation; centralisation of authority; and 
configuration (the 'shape' of the organisation in terms of the chain 
of command, spans of control and proportion of support personnel).4 
From the results a typology of bureaucratic forms was constructed 
on the basis of four principal component factors: the structuring 
of activities (related to specialisation and standardisation); the 
concentration of authority; the line control of workflow activities 
(whether direct and personal or impersonal), and the size of the 
supportive component. The first two of these have been taken to be 
the two primary components in the categorisation of organisational 
tYJ?es. Thus, for instance, "personnel bureaucracies" and "implicitly--
structured organisations" have less structured activities and dispersed 
patterns of authority (eg Pugh et al 1969b). As a framework for the 
description and classification of organisations according to their 
structural attributes, the Aston scheme is of some considerable 
importance. However, attempts to relate these to contextual variables 
( o t h ~ r r than size and 'dependence') have been less successful. Technology, 
measured according to the degree of "workfloW' integration" 
ob'served, has been shown to be of limited importance as a predictor 
variable (eg Pugh 1973). Based on a rework of the Aston data, Aldrich 
(1972) has suggested the reinstatement of technology as the most 
important contingency factor;' while Child and Mansfield (1972) have 
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observed that the results with respect to technology are improved 
once administrative and service units are excluded from the sample. 
However the results are at best ,inconclusive and, at worst, 
dismissive of the impact of technology.as so conceived upon 
structural characteristics of the organisation as a whole? 
2.2.2 Production 'Tasks 'and the Wider Organisation 
Relating these findings back to the literatUre on matrix 
management in complex and uncertain environments, the point is not 
that such findings negate the propositions made concerning the 
association between task characteristics and structural attributes. 
The Aston research, for instance, tests propositions based upon a 
deterministic model of the association between context and structure 
for effective performance; whereas the matrix literature adopts a 
normative framework for assessing strategic design options. Indeed, 
the variable of "strategic choice" (Child 1912), has been taken to 
constitute the critical intervening variable in any presumed direct 
association between technology and structure. Child (1912) argues 
that theoretical models derived from statistically established 
patterns of association between contextual and organisational 
variables attempt to explain the organisation at one remove by 
ignoring the essentially political process whereby power-holders 
within the organisation decide upon courses of strategic action 
(including not only the choice of design options, but also 
environmental manipulation (Thompson 1967), and the establishment 
of operative goals (Perrow 1961»: 
"The critical link lies in the decision-makers' 
evaluation of the organisation's position in the 
environmental areas they regard as important and in 
the action they may consequently take about its 
internal structure ••• Any association between the 
two may be more accurately viewed as a derivative of 
decisions made by those in control of the organisation 
2.13 
regarding the tasks to. be carried out in relation to 
the' resources' available to perform them. Indeed this 
may render any association between technology and 
structure quite tenuous." . 
(Child 1 972, P \' S" - b ) 
It is precisely these processes which students of matrix organisation 
tend to be interested in, in terms of establishing the range of design 
options available given the prevailing set of environmental, or contextual, 
circumstances. 
The point to be made concerning·the association between technology 
and structure is rather that the focus in the matrix literature upon the 
structure and functioning of the task t e ~ ~ group and its (and others') 
relationship to the wider organisation, has precluded a fuller examination 
of general features of the organisation as a whole. There is no clear 
impression given, for instance, of the structural attributes and oper-
ational characteristics of those sections or departments providing support 
services to the main 'line' organisation, and how these may be influenced 
by specific characteristics of the task environment they also face. One 
might hypothesise, for example, that there would be differences between 
sales and accounts sections in their tendencies towards a more 'organic' 
system of working. Qualitative differences in the commercial environment 
may imply differential modi operandi. The literature on matrix and project 
organisation and management does not restrict its interest to the prod-
uction technology employed ( ~ v a r i a b i l i t y y and complexity being.the key 
variables). Indeed, 'knowledge technology' and its centrality to the 
study of structures and processes of interaction in complex settings 
(Perrow 1967, Hickson et al 1969, Dewar and Hage 1978), is taken as the 
crucial factor. 6 It does h01,ever tend to restrict its interest to main-
stream production task activities - thereby serving to narrow some1.,hat 
the predictive capacity of the models employed. 
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A related point is that no firm impression is given of the 
relative degrees of 'coupling' (Weick 1976) between organisational 
activities and implications for the management of the organisation 
as a whole. For instance, the extent to which the task team group 
operates in a relatively self-contained fashion from other task team 
groups within the organisation. This is particularly so with respect 
to relationships with groups or sections which are not invo+ved 
directly in the management of the production workflow, but in 
sequentially-related activities: particularly those involved in 
input procurement and output distribution activities (eg materials 
and plant procurement and handling; product storage and distribution). 
It may be that the production techniques employed and associated 
patterns of resource use are either fully project-specific; or that 
they are shared between task groups, in which case some mechanism 
for scheduling production capacity and resource usage on an inter-group 
basis will be necessary. Similarly, in the case of output distribution, 
in which either a 'parallel' or 'pooled' system may operate. 
Two further and related points also concern the notion of the 
degree of coupling of activities. The first concerns the relationship 
between the task-team group and management at higher levels within 
the organisational hierarchy. While the tendencies in the matrix 
literature towards decentralisation and extensive participation by 
'technical' level participants in the management process are clear, 
the .implications of a. 'fusion' of levels (Kin"gdon 1973) for higher-
level management are not as clear. In the first place the question 
needs to be raised of the extent to which there is such a. 'fusion' 
and its comparative implications across different types of situation 
in terms of the relative locus of decision-making "a.ctivity. Secondly, 
and more specifically, does such a. 'fusion' imply a. greater level of 
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involvement by higher level management in terms of the technical 
content of discretionary decision-making activity; or is there some 
way in which their respective roles across organisational levels are 
more clearly delineated? Recent descriptions of matrix organisation 
and related forms of 'ad hocracy' (cf Mintzberg 1979) have tended 
to describe them as relatively 'flat' structures - with comparatively 
few levels between task group and departmental manager level - and 
narrow spans of control. 7 However a fuller discussion of both the 
range of variation in intervening levels and their general 
configuration or shape and patternings of roles and relationships 
within the wider matrix configuration is largely absent from the 
literature. The general point to be made here is to ask the 
question of to what extent and in what way do the 'system requirements' 
of a complex production task penetrate into higher organisational 
levels. 
The second point concerns the tendencies to subsume all roles 
and relationships within the organisation under the matrix rubric. 
The possibility that single or dual criteria for the design of the 
organisation may occur at a variety of levels is given little 
attention in preference to the adoption of an all-embracing matrix 
framework for the work of· the organisation as a whole. Again the 
variants described by Knight (1977) provide a number of instances 
of relatively self-contained matrix-type structures occurring within 
an organisation within which other design criteria are adopted at 
various levels. The more limited versions of matrix management 
(especially task forces) similarly point to the possibilities of' 
effectively decoupling tasks which require some form of matrix 
management from mainstream organisational activities based upon a 
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classic product, process or place formula for specialisation. 
The general comment to be made concerning this and the earlier 
points, is that the full complexities of those organisations being 
investigated is rarely fully explored, other than to provide a 
relatively unclear backdrop to the existence of matrix management 
in some form identified at the operational level, involving some, 
but by no means necessarily all, of the organisation's production 
activities. There is an evident irony here, in that organisational 
complexity and idiosyncratic variation are taken to be the cause 
c ~ l e b r e e of the student of matrix organisation. But it has been 
taking the task group as the starting point for investigation that 
has led to this imbalance. Again the tendency to have focused 
attention on a specific class or narrow band of organisations 
exhibiting matrix features, and usually those operating in high 
technology fields - and then to have focused almost exclusively 
upon these features - may have served to obscure important comparisons 
and contrasts in the phenomenon of matrix organisation and management. 
2.2.3 Group and Organisational Size 
The second significant omission from the study of matrix-type 
structures has been in not fully exploring the effects of group and 
organisational size. Galbraith, for instance, acknowledges in 
passing the importance of size variables in contingency approaches 
to the study of organisation (1973, p7, note 8), but fails to 
incorporate the variable and assess its potential implications. The 
most clearcut and consistent finding from the Aston research has 
been the high positive association found between organisational size 
and structural complexity (ie greater specialisation, standardisation 
and formalisation and decentralised authority: eg Pugh et al 1969b). 
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Size was found to be by far the largest single predictor variable of 
organisational characteristics. Such a result has been complemented 
by findings from other programmes. Blau's research - mainly into 
state agencies, universities and department stores (Blau et al 1966, 
Blau and Schoenherr 1970, 1971, Blau and Scott 1962) - uncovered a 
positive association between organisational size and "differentiation" 
subject to the economies of scale in administrative overhead 
available to larger firms ("differentiation" was measured according 
to the number of levels, departments and job titles). The tendency 
for both programmes of research to rely heavily upon formal document-
tation and descriptions of what Brown.(1966) terms the 'manifest' 
structure - rather than relying upon perceptual accounts of the actual 
workings of the organisation (eg Rage and Aiken 1967a, 1967b) has 
not gone unnoticed. It has been noted that the results obtained 
differ when use is made of perceptual measures as opposed to official 
documentation (Rall and Tittle 1966, Pennings 1973).8 Moreover, other 
findings have pointed to inconsistencies in the size-structure 
association (eg Hall et al 196Tb, Aldrich 1972). Nevertheless, size 
occupies a position of potentially critical importance as a contextual 
factor in contingency approaches (Rage 1980, Hall 1982). 
A number of studies have noted that size and technology may 
be co-predictors of structural attributes. Blau and McKinley (1979), 
in a study of architectural firms, found that whether those performing 
uniform tasks exhibited greater structural complexity and task diversity 
than those performing non-uniform tasks was dependent upon their size; 
whereas for the latter it was dependent upon the level of professional-
isation. Dewar and Rage (1978) found that size was associated with the 
development of administrative specialities, whereas greater technical 
diversity was associated with more role specialisation. Similarly 
Daft and Bradshaw 
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(1980) in their study of administrative and academic departments in 
universities. Of more direct relevance to this discussion are sets 
of findings which have addressed the impact of size as a moderating 
variable. In general, increased size is seen to pose problems 
through creating a tension in the pressure to decentralise decision-
making activity while at the same time maintaining centralised control 
over decisions made at lower levels in the organisation. Part of 
the response m ~ ~ lie in the tendency for procedures to be more 
standardised and formalised through the establishment of rules which 
allow decisions to be more programmed (Mansfield 1973). Such a 
possibility may help explain the Aston researchers' finding of a weak 
negative association between bureaucratic complexity ('structuring of 
activities') and centralised authority (ie greater size means a more 
decentralised authority structure and a concomitant reliance upon 
bureaucratic mechanisms of control through formalisation and 
standardisation). Similarly, Blau (1970) in a study of public 
personnel agencies found agencies with 'highly formalised procedures 
to have a more decentralised structure of authority. However, in 
more complex and uncertain task environments one would expect the 
onus to be put more heavily upon less obtrusive controls (March and 
Simon .1958, Simon 1960). Certainly, considerable emphasis has been 
put upon the role of professionals in reconciling the tendencies 
towards decentralisation with efforts to retain control in larger-
s c a ~ e e organisations in which the nature of the' task places a premium 
upon decentralised decision-making activity (Blau and Schoenherr 
1971, Hage 1980). Such findings are added to by others which 
address more directly the moderating impact of size upon the 
technology-structure association. Van de Ven et al (1976), for 
instance, found that while task uncertainty and interdependence placed 
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a premium upon more l a t e r ~ r a t h e r r than vertical, interaction and 
the use of more personal co-ordination mechanisms respectively, 
increasing size tended to lead to the adoption of more structured 
and impersonal forms of co-ordination. Similarly, in their 
elaboration of the 'organic-mechanistic' model, Hull and Hage (1982) 
found that increasing size constrained the organisation's ability 
to operate a more-flexible, organic form of organisation in order to 
achieve high rates of technological innovation. 
Such findings certainly lend consistency to the common view 
of a small, 'organic' task team group operating in conditions of 
task complexity, uncertainty and interdependence. However, the 
problem arises because it is precisely the small organic group that 
is taken as the starting point for the analysis of matrix-type 
organisations. The findings reported above beg the question of 
what affect group size may have upon the mechanisms of co-ordination 
and patterns of interaction within the task team group in a matrix 
setting. For instance, assuming a matrix form is requisite, if 
the nature of the task requires some input from a large number and 
wide range of project personnel (meaning a large group), ~ o o the 
propositions made concerning the (appropriate) form, level and scope 
of interaction needed still hold. If this possibility was not 
applicable (ie task team groups are always small in scale), then 
there would be no problem in extrapolating the findings from studies 
of matrix management to other situations. U n f o r t u n ~ t e l y . . the 
limited scope of matrix research coupled with the tendency to assume 
small scale group operations mean that this may not necessarily be 
the case. It is a priori quite possible to conceive of a situation 
in which the task team group required to operate in a matrix 
structure is large in itself. Moreover, following the proposition 
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that the boundary of the group will change as circumstances do and 
extend to those with information and expertise relevant to decisional 
processes at various points in time, it is also quite possible to 
conceive of significant variation in taskgroup size over time. 
Furthermore, if the earlier suggestions that closely-coupled working 
relationships with operational groups working in parallel, and with 
sequentially-linked and vertically-linked groups were extensive, 
then the possibility of size becoming a relevant variable is further 
enhanced. If any of these factors were relevant, then one might 
expect the association between task and organisational characteristics 
at the workgroup level to be moderated in some way by the effect of 
group size, and for size to become a potentially significant source 
of variation across cases. 9 
A second size-related issue to be briefly noted relates back 
to the earlier comments made concerning organisational subgroups 
operating beyond the confines of the focal task group(s)and concerns 
the effect of the size of the organisation as a whole. Specifically, 
it is to ask the question of to what extent the total scale of 
operations of the organisation may influence the applicability of 
concepts central to an understanding of the operation of a matrix 
system? For instance, may 'pooled' systems of input and output 
resources and facilities shared amongst task team groups be more 
effectively administered in a larger organisation via more routine, 
bureaucratic mechanisms of co-ordination and control. More generally, 
in a large organisation may the need to exercise control over decentral-
ised decision-making activity in a large number of task team groups 
make for a greater reliance upon more 'obtrusive' mechanisms than is 
found in a smaller organisation operating a matrix system. It has 
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been argued here that such issues are worthy of considerably more 
attention than they tend to receive in the literature to date on 
matrix and project management forms of organisation. 
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2.3 The Interorganisational Dimension 
With a few notable exceptions (eg Sayles and Chandler 1971), 
recent models of project and matrix forms of organisation and 
processes of management have concentrated attention for the most 
part upon the strategic design options facing the organisation 
engaged in undertaking series of one-off, customised projects. As 
such, the organisation, as opposed to the project, has been taken 
as the central focus and therefore unit of analysis. The concern 
has been to elucidate the nature of the relationship between the 
wider organisation and its operational unit operating in a more 
complex and uncertain task environment. As stated earlier, the 
focus of this study is upon the structure and processes of inter-
action within the project organisation established for the 
management of construction work on site. As such, attention is 
largely directed towards the network of interaction amongst personnel 
from the range of organisations within the "temporary multiorganisation" 
(Cherns and Bryant 1984) or "confederal system" (Sayles and 
Chandler 1971) or "cluster" of organisations (Kingdon 1973) that 
is established to undertake a construction project, bearing in mind 
the network of relationships between these organisations at a broader 
level. Before turning in more detail to discuss the nature and form 
of interorganisational relationships in the co-management of project 
t a s ~ ~ work, it is useful first to address the location of this 
dimension in models and studies of project and matrix management. 
The argument that is developed here is that the almost exclusive 
attention paid to the individual firm as the focal unit of analysis 
in the matrix and project management literature has tended to 
obscure consideration of the impact of relationships with external 
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agencies upon the for.m and process of management within the 
organisation. 
There are two closely-related issues that arise here. The 
first relates to the question of the potential impact of external 
relationships upon the internal structure and functioning of the 
organisation in which some for.m of matrix management occurs. A 
clear example of the issue is found in the work of Kingdon (1973). 
His interpretation of the development of matrix organisation in the 
Apollo setting is predicated upon the need for the firm to retain 
its autonomy while establishing a framework for close collaborative 
working relationships with the client (see above, p1.2). However, 
the implications'of this situation for the performance of work at 
the operational level are given little direct a t t e n t i o ~ ~ in preference 
to concentrating upon the characteristics of the firm's internal 
structures and processes contingent upon technical characteristics 
of the task (eg the relationship between programmers and systems 
analysts). To the extent that, 'boundary management' becomes a more 
pervasive phenomenon in such conditions, and also to the extent 
that technical and managerial levels are "fused" (ibid), then one 
would expect external relations to be included much more fully as 
a set of contextual factors that may influence internal forrris and 
processes of management. The potential implications of extensive 
patterns of interorganisational interaction at the managerial 
/technical level receive comparativelY little attention in the work 
of Kingdon (1973) and others interested in the form of organisation 
observed. This is not to suggest that all such instances necessitate 
taking this dimension into account; nor that it is necessarily of 
significance (it is quite possible a priori to conceive of 
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situations in which a matrix organisation, for example, is self-
contained and relatively little, if any, accommodation or interaction 
is required across organisational boundaries). Rather it is to 
suggest that those instances in which such forms have been 
investigated have tended to be those in which the degree of inter-
organisational interaction and collaboration has been observably 
high. The point suggests an irony: it is surprising to find that a 
type of situation which is essentially defined by an orientation 
towards project objectives articulated by an external body (ie the 
client) - and necessitating close working relationships with that 
body - is discussed and analysed, with comparatively little attention 
paid towards the potential import of that central dimension. It is 
more so given the contingency framework adopted and the emphasis 
placed upon the 'open system' chs.racteristics (Emery and Trist 1965) 
of the organisation. 
The second issue relates to the tendency in the literature to 
obscure intra- and inter-organisational distinctions in the roles 
and relationships found within a matrix context. It is related to 
the first issue in that it perhaps helps to explain the lack of 
attention paid towards the impact of external relationships. 
Specifically, the tendency is not to differentiate clearly between 
internal and external processes of interaction within a project 
setting, and consequently ,to more or less equate the characteristics 
of internal and external patterns of coordination and control. As 
an example, Sayles' (1976) description of matrix management appears 
,largely to be concerned with describing conditions within a single 
organisation: 
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"(a m a t r i ~ ~ introduces structural imperatives that 
serve to maintain fluidity in the balance of power 
among major subdivisions of the organisation or 
system and discourage the formation of rigid, 
exclusionary norms and sub-optional, vested-interest 
goals." 
(ibid, p17; emphasis added) 
However it is quite clear from his earlier discussion of the role 
of integrator that the inclusion of the phrase "or system" is 
meant to denote the wider applicability of the ideas to a matrix 
system of roles and relationships in an inter-organisational 
context: 
"(the integrator) is usually not in a position to make 
the relevant decisions himself because critical 
elements are controlled by autonomous organisations 
reluctant to make the required decisions themselves." 
(ibid, P \ 0; emphasis added) 
In this account, interdepartmental relationships among functional 
managers have somehow become transferred into interorganisational 
relationships among respective. agents. If the role of integrator 
is one of "boundary dweller" (Wilemon and Gemmill 1971), then it 
is left unclear as to whether the 'boundary' under discussion is 
that between different sections, departments or divisions within the 
same firm; or between different organisations involved in the same 
interorganisational 'project system'. Despite more precise 
formulations that focus specifically upon the organisation as the 
unit of analysis (eg Galbraith op cit, Knight op cit), the ease 
with which matrix-related concepts tend to be treated as comparable 
whether applied to an internal or external set of relationships is 
disconcerting given the fundamental difference in the basis of the 
relationship that underscores interaction in each case. In the 
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former, structural relationships of authority and accountability 
link respective groupings; in the latter case, transactional 
relationships are the salient feature. Different mechanisms of 
control correspond to these differing forms of relationship since 
they equate with differing bases of motivation: hierarchically-
based on the one hand; market-based on the other (Williamson 1975, 
Ouchi 1980). Yet the tendency to equate the two, or worse, to 
be unclear as to which forms of relationship'are the focus of 
study, is quite common in the matrix and project'management 
literature. 
It is argued here that both sets of issues have important 
implications for understanding the processes at work within such 
complex forms of organisation - both internally or indeed externally 
within a wider inter-organisational matrix' system of roles and 
relationships. Each of these issues will be addressed in turn 
before turning to an analysis of conditions in the construction 
i n d u s t ~ J J in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will then return to a more detailed 
examination of the correlates of interactive behaviour within a 
multi-organisational project setting. 
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2.4 External Relationships and the Boundary Unit 
Organisational research which has sought to address the 
association betw"een the organisation's environment and internal 
structures and processes has come to recognise the more direct 
potential impact of environmental conditions upon, internal structures 
and processes via the boundary-spanning component(s) of the 
organisation. The limitations of a deterministic model of organ-
isational fuctioning in allowing for the prediction of any 
significant direct association between environmental context and 
the structural characteristics of organisations as a whole has been 
noted (Child 1972). Nevertheless there is good reason to expect 
more direct and significant associations when the boundaries of 
the organisation are taken as the focal areas of investigation -
reflecting a degree of "permeability" at the boundaries of the 
organisation (Parsons 1960, Blau and Schoenherr 1971, Kochan 1975). Such a 
possibility has been suggested in critiques of the Aston programme 
of research (Mindlin and Aldrich 1975). Thompson's (1967) model 
specifically focuses upon boundary conditions as central to an 
understanding of the relationship between environmental context 
and structural form; He suggests that, the greater the number of 
constraints and contingencies that arise, then the greater the need 
for the organisat1onJ s boundary-spanning component to be segmented .. 
or dfvided up into specialised parts, and hence the greater the 
I ' 
total impact upon tpe firm s organisational structure (ibid, ch. 6). 
This would suggest that it would tend to be those organisational 
units operating at the boundaries of the organisation (eg sales, 
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purchasing,'distribution, research and development) that would 
prove most susceptible to environmental influences. In Thompson's 
scheme, it would be those functions that "buffer" or "mediate" 
the technical "core" within organisations, and which perform a 
central role in coping with high levels of task uncertainty, that 
would be most affected. 
Such a possibility is lent consistency by a good many 
research findings. In a study of joint programme management in 
health and welfare agencies, for instance, it was found that no 
association existed between the degree of interdependence and 
the level of overall formalisation (and only a low association 
with the degree of overall centralisation); however greater 
inter-dependence was found to be associated with greater structural 
complexity, in terms of the professionalisation of the workforce and 
the proliferation of co-ordinating and communication mechanisms 
~ i k e n n and Hage 1968). Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) study of 
firms in the container, food and plastics industries did detect 
differences between the internal characteristics of research, sales 
and production departments - both with respect to each other and 
across the industries - that were linked to differences in 
environmental uncertainty. At the same time, however, the findings 
are by no means unequivocal. Liefer and Huber (1977), for example, 
found that organisational structure had a greater effect upon 
behaviour in boundary-spanning units than the nature of the 
perceived environment, according to the frequency of dealings with 
individuals and groups. Consequently a good deal of caution needs 
to be exercised in expressing too overly deterministic a view of 
the relationship between context and boundary unit structure and 
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processes. It is not the intention here to delve further into an 
explanation of the nature and extent of a possible association 
between characteristics of the boundary unit(s) of the organisation 
and environmental conditions. 10 The point to be made here is simply 
that the link between environment and the internal workings of the 
organisation would appear to be potentially most apparent in the 
performance of managerial work as it relates to those functions 
undertaken at the boundary of the organisation. 
The point about project systems is two-fold: firstly, that 
the 'technical core' functions undertaken by the focal organisation 
themselves span the boundary of the organisation to the extent that 
they involve reciprocally-interdependent working relationships 
between individuals and groups from a variety of organisations 
involved in various ways in the specification, design, resourcing, 
manufacture and inspection of component products. Secondly, and 
following on from this, that interorganisational, or across-boundary 
working relationships during taskwork form a critical axis in the 
definition of the organisation's relationship with its immediate 
task environment. It is not simply that constraints and 
contingencies arise due to the technical nature of the task being 
performed by the focal organisation, but also that these constraints 
and contingencies may be articulated by agents or agencies external 
to the focal organisation: through the specification of targets, 
methods or materials; or changes in these specifications as the task 
is performed, for e x a m p l e ~ ~ Project tasks will tend to be performed 
on the basis of targets, specifications and schedules of work to 
some extent set by external (ie client) bodies. In construction, 
as in other types of project setting, client representatives may then 
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play a central part in establishing detailed plans (the design for 
the works) and inspectins, maintaining and controlling the work as 
it is produced. Further, to the extent that the focal production 
organisation (in the case of construction, the main contractor) 
subcontracts the supply, manufacture and installation of components 
of the total product, then the process of interorganisational 
interaction in the planning, organising, co-ordination and control 
of taskwork is repeated at a different level for the' range and 
variety of 'packages' of work that form constituent parts of the 
total production, or construction, process. The 'project team' 
in these instances comprises staff from a variety of organisations, 
performing different functions at different levels, and involved at 
various points and in a variety of ways in the total design and 
construction project cycle. In other words, one has to take into 
account the performance of complementary functions for the realisation 
of the common task objective and its manifestation in a 'work 
relationship pattern' (Herbst 1974) that crosses the' boundary 
between organisations. 
The question then becomes one of: to what extent and in what 
ways do external working relationships influence the internal 
structure and operations of the firm involved in a project setting? 
Or, more particularly, the workings of the 'organic' task team 
strqcture that is expected to be appropriate in such circumstances. 
One possibility that clearly contrasts with the emphasis in the 
literature on matrix and project settings is that the "business 
system" relationship (Sayles and Chandler 1971) between organisations 
puts a premium upon a more, rather than less, structured approach 
to the management of project work. The need to meet contractual 
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deadlines, budgets and standards, the legal implications of decisions 
reached and so on, may engender a rather more cautious than creative 
approach to managing work in an uncertain task environment. Sayles 
and Chandlers' (1971) findings, returned to below, have addressed 
this possibility in the context of relationships between organisations, 
and have pointed to the types of rigidities that may emerge in 
interaction. The question here is whether such conditions have any 
impact upon the internal conditions within the individual firm 
engaged in this type of setting. The implications for the focal 
organisation in the longer term may in fact be a more structured 
form of organisation in which documentation is more formalised, 
decisions are taken more centrally and administrative and managerial 
procedures are purposively routinised. Such a possibility is 
given credence if one looks at findings from other research. For 
instance, it has been noted that organisations operating in more 
hostile or competitive environments may tend to 'tighten up' their 
operational and administrative procedures (Khandwalla 1972, Pfeffer 
and Leblebici 1973). One might speculatively link this type of 
environment with that facing the organisation which has to 
competitively tender for one-off contracts with client 
organisations who are concerned with driving a hard contractual 
bargain (Sayles and Chandler 1971). The question is very much an 
open one, since the tendency in the literature is not to address 
fully the potential impact of such conditions.' The general point 
is that, in the absence of a more complete incorporation of variables 
related to external relationships in models of project organisation, 
one can only speculate upon the possibility that at least some of 
those 'aberrations' to the norms prescribed by researchers into 
matrix and project management may be accounted for by the nature 
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of processes of interaction with bodies external to the focal 
organisation. 
The lack of full consideration given to the potential impact 
of external relations is quite surprising given the centrality of 
Thompson's (196T) framework for categorising the co-operative 
strategies adopted by firms in uncertain task environments in 
general descriptions of the role perfor.medby the focal organisation 
within the wider project system (eg Kingdon 1973). Thompson 
identifies three strategies which he labels as "contracting", 
"co-opting" and "coalescing", and which he relates to the 
organisation's attempts to secure power - in the sense of reducing 
uncertainty - to offset their dependency upon the environment 
(ibid, p34). He describes the use of a particular strategy 
according to the relationship betveen organisational needs and 
'support capacity'. More pertinent to this discussion, he notes 
that while these three forms of co-operative strategy increasingly 
help to cope vith greater levels of task uncertainty, they also 
increasingly represent greater levels of organisational committment 
and accommodation to external agencies: 
"Under co-operative strategies, the effective achievement 
of power rests on the exchange of committment, the 
reduction of potential uncertainty for both parties. 
But committments are obtained by giving committments, 
and uncertainty reduced for the organisation through 
reduction".. of uncertainty for others. Commi ttment 
thus is a double-edged avord ••• " 
(ibid, p35) 
It may be the case that external relationships are based, say, 
upon exchange agreements for the supply of basic raw materials at an 
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agreed price. The relationship is one of direct economic trans-
action and, as such, may require relatively little accommodation 
on the part of each agency. On the other hand, it may be based 
upon a joint committment to achieve a specific objective or set 
of objectives, in which case a greater degree of mutual accommodation 
m ~ y y be required, since the task crosses the boundary between 
organisations. Thompson points to the establishment of consortia 
for major construction projects (Miller and Rice 1959), and multi-
disciplinary approaches to custodial treatment in health care 
institutions (Perrow 1965) as examples of the more constraining 
latter alternative where more tightly-coupled working relationships 
between organisatioIBoccur and where, in particular, decisions may 
be reached jointly. Referring specifically to the construction 
industry he notes that: 
"In the construction industry ••• the contractor and the 
customer establish a relationship which has the effect 
of placing the customer in the project's administrative 
apparatus; and if the customer is an organisation rather 
than an individual, the customer's agent may be a full-
time liaison member of the project." 
(Thompson 1967, p44) 
It is precisely this type of quasi-administrative arrangement which, 
it is argued, is salient to the conditions faced by the organisation 
involved in the types of project settings taken as those appropriate 
to the s t u ~ ~ of matrix management. Thompson (1967) notes in 
particular the constraining influence of a committment to joint 
decision-making: 
"A coalition may be unstable, or have a stated terminal 
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point. But to the extent that it is operative, the 
organisations involved act as one with regard to , 
certain operational goals. Coalition not only provides 
a basis for exchange but also requires a committment 
to future joint decision-making." 
(ibid, p36) 
A similar tendency towards a more "unitary" context for decision-
making is identified by Warren (1967, 1972): 
"Insofar as (organisations) concert their decisions 
voluntarily, they may enter into a coalition, under 
which they retain their autonomy but make decisions 
and act in concert only insofar as they see such 
behaviour as preserving' or enhancing their respective 
domains." 
(Warren 1972, pp24-25) 
Similarly, the centrality of a committment to joint decision-
making in project systems is recognised by Sayles and Chandler 
(1971) : 
" ••• (planning) is a dynamic process by which both 
inside and outside interests arrive at a new balance 
of power - reflected in new structure and new policy -
designed to establish the parameters of executive 
decision-making for some period of years but not 
forever." 
(ibid, p42) 
In ~ t h e r r words the agreement is based upon the' committment to joint 
achievement of a common goal, giving rise to joint shares in the 
resultant outputs and benefits. Unitary behaviour becomes requisite 
if task accomplishment is to be effective and mutual gains from that 
realised. The next section turns in more detail to the implications 
for patterns and processes of interaction. The point to be made 
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here is that the implications of such more tightly-coupled working 
relationships with external agencies for internal structures and 
processes tend to be largely ignored in the relevant project and 
matrix management literature. 
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External Relationships in a Project Management Setting 
Introduction 
The ~ r e v i o u s s section addressed the possibility of a more 
~ r o f o u n d d i m ~ a c t t of external relations upon the internal workings 
of the firm than is commonly assumed in the matrix and project 
management literature. The aim of this section is to address the 
second point raised: namely, the implications of the tendency to 
obscure intra- and inter-organisational differences in the joint 
management of project work. As a first step, the discussion will 
turn to the broader relationship between the organisations involved, 
before assessing the implications of patterns of goal- and resource-
dependency for the. processes of interaction at a more disaggregated 
(ie operational) level of analysis. It should be noted that thus 
far the discussion has tended to focus upon the individual 
organisation rather than upon the network of relationships within 
the wider 'project organisation or system'. This section heralds a 
move somewhat towards the latter perspective. Indeed, the independent 
variables of the foregoing discussion (the external relationships 
with other bodies) are brought more towards the centre stage, and 
later treated as the set of dependent variables central to this 
study (ie the structures and processes of interaction between 
autonomous organisations). Employing this framework, interest 
turns to the impact of, among other things, internal characteristics 
of the one organisation for patterns of external interaction with 
other organisations with which it is linked in the management of 
project work. 
In pursuing the line of argument in this section, two 
simplifYing assumptions are made which will be returned to in more 
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detail at a later point. Firstly, use is made of a simple dyadic 
system of roles and relationships in which two organisations (say 
client and contractor) performing complementary functions (ie 
design and construction) are linked together in a (contractual) 
relationship to achieve a common objective (ie the construction 
of a new building). Later on, some of the implications of a more 
complex (triadic) system will be addressed (in the construction 
setting the client-designer-contractor and designer-contract or-
supplier relationships in particular). Secondly, the assumption 
is made of consistency between wider organisational and operational 
subunit goals with respect to external interaction. Later on in 
the discussion, some added complexities of hypothesising differences 
in goals between the relevant parts of the organisation will be 
returned to. This will correspond in part to the emphasis placed 
by Kingdon (1973) on forms of "segregation" and, more generally, to 
the wider concern with the control of decision-making within the 
organisation in conditions characterised by high levels of task 
uncertainty and interdependence (Galbraith, op cit). However, for the 
moment and for purposes of exposition, the assumption of goal 
consistency is maintained. 
Interorganisational Relationships 
The series of points to be made here pertain to the inter-
organisational network of roles and relationships and the 
a s s o ~ i a t i o n n between organisational goals and project objectives. 
Each organisation can be conceived of as part of an inter-
organisational "network" (Jacobs 1974 , Pennings 1976) upon which 
it is dependent, to a greater or lesser extent, tor performing the 
functions which it undertakes in order to achieve the specific goals 
which it intends to pursue (Levine and White 1960).11 A similar, 
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but distinct, construct is that of the "organisation set" 
(Evan 1966). Both constructs allow for a focus (in an industrial 
setting) upon relationships with (a) customers, distributors and 
users of the product or service; (b) materials, equipment and 
component suppliers; and (c) other bodies such as statutory 
agencies, unions and employers' organisations, etc. The difference 
is that while the latter takes relationships from the viewpoint of 
the individual organisation as the focus of i n v ~ s t i g a t i o n , , the 
former takes the aggregated patterning of roles and relationships -
the network itself - as the appropriate unit of analysis. 
Interorganisational theorists and researchers have long 
identified the centrality of the relationship between organisations' 
goals as the primary defining characteristic of an exchange 
relationship. In their study of community social health and welfare 
a ~ e n c i e s , , for instance, Levine and White (1960) noted: 
"Organisational'exchange is" any voluntary activity 
between two organisations which has consequences, actual 
or anticipated, for the realisation of their respective 
goals or objectives." 
(ibid, p121) 12 
Conversely, in order to achieve their goals, organisations are 
dependent to some degree upon the resources and actions of other 
. 
organisations whose performance contributes in some way toward the 
realisation of the organisation's goals: whether that contribution 
is manifested in an exchange of resources on agreed terms, or in a 
more extensive agreement that commits both parties to the pursuit 
of a common task objective. 
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Central to the study of interorganisational relations have 
been the implications of patterns of goal dependency, their mani-
festation in the resources brought by each party to the relationship 
(Yuchtman and Seashore 1967), and c o n s e ~ u e n t l y y the relative 'power' 
of one party vis-a-vis the other. Aiken and Alford (1970), for 
example, suggested that the community systems they studied could be 
viewed as networks of interorganisational fields , in which 
the basic interacting units are, in effect, centres of power. 
Thompson's (1967) exposition of co-operative strategies, based upon 
Emerson's (1962) model of p o w e r - d e p e n d e n ~ y y r e l a t i o n s ~ 3 3 is concerned 
chiefly with the options available to the organisation given some 
degree of dependency upon external organisations which control 
resources necessary for the achievement of the focal organisation's 
goals. One implication noted of greater interdependence has been 
the tendency for the organisation's strategic obJectives to be 
formulated in terms of a selection of goal paths that offer maximum 
convergence with the interests of other parties represented in the 
"organisational matrix" (Selznick 1949, Thompson 1967). The main 
general point to stress, however, is the centrality of patterns of 
goal dependency and power, in relation to the locus of control 
over resources necessary to achieve those goals, in relationships 
within an inter-organisational setting. 
In a project setting, the wider goals of each organisation are 
linked through the pursuit of a common (and agreed or negotiated) 
set of project objectives - namely the construction of a building to 
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specific time, cost and quality parameters. These constitute the focus 
for the "action set" within the broader interorganisational network 
(Aldrich 1979, pp28O-281). A precise formulation of the concept of 
goals, and the relationship 'between goals and means is a difficult 
exercise (Simon 1964), and one that is beyond the scope of this study. 
However, it is possible to assert that in an interorganisational setting 
such as that under study here, the set of project objectives that link 
the autonomous organisations are, for each organisation, subordinate to 
that organisation's wider goals. For both organisations it is almost 
impossible to conceive (although it may occur in very rare instances) 
of the construction of a building as being the ultimate aim in itself. 
For the client it is more likely to be part of a longer-term programme 
of development, geared towards future growth and/or profitability. For 
the contractor, similar concerns (eg sales growth, profit) will be 
critical in the 'location' of the individual project in the firm's 
wider mainstream activities. Beyond this it is possible to conceive of 
complex vectors of goals and objectives. For instance, the project may 
constitute part of a market penetration strategy. If so, there arise 
questions of how this relates to other strategic objectives pursued by 
the firm. (A different point that relates back to the earlier assumption 
made of goal consistency, and one that will be returned to below, is 
that it may represent differing goals pursued by different sections or 
divisions within the same organisation.) However, in all cases the 
common set of project objectives will constitute part of the means towards 
achieving wider organisational goals. For the organisations taken 
together, the set of project objectives can be conceived of in a manner 
not dissimilar to that of "operational goals" (Perrow 1961) - albeit 
in an interorganisational context. 
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The general point here, with respect to any specific project 
and its associated objectives, is two-fold. Firstly that, for 
each organisation, the achievement of this particular set of project 
objectives will contribute variously and to varying degrees to the 
wider goals of the organisation, thereby defining the degree of 
dependence of that organisation upon the effective achievement of 
project objectives. Secondly, that the achievement of project 
objectives, to the extent that it requires external interaction, 
will be mediated by the performance and contribution of the other 
organisation to which the first is linked in a contractual 
relationship. Consequently, the particular constellation of 
organisational goals, and the position and magnitude of project 
objectives with respect to those goals, coupled with the degree of 
functional interdependence between the organisations (Aiken and 
Hage 1968),will determine the relative 'balance of power' between 
those organisations in subsequent interaction. In other words, the 
relative importance of project objectives to the achlevement of 
organisational goals will determine the organisation's dependency 
upon another (and hence its lack of power) to the extent that the 
other organisation mediates, through joint interaction, the goals 
obtainable. Following Emerson's (1962) scheme it is then possible 
to conceive of a continuum of states of dependency (and hence lack 
of power) of one organisation upon another: the mid-point would 
r e p r ~ s e n t t a state of 'balanced' or mutual' dependency (and hence, 
balanced power) in the relationship between the organisations 
involved. 
The picture presented here is complicated somewhat when account 
is taken of the possibility that the relationship between the 
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organisations extends to the performance of other projects and 
their associated sets of objectives. The discussion so far has 
focused entirely upon the subset of relationships associated with 
the performance of oue specific set of project objectives. In 
doing so, the assumption of this being the only link between the 
organisations has tended to have been made. However, this may 
not be the case. In other words, the organisations may be linked 
together in a number of supply-demand transactions, and 
consequently engaged in a series of projects running end-on or 
c o n c u r r e n t l Y . ~ ~ In such a situation, one needs to take account of 
both the breadth of activity that constitutes the wider relationship, 
and the length and importance of the relationship in a historical 
sense. Only by taking account of these factors is it possible to 
gain a fuller understanding both of the importance of the 
relationship to the parties concerned, and the significance of the 
particular project studied relative to that broader relationship. 
For example, one single project may be ostensibly of limited 
significance to organisation A, and one 'might presume this would 
lessen A's dependency upon another organisation B. However, if 
one takes into account the importance of the relationship with 
organisation B over past years, and the assumption that this may 
continue in future years contingent upon A's performance on this 
project, then the relative position of A and B changes quite 
considerably. Consequently, it is important to set the project and 
the objectives pursued in the context of a full description of the 
broader relationship between the organisations involved - including 
its historical patterning. Sayles and Chandler (1971) have gone 
some way towards this .in their exposition of the interorganisational 
dimension in the study.of project management. Specifically, they 
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have looked at the association between 'sponsor' and 'satellite', 
and highlighted the (economic) significance of the relationship and 
its potential as a control variable in interorganisat ionalr relations. 
They suggest an operationalisation of the construct based jointly 
upon: (i) the extent to which the project 'sponsor' monopolises 
the work of another organisation; and (ii) the extent to which 
'satellite' organisations monopolise the performance of one of the 
sponsor's key functions (ibid, Ch 4). To some extent this formulation 
allows for the importance of the relationship as a whole, as well as 
that of the current transaction, as the two elements of primary 
importance (Hall etal 1977, 1978, Schmidt and Kochan 1977). However, 
the foregoing discussion would suggest that the historical basis of 
the relationship might further be incorporated in Older to aqoid 
being left with too static a picture of the association. Furthermore, 
following Emerson's (1962) and Blau's (1964) schemes, added attention 
might profitably be directed towards assessing the nature and extent 
of the alternatives available to each party in that situation. Both 
factors would perhaps present a clearer and more extensive picture of 
the dynamics involved in the background to the current interorganisational 
relationship. 
2.5.3 Goals and Power in External Matrix Systems 
The foregoing discussion has noted the centrality of goal 
dependence and power relationships to the study of interorganisational 
networks, and related them to the type of setting found in project 
systems. It seems appropriate at this point to return to the 
original question of the implications for the study of matrix 
phenomena of differences in internal and external relations. Further, 
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attention will then be directed towards the mechanisms established 
in the form of the relationship itself aimed at achieving some level 
of inter-organisational co-ordination and integration. 
It will be recalled that, central to an understanding of the 
emergence or establishment of complex organisational 'forms, were 
the problems associated with differentiation (especially with regard 
to goal divergence), and power differentials among subunits (Galbraith 
op cit). The essential point to be made here is that, in an 
interorganisational setting, it is organisational, as opposed to 
functional disparities in goals, vaiues, norms and power that form 
the critical nexus in the pattern of interaction in a matrix setting. 
This is perhaps illustrated by first addressing the concept of 
differentiation in an interorganisational setting. In this case a 
clear prominence attaches to the degree of goal divergence between 
the parties in the context of an economic transaction between the 
organisations, which is perhaps not apparent in the same form (or 
at least to the same degree) in an internal setting. It is simply 
that, in a supply-demand transaction between organisations, the 
parties will be operating under at least partly-conflicting goals, 
and will tend towards representing divergent economic interests. 
One might expect differences across other dimensions (eg functional 
goals, time orientations, formality of structure, etc) to be equally 
pertinent to the study of interaction across both types of setting, 
but not necessarily,as salient a factor to those involved. 
Disaggregating the concept of divergent orientations stemming 
from differentiation suggests a range of possibilities. For example, 
d i v e r ~ e n t t goal orientations stemming from organisational 
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differentiation and the existence of a transactional relationship 
between the ,parties 'may be high (one party'directly profits from 
the losses of the other). At the same time, similar functional 
perspectives may serve to minimise differences of view in problem-
solving processes. A case in point may be the relationship between 
engineering sections in, respectively, the design and construction 
firms linked in a contractor-contractee demand-supply transaction. 
On the one hand, the commercial relationship suggests a divergence 
of interests; on the other, professional links may suggest a congruence 
of perspectives. (In the latter respect, orientations across 
organisational boundaries may actually converge much more closely 
than is the case in the relationship of each section with other 
sections or departments within their own respective organisation.) 
Following Thompson's (1967) scheme, contrapuntal tendencies towards 
shared "cause-effect beliefs" but divergent "preferred outcomes", 
would lead one to predict "compromise" as the strategy of resolution 
in decisional processes. The difference in an external setting is t h ~ ~
that the mechanism for adjudication or arbitration is based in the 
nature of the transactional arrangement that governs interaction 
between the parties, and is much more likely to involve the 
mobilisation of power differentials between them. In an internal 
setting, inter-unit power differentials may play an important 
part (in direct negotiation or 'lobbying' for example), but 
additional (hierarchical) mechanisms of co-ordination and control are 
likely to play the central role (eg the judgement or decision of a 
common supervisor). 
There is a further, more subtle point to be made with respect 
to differentiation. While perspectives may be shared or not, in 
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an external setting where interorganisational relationships may be 
novel, temporary and transitory, whether this is so is not necessarily 
known. To some extent there may be a learning process associated 
with reaching an understanding of the differences in perceptions, 
and attitudes held by counterparts in another organisation. In an 
internal setting, such divergencies may be large, but at least they 
are more likely to be known by virtue of the familiarity of the 
groups working together. In an external setting, such divergencies 
may be large or they may be small. But in the first instance, they 
are more likely to be to some extent unknown, and perhaps only fully 
appreciated as the relationship deveiops. In this case, initial 
interaction at least may be guided rather more by expectations 
and assumptions of others' likely response. In the above example, 
for instance, it may be perceived that "cause-effect beliefs" are 
unlikely to be shared, given expectations informed by the nature 
of the transactional relationship. In this case, the predictable 
outcome - again according to Thompson (1967) - is the need for an 
"inspirational" approach to problem-solving and decision-making 
processes. In an internal setting, in contrast, preconceptions may 
be more accurately informed by direct previous experience of working 
together. 
The central part played by power differentials is likely also 
to represent a qualitatively distinct set of factors in an external, 
as opposed to internal, matrix setting. The n'eed for 'balanced' 
influence in an internal matrix organisation is predicated upon 
the differential effects of levels of task uncertainty upon the 
power of subunits within the organisation (Galbriath op cit). 
Specifically, those performing 'uncertainty-absorbing functions' 
(March and Simon 1958) are seen to be more powerful, since other 
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personnel rely upon inferences drawn from data available only to 
those departments, and hence become dependent upon the knowledge and 
expertise of its staff. In the literature on matrix systems, it is 
technical level participants - in production and product or process 
design - that assume this mantle, since their knowledge, information 
and expertise is critical to the performance of the task. However, 
given the salience of the contractual dimension in an inter-
organisational context, it might instead be argued that role-
holders occupied with administering the business transaction 
between parties may become more powerful relative to their technical 
system counterparts, by virtue of the dependence of the organisations 
in this respect. Such a point has been expanded upon in some detail 
by Sayles and Chandler (1971). They found that "business system" 
r e ~ u i r e m e n t s s had implications for the respective power of role-
holders and functional groups: 
"Because it comes to serve a variety of unintended 
functions, the lower status, static, predictable but 
control oriented business system may actually dominate 
the higher status, dynamic, but less predictable 
technical elements." 
(ibid, p28; emphasis added) 
While one might argue here that their assignments of (perceived) 
levels of status are perhaps somewhat arbitrary, their general 
proposition and its implications for the respective power of role-
holders holds some merit. The tendency they observed may be 
explained by the greater criticality of such functions in an inter-
organisational context. More general research has indicated the 
greater relative power of those units within the organisation 
performing critical functions: Crozier (1964) noted this phenomenon 
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with respect to maintenance in his study of French organisations; 
Perrow (1970) in a study of twelve industrial firms, identified 
sales as the critical function and hence the most powerful. In 
the matrix and project management literature perhaps the tendency to 
equate 'uncertainty-absorbtion' and 'criticality' in the functions 
performed by technical level participants needs to be addressed in 
more detail, if the models proposed are to have equal validity 
when translated into' an interorganisational setting. (Furthermore, 
the discussion in the latter part of Chapter One suggested that, 
internally, there may also be tenee ncies towards "business system" 
power and control). The knowledge, information and expertise 
necessary to perform the task most certainly will heighten the part 
played by "technical system" staff in absorbing uncertainty - and 
hence place a premium upon the exercise of expert and informational 
power (French and Raven 1959, Pettigrew 1972). However, the net 
balance of influence may more favourably be tilted in the direction 
of "business system" role-holders, whose power rests on the 
criticality of their function for the immediate commercial success 
of the organisations engaged on the project. Perhaps through 
administering a fairly precise delineation of contractual terms and 
conditions and legal rights and obligations which reduce the 
susceptibility of the organisation to problems stemming from 
constraints and contingencies occurring through the actions of 
e x t e ~ n a l l parties. In other words, through being able to exert some 
degree of control over the potential impact of external factors. In 
this case, a general alternative proposition m ~ ~ be that it is 
those performing more certain subtasks that will be more 'powerful', 
since they have mOre 'facts' to back their argument. or because 
their tasks significantly constrain the actions of others. Examples 
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of this would include the constraining influence of budgetary control 
by financial personnel over research and development expenditure; or 
the influence exerted by production over sales staff stemming from 
tightly-constricted production schedules. In an interorganisational 
context, where the negotiation of packages of work and their details 
may be of central importance, one might expect that the possibility 
of such a factor coming to the fore would be enhanced. 
2.5.4 Implications 
These points are of significance, since an understanding of the 
motivational basis underlying interaction and its grounding in the 
nature of the relationship between participants or groups involved 
in the 'project system' has potentially important implications for 
the propositions made concerning appropriate and/or observed forms 
and processes of interaction in a matrix setting (see above, Chapter 1). 
The earlier referred to prospect of 'negotiated interaction' during 
taskwork (Kingdon 1973), for instance, has rather different 
connotations when applied to the processes involved in an external, 
as opposed to internal, setting. The preferences expressed for 
collaborative modes o f i n t e r a c t i o ~ ~ rather than competition, may be 
more effectively realised internally than externally, where a 
supply-demand transaction forms the basis of the relationship. 
Similarly, in an interorganisational setting, differences in 
'preferred outcomes' may become more highly salient in decisional 
processes, despite highly convergent views, or'shared 'cause-effect 
beliefs'. More generally, the question arises as to what extent 
are the conclusions drawn with respect to the 'cultural' characteristics 
of the new forms of organisation appropriate to an interorganisational 
setting? Not only is there comparatively little time to achieve any 
'cultural transformation', there are also likely to be few incentives 
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to do so given the transactional basis of the relationship. A 
further possibility that bears mention is that of a 'clash of 
cultures' between organisations linked in a short-term contractual 
relationship. 
As part of the emphasis upon cultural norms, to what extent is 
the norm of authority based upon relevant expertise and knowledge 
realisable in situations in which "business system rigidities" 
. (Sayles and Chandler 1971) may tend to govern interaction? Sayles 
and Chandler (1971) have alternatively noted that an overemphasis 
upon "business system" legalities in efforts to minimise the possible 
risk of failure may result in managers accepting little interference , 
in the form of suggestions for change or modification, being 
unwilling to share informational resources, and resisting attempts 
to make their activities 'visible' (ibid, Ch 14). Melchers (1977) 
has noted how such 'communication problems' were important underlying 
reasons for the bridge failures that he stUdied. Rather than treating 
such possibilities as aberrations to the norm, might it not be more 
accurate to suggest that they represent rational strategies given 
the nature of the relationship and the premium put upon managing the 
business relationship. In a contractual relationship, where the 
organisation is faced with task uncertainties stemming in part from 
dependencies upon the resource inputs, information or specifications 
supplied by external bodies, it may tend to be' the more formal 
bases of influence - namely the terms and conditions of the contract -
that play the central role. 
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A Further, and final, series of points to be made here concern the 
difference in the leadership role performed by the integrator in 
an internal and external setting. If one can conceive of 
'leadership' processes as such being applicable in an inter-
organisational setting, then one must needs take account of thc 
differential motivational base that characterises leader-follower 
interaction in an external setting. In the "path-goal" model, 
for instance, subordinates' perceptions and expectations playa 
central part in transfor.ming leader actions into outcomes, 
assuming situational conditions are e q u a l ~ 5 5 Fiedler's (1967) 
incorporation of the quality of leader-member relations as a 
contingency variable is a more direct, albeit less sophisticated 
recognition of the potential impact of subordinates' expectations. 
More importantly perhaps for the purposes of this discussion is 
the inclusion of 'acceptance' factors in the model proposed by 
Vroom and Yetton (1973). Due to the particular constellation of 
factors involved in an external matrix ~ e t t i n g , , the potential 
importance of this factor suggests a variety of possibilities. 
On the one hand, divergencies in goal orientation may make 
'acceptance' more critical. On the other hand, the ability to 
make the parties confor.m to the contractually-agreed set of 
procedures may make 'acceptance' less critical (since the 
indominus party has recourse to formal mechanisms for resolving 
disagreements). In the first instance, a more 'participative' 
approach can be expected; in the second instance, a more 'directive' 
or 'autocratic' approach. Similar possibilities may hold in an 
internal setting. However, the point here is that the two 
situations vary qualitatively in the dynamics of the processes 
involved. For instance, assuming the first possibility - that 
acceptance is more critical: in an internal setting the issue is 
one of generating concensus within the context of an internal 
structure of interaction to some extent 'accepted as legitimate; 
in an external setting the issue is one of generating a concensus 
within the context of a negotiated framework for interaction 
between the parties which may, be less accepted as legitimate. 
It is the difference between the tendency towards a more normative-
based framework for interaction on the one hand, and a more 
utilitarian-based'framework for interaction on the other 
(Etzioni 1965). If one further assumes that the formal position 
power of the integrator is high in both cases (ie internal and 
external) then significant differences may emerge. In the internal 
setting, the tendency may be for this potential influence to be 
held in abeyance given the assumption that a relatively high 
degree of unity of purpose will serve to ensure that the 'best' 
decision is reached. In an external setting, however, such an 
assumption may not be held, and it might be rather the case 
that the threshold for pursuing a more direct and directive approach 
in decision-making, given the ability to obtain compromise based 
upon recourse to the formal mechanisms available, is much lower. 
In the former case a more 'participative approach prevails. In the 
latter case, the approach taken is more directive. In effect, the 
position power of the integrator in this instance serves as a 
' s ~ b s t i t u t e e for leadership' (Kerr and Jermier 1978). 
It is not the intention here to delve into more detail into 
the vast number of possibilities given the range of situational 
contingencies and their possible variation and interactions. 
Hopefully, the foregoing example serves as an illustration of the 
possibilities in understanding leadership processes and how they 
may differ as between an internal and external setting. The 
general point to be made here is that, if one is to fully understand 
the nature and implications of leadership processes within a matrix 
setting, then one has to take into account the differing bases of 
motivation in internal and external settings, since motivation 
is central to an understanding of leadership processes. In not 
clearly differentiating between the two types of setting, the 
tendency may be to e ~ u a t e e the processes involved, whereas in 
fact a need to differentiate between them is paramount if one is 
to be able to fully account for and predict the outcome of leader 
action. 
S ~ a r y y
In summary, it is useful to reiterate the main point raised 
in this section. Specifically, it is that"the tendency to obscure 
the difference between internal and external systems of matrix 
management ignores a central point of departure in the power 
implications of transactional relationships between parties. It may 
well be that models of matrix oreanisation allow one to predict the 
greater power and influence of technical subsystem role-holders in 
an internal setting (alternatively, the points made in this section 
. 
may have a good deal of bearing upon those raised in the previous 
s e c t i o ~ ~ However, and as Sayles and Chandler (1971) and others 
have found, it is not so easy to predict such an hypothesis in an 
interorganisational matrix system of roles and relationships. 
Having addressed in Chapter 1 the concept of.matrix management 
• 
and discussed its relevance to ~ r o j e c t t settings, this c h a ~ t e r r as 
a whole has sought to address a number of shortcomings and 
orndssions in the theory and research upon matrix management. 
In particular, attention has been focused upon: the slim bedrock 
of empirical data upon which many of the models are based; the 
tendency to narrow the scope of investigation to individual sets 
of production activities and not to fully account for the 
potential implications of variation in group and organisational 
size; and the absence of a full and detailed discussion of the 
implications for matrix systems of an interorganisational 
dimension in the management of project-based activity. Chapter 
4 will return in more detail to this latter set of issues and 
their implications for the forms and ~ r o c e s s e s s of interaction 
found in the management of construction project taskwork. In 
the meantime, the next chapter (3) is concerned with addressing 
the characteristics of construction activity, organisation and 
management in the light of the concepts introduced and discussed 
in Chapters 1 and 2. 
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Footnotes: 
For a review of the relevant literature see, for instance, 
Hall (1982, Chapter 13). 
2 Although construction firms were specifically excluded from 
the sample. 
3 The research programme and findings have since been compiled 
in four volumes published by Gower Press (Pugh and Hickson 
1976, Pugh and linings 1976, Pugh and Payne 1977, Hickson 
and MacMillan 1981). 
4 For a more complete explication of these dimensions see, 
for instance, Pugh et al 1968. 
(NB Later versions of the model added a sixth dimension 
- standardisation of employment practices (cf Pugh 1973.» 
5 For a fuller critique of the structure-technology approach 
see, for instance, Perrow 1979, pp168-70. 
6 The earlier point made concerning the relationship between 
task uncertainty and informational requirements is of some 
relevance here. Specifically, whether the capacity to process 
information is fully synonymous with the concept of knowledge 
technology would appear to be a critical question that is not 
fUlly addressed in the matrix and project management 
literature (cf Galbraith op cit). 
7 A broad description compatible with the findings for unit 
production firms from Woodward's (1958) study. 
8 The point of course also applies to the earlier-discussed 
relationship between technology and structure. 
9 The simple fact of exponential changes in the number of 
possible interactions as the number of participants increases 
(Caplow 1964) suggests the potential importance of group 
size in a setting in which 'networks' of interaction are 
deemed appropriate. 
10 For a more detailed discussion, see for instance, Thompson (1967). 
11 Interorganisational theorists have tken the concept of "domain" 
as defining the relative position of the organisation - and 
hence the nature and extent of its roles and relationships with 
respect to other organisations - within a broader "technological 
matrix" (Thompson 1967, Levine and White 1960, Emery and Trist 
1965). 
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12 The focus here is upon contractual relationships in a 
competitive market situation. The emphasis is upon 
"voluntarism" (Warren 1972), whereby a relationship is 
formed when both parties perceive mutual benefits from 
interacting (Levine and White 1961, Tuite et al 1972). 
It should also be noted, however, that an alternative 
rationale lies in the possibility that a relationship 
is formed when one party is powerful enough to induce the 
other to interact (Yuchtman and Seashore 1967, Aldrich 1972, 
Kochan 1975). 
13 Emerson (1962) suggested that the dependence of an actor 
(here: organisation) A upon another actor B provides the 
potential for B to exert power over A, since B controls 
the resources that A requires. Power, therefore, is an 
inverse function of the degree of dependency, and arises 
directly from the nature of that dependency. He defined 
dependency as being directly proportional to A's 
motivational investment in goals mediated by B; and 
inversely proportional to the availability of these 
goals outside the A-B relation. Blau (1964, pp118-125) 
has extended Emerson's ideas to a set of four conditions 
that should foster the independence of A from B: namely 
tpe essentially and substitutability of the resources 
offered by B (see also Jacobs 1974); A's control over 
strategic resources; and the ability of A to use coercive 
power to secure B's resources. 
14 Further, it is possible to conceive of situations in which 
the directionality'of the supply-demand transaction is 
reversed in some of those relationships. 
15 Based on Vroom's (1964) expectancy theor.y of motivation. 
attention is directed towards the valences attached to a 
specific outcome and the probability of its occurrence. 
Two sets of expectancies - that effort will lead to 
performance, and that performance will lead to reward 
- serve as the postulated mechanisms (House and Mitchell 
1974, House and Dessler 1974) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MATRIX M A N A G E M L ~ ~ AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 
The application of the concept of matrix management to an 
understanding of the processes involved in project organisations 
in general (eg Cleland and King 1975), and in construction project 
. t' . . u1 1 organlsa lons ln partlc ar, has been considerable in recent 
years. The aim of this chapter. is to address the applicability 
of a matrix management framework in the investigation of processes 
of construction management by focusing upon the task that is 
performed in construction and its distinctive characteristics. 
In doing so, attention will be directed towards the applicability 
of matrix concepts at two levels of analysis within the type of 
setting studied here: namely, intra- and inter-organisational 
patterns of communication, co-ordination and control of project 
taskwork. As noted above, the literature already cited focuses 
generally upon the single organisation as the unit of analysis 
in investigations of the phenomena of matrix and project management. 
This study, in contrast, focuses more directly upon the project 
o r g ~ ~ i s a t i o n n itself that is established to Undertake project work. 
However, the centrality of intraorganisational variables to a 
study of the processes involved in an inter-organisational project 
context necessitates also a full consideration of the circumstances 
facing the individual firm or organisation in external interaction 
in a complex and dynamic task environment. Consequently while 
t h ~ s s study focuses upon the organisation and management of 
construction projects, as opposed to construction (and/or design) 
firms, a consideration of the latter is of equal importance since 
it may serve as a critical component in definins the position of 
one organisational team vis-a-vis the other(s) within the wider 
project terun. Consequently before attention is directed towards 
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the fact of "organisational differentiation" within the project 
team (Morris 1972, 1973) attention will be turned briefly 
towards the task undertaken by individual construction organisations 
within a construction context. For the purposes of this discussion, 
the focus is upon the construction firm, rather than upon fir.ms 
specialising in design activities. However, it should be noted 
that much the same implications of the nature of the task and 
general product market conditions are expected to hold for firms 
engaged at this stage of the total project 'cycle'. The major 
I '. difference here is that the production system employed 1S to 
some extent separable from the geographical location of the 
product being built (ie whereas construction takes place on site, 
design activity may be undertaken in drawing offices located 
elsewhere). With this exception, other conditions - the design 
of a one-off product to a client specification over a definitive 
timespan - are expected to hold and to have similar implications 
for the organisation and management of design work as for the 
organisation and management of construction work. The inter-
dependence between these two sets of a c t i v ~ t y y and associated 
patterns of integration forms the main thrust of the later section. 
3.1 Construction Task Characteristics 
The first set of characteristics to be noted about 
construction "":·taskwork is that a unit-based system of production, 
in. which individual projects are custom-built to client 
specifications, is the supply mode common to most types of 
construction activity. Individual projects may involve the mass 
repetition of individual SUbunits: eg virtually identical units in 
a housing estate development project; or identical classrooms 
in a school building. However, taken as a whole, the project 
involves the construction of a unique one-off product (ie the 
estate;' the school) custom-built to a client's specification. 
In these examples, similar previous and future-planned estates or 
schools undertaken as a series of contracts in a 'rolling' programme 
of development, may heighten the tendency towards what may be 
interpreted as implying more of a 'large batch' system of 
production (Woodward 1958, 1965). Consequently both within the scope 
of an individual project and across serially-linked projects some 
degree of similarity and repetition in the type of output produced 
may be apparent. However, the essential feature is rather some 
degree of discontinuity and dissimilarity in the types of outputs 
produced both within and between projects. In part this may reflect 
differential client specifications, or, within the scope of one project, 
a more variegated, and idiosyncratic specification for subsections of the 
work (eg variation in the dimensions for individual houses' rooms or 
classes). This feature is discussed in more detail below. However other 
basic distinctions may also occur due to two inherent and distinctive 
features of the task being undertaken: its spatial and temporal 
aspects. The difference lies in the differential location -
both spatial and temporal - of the production activities that are 
involved. Rather than a system of production operating in which 
the processes of production themselves are relatively fixed and 
static (as in the case on an assembly-line in a factory system 
of·production), the production processes themselves must needs be 
applied both where and when the products (and their constituent 
parts) are to be produced. In other words the process of 
production is to a large extent inseparable from the geographical 
and temporal location of the output that is produced. 
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The actual location of the task being performed is one 
salient and key characteristic which marks off construction activity 
from the type of work undertaken in perhaps otherwise comparable 
product market conditions (eg research and development projects; 
the manufacture of engineering prototypes; etc). In construction 
the finished product (eg a building) is non-transportable and 
is produced at the point of consumption. This is a particularistic 
characteristic of the conditions of demand within the industry, 
and one which has profound implications for the form of production 
system and organisation observed: 
"While some work may be prefabricated in factory 
conditions, the building or other structure must 
ultimately be provided at a particular location, 
fixed as it were, to the site ••• Thus the advantages 
which firms in other industries may gain from 
centralised production in factory conditions do not 
apply in the construction industry." 
(Fleming 1980, pp231-2) 
Since the demand for the firm's products is conditioned in this 
way, both the system of prOduction employed and the organisation 
to directly manage that work are necessarily dispersed 
geographically, and specific to where the product is to be used. 
A further, and consequential, important aspect here is that 
physical environmental conditions play an important part in the 
production process itself. The actual geo-physical conditions 
on site may influence to varying degrees what is built and how. 
For example, ground conditions (eg water levels, subsidence), may 
determine the need for a particular type of foundation, or affect 
the manner in which it is put in place. More generally, the process 
of production is influenced by the nature of the task environment 
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in a very direct and physical way: namely, via the weather. 
Unlike conditions in a factory-based system of production, where 
the physical environment is to a large extent controllable, in 
construction it is not. Indeed, the products of the construction 
industry include those (eg factories) which allow such conditions 
to be controlled. As noted in the above quote, constituent parts 
may be, and often are, prefabricated under more controllable 
(factory system) conditions. However, in large part, the industry 
continues to be one in which in situ construction is the norm 
(Bishop 1972). 
Moreover, the construction of the total product on site involves 
necessarily the on site assembly of prefabricated or 'system' 
components. In relation to the earlier point concerning production 
system variation within and between projects, the point here is that 
geophysical properties, in varying from one part of the site to 
another, or between sites, may have implications for the processes 
of production involved. For example, two otherwise identical 
housing estates (or two sections of one estate) may involve quite 
different processes of construction by virtue of the difference 
between the ground conditions at each site. 
The second major characteristic of the construction task, 
shared with other types of project, is its transience. Each project 
will have its own 'life expectancy', manifested in an end completion 
date after which no further activity is expected or warranted. 2 
The timespan may vary as much as between, say, six months and six 
years. However, it is the finality afforded by a completion date 
that sets aside construction (and other farms of project) activity 
from that found in more permanent settings. Production runs in a 
factory may be short or long. However, the production system itself (and 
the organisation) is unlikely to be disbanded or moved elsewhere once 
these runs are complete. Rather the system is modified (or left unaltered) 
to undertake other product runs. In construction, the transience of 
project work, coupled with its location-specific orientation, means that 
these are necessarily the preconditions for the performance of a new task. 
As such there is comparatively little continuity in the form of production 
system established between projects. Each construction project marks the 
establishment of a new and temporary production system and organisation 
located at the point of consumption. Taken together these conditions mean 
a substantial reduction in the scope of construction firms to achieve 
technical economies of scale (Fleming 1980, p236). 
The temporal dimension complicates matters further if one then 
takes into account within-project characteristics. Taken as a whole, the 
p r o j e c ~ ~ 'cycle' originates from the conception of a product to be built, and 
develops through broad and detailed design stages, through to construction 
on site and, finally, commissioning, occupation and use (eg Wearne 1973). 
Taking one part of this - the construction process itself - the eventual 
product (in the case of a building) is 'built up' through the establishment 
of foundations and substructure, 'the erection of a superstructure, the 
external and internal finishing of the work, and the installation of 
services, fixtures and fittings. These activities may, of course, be 
undertaken in sequence or in parallel, depending upon the pattern of inter-
. 
dependencies and resource and technical constraints. However, overall, 
there is an essential linearity in the process, based upon the logic of a 
chronology of activity in the building of the total product. What this 
means is that construction (and other project) activity on site is 
essentially unrepetitive in nature. The degree of repetition and 
3.6 
standardisation of product output observable in factory systems is 
unobtainable in a construction project setting. The production processes 
involved between projects may be essentially similar. However, the 
continuity necessary to take advantage of this degree of routinisation 
is restricted due to the fragmented nature of activity in time and space. 
Within the scope of one particular project, the range of activities 
undertaken, and the variety in the production processes involved (and 
perhaps also the different temporal location of like activities at 
different points in the construction cycle) means also that discontinuity 
and change in the basis of activity, rather than continuity and stability, 
is the norm. 
The type of production system employed in construction, in its 
relationship with product market demand characteristics, is therefore 
highly distinctive from other types of production system found in more 
stable and permanent settings (and distinctive, perhars, from other forms 
of project activity by virtue of its geographical dispersal and the 
influence of physical environmental conditions3). In terms of the resources 
and production techniques employed, it should also be noted that this lack 
of 'systematisation' of the production processes that are involved has 
meant that construction work still remains somewhat 'traditional' in its 
production techniques and methods, and that a continuing premium is placed 
upon the skills of skilled craft labour - to an extent that is not as 
apparent in other types of production system. 4 The early depiction of 
construction as a craft-based system compared with the bureaucratic systems 
found in other industrial settings (Stinchcombe 1959) still to a certain 
extent holds. 
3.2 The Organisation and Management of Construction Work 
These characteristics of the task being performed present 
particular problems of organisation for the firm involved in 
construction work.5 Above all, they imply the need to create or 
put in place, series of local and temporary organisational units 
in order to manage construction activity. For the firm as a whole, 
its operations may be highly geographically. dispersed in relation 
to its 'core' central administrative organisation. Further, at 
anyone point in time, the firm is likely to be engaged in 
performing a series of project tasks at various points or stages 
in their overall project (and construction) 'cycles'. It is this 
degree of spatial and temporal disjuncturing in the firm's 
mainstream task activities and the fact that individual projects 
are the focal unit in the firm's calculations, that makes the 
construction situation somewhat distinctive in the strategic 
options available to the firm in designing an appropriate 
managerial and administrative structure. 
The first point to be noted here is that these constraints 
in the nature of the task being undertaken predispose the firm to 
specialise, at the level of its separate project activities, 
according not only to the particular project (ie product-basing), 
but also to the particular client, location and time span of 
activity. In other words, specialising at the level of operations 
aceording to the produc't, client I location and time are inherent 
in the nature of the work being performed. The production system 
and organisation which is established on site to perform and 
manage task work is specific to that project (and its client), 
its territorial location and timespan (Miller 1959). While it is 
theroetically possible, it is highly improbable that the firm will 
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choose to manage the project by appointing two separate teams: to 
undertake either two sections of work on the same site (each team 
performing comparable work on another 'split' local site), or two 
different stages in the construction p r o c e s s ~ ~ The need to 
co-ordinate activity specific to the construction of a particular 
project will militate against this happening. 
Above and below the level of the site, of course, different 
organising principles may be apparent. Within the scope of the 
project, work may be organised according to the processes of 
construction involved, or the subproducts being built and their 
location (for example, exercising the choice between constructing 
sections of a housing estate in sequence (process) or in parallel 
(product and/or place). However,it should be noted that even here 
this choice may be effectively constrained by explicit or implicit 
demands posed in the original client specification. For example, 
the specified time period available may heighten the efficacy 
of a product, as opposed to process-based form of organisation 
(if certain sections of the work are to be 'handed over' to the 
client at interim completion dates). At the level of the firm 
as a whole)operations may be grouped geographically in regional 
divisions; by product (eg housing construction as against non-
housing construction and civil engineering works); in certain 
i n ~ t a n c e s , a c c o r d i n g g to the client (if one or'a group of clients 
are sufficiently important and/or regular customers); or Derhaps the 
processes involved (eg establishing separate divisions for main 
trades construction and services). One would expect that the 
need to integrate closely the processes involved on a project by 
project basis to again militate against this latter possibility. 
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However, many examples do occur.7, 8 
The point here is that, at the level of the site, the nature 
of the task being performed constrains the options available to 
the firm in organising its operations on a company-wide basis. 
In turn these constraints present problems for the firm in their 
patterns of internal resource a1location.9 The materials and plant 
r e ~ u i r e d d to undertake project work are likely to some extent to be 
idiosyncratic and project-specific. The firm may hold stocks 
of such, however the variable pattern of demand and its specific 
characteristics mean that at anyone point in time there is unlikely 
to be any easy direct match between the level and types of materials 
and plant held and those needed to undertake work across the range 
of the firm's operations. Furthermore, depending upon the pattern 
of the firm's activities, bottlenecks and excess capacity across 
the range of (un)needed plant and materials are highly likely. 
More importantly, the constraints stemming from geographical 
dispersion and temporal fragmentation of the firm's operations, 
make it highly probable that problems emerge in having 'the right 
people available in the right place at the right time' (or 
conversely, in there being excess managerial and ·workforce 
capacity). To the extent that this is the case, and to the extent 
that projects differ in their size and type (andhencepersonnel 
requirements), then the aim of achieving some degree of continuity 
and consistency in employment patterns from one project to another 
becomes a difficuit exercise: O In other words, the establishment 
of an organisation for the performance and management of construction 
work on site is itself to some extent a unique and novel exercise:' 
Consequently, there are problems for the firm in matching up the 
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demands for, and supply of, personnel across t h " ~ ~ current range of 
work available, and in maintaining some degree of continuity and 
stability across the current and prospective range of operations 
that are undertaken by the firm. In having to organise and 
manage work on specific projects that are often distinctive in 
nature, dispersed geographically and temporary in duration, there 
is a tension between the orientation that this suggests towards 
the specific project on the one hand; and the longer-term processes 
of resource allocation consistent with achieving some level of 
administrative efficiency and the economies of scale through the 
functional specialisation that may accrue on the other. 
3.3 Project Organisation Forms 
It is this element of duality in orientation, which is the 
hallmark of the matrix management systems described above, which 
makes for the applicability of a matrix scheme to a study of 
internal processes of management at the level of the construction 
firm. The dual orientation' stems from the committment to 
immediate project objectives and conditions that vary from one 
project to another; and the simultaneous need for continuity, 
stability and development of the firm's administrative specialisms 
in order to achieve a high degree of efficient internal resource 
allocation within the organisation as a whole. If one assumes for 
the moment high levels of task uncertainty and interdependence 
( r ~ t u r n e d d to below), then following Galbraith's scheme, the firm 
is faced with three broad strategic design options in organising 
its project task work. The first is that each project operates 
as a "self-contained task" (ibid, 1973). However, in situations 
such as construction, where over time and space the firm's broad 
range of operations consists of projects in which essentially 
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similar operations and functions are performed (for instance, 
estimating and network planning activities), one would expect 
this to be a costly strategic option for the firm. While specific 
projects may be highly idiosyncratic in nature, the fact that the 
firm's operations consist in their entirety of such projects makes 
for a degree of relative continuity and consistency in the 
application of techniques and procedures from one project to the 
next. In other words, variation in sUbstantive content rather 
than managerial procedural mechanisms is the norm. While each 
project may need to be approached in a different manner, this does 
not mean that treating it as fully distinct from the firm's 
mainstream activities and hence organising in such a way that it 
were regarded as a completely unique, one-off experience, never or 
rarely to be repeated, is the appropriate strategic response. 
Certain instances may occur in which this is a possibility (for 
example, a large-scale one-off design and construction project 
being undertaken by a firm which has formerly been involved only 
in 'traditional' contracting). However, one would expect these to 
be rare and, by definition, exceptional cases. 
The second possibility is in organising fully and explicitly 
on a project by project basis (ie a fully product/ project 
d i v i s i o n a l i s e d f u r m ~ ~ Again, however, one would expect this to be a 
c o ~ t l y y strategy and one which is only r a r e l y ~ ~ if ever, 
encountered in practice. Unless an individual project is 
sufficiently large (and that individual client and their project is 
of sufficient size relative to company turnover), then it seems 
unlikely that the conditions faced by the firm allow for a full 
product (ie project) orientation in its divisionalisation strategy 
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or general configuration. The comparatively small-scale of most 
individual project operations makes costly the full disaggregation 
of specialised activities (eg estimating, planning, etc) and their 
attachment to specific projects; and, conversely, the more cost-
effective their concentration in centralised service departments 
providing s p ~ c i a l i s t t support services to the;.Tange of operational 
units in the field. One might expect that some very large projects 
are sufficient in scale to warrant the additional overheads and, 
thereby a closer approximation to a product-divisionalised form. 
Indeed, examples cited of very large scale construction projects 
do give illustrations of a more decentralised and self-contained 
project organisation consistent with the tendency towards a more 
explicit product-orientation (eg NEDO 1970). 
Consequently, project size is likely to be of significant 
importance in this respect. However, such examples are again 
likely to be comparatively rare, and where they do occur, still 
to some extent functionally-linked with other projects through 
the co-ordination activities undertaken at central office level 
(eg in allocating and administering large scale plant between 
projects). In the mainstream of construction activity, it is 
rather some degree of 'balance' in the management functions 
performed by site and head office personnel that is the more 
likely possibility. In particular, it is the balance between on 
site production capacity and off-site planning and administrative 
support capacity (ie estimating, planning, engineering design 
services, resources allocation, financial and contractual 
management etc), that in practice tends to occur (eg Ward 1979, 
Kavanagh et al 1978, Harris and McCaffer 1983). In construction 
management, the performance of work on site constitutes only a part 
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of the total 'cycle' of project activity. Prior to that stage, the 
firm is involved in estimating and placing a tender for the work with 
the client, in planning out the work, designing and detailing known 
and agreed processes of work, arranging to some extent the pattern of 
resources flow to the site (including selecting the site management 
team and appointing subcontractors and suppliers), and agreeing and 
arranging the details for the administration of the contractual set 
of terms and conditions. (Following the construction process, the 
final settling of accounts and claims constitutes the final set of 
acts with respect to this latter function.) As such, and to the extent 
that a degree of continuity in performing these more general functions 
in a supervisory capacity continues throughout the construction part 
of the 'cycle' as a whole, then the conditions are set for the 
possibility that some form and degree of matrix management, with 
respect to the performance of specialised functions provides a 
framework for understanding the process of construction site management. 
It is not the intention here to address the question of what 
particular forms will be apparent, or how these may be conditioned 
by levels of task uncertainty a n ~ ~ interdependence in the 
performance of construction work on site. It may be that the forms 
observed will range from relatively 'weak' functional authority 
patterns (eg with respect to, say, resource acquisition) through 
to ~ h e e more direct line control of site staff (eg engineering and 
surveying specialists). Further, it is not intended here to 
speculate upon mechanisms of integration and the nature and bases 
of interaction. These are. empirical questions reserved for the 
later case descriptions and their analysis. The proposition that 
is suggested here is rather more general. Namely; that high levels 
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of uncertainty and interdependence in the nature of the task 
being undertaken will predispose the organisation to maintain 
and operate an organisational framework within which explicit 
or implicit tendencies towards a matrix system of roles and 
relationships will be apparent. The earlier-noted relevance 
of organisational size as a conditioning 'factor also suggests a 
further proposition. Namely that these tendencies will be more 
apparent to the extent that the size of the project allows for a 
disaggregation of specialised activities performed to the level 
of the site. In other words, the larger the scale of the work, 
the more likely that specialist staff performing specialised 
functions will be seconded to the site team to perform these 
activites. Consequently the more explicit will be the tendency 
towards a dual structure of roles and relationships on site. In 
making this proposition, the starting assumption is that more 
generalistic, 'production management' staff are those most directly 
involved in managing the overall process of construction on site. 
What is being suggested here, in effect, is that the more 
extensive the pattern of secondment of specialist staff'to the 
site, then the more one moves away from a tsecondmentt towards 
an 'overlay' or 'co-ordination t model of matrix management 
(Knight 1977). Given these terms, the semantics here are somewhat 
confusing. However, the main point is that the latter represents 
the tendency towards a more dispersed and shared pattern of 
authority and control on site. The possibility this gives rise to 
is depicted in Figure 3.1(a). (The comparable situation for a 
design firm is depicted in Figure 3.1(b).) It should be noted 
that these diagrams only give illustrations of two sets of broad 
possibilities. A multitude of variants are possible, given the 
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Figure 3.1 Intraorganisational Matrices of Roles and Relationships 
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particular configuration of roles and relationships within and between 
departments and sections within the wider organisation. In particular, 
the extent to which production staff 'project managers' have direct 
'line' authority over project team members has been simplified for 
purposes of illustration to the position in an 'overlay' model of 
matrix management (Knight 1977). 
3.4 Task Uncertainty and Interdependence 
Investigations of the nature of task activity undertaken in 
construction have indeed taken as their starting point high levels of 
task uncertainty and subtask interdependence as highly salient features 
of the construction process on site (eg Riggin and Jessop 1965, Crichton 
1966, Morris 1972). For the construction firm involved in constructing 
a building or other type of structure, technical uncertainties stem from 
the geophysical conditions on site. Also to the extent that the resources 
and techniques are project specific, and perhaps untried and untested, 
then the means of achieving project objectives may to some extent involve 
technical uncertainties. However, perhaps by far the greater source of 
uncertainty may lie in the nature of the product specification itself and 
the constraints for the process of'production that this implies, rather 
than in the processes of production per see Specifically it is the nature 
and degree of product and process specification over which the construction 
organisation has no formal, direct control that provides an important 
souree of potential uncertainty.12 Other technical problems apart, the 
consistency of design plans with extant site conditions, and the 
variability of those plans as either conditions change, details are 
clarified, or variations are introduced make for a situation in which 
extensive'feedback' mechanisms in the construction process between 
construction and design activities tend to be appropriate (Crichton 1966). 
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Levels of subtask interdependence are also high, to the extent 
that physical and technical conditions require the close co-ordination 
of separate trades' work across the site as a whole. This will 
particularly tend to be the case to the extent that the amount of time 
available to perform specific tasks is constrained. For example, 
plastering and painting internal walls are sequentially-linked 
processes: painting follows on from plastering. If the 'overall 
programme is 'tight' however, the processes may become more tightly-
coupled, any problem in the execution of the former .having knock-on 
effects in the performance of the latter. A parallel set of activities 
may be involved in the installation of internal fixtures and fittings: 
eg lights, power points etc. Here, moreover, the processes may be 
reciprocally-interdependent: the space left in plastering sets constraints 
for the installation of electrical cablework; the installation of cables 
affects the finished quality of the plasterwork. If one adds to this 
the possibility of design variations (in the colour specification for 
paintwork, and the location of lights and power points respectively, 
for example), then the implications for the established plan of work 
should be obvious. 
These examples are given as very specific and simple illustrations 
of the tendencies towards conditions of uncertainty and inter-dependence 
in the performance of task work on a construction site. The general 
implication, broadening the focus to the managerial processes involved, 
is that project planning, co-ordination and control processes related 
to the performance of taskwork on site are subject to the complexities 
of these interdependencies and the propensity for change that are 
characteristic of the construction process. T h ~ ~ tendency for change 
in particular stems in part from the constraints and contingencies 
3.19 
arising through the geophysical conditions on site, and also perhaps 
from properties of the resources and techniques employed in the 
'transformation system' lKingdon 19r3). However, it is also, and 
perhaps most importantly, the propensity towards lack of full coverage 
or clarity, and to change in detail in the product specification itself 
(with its implications for the processes i n v ~ l v e d ) ) that marks the 
distinction of the construction process as a unit-based system of 
production from perhaps other forms. The industry does not occupy 
a position on a plateau of high technology as is the case in the matrix 
systems commonly discussed. However, its distinctive product and 
process characteristics do mark it out as a type of situation in which 
complexity, variability and high levels of interdependence in the 
performance of taskwork are'salient features. 
At the broader level of analysis, what this suggests for the 
firm is a reliance upon the technical and managerial expertise of 
personnel performing the work at the operational level (and hence the 
decentralisation of d i s c r e t i o n ~ r y , , decision-making authority to 
those 'on the ground'); coupled with the retention of some degree of 
centralised control over the management of the project as a whole. 
Corresponding tendencies towards a more 'organic' system of 
management at site level have been extensively commented upon in the 
construction management literature. Birrell (1981), for instance, 
desC"ribes the "informal organisation" which performs and manages 
construction site activity (comprising main contractor and subcontractor 
staff) in terms of extant processes of communication between the 
parties and their representatives. He stresses the importance of a 
participative approach by site managers and the importance of relation-
ships of confidence and trust between site representatives and head 
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office staff, and between the main contractor's site manager and 
subcontractors' representatives. Interestingly, however, his description 
of an "axle and spoke" pattern of communication stands in some contrast 
to the network communication structures deemed appropriate in the 
'organic' model. A similar, strong emphasis upon participative strategies 
at all levels in the site hierarchy, is found in the work of researchers 
investigating motivation and productivity performance on large sites 
(eg Borcherding 1977, Borcherding, Sebastian and Samuelson 1980, 
13 Borcherding and Garner 1981). The efficacy of a participative approach 
for quality performance on site has also been noted (Freeman and Bentley 
1980) • 
With respect to change and variability in the processes of 
construction on site, Hatchett (1971) has noted the need to allow for 
what constitutes a "dynamic learning system" of production on site, and 
has contrasted this with the somewhat static procedures and mechanisms 
that tend to be employed by construction firms for the monitoring and 
control of site activity. A similar emphasis upon the developmental 
and changing features of construction site activity'is found in the 
increasing attention given by researchers to transience and change in 
the management of site project work (eg Sozen 1981, Eguchi 1981, Halsey 
and Margerison 1978, Bryman et al 1986). At a broader level, an ',I, ' 
interesting set of findings with implications for the line of argument 
pursUed here have been obtained in an historical analysis of work 
organisation in the French construction industry since the war 
(Campinos - Dubernet 1985). The research questioned the assumption of 
the 'traditional' nature of construction activity by pointing to the 
extensive fragmentation and division of labour within the industry 
since market conditions changed over the 1960's. (It should be noted 
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that Stinchcombe's (1959) analysis is grounded in the association 
between the form of work organisation found in construction and 
market conditions). The researchers noted how the need to allow 
flexibility to cope with variability in construction processes had 
historically been met by a more decentralised control system in which 
"semi-autonomous groups" or gangs led by foremen played the central 
part in controlling the performance of work on site. As conditions 
changed over the 1960's (the market becoming 'tighter'), efforts to 
adopt an orthodox Taylorist system of production control were 
instigated, but were limited and met with little success. However, 
more direct control over the performance of work on site was 
developed through greater specialisation in site management activities 
(site managers succeeding foremen as those in.direct control), and 
through the establishment of work study 'packages' (in planning, 
estimating) available to site management on a 'consultancy' basis. 
It is interesting here to compare the similarity of this process with 
the developmental mOdels of matrix management discussed in Chapter 1 
above: control over the performance of taskwork on site, where a 
"semi-autonomous group" system of working was necessary, was sought 
via external forms of regulation manifested in a pattern of functional 
authority and influence over the performance of work on site. 
A similar relat·ed tendency has been noted towards the adoption 
of more sophisticated planning and control systems, and away from the 
characteristic 'ad hoc' approach that tended to characterise construction 
project activity through to the 1960's when more 'turbulent' economic 
conditions emerged (Lansley 1981). It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to consider the design and use of informational systems to aid 
the processes of estimating, project planning and control. The 
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literature is extensive and the methods and mechanisms adopted are 
more fully discussed elsewhere (eg Cleland and King 1975, Burman 1972). 
However, it is pertinent'to note the correspondence of this historical 
development due to more 'turbulent' conditions, with the developmental 
strategy described by Galbraith Cop cit) of responding to conditions 
of increased task uncertainty ,by investigating in vertical information 
systems. The points just raised may suggest that the two developments 
(matrix management and computerisation) have been complementary 
strategies adopted by construction firms over time to cope with 
conditions 1n an increasirigly'turbulent' product market environment. 14 
The juxtaposition between matrix management forms and the 
employment of sophisticated informational systems in construction 
finds expression in research undertaken in 20 firms in the Turkish 
construction industry (Arditi and Kutay 1981). The researchers 
adopted (and adapted) the Aston scales to investigate tendencies towards 
matrix management between 'user' and 'non-user' companies of network 
(systems) planning and control techniques. They found that the 
former group of firms exhibited tendencies towards more 'structuring 
of activities' and greater ' d e c e n t ~ a l i s a t i o n ' ' (Pugh et al 1968). Also 
they exhibited fewer management levels and were larger in size than 
'non-user' companies. They concluded that these firms exhibited 
greater tendencies towards a matrix system of management. However, 
the results and interpretation put on them are by no means convincing. 
Firstly, the structural attributes employed as dependent variables 
(eg decentralisation) are not necessarily symptomatic characteristics 
of a matrix structure. Matrix organisations may well be more 
decentralised, but not all decentralised organisations are matrix in 
form. There was no evidence given of a duality in structure: the 
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necessary condition for a matrix system. Given this omission - of the 
constructs central and necessary in an operationalisation of the matrix 
concept - one might well conclude that the firms varied simply 
according to their degree or type of bureaucratisation. Secondly, the 
finding of a greater degree of structuring of activities in 'user' 
firms, suggests perhaps the opposite to what one might expect in a 
matrix organisation. Given that such firms were also larger, the 
correspondence between the higher degrees of 'structuring' and 
'decentralisation' is by no means incompatible with the findings for 
large bureaucracies (see above, section 2.2). In a matrix organisation, 
moreover, one would expect activities to remain comparatively 
unstructured, reflecting a reliance upon professional and technical 
discretion in interaction, and the adoption of less 'obtrusive' 
mechanisms of control. In other words the findings contradict the 
interpretation put upon them. Thirdly, it is unclear as to why the 
adoption or not of network systems should be taken as the central 
differentiating variable. Arditi and Kutay (1981) relate this to 
the occurrence of a 'task culture' within the firm. This may be 
true. However, as noted in Chapter 1, differing types of culture 
may be conducive to differing forms of matrix organisation. More 
importantly perhaps, the use of network systems corresponds to 
Galbraith's (op cit) option of greater investment in vertical 
information systems - a complement or alternative to the extension 
of lateral relations in a matrix system. The association between 
system usage and greater structuring of activities 1S then consistent 
with the results: the use of such a system may in fact be associated 
with a greater structuring of activities within the firm as a whole, 
in which case more 'Obtrusive' mechanisms may take the place of 
the more 'organic' system of management presumed to characterise a 
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matrix setting. 
Before continuing further, it is ,useful first to summarise 
the main point raised in this brief review. It is essentially that 
the forms and processes of interaction that are found in the 
management of construction site work are symptomatic of many of the 
types of conditions found within a matrix setting. Furthermore, 
that the system of organisation that is established for the 
management of construction project· work, supplies a framework for 
the occurrence of a matrix system of roles and relationships: in 
varying forms, and to varying degrees of formality. The research 
evidence on the forms and processes of interaction involved with 
respect to the actual operation of a matrix system of management 
is somewhat.scant and inconclusive. The question is whether such 
necessary conditions are sufficient for a depiction of the actual 
processes of construction project management within a matrix 
framework. The general proposition put forward in this study is 
that they are. The empirical questions, to be explored in the later 
case descriptions and analyses are: how is this manifested, to what 
extent, in what forms, and with what implications? A similar set 
of questions are also inherent in the next section,which shifts the 
focus of attention now to the interorganisational network of 
relationships in the organisation and management of construction 
project activity. 
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3.5 Interorganisational Matrices 
The situation described in the previous section relates only 
to the position and role of the individual (construction) firm 
involved in the network of interorganisational relationships 
that constitutes the 'temporary multi-organisation' (Cherns 
and Bryant 1984) that is established to undertake and manage 
construction taskwork. The picture is complicated immensely 
once this wider inter-organisational framework is taken into 
account. The diagrams given in Figure 3.2 illustrate two 
sets of types of contractual and management system that may be 
found in construction: differentiated according to whether project 
design activities are undertaken in house or via the employment, 
by the client, of independent conSUltants. Again it should be 
noted that these diagrams only depict two possibilities. A 
multitude of variants are possible, given the particular configur-
ation of internal and external relationships for any given project. 
Also the potential complexity in the configuration of formal 
and informal relationships within the 'project organisation' has 
been simplified for the purposes of presentation. The main general 
point to be made here is that at a broader, interorganisational 
level of analysis within the project organisation as a whole, there 
is. also the potential for the occurrence of an (implicit) matrix 
system of roles and relationships given the multiple influence 
patterns that are observable amongst the organisa.tions' operational 
units, and each units' relationship with their broader organisation. 
Before turning to the dynamics of the management process that 
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Figure 3.2 Interorganisational Matrices of Roles and R e l a t i o n s h i ~ s s .. 
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Figure .2 Interorganisational Matrices of Roles and Relationships 
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allow for this prediction (especially, the relationship between 
design and construction processes), a brief series of points needs 
to be made in relation to the phenomenon of subcontracting in 
this respect. 
There are a variety of forms of subcontracting that occur 
within the industry. At the level of the range of operations 
performed on site, subcontractors may be employed on a labour-only 
basis, on a labour and plant or materials basis, or as a self-
contained unit operating on a supply and fix basis. 15 The general 
economic, technological and other reasons for the decision as to 
whether to subcontract work or not in relation to a specific project 
are beyond the scope of this discussion. The important factor here 
is that subcontracting represents a degree of 'vertical disintegration' 
in the main construction firm's operations on site. The strategy 
may be one generally adopted by the firm, or contingent upon 
o. 0 dOt 0 16 H t th t spec1f1c proJect and local con 1 1onso owever, 0 e exten 
that it occurs it involves the substitution of ahierarchical system 
of control for a market-based system of control based upon the. 
establishment of a contractual set of terms and conditions (Ouchi 
1979, Williamson 1975). At the same time, however, the physical 
proximity and interdependencies between the processes of work 
involved - described in the previous section - mark the need for a 
framework and processes of managerial interaction that allow for the 
c o m p l e ~ i t i e s s and interdependencies in the work processes involved 
in order to achieve a sufficient degree of co-ordination and control 
of work on site. If, because of these factors, a more decentralised 
system of management in the (main) construction organisation is matched 
with a more decentralised system within each of the subcontracting 
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organisations involved, then the conditions exist for studying 
the processes involved within a matrix framework. In this model, 
the relevant dual axes, and sources of authority, influence and 
control, become: on the one hand, that associated with the 
extra-organisational management of project task work; on the 
other hand, that associated with the relationshirsbetween the 
operational units and their wider organisations. In other words, 
the subcontractor's representative, agent or team, is responsible 
to the representatives of the main contracting organisation who 
are managing work on site on behalf of the firm to whom the 
subcontractor is under contract. At the same time they are also 
responsible to their own firm for the pursuance of organisational 
goals with respect to the project. The distinctiveness in the 
basis of this relationship and possible implications for the form 
and basis of interaction will be ,discussed b ~ l c w w in 
Chapter 4. The point here is that such a framework, given the 
nature of the task, is apparent in the system of relationships 
that managing construction project task work involves. (It 
should also be noted that a comparable framework exists in the 
configuration of relationships amongst the design team and their 
position vis-a-vis the client. Here, however, it is rather the 
degree of 'horizontal (dis)integration' of design disciplines 
that is the appropriate split. Figure 3.2 has been subdivided 
in' order to show the different pattern that in house and 
consultant relationships have in this respect. The difference is 
analogous to the difference between the main construction firm 
performing the work directly and hiring subcontractors. In both 
settings (construction and design), and in both configurations 
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(internal and external) a matrix framework occurs. The difference 
in the former respect is in the different basis of (dis)integration 
and specialisation in functions. Wbe difference in the latter 
respect is in the different basis of the relationship 
(hierarchical or market) between groupings). 
A further compounding factor in the administrative complexity 
that this suggests stems from the existence of 'nominations' for the 
performance of subcontract work. Formal nominations (and less formal 
mechanisms such as the appointment of 'approved' or 'preferred' 
subcontractors and/or suppliers) occur when a particular sub-
contractor is specified by the client or their agents. Most usually 
the type of work will be specialist in nature reflecting the 
premium placed upon the more direct control by the client and design 
team of the design quality of the work involved. 'Nominations' are 
distinct from the employment of the main contractor'S own 'domestic' 
subcontractors, and are employed in the industry under a distinct 
form of contract. 17 In terms· of the management process that is 
involved, the employment of nominated subcontractors represents 
in practice a more extensive degree of involvement of design staff 
(the client's agents) in the design, manufacture and assembly of 
component products or units. What this means for the matrix 
framework described above, is a somewhat more complex potential 
pattern of authority, influence and control of subcontracted work 
by virtue of the additional processes of interaction with respect 
to the design that this implies. In other words, not only is the 
subcontractor subject to the dual pattern of influence with respect 
to their own organisation and the main contractor, but also to a 
tripartite system of influence and control due to the inclusion 
3.31 
of direct relationships with members of the design team. In 
practice, of course, the conditions will vary, contingent upon 
the circumstances faced. In one respect this may mean that the 
main contractor de facto plays a much more direct role in mediating 
designer-subcontractor patterns of interaction. Conversely, 
however, such patterns of interaction may extend de facto to the 
management of the main contractor's own 'domestic' subcontractors' 
operations. These are largely empirical questions. The general 
point here is that the potentiality for close and continuing 
interaction with respect to the design details involved lends a 
further complicating dimension to the model of interorganisational 
matrix management proposed. 
3.6 Interdependence between Design and Construction Processes 
The foregoing discussion has been based implicitly upon the 
assumption of a degree of reciprocal interdependence (continuing 
into the construction process on site) between design and construction 
activites. Indeed, a high and continuing level of such inter-
dependence between these activities (across the range of work 
undertaken on site) has proved a central feature in 'investigations 
of the problems of management of the construction process as a 
whole (Riggin and Jessop 1965, Crichton 1966, Morris 1972, 1973). 
There are two issues that deserve attention here. The first concerns 
problems of co-ordination and control between design and construction 
a c ~ i v i t y . . The second concerns these problems in the context of 
organisational differentiation. To deal briefly with the first 
point, the nature of the task undertaken in construction is one in 
which the 'technical system' requirements are for a pattern of 
interaction in which communication patterns are requisitely more 
informal (Riggin and Jessop 1965) and the relationship between 
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design and construction phases recognises the need for 'feedback 
loops' (Crichton 1 9 6 ~ , , and more informal mechanisms of control 
(ibid, p46). However, since early reports concerning the problems 
of management in the construction industry (Emmerson 1962, Banwell 
1964), attention has been directed towards the inherent conflict 
between these 'technical system' requirements and the nature of 
the institutional framework for linking design and construction 
processes - based as it is upon a system of tendering and 
contractual relationships amongst the parties involved. The focus 
has been upon the disjuncture at the "interface" (Morris 1972) 
between design and construction processes, and its inconsistency 
with the need for a more flexible and informal arrangement to 
complement the interdependencies in the technical processes 
involved. Thus, attention has been directed towards the 'sequential 
finality' implicit in the institutional framework, in which phases 
and responsibilities are separated and differential and inconsistent 
control mechanisms are employed (Crichton 1966). The problematic 
is manifested in the tendency for construction firms to have a 
limited degree of involvement in design processes despite the 
presumed efficacy of this; problems in introducing engineering 
design changes and in reaching agreement on design changes once the 
contract has been signed; and the problems of coordination that occur 
to the extent that there is a significant degree of 'overlap' 
between design and construction stages of the project. It is noted 
that, in practice, there is a tendencr for more informal and 
flexible patterns of interaction to occur (Higgin and Jessop 1965, 
Crichton 1966). For example: 
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" in practice, reality forces a recognition of 
interdependence, uncertainty, phased decision-making 
and continuous application of functions. It forces 
members of the building team to adapt themselves." 
(Crichton 1966, p46) 
However, these pragmatic tendencies are seen as being generally 
'overpowered' by the formal system of interaction in which contractual 
documents - and the bill of quantities in particular - provide a mechanism 
for control and a general framework for interaction which is regarded as 
inconsistent with the processual (rather than product) dynamics of the 
task (Higgin and Jessop 1965). According to Morris (1972, pp8-9) there 
is fostered a "hierarchic" as opposed to "transformational" viewpoint 
of the performance of construction task work. The tension between these 
tendencies is made explicit in many commentaries on the management of 
large projects (eg Halsey and Margerison 1978, pp249-251). The implications 
of this for the forms and processes of interaction in the construction 
setting will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. The main point 
to be emphasised at the moment is that, in the relationship between design 
and construction processes, there is generally held to be a mismatch 
between the technical uncertainties and interdependencies in the processes 
involved and the imposition of a formal contractual system that assumes 
a degree of certainty, finality and independence of the processes involved. 
The key element in this mismatch is the organisational independence of 
resource controllers involved in the total process of design and 
construction (Higgin and Jessop 1965; Morris 1972, 1973). 
Referring this back to the earlier description of the matrix 
framework for interaction, what is of particular interest are the 
implications of organisational differentiation with respect to design and 
construction activities across this contractual divide, and associated 
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patterns of integration. These issues will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 4. However, it is worthwhile to note specific possibilities 
identified in the construction management literature. Morris (1972, 
p31) in particular addresses the tendencies towards differentiation 
(Lawrence and Lorsch 1967) at an organisational level, related to 
differences in the 'character' of the interacting organisations. 
" 
Specifically he notes potential general variability between design and 
construction organisations in their size (contractors being larger in 
scale); their structural attributes (division of labour, levels of 
management, administrative ratio, etc); their complexity (levels of 
specialisation and professionalisation); their performance criteria (eg 
quality or cost); and, generally speaking, relative tendencies towards 
a more 'organic' as opposed to 'mechanistic' framework of interaction 
(he suggests that design firms will exhibit greater tendencies towards 
the latter). Unfortunately, his analysis of the results does not clearly 
and systematically disaggregate these facets of the organisations' 
attributes in relating organisational differentiation with the processes 
and levels of integration achieved at the 'design-construct interface'. 
However, one would expect such factors and their implications to be of 
some interest in the investigation of project management in this type of 
interorganisational setting, given the broader 'cultural' inconsistencies 
that they tend to imply. 
3.7 Alternative Delivery Systems 
A more general set of observations can be made with respect to 
the level of integration achieved if one looks more broadly at the 
form of contractual relationship or 'delivery system' under which 
the various parties are contracted by the client to perform and 
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manage project task work. The earlier discussion has tended to 
assume the occurrence of a 'traditional' set of contractual 
relationships, in which design and construction organisations 
are hired separately by the client to undertake the work: the 
former, as well as providing the design, supervising and controlling 
the process of construction on site on behalf of the client 
"t" 18 organJ.sa ~ o n . . However, in recent years, attention has been 
directed towards alternative frameworks for project organisation 
and management: specifically, management contracting and design 
and construct contracting. In the former case, a main managing 
contractor is employed specifically to manage the process of 
construction, undertaking none of the work directly and is paid 
a fee in much the same way as design consultants are 
(see, for instance, Thomas 1975, Carter 1972). 
In the latter case, a construction firm is employed to supply a 
"package deal' - involving the design of the product as well as its 
construction. 
The historical development of these forms is described by Higgin 
and Jessop (1965) in their discussion of the development of the 
professions and buiilders' organisations at a societal level. 19 
The point to be raised here, is that such arrangements are 
ostensibly geared towards accommodating the complexities, 
uncertainties and interdependencies involved in the relationship 
between design and construction activities (and on site in the 
relationship between interdependent construction processes). In 
the case of management contracting, this is reflected in the 
specialisation of the firm in planning, co-ordinating and 
controlling work itself and in acting as a conduit for the two-way 
flow of design and construction information between designer and 
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subcontractor. In the case of design and construct 'package 
deals' ~ ~ the process of design-construct interaction is internalised 
within the firm performing both functions. Both systems involve 
a much earlier degree of involvement of the construction 
organisation in the design process t h a n · ~ ~ tends to be the case in 
a more 'traditional' system. Further, it has been noted that the 
'management system' for the performance o f ~ ~ s k w o r k k is, in these 
cases, more fully consistent with the 'contractual system' of roles 
and relationships that link the parties than is the case in a 
more 'traditional' setting (Institute of Building, 1979). It is 
not the intention here to address the quite sizeable body of 
construction management literature that, usually drawing upon 
descriptions of specific instances in which these systems have 
been employed, categorises the applicability of these systems 
to the scale and type of work involved, their advantages and 
disadvantages with respect to achieving cost, time and quality 
objectives, and the problems or otherwise in their implementation 
and operation. 20 Rather the intention here is to make the 
general point that such mechanisms aim in part to achieve the 
degree of co-ordination and control of construction work that is 
confounded by the organisational separation of design and 
. 21 
construction processes. Whether they achieve this aim (and at 
what costs) is the subject of debate within the industry. For 
the purposes of this discussion, whether or not they achieve 
a sufficient level of integration in the sense of the word as 
defined by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) is an empirical question. 
One might expect, for example, that each professional group's 
investment in their position and role within the construction 
management process, might militate against the favourable review 
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of such forms by certain groups, and promote their exaltation by 
others. Put more simply, architects, for instance, may feel 
that such forms mean that contractors are 'stealing the show'. The 
broad issue here is the effects on a 'role culture' within the 
industry (Riggin and Jessop 1965) in which the position, role and 
jurisdiction of professional and occupational groups with respect 
to project management is ahighly developed and salient feature. In 
relation to specific projects, the questions arise as_to what impact 
such forms have upon achieving the level of integration required, 
in what ways, in what respects, and with what consequences? In part 
this may be influenced by the sets of perceptions, assumptions and 
attitUdes mentioned above. More specifically, it will be influenced 
by particularistic characteristics of the work involved, the management 
of the processes involved, and the constellation or pattern of roles 
and relationships within the 'local' network of interaction between 
those organisations and their subgroups involved. 
What is clear however, is that with respect to the matrix 
framework for interaction-described earlier, -this variability in the 
nature of the contractual system employed, represents variability in 
the explicit mechanisms employed to co-ordinate activity and to 
integrate subunits performing interdependent work. In other words, 
the empirical possibility is of the e m p l o y m ~ n t t of an explicit and 
central integrative mechanism in the network of interorganisational 
roles and relationships in the event of the establishment of a 
'non traditional' contractual system for the performance of project 
work. In the case of a design and construct contract, this mechanism 
will be internal to the firm undertaking both design and construction 
activities. In the case of a management contract, the mechanism will 
be external to the firms undertaking the activities. In both 
cases an individual Project Manager or Project Management team may 
be involved in coordinating activity undertaken by functional 
specialists. The difference will be in the relative organisational 
location of the respective participants. The system of management 
contracting or, to give it is more generic term, 'Project Management' 
in particular has received a considerable amount of attention in the 
construction management literature, as a mechanism whereby design and 
construction processes are more closely coordinated. The development 
of this system has been most extensive in the United States as has 
the discussion of its rationale and implications (eg Adrian 1981, 
Clough and Sears 1979, Barrie and Paulson 1978). Referred to as 
"(Professional) Construction Management", the emphasis is upon a 
processual view of construction project activity as a whole: 
"(Construction Management) is a process by which a 
potential project owner engages an agent, referred 
to as the CM, or Construction Manager, to co-ordinate 
and communicate the entire project process, including 
project feasibility, design, planning, letting, 
construction and project implementation, with the 
objective of minimising the project time and cost, 
and maintaining the project quality. 
(Adrian 1981, p2; emphasis in original) 
A similar emphasis upon co-ordination and integration of design and 
construction processes is found in discussions.of its application to 
the management of project activity in the UK (Ireland and Stretton 
1981, Failes 1977, Institute of Building 1979): 
"By comparison with other methods in which the design 
and management roles are simultaneously taken by one 
person, or in which the management responsibility is 
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passed from one functional group to another during 
the project, the Project Management method provides 
an integrated approach." 
(Ireland and Stretton 1981, p68) 
The method is linked to the intensive need for co-ordinating the 
activities of various trades, specialisms and disciplines towards 
the achievement of a common set of project objectives, where there 
is complexity in the processes involved, a lack of time for planning 
and 'the need for cross-cutting 'teamwork' (eg Failes 1977). The 
mechanism consists of the appointment of an agent independent of 
those with prime responsibility for undertaking design and 
construction activities (in a traditional contracting system, it 
is a design specialist - architect or engineer - who has t r a d i t i o n a l ~ ~
performed this 'project management function'). The independence of 
this agency (or team) is the feature that marks out the distinctiveness 
of the management contracting form from both the more 'traditional' 
arrangement, and the design and construction alternative. Given the 
discussion in the latter part of Chapter 2 above, it is this facet 
in particular, and its implications for the role of the integrator in 
a matrix system, that is of particular interest to this study. 
3.8 Summary 
This chapter has sought to relate the discussion in the 
previous two chapters to the situation and circumstances found in the 
construction industry. Attention has been focused upon the character-
istics of the task performed in construction, and the implications 
of its distinctive features have been addressed in terms of the forms 
of organisation and processes of management found at both an intra-
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and inter-organisational level of analysis within the industry. In 
particular the occurrence of a matrix-type framework for interaction 
in the management of construction project taskwork at both levels 
of analysis has been postulated. Bearing this situation in mind, 
the discussion in the next chapter turns to a consideration of likely 
patterns and processes of interaction in the interorganisational 
management of the project. The discussion will return to and explore 
more fully some of the issues raised towards the end of Chapter 2, 
but in the context of the more specific characteristics of the 
process of management with respect to construction project task work 
that have been highlighted in this chapter. Following this commentary, 
the themes that have been discussed will be drawn together and 
presented as a model of the processes of construction project 
management, from which a number of hypotheses will be drawn and 
presented. 
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Footnotes 
See, for instance, the articles by Bissett, Hollenbach, 
Duke et al in "Realities in Project Management" (Proceedings 
of Project Management Institute (USA), Chicago, Illinois, 1977). 
2 Excepting here the possibility of the need to perform 
'remedial and/or maintenance work during the buildings' 
commissioning and use. 
3 An exception to this rule in the latter respect may be found 
in the conditions in the shipbuilding industry. In shipbuilding, 
spatial 'and geophysical conditions may also playa similar part 
in conditioning and influencing in practice the production 
system employed. The slight difference here is that shipbuilding 
is not necessarily a location-specific production activity 
(although the size of the product tends in practice to mean 
that this is so). A more important practical difference is 
that access to water and launch facilities is the major 
prerequisite. Consequently, the firm's activities are not 
geographically dispersed, but concentrated round, for example, 
one locality in which deep water harbour facilities are 
available. . 
4 See, for instance, Braverman (1974). It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to discuss in any great detail characteristics 
of the labour process in construction, and the relationship 
between production technology and levels of skill. For a 
fuller discussion, s e ~ ~ for instance, papers by A •. !uckman and 
J. Pauld1ng in Bartlett (1980), Proceedings, pp. 54-63. 
5 They also have implications for the structure of the industry 
at a more macro level. In particular, the implications for 
lowering barriers to entry to small firms within the indUstry: 
through reduced economies of scale; ability to specialise by 
process not product (meaning extensive vertical disintegration); 
and the low fixed capital outlay required to set up in 
business. Such factors have meant the continued existence of 
a large number of small, specialised firms, and no significant 
historical trend towards higher levels of concentration. For 
a fuller discussion, see Fleming (1980), Thompson (1981). 
6 Although in the latter respect, differentiating between 
broad stages - eg main construction and remedial/maintenance 
work - ,does suggest this possibility. However, here one is 
strictly dealing with different rocesses that happen to 
correspond (although not necessar.ily with distinct 
chronological stages. 
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7 As will be described in Chapter 6, the main contractor 
employed on that project owned and operated its own piling 
division. Much of that division's activity was in undertaking 
subcontract work for main contractors on other projects. It 
should be noted that this example, coupled with others (eg 
the main managing contractor in Chapter 10) suggests a further 
basis for specialisation: namely in the specific form of 
contractual or' delivery system employed. The two examples 
noted here serve as illustrations of specialising as a 
subcontractor, and as a management contractor, respectively. 
T h ~ ~ former is somewhat different in that the limited scope 
of the work undertaken with respect to the specific construction 
process meant that, by definition, the division could only 
undertake subcontracted work (including for its own parent 
organisation). The latter is perhaps more interesting. In 
the course of the research it was noted that a number of large 
construction organisations competing in the industry now 
operated specialist divisions that undertook only management 
and/or design and construct contracts. These forms are 
returned·to in more detail below. 
8 The situation facing firms engaged in the provision of 
professional design services is clearly different here. 
Namely, the orientation of each specific discipline 
(architecture, civil/structural engineering, mechanical/ 
electrical services engineering, and surveying) is to 
specific processes across the design and construction 'cycle'. 
Consequently, specialisation by process in this respect is a 
a more pertinent characteristic. 
9 A more general problem emerges in the financing of project 
work, which inVOlves, initially, large outlays for variable 
capital for which remuneration is obtained only after the 
work involved at interim stages. For a fuller discussion 
of the implications, see Fleming (1980). 
10 The degree of 'casualism' in employment patterns and 
recruitment within the industry that this sitation 
engenders has been the subject to a good deal of attention. 
(Phelps-Brown 1968, NEDO 1970, EIU 1978). It is not the 
intention here to delve further into the issue of labour 
recruitment, other than to note the extent to which, in recent 
years, subcontracting has developed as a mechanism employed 
by main contracting organisations to offset their dependency 
upon fluctuating and uncertain product and labour market 
conditions (eg Bresnen et al 1985). 
11 For a discussion of the implications of organisational 
transience in temporary systems, see Bryman et al (1986). 
12 A corresponding source of uncertainty for the design firm is 
in the nature of the original client's brief, and any subsequent 
ambiguities that emerge from that brief, or changes that occur 
to it as the process of design (and then construction) is 
undertaken. 
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13 For a review and c r i t i ~ u e e of this literature with respect 
to the for.ms and processes of leadership exercised on site, 
see Bresnen et al (1984). 
14 Here it is worthwhile to point to one ~ u e s t i o n n that this 
distinction raises. Specifically, if task conditions on site 
suggest the efficacy of a much 'looser' organic model of 
interaction, then to what extent, and how, does this situation 
dovetail with the aim of devising a set of more precise 
mechanisms for planning and project control which amount to 
a more 'mechanistic' aid to project management? For example, 
what are the implications of devising a mechanism for the 
assessment of performance based upon precisely and 
unambiguously' defined evaluation criteria, when for performance 
to be effectively achieved, those criteria themselves are not 
necessarily unambiguous. The issue will be, to some extent, 
returned to later (Chapter 4) in a discussion of the 
juxtaposition between technical system and business system 
r e ~ u i r e m e n t s s (Sayles and Chandler .1971). At the moment it is 
worthwhile to point out that the massive attention directed 
towards devising more suitable and effective informational 
systems for project planning and control reflects this 
contradiction between the need for an essentially static 
and certain mechanism in conditions in which change and 
uncertainty are the norms. 
15 An additional possibility, returned to below, is that of 
client/design team "nomination". 
16 A similar line of argument here is applicable to the contracting 
of materials suppliers and plant hire firms to provide 
materials and plant respectively for the performance of work 
on site by the main contracting organisation. 
17 Employment is via, respectively, the 'green' and' blue' 
forms of standard subcontract issued by the Joint Contracts 
Tribunal. 
18 In both building and civil engineering, standard forms of 
contract, published by the Joint Contracts Tribunal and the 
Institute of Civil Engineers respectively, provide the 
framework for this triadic system of roles and relationships 
(see Walker, Smith and Close (1971». 
19 It should also be noted that additional, but less pervasive 
in large scale and idiosyncratic construction settings, 
• mechanisms have emerged: notably, the use of serial contracts 
for 'rolling' developments and, in certain instances, the 
direct management of wholly-subcontracted work by professional 
design staff (ie architects). 
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20 See. for instance, McLaughlin (1981, pp321-330), for a 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of these 
forms from the viewpoint of the client; and the factors that 
are likely to influence the efficacy of one form or another 
in this respect. See also the reports by Wood (1975) and 
Wilson (1974) which pertain to the strategic choices available 
to the client in the public and private sectors of the industry 
respectively. 
21 Interestingly, if one takes the individual organisation in 
interaction as the focal unit of analysis, such mechanisms 
may be interpreted as being strategies adopted by the firm 
(ie the contractor) to lessen their dependency upon the 
environment by seeking to control key functions (ie design). 
In the case of design and construct, by expanding their 'domain' 
to include these activities; in the case of management 
contracting, by changing their 'domain' and specialising in 
the actual co-ordination and control of design and construction 
processes. Aldrich (1979) has noted that firms in an 
interorganisational network may resolve disputes by expanding 
or contracting their boundaries. It seems pertinent to 
suggest that, at a broader level, firms may seek to control 
their environment by pursuing comparable strat,egies involving 
changing their 'domain' (Leyine and White 1960, Thompson 1967). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTERORGANISATIONAL PROJECT W L ~ A G E M E N T T IN CONSTRUCTION: 
Chapter 2 addressed the issue of the power-dependence 
relationship between organisations and potential implications for 
the form and processes of interaction at the operational level in 
the joint management of project work. In the light of the discussion 
in Chapter 3, the intention here is to address the issue further 
by focusing more particularly upon the nature of the business 
relationship linking the parties and its relevance to an under-
standing of the achievement of a level of integration between the 
parties concerned. In doing so, attention will be directed towards 
the formal structure of interaction as it is defined by, and in 
turn may define, the broader power relationship between the parties. 
The form of agreement entered into will be looked at with respect 
to its role in defining and delineating the formal structures 
and processes of interaction between the parties involved, and how 
this may correspond to the 'technical system' requirements of the 
task being performed. 
4. 1 
4.1 The Contractual Relationship: The Formal Basis for 
Interaction 
The use of a contract corresponds to the establishment of 
a formalised agreement between the parties involved (Marrett 
1971) which is legally and contractually binding (Van de Ven and 
Ferry 1980, Aldrich 1979). The contractual system of interest 
in this study is the set of legally-enforceable terms and 
conditions of contract that form the basis for case law in the 
construction industry (eg Porter 1980). A more detailed exposition 
of the roles and responsibilities of the parties under these 
various forms of agreement can be found in Porter (1980) or 
Walker, Smith and Close (1971). At the moment, it is useful 
to assess the general properties of the type of agreement reached 
in a construction project setting. Firstly, it is important 
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to distinguish between the terms and conditions of the contract 
as they apply to the specific project concerned, as opposed to the 
more generalised rights and obligations of parties under a contract. 
The former encompass details which are project specific. These 
will include the sUbstantive content of the agreement (ie time, 
cost and quality objectives, specification of levels and types of 
resources to be used, production techniques, etc), as well as 
procedural mechanisms established for the planning, monitoring and 
co-ordination of work (eg monthly review meetings, the procedures 
for the approval of drawings and programmes, etc). The latter 
relate to the legal rights and obligations of the parties conferred 
under general terms and conditions of contract (eg rights to 
compensation, remuneration, etc). The legal framework which 
encompasses this latter set of general terms and conditions of 
contract corresponds quite closely to a 'mandated' framework for 
interaction (Hall et al 1 9 7 7 ) ~ ~ wherein the roles, rights and 
obligations of the parties under law are s p e c i ~ i e d , , their enactment 
being contingent upon SUbstantive and procedural features of the 
project and circumstances as they occur and develop. As such, 
general terms and conditions serve to define the parameters to the 
legitimacy of action of one party with respect to the other, and 
the nature and'extent of sanctions applicable in the case of default. 
The argument that is pursued here is that, in doing so, they function 
as a-proxy for internal, bureaucratic mechanisms of control exercised 
w i t h i ~ ~ organisations, in the sense that they define formal patterns 
of authority and accountability in the relationships between 
participating organisations. The formal authority of one party 
(and, conversely, the others' responsibility) is given legitimacy 
in a structural framework for interaction devised at a broader, 
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'institutional' level within the industry (Parsons 1960). The 
availability of formal sanctions and a system of arbitration in the case 
of default by one or other of the parties means that the framework also 
constitutes a judicial or appeals system for the resolution of disputes 
(Brown 1966; Simon 1960, pp11-12). Schlacher (1979) has described this 
system as. the "constitution" of the construction project organisation. 
Before continuing further, it is useful to address briefly certain 
aspects of the form of the relationship as it is conditioned by a 
broader framework agreed or negotiated at an institutional level. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to provide a broad 
overview of patterns of interaction at an institutional level with 
I 
respect to the establishment of construction contracts, or to attempt 
to chart changes in general terms and conditions over time and the 
dynamics of the processes involved. 2 However, what is pertinent 
to this discussion is that current. terms and conditions of contract 
reflect the outcome of broader processes of agreement or negotiation 
concerned with defining the respective rights and obligations of 
the parties engaged in a demand-supply transaction. As such, and 
given that some degree of legitimate goal conflict is inherent in 
the nature of a demand-supply transaction (Litwak and Hylton 1962, 
Warren 1967, Turk 1973), then one would expect that the weights 
attached to the legitimacy of the respective parties would in some 
way be related to the locus of p o ~ e r r at an institutional level and 
. 
the degree of representation available, through c?llective action, to 
the interests involved. In other words, that the establishment 
of a legal framework for interaction follows from a negotiating/ 
bargaining process, rather than from a process in which concensus 
fully exists. The recent debate centring upon the introduction of 
new standard terms and conditions of contract within the industry 
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serves perhaps as a timely illustration of the process of change 
in the formal legal framework for interaction, and how change in 
this respect is manifested in a new 'balance of power' among the 
interests represented. 3 The point to be made here is simply 
that the ~ o r m a l l agreement embodies the institutionalisation of 
legitimate but conflicting interests; in doing so, it may represent, 
in part, conditions of demand and supply at a broader societal 
level which, moreover, are not necessarily static and which may be 
amended or adjusted historica1ly.4 
Turning again to what this type of system means for the parties 
engaged in a specific transaction, it should be clear that some 
degree of legal specification of formal rights and obligations exists 
to guide interaction. Such a situation - of a highly developed 
(albeit subject to change) system of formal, legal specification of 
rights and obligations - perhaps contrasts somewhat with the types 
of situation commonly investigated in other interorganisational 
settings. Early interorganisational analysts tended to stress the 
study of interactive behaviour under conditions of unstructured 
authority. For example, in their study of co-ordinating agencies 
in community chest and social services exchanges, Litwak and Hylton 
(1962) suggested that: 
" ••• most intraorganisational analysis is made under 
the assumption of a ~ a i r l y y well-defined authority 
structure. As a consequence, formal authority plays 
a larger role in explaining behaviour within organis-
ations than it does in interorganisational analysis." 
(ibid, p341) 
This is undoubtedly the case, given the specific types of network 
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(eg community and public services networks) that have most commonly 
been researched in the field. Later models, turning their attention 
to 'mandated' frameworks for interaction (Hall et al 1977, 
Raelin 1980) have provided a means whereby formal relationships 
that play a significant part may be more fully incorporated. 
", 
However, such mOdels have tended to diverge considerably from the 
emphasis upon economic exchange which is the basis for interaction 
in the type of setting discussed here. More generally, the point 
has been made that contractual relationships and other forms of 
external interaction common in a business and industrial setting have 
seldom been the focus of attention for interorganisational analysts 
{Reve and Stern 1979).5 
The point raised here is that the formal contractual structure of 
interaction constitutes a form of "executive system" (Brown 1966) 
that acts as a proxy for internal structures of power, authority 
and control since it is concerned with specifying the legitimacy 
of action (and hence, legitimate power - French and Raven 1959) of 
the parties and their rights to exercise sanctions with respect to 
the performance of project work. As such it plays an important part 
in defining the parameters for interaction, and may be critical to 
an understanding of the processes involved. The first point about 
the contract framework for interaction is that it is implicitly 
hierarchical in nature. That is, the roles, rights and obligations 
of each party under the contract reflect their position in the 
demand-supply chain of relationships. In other words: clients 
supply a brief for designers to design to; manufacturers build to 
the designers' specifications; and suppliers supply work or components 
to the detailed specifications and schedules of work articulated by 
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the manufacturer and based on the original brief and specification. 
As was noted in an earlier quotation, the contractual relationships 
that link the parties at each level are control-oriented (Sayles 
and Chandler op cit). The contractual terms and conditions reflect 
this directionality: the party on the demand side is vested with 
the right to obtain the levels of performance required as specified 
in t ~ e e details of the original agreement; the party on the supply 
side is vested with the right to remuneration for the performance 
of that work, and for compensation stemming from any changes to 
it or any misdirections in the original remit. The problem of 
securing accountability in this respect, of course, stems from 
ambiguities and so on in the interpretation of the original 
details or of the performance levels required: this will be 
returned to below. The point here is that, while the transaction is 
one of exchange (Homans 1958), it is a peculiaristic form of 
exchange, in that the level and intensity of managerial interaction 
is high (eg in the two-way flow of design and production information 
between the parties). Unlike in a more straightforward form of 
exchange relationship, the general conditions of contract need to 
account for this feature: they do so by supplying a legalistic 
framework that is quasi-hierarchical in nature. Another way of 
looking at this is to recognise that the chain of relationships 
described above corresponds to a situation of "vertical disintegration" : 
rather than one organisation performing all t h ~ s e e functions (ie 
design, manufacture, supply),they are undertaken by separate 
organisations linked in a market relationship - each party's outputs 
forming part of the inputs of the next down the chain. Given this 
level of interdependence, the contractual mechanism serves not simply 
to specify terms and conditions of exchange, but also to provide a 
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framework for the performance of planning, co-ordination and control 
functions with respect to the management of project work. 
A ~ r i t i c a l l feature of this formal structure of interaction is the 
extent to which it defines the right to exercise discretion and 
what this means for the locus of formal influence within the 
interorganisational network. From a cursory glance at sets of 
contractual terms and conditions used in construction, there are 
sufficient examples of the phrases "where in the opinion of ••• " 
and "to the satisfaction of ••• 1t and the like, to suggest that this 
discretionary component is of significant importance. 6 For 
example, assuming the quality of a supplied product is not fully as 
specified. The designer then has the right both to decide whether 
to accept or reject the product, and then to act according to the 
procedural mechanisms available (eg to inform the supplier to 
replace the product within a specified time period). Of course, a 
multitude of factors may influence the decision (eg the benefits 
of rework against the costs of disruption if the problem is minor). 
However, the main point is simply that, in a great many instances, 
that discretionary authority is available. In other words, like 
internal structures of authority that constitute the organisations' 
'executive system' (Brown 1966), contractual structures of 
authority in the form of those investigated here describe the formal 
authority available to participants - both to act and to decide 
(Koontz and O'Donnell 1980). The difference here perhaps lies in 
the notion of the legitimacy of action - particularly in the exercise 
of discretion available to participants - on the basis of this 
contractual authority. French and Raven (1959) describe legitimate 
power as: 
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" ••• that power which stems from internalised values 
in P which dictate that 0 has a legitimate right to 
influence P and that P has an obligation to accept 
this influence ••• the notion of legitimacy involves 
some sort of code or standard, accepted by the 
individual by virtue of which the external agent can 
assert his power." 
(ibid, p265; emphasis added) 
The question one has to ask in an interorganisational setting is 
to what extent the general terms and conditions of contract embody 
values which are shared amongst the participants. In other words, 
to what extent the utilitarian, as opposed to normative, basis 
of the relationship (Etzioni 1965) promotes differential perceptions 
of the legitimacy of particular forms of action - particularly the 
manner in which discretionary authority is exercised. On the one 
hand, one might expect some degree of 'unity of purpose (Simon 1965) 
directed towards the achievement of a common set of project 
objectives would tend to widen one party's "zone of acceptance" 
(ibid) to influence attempts made by the other on the basis of 
their contractual authority. However, one might also find that 
differential values, norms and goals may play some part in defining 
the party's "zone of acceptance" of influence attempts made on this 
basis. 
The general point to be made here is that the establishment of a 
contTactual framework for delineating the respective rights and 
obligations of the parties involved acts in many ways as a quasi-
administrative framework for interaction in the joint construction 
and management of a building project. The arrangement is neither a 
pure market transaction, nor a pure administrative arrangement 
(OUChi 1980): it combines elements of both. 
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4.2 Contractual Terms and Conditions 
The issues just described serve as an important structural backdrop 
for the following discussion of the nature of processes of 
interaction between the parties involved jointlr in the management 
of a construction project. In particular, it should be borne in 
mind that the legal framework sets the limits to action br providing 
the opportunitr to take recourse to formal mechanisms to secure 
compliance (although the associated costs and disadvantages may 
practically constrain the choice of options here: eg the costs of 
litigation); also, however, that the possibilities for more 'informal' 
processes of interactive decision-making may be extended by virtue 
of the discretion available to participants. On the latter point, 
the formal authoritr to take decisions may enhance the power in 
interaction of one partr relative to the other. On the other hand, 
to the extent that the other party has other means of influence at 
their disposal (eg economic power), then in an ambiguous situation, 
the exercise of discretionary authority mar in effect allow access 
to the other party to influence that decision. In other words, 
depending on circumstances, the scope available to exercise discret-
ionary authoritr m ~ ~ become transformed into the scope available to 
other parties to influence - through persuasion, cajoling or 
negotiation - the decision taken. 
Returning to the proj ect-specific content of the agreement, and in 
particular its substantive content, there are a number of points 
to be raised here. The first is that the specific terms of the 
agreement (ie the qualitr and quantitr of work expected for an 
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agreed price) may reflect to some extent the respective (economic) 
power of the participating organisations. In the case of a 
competitive tendering process that led to the reaching of an 
agreement, the price/output for.mula may be a reflection of general 
economic conditions within the industry as a whole (ie whether it is 
a buyer's or seller's market). However, it may also be possible that more 
'localised' environmental conditions play an 5mportant part (Kochan 1975, p43S. 
For instance, the heavy dependence of a contractor upon one major 
client as a source of work in generally unfavourable economic 
conditions may influence downwards the price submitted to undertake 
the work. Where a negotiated process precedes the reaching of an 
agreement, such 'localised' economic factors are clearly likely to 
become more salient to the process and possibly influence the terms 
finally reached. There are, of course, a multitude of possibilities, 
and the aim is not here to examine fully the range of possibilities. 
Rather it is to suggest simply that such antecedent conditions may 
have an important bearing upon subsequent processes of interaction. 
As Sayles and Chandler (1971) have noted: initially in negotiating 
contracts, each party is concerned with driving a hard bargain. 
The formation of the transaction places the parties in basically 
conflicting positions. The business agreement reached is by 
definition competitive rather than cooperative, and the adversarial 
nature of the relationship is inherent. This is not to suggest 
t h a ~ ~ conflict, competition and so on necessarily emerge subsequently 
in the relationship. In many instances it may not be the case that 
such 'latent conflict' (Pondy '967) exists, if both parties feel 
they have not been disadvantaged in the process of reaching an 
agreement. In other words, it is not necessarily a zero-sum or 
win-lose situation (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). Furthermore, 
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any such latent conflict in this respect may not be converted into 
'overt' conflict (Pondy 1967). The extent to which such circumstances 
occur or not is clearly an empirical question, and one which may 
depend upon a variety of conditions. Indeed, interorganisational and 
collective bargaining theorists stress the importance of separating 
latent conflicts of interest from overt conflicts in interaction. 
For instance: 
"By distinguishing between interorganisational and 
intraorganisational analysis, the investigator is 
sensitised to the organisational correlates of value 
conflict and value consistency. Without such a 
distinction, he might concentrate instead on showing 
that value conflicts lead to organisational breakdown 
without appreciating that interorganisational 
relations permit and encourage conflict without 
destruction of the overall societal relation." 
(Litwak and Hylton 1962, pp340-1) 
A related point is made by Warren (1972), who takes a more detailed 
focus of analysis and who separates the conditions of the relationship 
as a whole, from those with respect to the resolution of specific 
issues within the context of that relationship: 
"On any particular issue, any two organisations may 
have the same issue-outcome interest, or divergent 
issue-outcome interests. It is important to note 
that concerted decision-making may occur under 
situations of issue-outcome interest convergence or 
divergence. Where issue-outcome interests of two or 
more organisations converge, their concerted decision-
making is likely to be characterised by co-operative 
processes in the decision-making itself, and in 
seeking to assure the mutually desired issue-
outcome ••• Where issue-outcome interests ••• diVerge, 
their concerted decision-making is likely to be 
characterised by contest processes in the decision-
making itself, and in seeking to assure the mutually 
exclusive desired issue-outcomes." 
(ibid, pp26-27) 
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The point here is that the very nature of the contractual relation-
ship and the way in which an agreement has been reached manifested in its 
terms, may provide the basis for understanding the motivation to 
ensure the achievement of one's own desired outcome in subsequent 
interaction episodes. One would expect this to be particularly the 
case in circumstances in which the process of reaching agreement has 
been based upon overt or tacit attempts to obtain acquiescence or 
compliance based upon the explicit or implicit exercise of (economic) 
power. Subsequent conditions and developments may help or hinder the 
parties in furthering their advantage or redressing the balance. The 
stance taken with respect to specific issues mayor may not be informed 
directly by experience in earlier processes of interaction. These 
possibilities clearly depend upon the empirical circumstances surrounding 
the nature and development of the particular relationship in question. 
However, it is important to note that the motivational basis underscoring 
interaction may be in part a consequence of the dynamics of the process 
that led to the establishment of that relationship in the first place. 
The second point to be raised concerns the status of the agreement 
reached with respect to the scope available to the participants in 
exercising influence - through negotiation and bargaining strategies 
for instance - once the agreement is reached. The previous paragraph 
raised briefly the possibility that the process of reaching agreement 
may itself form the basis for an understanding of the motivation of 
the parties in subsequent interaction (with respect to achieving their 
goals). This point is concerned with addressing the extent to which 
the actual nature of the agreement allows them the opportunity or 
ability to realise their goals in interaction. 
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The complementarity of the motiviation to pursue a set of goals and 
the ability to achieve them by being able to ' i n t e r f e r ~ ~ with others' 
goal attainment has been shown to be crucial to an understanding of 
bargaining and conflict in interorganisational settings (Schmidt and 
Kochan 1972, Kochan et al 1975). The point is of particular 
importance here because of the juxtaposition in the relationship 
between the business agreement reached and the complex and uncertain 
characteristics of the task being performed (Sayles and Chandler 
1971). The key issue here is the degree of coverage and clarity 
in the original agreement with respect to the substantive c o n ~ n t t
and procedural mechanisms established for the performance of work in 
a complex project setting. 
Thompson (1967) has defined contracting as: 
"the negotiation of an agreement for the exchange of 
performances in the future." 
(ibid, p 35) 
In a straightforward transaction of a product or service at a given 
price and specified (and easily monitored) quality, the 'performances' 
involved are likely to be subject to a minimum of uncertainty or 
• • '? 
ambl.gul. ty. I However, in the type of setting discussed in this 
thesis, such an ability to define fully in a d v ~ c e e the quantitative 
and qualitative parameters of the performances to be achieved is by 
no means. as straightforward an exercise. 8 Sayles and Chandler 
(1971) have devoted considerable attention to this phenomenon and 
its manifestation in the particularistic form taken by planning 
activity in conditions of task uncertainty and interdependence, and 
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where an interorganisational bargaining process forms the means of 
reaching a contractual agreement: 
"In large scale redevelopment projects, a clear 
sequence of action is not possible because of their 
extended duration, the many technical unkno'WIls, the 
changing balance of power among interest groups, the 
continUal discovery of new 'facts" and constantly 
changing constraints and pressures." 
(ibid, pi) 
They note that the planning process.is a dynamic and iterative one. 
In sUbstantive terms, it may invqlve some degree of uncertainty 
concerning the precise technical means to achieve objectives, for 
instance. Further, certain sections of the work may be dependent 
upon the outcome of earlier results; consequently, specific sub-
objectives, and the resources and techniques needed to perform 
them, may be left unclear and subject to fuller specification and 
perhaps negotiation during the course of taskwork performance. In 
construction projects in the UK, !provisional sums' are used to 
demarcate an area of work to be subsequently more fully specified 
as the project on site proceeds. 
Secondly, dependent upon circumstances, the work being undertaken 
may change or be amended. In construction, design variations and 
the need to perform extra work - either as a consequence of factors 
emerging during the course of construction (eg, ground conditions) 
or through client initiation (eg deciding to change the type of 
fittings to be installed) - are common enough phenomena. 
An additional set of factors emerge to complicate the planning 
4.15 
process, when one considers the part played by other organisations 
in defining the content of the sUbstantive agreement. Sayles and 
Chandler have noted, for instance, that planning as a process 
becomes much more dependent upon information generated during 
the course of negotiations (ibid, Ch 2). In construction contracting, 
of course, the price of the work ultimately depends upon the 
information supplied by contractors during the tendering or 
negotiation process. However, additional interorganisational 
interaction during the planning process may also be to some extent 
evident in the establishment of other performance criteria (notably, 
the quality specification: whether, for instance, a certain type of 
finishing can be achieved and, if so, at what cost and with what 
implications for the programme of works?) In other words, the plans 
drawn up for the work depend to some extent upon a two-way flow of 
design specification and construction planning information. (The 
same phenomenon may hold at other levels: eg the main contractor 
needing to adjust their plans to allow for suppliers' production 
lead times and their schedules of work with respect to the capacity 
available). What is particularistic about this type of setting is 
not only that the process of planning itself is a dynamic and iterative 
one, but also that it crosses the boundary between the organisations 
involved and may also correspond to a process of negotiation. In 
other words, not only are original plans an 'estimate' of what is 
required (using 'estimate' in the generic sense and not solely with 
respect to the price submitted); but also they constitute a 
'negotiated estimate' of the work required, obtained through jOint 
interaction to some degree in the planning process. 
The point here is that, to the extent that this occurs, there 
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is a degree of 'reciprocal interdependence' in the planning process 
itself (as well as in subsequent interaction, including the 
replanning of work on site as conditions alter). Taking the 
relationship between design and construction activities in general, 
their conceptualisation as distinct sequentially-related phases in 
the project cycle as a whole contrasts with a reality in which the 
processes are more closely interlinked (Morris 1972). Moreover, 
to the extent that task uncertainty is a feature of the situation, 
one would expect this to be requisitely so. There is a paradox 
suggested here: the characteristics of the task being undertaken -
in particular the susceptibility to changes in requirements as 
the work is undertaken - contrasts with the degree of 'closure' 
implied in reaching an agreement. For areas of work that are either 
not fully or unclearly specified, or in the event of changes to 
the original set of plans, the agreement serves only to establish 
the parameters for future negotiation and agreement on these 
sUbstantive issues, as Sayles and Chandler (1971) suggest. 
Consequently, while the agreement may constitute a mechanism of 
control, it is limited in this respect to the extent that it does 
not fully prescrige the work to be done. The·paradox lies in the 
fact that if the task is to be performed 'effectively' (given high 
levels of task uncertainty and interdependence) then it requires a 
framework for interaction that is left imprecise and ambiguous. 
However, this is not at all the type of arrangement deemed suitable 
for the establishment of a relationship between the parties engaged 
in a demand-supply. business transaction. The consequences are 
illUstrated in the problems of achieving high levels of technical 
innovation and in introducing engineering design changes that are 
reported in the project management literature (eg Barrie and Paulson 1978). 
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This degree of interdependence in planning and its co-occurence 
with processes of negotiation may have important implications for 
the ability of the organisations' involved to engage in negotiating 
strategies in the s u b s e ~ u e n t t relationship. The point has been 
made that the nature of planning in a complex and changing project 
environment, and its close correspondence with the establishment 
of a formal agreement)makes rather more for a high rather than a 
low degree of clarity and coverage in product and/or process 
specification at an early stage. In doing so, s u b s e ~ u e n t t issues 
that arise and the question of how to deal with them, given some 
level of initial ambiguity in the specification, may be open to 
a variety of interpretations. For example, if specific design 
details are not fully known at an early stage or are subsequently 
altered, since the actual details depend on or are affected by 
the actual process of construction, then there is clearly adequate 
scope for disagreement concerning the validity of the original 
details of the agreement with respect to that work and the level 
of remuneration deemed appropriate. It is not difficult then to 
imagine how the process of reaching an agreement on the issue may 
inVOlve some degree of negotiating behaviour: for instance, in 
differing opinions with respect to the 'knock on' effects of the 
additional work r e ~ u i r e d . .
In general terms it is expected that the more incomplete and/or 
ambiguous the coverage of the agreement in its substantive content 
then, assuming the motivation exists, the more likely that the 
employment of negotiating strategies may occur. The form of the 
agreement may outline the'discretion involved to the participants 
in reaching a decision as to what levels of work and remuneration 
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are 'reasonable' in the circumstances. But for this not to 
provide the basis for some form of negotiation or bargaining 
requires either the lack of motivation to engage in such strategies 
on the part of at least one party to the contract; or a matching 
interpretation of what is considered to be "reasonable" based, for 
example, upon consistent and unambiguous information concerning 
the change and the effects of the change; or some other means 
whereby it is expected that attempts to exert influence in such a 
way are unlikely to be effective (Rubin and Brown 1975). 
Generally speaking, one would expect any feelings of 'latent 
conflict' stemming from the originally-established terms and 
conditions to contribute towards the former possibility (for instance 
if the job is felt to be over/under-priced). Also one would expect 
differing perspectives and attitudes and the inherent competitive 
nature of the relationship to contribute towards this possibility, 
and to lessen the extent to which the latter two may occur. On 
the question of unambiguous information, Sayles and Chandler (1971) 
have noted the difficulties in securing, in an interactive setting, 
the full "visibility" of the parties, and avoiding the possibility 
of agents or groups withholding information. On the question of 
the effectiveness of such a strategy, one would expect this to be 
conditioned by a variety of factors: the availability of information 
to support one's case; the anticipated benefits available set against 
the ~ o s t s s of achieving them; the attractiveness of the option with 
respect to the longer-standing relationship with the other party; 
the possibility of not furthering the advantage as a means of 
securing future accommodation via the norm of 'reciprocity' 
(Romans 1958); and so o n ~ e e e Rubin and Brown 1975, pp 283-6). 
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In general terms, the point is that it is not entirely the case 
that the reaching or an agreement in this type of situation 
precludes the investigation of subsequent exchange transactions, 
as some investigations of interorganisational phenomena suggest: 
"Once the agreement is signed or otherwise 
authorised, it throws the relationship into a different 
light, since interactions are based on a specific 
pattern rather than ongoing through the exchange 
process at each interaction episode." 
(Hall 1982, p253) 
In the" type of situation discussed here, one would expect this 
situation to be variable, depending upon the nature of the agreement 
initially reached - particularly its clarity and degree of coverage. 
Generally one would expect a greater degree of "overlap" 
between, say, design and construction stages of the project to be 
associated with a tendency towards greater negotiation and more 
extensive exchange transactions in subsequent dealings. This would 
be because of the tendency for planning activity and associated 
exchange transactions and bargaining approaches to run concurrent 
with the process of construction rather than having unambiguously 
preceded it. Additionally, the susceptibility of the work to 
change, and the necessity to replan work, one would expect to be 
a further dimension leading towards tendencies towards exchange 
as the work proceeds (by virtue of the simple principles of 
remuneration for extra work and compensation for changes to the 
existing s p e c i f i c a ~ i o n s s that affect already-established plans). 
The extent to which such exchanges are transformed into bargaining 
and negotiation strategies one would expect to be guided by any 
differences in the partys' views of what constitutes either the 
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appropriate level of work for a given price, or the appropriate 
level of remuneration for a given level of work. 
4.3 The Management of ' the Contract 
The discussion sO'<far has centred upon s,ubstantive features, of the 
agreement. It seems appropriate at this point to return to 
procedural aspects of the relationship as formed during the 
planning/negotiation stages to assess possible implications for 
the ability of the parties to engage in subsequent negotiation 
strategies once the agreement has been reached. One of the 
central features, discussed in Chapter 1, of the type of organisational 
arrangement deemed suitable to the kind of task conditions 
investigated here, is a model of organisation which stresses dual 
patterns of authority and control, and processes of influence based 
upon one's contribution toward taskwork processes rather than by 
virtue of one's formal position, role and jurisdiction. In other 
words, shared control, jurisdictional ambiguity and dispersed power 
are requisite features in a matrix setting. Yet these are precisely 
the types of conditions that have been shown to enhance the 
possibility of conflict and make likely the adoption of negotiating 
strategies in an interorganisational setting {Kochan " 
et al 1975).9 Integrative mechanisms and an appropriate 'culture' 
have been suggested as the means by which these inherent features 
of matrix management may be accommodated in an internal setting 
(sea Chapter 1). However the question arises' as to how these 
features may be accommodated in an external setting where the 
central integrating device corresponds to the contractual agreement 
and its formal terms and conditions. 
The problem here arises since the model of organisation that is 
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hypothesised to be appropriate to the types of task conditions 
studied here, is precisely that model of organisation which yields 
the most likelihood of there being problems in the relationships 
between the parties in an interorganisational setting. In seeking 
to overcome these potential problems the arrangement arrived at -
the formal agreement - contrasts what is needed in order to secure 
the effective performance of the task. This would be the case to 
the extent that areas of jurisdiction that should be left ambiguous 
are more precisely demarcated, and patterns of shared control and 
authority are given greater unity. The task suggests the need for 
a framework of interaction that 'evolves' and adjusts to complex 
and changing conditions. The business relationship suggests the 
need for a structure and processes of interaction that are clearly 
defined in advance and whose parameters are undebatable. 
A similar point arises when one considers the status of the 
contract as a mechanism of co-ordination and control in inter-
organisational relations. Specifically, a contractual framework in 
effect acts as a relatively "obtrusive" (March and Simon 1958, 
Simon 1965) means of control in a setting in which, if the transaction 
was internalised and hierarchically-based, would be most appropriate 
the use of less obtrusive mechanisms, geared towards influencing 
the premises for decision-making (Simon 1965, p79) at the operational 
leVel. It has been noted that targets, specifications and plans 
form a p p r o p r i a t ~ ~ albeit relatively obtrusive, mechanisms of control 
in a sequentially-interdependent working relationship (Child't972). 
However, to the extent that reciprocal interdependence is a key 
feature of the relationship, one would expect such mechanisms to be 
inadequate, since management by exception procedures and the resolution 
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of problems by upward referral would tend to 'overload' the managerial 
hierarchy (Galbraith op cit). Yet such mechanisms are precisely 
the types of mechanisms appropriate in the context of a business 
transaction between parties, since they define and clarify the work 
to be undertaken and the procedures to be adopted. The problem is 
that, in an interorganisational setting, potentially relevant axes 
of unobtrusive control are bound to be heavily influenced by cross-
organisational differences in goals and perspectives. In other 
words, the 'premises' for decision-making (Simon 1965) are dual: 
c o r r e s p o ~ d i n g g to the sets of goals, assumptions, beliefs, 
expectations and attitudes brought by each party to the relationship. 
Perrow (1979) has described succinctly how types of 'unobtrus'ive' 
control operate: 
" ••• they limit the informational flow and content, 
thus controlling the premises available for decision; 
they set up expectations so as to highlight some aspects 
of the situation and play down others; they limit the 
search for alternatives when problems are confronted, 
thus ensuring more predictable.and consistent solutions; 
they indicate the threshold levels as to when a danger 
signal is being emitted ••• they achieve co-ordination 
of effort by selecting certain kinds of work teChniques 
and methods." 
(ibid, p149) 
Perhaps a feel for the problems associated with unobtrusive control 
mechanisms in an interorganisational context i ~ ~ gained if one 
s u b s ~ i t u t e s s the word "they" for some phrase that links the actions 
involved with the part played by autonomous agents in articulating 
these constraints in a transactional relationship. In other words, 
and following Simon's (1965) scheme, the problems of simplifying 
decisions to the "bounds of rationality" in an interorganisational 
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setting, is that one is faced vith vhat amounts to tvo competing 
ideas 01' vhat constitutes "rationality" to the extent that goal 
and other (attitudinal) differences underpin the relationship. 
This p a r ~ d o x x has not gone unnoticed. Indeed it has formed the 
basis 1'or Sayles and Chandlers' (1971) discussion of problems in 
the "technical system - business system. interface". The p o t e ~ t i a l l
implications 01' this 1'or the respective pover 01' role-holders vas 
discussed in Chapter 2. The i m ~ l i c a t i o n s s for patterns 
of inter-agency interaction are discussed here. Sayles and 
Chandler (1971) have noted the contradiction between the needs for 
flexibility and rigidity in administrative procedures and 
managerial processes. They identify the technical system. as a less 
programmed process: alternatives are left open, problems are 
unpredictable, and control occurs through feedback. The business 
system, in contrast, is identified as a programmed process; 
involving the detailing of formal rights and obligations. They 
suggest that the latter acts as a 'conservative force': while 
technical system goals stress differentiation, business system 
goals stress integration (ibid, Ch 13). Given these inherently 
contradictory tendencies, there is a mismatch betveen the 
technical requirements of the task, and the structural form 
established to integrate and co-ordinate joint activity: 
It ••• (the problem becomes one of) exerc1s1ng control 
and gaining co-operation in a vork environment which 
calls for a finely-tuned effort that can be neither 
specified contractually nor achieved through traditional 
supervisory methods." 
(ibid, p70) 
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In their scheme, therefore, even well-defined rights and obligations 
provide an insufficient basis for control in conditions of high 
rates of technological change or., more generally, high levels of 
task uncertainty. 
There appear to be likely tendencies towards either one of two broad 
possibilities here. Either extant processes of interaction relate 
directly to the requirements of the task; or they relate more 
directly to the requirements implicit in the form of agreement 
reached. In the first case, one might expect there to arise problems 
of shared control and jurisdictional ambiguity that may manifest 
themselves in some degree of 'structural conflict' (Molnar and 
Rogers 1979) as the relationship develops. At the end of the day, 
for instance, outstanding problems may be voiced in terms of 
disputes over which party was responsible for the problem, whether one 
participant had sufficient authority to take a decision, and so on. 
In the second case, a more cautious (or aggressivel) contractually-
oriented approach may be engendered, in which case the rigidities 
in interaction described by Sayles and Chandler and deemed 
'sub-optimal' (by them and other authors) will tend to emerge. 
That this may be 'sub-optimal' with respect to the effective 
performance of the task may be true. However, it is equally valid 
to suggest that, from the viewpoint of the single organisation in 
interaction, and given the salience of the business dimension, such 
an approach is a highly rational one. The'issues that arise will 
be those involving some 'grey area' of contractual responsibility. 
In the context of a business transaction, such 'grey areas' may 
involve at best a committment to extra work with the possibility of 
not ~ e c e i v i n g g remuneration; at worst, a heightened degree of 
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vulnerability of the organisations agents in interaction. A second 
factor, relating back to the earlier discussion, is that the 
existence of such 'grey areas' may enhance one organisation's 
ability to make gains at the expense of the other. Assuming, for 
instance, the motivation to employ negotiation strategies, then their 
effectiveness may be enhanced by the other parties' vulnerability 
in a 'grey area' of contractual responsibility (Kochan et al 1975). 
What is being suggested here is a form of 'prisoner's dilemma' 
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944), in which the context suggests that 
the balance of probabilities means that in all likelihood the latter 
approach will tend to be that most commonly adopted. Only in the 
absence of residual 'latent' conflict and where a sufficient degree 
of mutual confidence and trust exists in the relationship between 
the parties can one expect the former possibility to necessarily 
occur. Otherwise, the second condition would tend to hold since, 
in their contractual relationship, each party will tend to have 
more to lose than to gain by adopting the more open, collaborative 
approach which would be consistent with the model described earlier. 
The likelihood of this being so is further enhanced by the transience 
of the relationship: in other words in a novel, one-off transaction, 
and given the learning processes involved, one would expect a 
tendency towards caution and competition rather than full and 
o p e ~ ~ committment. The relative significance of the individual 
transaction and the broader relationship between the parties one 
would also expect ~ o o be a significant feature: the less important 
the transaction (and/or relationship) to one or both parties, the 
more likely that a cautious and competitive approach may be adopted. 
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The general point here is that there is an inherent contradiction: 
to the extent that the nature of the task for effective ~ e r f o r m a n c e e
precludes both a complete specification in advance of a p ~ r o p r i a t e e
patterns of authority and accountability and a unitary, rather than 
shared, control model of organisation, th!n a formal structure of 
interaction that must needs specifY fully and unambiguously the roles, 
rights and obligations of the various parties cannot by definition 
operate as the requisite model of organisation in these circumstances. 
Returning to Burns and Stalker's (1966) 'organic-mechanistic' 
continuum, the framework for interaction embodied in the business 
system of roles and relationships may be taken to correspond to 
a 'mechanistic' framework for interaction, in conditions in which 
a more 'organic' framework may be the most appropriate. The 
question then becomes one of what implications this ~ o t e n t i a l l
mismatch has for extant ~ a t t e r n s s and processes of interaction, and 
what factors help explain how these patterns and processes are 
manifested. The foregoing has attempted to identify those factors 
which may help explain whether co-operation or conflict, concensus 
or negotiation, will tend to characterise the relationship by 
focusing upon the conditions that may motivate and influence the 
ability of one (or both) parties to engage in negotiations. 
Particular importance has been given to the underlying characteristics 
of the relationship, and the importance of the dynamics of the 
planning and negotiation process that may have'occurred in its 
establishment. Attention has also been directed towards the 
distinction between the potential outcomes in the nature of the 
relationship as a whole, and specific issues upon which such factors 
mayor not emerge. 
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4.4 Triadic Systems of Interaction 
Before continuing, a brief series of points needs to be 
made with regard to relaxing the earlier-stated assumption of a 
dyadic model of interorganisational relationships. As stated 
in the previous chapter, interest in this study extends to the 
totality of relationships amongst the organisations involved in the 
management of construction work on site. The previous discussion 
has focused upon bilateral relationships among two interacting 
organisations. The general point to be made here is that, extending 
the study to the full range of organisations involved in the 
interorganisational network complicates immensely the range of 
possible forms and bases of interaction. It is not the intention 
here to reiterate the previous discussion allowing for this added 
complexity, but rather to note briefly three types of situation 
in a more complex (triadic) system of roles and relationships, 
and their potential implications, that are of particular interest 
to this study. 
The first concerns the possibility of coalition formation within 
the network in a situation in which the 'outcomes' available to 
actors Band C are controlled by a (contractually-senior) actor A. 
Emerson (1962) has classified coalition formation as a form of 
'balancing operation' used to redress imbalances of power between 
interacting parties. The literature on the reasons for, and 
proc€sses of, coalition formation is extensive (eg Rubin and 
Brown 1975) and will not be reviewed here. The point here is 
simply that the possibilities for coalition formation are enhanced 
by the types of factors related to the initial reaching of an 
agreement that were identified in the foregoing discussion. Rubin 
and Brown (1975), for example, note: 
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"Coalitions are especially likely to form in competitive 
multibargaining relationships when power (or other 
resources necessary for obtaining an outcome) is 
distributed, or perceived to be distributed, in such 
a way that one or more of the parties views himself 
as disadvantaged with respect to obtaining some 
outcome and does not consider it fruitless to join 
forces with another in pursuit of the outcomes he seeks." 
(ibid, p67) 
A similar emphasis on a perceived early disadvantage is found in the 
results of Festinger and Lawrence (1954), for instance. A range of 
reasons have been given for understanding which coalitions may form 
and when: notably, a situation of interdependence and mutual 
dependence on a third party (Emerson 1962, Thompson 1967); a high 
degree of 'issue-outcome interest' (Warren 1972, Thibaut and Kelly 
1959); the attractiveness or perceived usefulness of another as 
a coalition partner; and the ability of the dependent parties to 
mobilise sufficient power to offset the others' advantage (Thibsut 
and Kelly 1959). 
It should be noted that, for the purposes of this discussion, a 
somewhat generalised concept ot power is being .used. The emphasis 
in the above commentary is implicitly upon the exercise of economic 
power - through the use of informal positive and negative sanctions. 
However, the possibilities extend to the use of other bases of 
power. In the context studied here, notably that ot expertise and, 
especially, informational power (French and Raven 1959, Pettigrew 
1972). In particular, earlier points were made which pointed to 
the possibilities of mobilising expert power and controlling 
relevant information. The latter possibility has particularly been 
noted as a feature of interaction in project, interorganisational 
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settings (Sayles and Chandler 1971). The point here is that 
the possibilities of implicit or explicit coalition formation 
centred upon specific issues (or perhaps more generally based) may 
take these latter forms. The process of resolving an issue or 
reaching a decision may not explicitly involve the exercise of 
(economic) power within a negotiating framework. Rather it may 
take the f o ~ ~ of less aggressive strategies of persuasion or 
argument in which two parties join forces to press their viewpoint. 
The possibility of presenting a United fronf based upon congruent 
preferred outcomes for which a common set of cause-effect beliefs 
and a shared informational base exist is clearly a possibility 
that needs to be accounted for in a setting of multiparty inter-
action in which a premium is put upon knowledge and information 
relevant to the performance of the task. This point is perhaps 
particularly pertinent when one considers the more structured 
context within which the parties interact. Models that have been 
devised of coalition formation and negotiating strategies have 
tended to concentrate attention upon essentially unstructured 
settings ~ g g Thibaut and Kelly 1959). However, as noted earlier, 
the setting of interest here is one in which 'a specified and 
structured framework of interaction exists (in terms of patterns 
of authority, responsibility and accountability). In setting the 
limits to the legitimacy of action, such a framework may thereby 
serve to constrain the extent to which informal processes of influence 
based upon bargaining and negotiation strategies may be feasible 
or effective. In other words, forming a coalition and negotiating 
to pursue one's own preferred outcomes, given that other conditions 
are highly conducive to pursuing such a strategy, may not be 
effective if, at the end of the day, the indominus party can simply 
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exercise their option of whether or not to accept this challenge. 
In such a situation, one might expect more subtle attempts at 
influence (based upon persuasion and argument and informed by 
expert knowledge and information) to be perhaps equally, if not 
more, effective. Consequently, as a general point, one needs 
to have an awareness of the characteristics of the structure of 
interaction as a possible further conditioning factor upon the 
plausibility of influence attempts based upon a coalitional 
strategy and the form that this strategy may take. 
The second situation of interest, is one in which an actor A 
wields considerable power over another B, not by virtue of their 
direct contribution to B's reward-cost outcomes, but by virtue of 
their role as mediator of the rewards and costs obtainable by B 
and offered by C. In other words, A is the agent of C who is 
the actual employer of B. Such a situation is of particular 
relevance in the triadic system of relationships between client, 
designer and builder in construction (it also has potential 
relevance to other triadic systems: notably in the relationships 
between designer, builder and supplier or subcontractor). In 
this model, actor A, (the designer) has the ability to influence 
B's (the builder's) outcomes obtained from C (the client), by 
accepting or rejecting B's actions. Following Thibaut and Kelly's 
(1959) scheme, this corresponds to a situation'in which the 
"fate control" exercised by C is "converted" and vested in C's 
agent (A) who then mediates the outcomes available to B. The 
situation is of some significance to this study because it suggests 
the possibility of two-way influence attempts based upon competing 
bases of power. On the one hand, the position and discretion 
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available to A in interaction with B suggests the possibility of 
successfUl influence attempts based upon formal authority or 
legitimate power. On the other hand, a correspondence of 
economic reward-cost outcomes in the relationship between B and 
C may give B the opportunity of lessening their dependence by 
by-passing A and convincing C of the benefits to C available by 
pursuing an action preferred by B but contrary to A's wishes. In 
other words, there exists the possibility of pursuing a 'divide 
and conquer' strategy. A lot would clearly depend upon the 
characteristics of the relationship between C and their agent, A 
most notably, perhaps, the degree of independence and autonomy 
of A and, conversely, the degree of control exercised by COver A. 
For example, the greater is e's control, and the lesser A's 
independence, the greater the likelihood of A's decisions being 
over-ridden by C given the motivation to do so. The next section 
will return in more detail to these characteristics and their 
potential implications for patterns of inter-agency interaction. 
The point to be stressed here is that the position of A in this 
situation may be one that is either secure or vulnerable to 
the counter-responses of B to A's influence attempts depending 
on the circumstances involved. 
Thethird,and final, situation of interest is one similarly 
in which the role of a third party (D) as mediator of B's outcomes 
becomes apparent, although the constellation of roles is different. 
Specifically, it is the situation in which, as above, the outcomes 
available to B are mediated/controlled by A/C, but where such 
outcomes are also dependent upon the actions of D whose outcomes 
are also controlled by C. In other words, B is in a position in 
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which, even if it follows A's direction, its outcomes may be 
adversely affected by the actions of D. Further, B may b ~ ~ in a 
position of dependence upon two parties - A and D - whose requirements 
and directions contradict and conflict. The position of the main 
contractor vis-a-vis the architectural and engineering consultants 
hired by the client serves as an illustration of this possibility. 
There are also others: for instance, .the position of a subcontractor 
or supplier vis-a-vis the design consultant and the main contractor. 
Such a situation is of clear importance given the possibility of 
an interorganisational matrix structure of roles and 
relationships among groups within the project organisation as a 
whole. What is being described here is a form of 'role conflict' 
(Kahn et a1 1964) at a group level of analysis. There are a number 
of possibilities here. For instance, A or D may be able to over-
ride one anothers' decisions by virtue of their comparative 
positions with respect to C, in order to avoid exploitation of 
the divide by B (ie one party is able more fully to exert their 
control over the situation than the other). Alternatively, this 
divide may be exploited by B by switching allegiance to one party 
or the other, depending upon which party is able to affect their 
outcomes most profoundly (generally, or in relation to specific 
issues), or by exploiting the existence of a more direct issue-
outcome interest with C • 
. Again, what happens will clearly depend upon the characteristics of 
the network of relationships involved - particularly within the 
C - A - D triad. For example, the more congruent the goals of 
CIA and the greater the control of Cover D, then the greater the 
likelihood of A asserting control over D's actions, and the greater 
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the possibility of B following A's rather than D's directions. 
Alternatively, the more equal the relationship between A and D 
relative to C, and the greater the opportunity to B of obtaining 
access to, and acceptance by, C, the greater likelihood of the 
divide being exploited by B. 
This section has attempted to address briefly the implications 
for studying processes of interorganisational relationships in 
a project setting by extending the network to incorporate more 
complex systems of interaction involving three or more parties, 
and by relating the possibilities to specific types of situation of 
particular interest to this study, given the framework of interaction 
that provides a structural backdrop in this type of setting. In 
doing so, attention has also been directed in passing towards the 
potential importance as a set of moderating factors of patterns 
of control and autonomy within the network. It is to a more 
explicit consideration of the impact of these factors and, in 
particular, involving dropping the earlier made assumption of 
unitary behaviour in external interaction, that the discussion now 
turns. In the next section, specific attention is turned to 
considering possible intraorganisational correlates of external 
interaction. 
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4.5 Intraorganisational Correlates o ~ ~ Joint Interaction 
The ~ i n a l l series o ~ ~ points to be made in this chapter concern 
the i m p l i c ~ i o n s s o ~ ~ internal patterns and processes o ~ ~ co-ordination 
and control ~ o r r external interaction in the management o ~ ~ project 
work. Throughout the previous discussion, occasional r e ~ e r e n c e s s
have been made to the impJjcations o ~ ~ addressing processes o ~ ~
interaction between boundary unit personnel of the respective 
organisations and (latterly) patterns o ~ ~ control within subgroups 
of the wider project organisation. For the purposes of discussion 
in the foregoing sections, however, an a s s u m p u o n o ~ ~ some degree 
of unity of purpose and o ~ ~ direction on the part o ~ ~ each 
organisation has been made. Yet it should be clear ~ r o m m the 
discussion in Chapter 1 that, for the single organisation, it is 
precisely problems o ~ ~ organisation and management in these respects 
- for example, problems of "segregation" (Kingdon 1973) - which are 
extensiveif the organisation is to organise for effectiveness in 
conditions of high task uncertainty and interdependence. In a 
sense this section turns round the discussion of the latter part of 
Chapter 2: rather than focusing attention upon the organisational 
response to conditions in a complex and uncertain task environment 
(including relations with external agencies), the aim is here to 
highlight the implications of organising in such a way for external 
processes of interaction. In line with the earlier theme of there 
being problems in extrapolating the conditions found in internal 
matrix settings to external ones, a critical component of this 
discussion is the inherent contradiction that is posed by considering 
this question. If in the conduct of external relations, and as 
suggested in the previous discussion, a premium is placed upon 
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clarity, consistency, unity and concensus on the part of each 
organisation, then how does this square with the inherent 
ambiguities, conflicts,disunities and 'negotiated interaction' 
deemed suitable in the type of task environment facing the 
organisation? The central issue explored here is the implication 
for external interaction of internal relationships between the 
'boundary unit' involved and the wider organisation. 
Interorganisational and collective bargaining research has 
thrown some direct light upon the sorts of issues addressed here •. 
The research by Kochan et al (1975) for instance, although their 
results were modest, yielded some support for the proposition that 
the organisation's ability to interfere with another's goal 
attainment was conditioned to some extent by the organisation's 
internal cohesion and clarity. As described earlier, they 
identified jurisdictional ambiguity, shared control and dispersed 
power within the organisation as conditioning factors in effective 
external bargaining relationships. An alternative proposition 
noted earlier - that organisations faced with a problematic 
environment may 'tighten up' their procedures for co-ordinating 
and controlling activity - shares with these results the implication 
that the operation of an 'organic' task team model within the 
context of a matrix structure of roles and relationships may not 
at all be conducive to success in managing external relationships 
based upon a business transaction. This may be expected to be 
particularly the case to the extent that the relationship is 
characterised by bargaining and negotiating strategies. In other 
words, a 'united front' and 'clear direction' coupled with the 
ability to bring in higher levels of authority and to rely upon a 
4.36 
more formalised and routinised set of documents and procedures, may 
prove more effective in pursuing wider organisational goals in 
interaction. Conversely, one might expect that factors such as 
some degree of ambiguity or conflict in authority and reporting 
relationships (stemming from patterns of dual influence), lesser 
status and authority, and the absence of sufficiently formalised 
documents and procedures to disadvantage boundary unit personnel 
in their dealings with external parties. The general proposition 
here is that the more unitary and cohesive is the internal context 
for decision-making, ceteris paribus, then the more weight will 
be given to overall organisational (as ~ p p o s e d d to specific functional) 
goals in external interaction. A second and related proposition 
is that the more unitary and cohesive is the internal context for 
decision-making then, ceteris paribus, the more successful will be 
that agency's strategies in external interaction. 
A feature of such a setting which is of particular interest 
to the issues described here is the position of professionals 
and functional specialists within the organisation, and their 
relationships with other professionals in external interaction. 
Reference has already been made to the possibility of congruent 
perspectives and orientations across organisational boundaries (see above, 
p p 2 ~ 4 - 2 ~ 6 ) . . Similarities in ways of working and thinking 
may promote strong ties across organisational boundaries to the 
extent that functional or professional counterparts are involved 
in interaction. Such ties may indeed extend to some degree of 
functional goal congruence. For example, one m ~ g h t t be able to 
envisage groups of engineers getting together to design a 
technically sophisticated product, while their respective budgetary 
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controllers attempt to keep the cost implications of this in check. 
The tendency in the matrix and project management literature has 
been to view the position of the professional or specialist in 
isolation from their peer group when involved in a multi-disciplinary 
team (cf S ~ l e s s and Chandler 1911). However, if one takes an 
external relationship as the focus of enquiry, it may be that 
such comparative isolation within the organisation is countered. to 
some extent by peer group association within the wider project 
multiorganisation. For example, each party to the transaction may 
employ their own legal specialists to administer the contractual 
relationship between them; or their own technical engineering 
specialists to cope with the details of product or process 
specification, design and construction. Such a prospect, to the 
extent that it occurs, suggests the possibility of a much more 
variegated relationship between individual or group, project, and 
organisational goals than is suggested in the matrix and project 
management literature. 
It is not the intention here to review fully the literature 
on the nature of professionals or professionalisatioJO' or, more 
specifically, on the position and role of the professional within 
the organisation. 11 However it is worthwhile to note a number 
of general issues that have arisen in studies of professionals 
vitnin organisations. Specifically, several studies have found the 
contrasting orientations of managers and professionals (including 
'staff' specialists) to be a significant source of conflict within 
formal organisations (Dalton 1959, Blau and Scott 1961, Gouldner 
1959, Stinchcombe 1959, Udy 1965). The position of professionals 
vithin bureaucratic organisations is differentiated according to 
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the relevance of external as opposed to internal norms, values and 
goals that may guide behaviour. Specifically these relate to the 
importance of professional peer groups and their institutions as 
sources of authority, standards, codes and ethics, and as the 
appropriate means of securing accountability and exercising 
sanctions (Blau and Scott 1961). 
The position of professionals within the task team group in 
a matrix setting has, of course, received a good deal of attention 
vith respect to issues of motivation, committment and so on (see 
above pl.31). However the particularistic patterns of external 
interaction in a matrix setting and.their implications for the 
position and role of professionals and specialists in the wider 
project organisation - with respect to their degree of autonomy or 
dependence - has received somewhat less attention. Such an 
omission is odd, since one might expect these conditions to have an 
important bearing upon the nature and form of interaction at the 
operational level. To the extent that the nature of the task 
requires a decentralisation of decision-making authority to 
operational levels, where interaction with external agents may be 
extensive, then the position of the professional or specialist 
is somewhat distinct from the role of mainstream personnel 
undertaking· main 'line' activities. From the viewpoint of the 
organisation, the existence of broader professionally-based standards, 
norms and values and, more s p e c i f i c a l l y ~ ~ their shared nature in peer 
group interaction across organisational boundaries, might be 
expected to contribute towards a further attenuation of the link 
between broader organisational and specific functional goals. The 
]remises which guide the professional or specialist in that setting 
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may be more professionally-orientated - a possibility that may 
be enhanced and reinforced by greater 'localised' peer group 
interaction. Following Kingdon's (1973) scheme, the possibility 
of "segmentation" and lateral "dissociation" may be affected by 
the positive pull of congruent norms, values and goals across 
organisational boundaries. From the viewpoint of the individual 
professional or specialist (or subgroup), the reverse set of 
conditions (ie greater organisational control and lessened 
autonomy) may heighten tendencies t o ~ a r d s s conflict of interests and 
a degree of compromise in their understanding and performance of the 
role. Such conflicts may be lent a heightened awareness and assume 
a greater insiduousness given extensive peer group interaction at 
a more 'local' level. Put more simply, the phrase "I would like 
to agree with you, but I can't" may be a statement symptomatic of 
what constitutes a latent conflict of interest" Whether such a 
situation occurs and is salient to those involved, depends of 
course upon a variety of circumstances - generally, the juxtaposition 
of organisational and professional interests in relation to the 
specific issue at hand and the dynamics involved. Clearly, however, 
the prospect is an empirical possibility that needs to be borne in 
mind. It may help to explain both more 'obtrusive' patterns of 
organisational control that occur, and also any degree of role 
conflict felt and articulated by those involved. It is not simply 
here" that the organisation's agent may be subject to two sets of 
conflicting orientations (the one functional, the other project). 
In an external setting, this possibility is added to by an 
orientation towards project work as it is n2i mediated by 
organisational goals and interests. To draw the distinction one 
might compare two subtly different conceptions of, say, the engineer's 
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processes. However, if one draws a distinction between the position 
of the integrator in an internal and external setting, then certain 
implications follow for a fuller understanding of the role in 
project environments. The earlier noted tendency to equate a 
project management function in both an internal and external setting 
simplifies what in practice are two very different types of situation. 
In the internal setting, the integrator is expected to be a neutral 
facilitator and adjudicator in inter-functional team relationships. 
In the external setting, the integrator is expected to be a 
neutral facilitator and adjudicator in inter-organisational team 
relationships. If one assumes that each party has their own 
project manager to perform the former function, but that there is 
no intermediary to perform the latter function within the wider 
project organisation, then one would expect that, as well as 
facilitating inter-functional interaction internally, one of the 
main functions of the respective integrators would be in conducting 
negotiatings and bargaining with their counterpart(s) in the other 
organisation(s) (their involvement depending perhaps upon the 
issue at hand and its 'importance'). In other words, a central 
component of their role would be giving a lead to the individual 
organisation in external negotiations and resolving disagreements. 
The role becomes one similar to that described by Likert in the 
project manager's role in performing a 'linking-pin' function, 
a l b ~ i t t in an external setting: 
n ••• the leader fully reflects and effectively 
represents the views, goals, values and decisions of 
his group in those other groups where he is performing 
the fUnction of linking his group to the rest of the 
organisation. He brings to the group of which he is 
the leader the views, goals and decisions of those 
other groups. In this way, he provides a linkage 
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whereby communication and the exercise of influence 
can be performed in both directions." 
(Likert, 1961, p171) 
In this situation it is performing a "boundary controlll function, as much 
as "goal achievement" and "systems maintenance" functions (Herbst 1974) 
that comes to the fore. 
If one then assumes fUrther that an autonomous intermediary is in 
the position of mediating relationships between organisational groups, 
then one would expect (to the extent that conflict and/or negotiation 
processes occur) a quite different role to be performed. As much as 
acting as a 'facilitator' or 'decision-broker', one would expect that 
their role is one of acting as conciliator, arbitrator or adjudicator 
and perhaps even decision-maker in the absence of concensus, given the 
competing and conflicting demands that need to be reconciled. There is 
a subtle difference here in the differential sets of role requirements 
involved. Broadly speaking, in this latter situation, each o r g a n i s ~ ~
ational integrator is acting in the capacity of a 'champion' of their 
own organisational interests ~ t h h respect to the project: their role 
in the wider project organisation is one which compares closely with that 
performed by their functional department or section-head counterparts 
within their ovo organisation; the difference being that external 
rather than internal relationships are the focus of their activity. 
The intermediary, on the other hand, is acting in the capacity of 
a 'champion' of project interests and, in doing so, their central 
focus of interest is in managing and mediating what are mainly 
external relationships amongst the organisational groupings involved. 
Following Galbraith's scheme (op cit) the latter perhaps corresponds 
to the performance of a 'managerial linking role' rather·than integrator 
in the generally-held sense of the word. The difference lies in the 
normative basis underlying interaction to 
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some extent the norms, values and goals underlying interaction in 
an internal setting viII be shared to an extent that is perhaps 
less likely in an external setting. A specific orientation towards 
the project is the same. But the unity of purpose this may generate 
in an internal setting is a qualitatively distinct phenomenon from 
what will occur in an external setting simply by virtue of what 
this represents to the participants inVOlved in each case. In an 
internal setting, project objectives represent a link between 
functional and vider organisational goals (which may converge or 
diverge). In an external setting, project objectives represent 
a link between sets of organisational goals (which are more likely 
to d.i verge). In the latter case, functional goals may be a 
complicating factor. However the essential link is a lateral one 
- between organisations - rather than a hierarchical one - as in 
the relationship between functional departments and the wider 
organisation. In occupying the position which corresponds to 
'championing the project objectives in each case, the types of 
functions undertaken by the two types of integrator are likely to 
differ according to the respective difference in the constellation 
of relationships between objectives and goals. Put more simply, 
an in house integrator is likely to be able to depend upon a much 
greater degree of concensus amongst the groups they are co-ordinating 
than is an external intermediary integrator. 
For the organisation as a whole, the prospect is that the 
problems of achieving sufficient levels of co-ordination and 
control made salient by the dispersion of discretionary authority 
and associated problems of 'segregation' (Kingdon 1973), are 
compounded by the susceptibility to the constraints and contingencies 
4.44 
arising due to the impact of relations with external agencies. In 
that type of situation, one might expect more 'obtrusive' mechanisms 
of control, a greater concentration of authority, and greater 
structuring of activities to be the means whereby an appropriate 
degree of co-ordination and control is obtained. For example, one 
might expect that negotiation and/or conflict at the interface 
between organisations will lead to a greater degree of involvement 
by senior management personnel and their greater influence in joint 
decision-making. Such a possibility has been noted by Warren (1972) 
who includes the degree of organisational 'inclusion' as a parameter 
in joint decision-making: reflecting the extent to which problems 
are 'escalated' to higher levels within the respective organisations 
for resolution through agreement or negotiation. More obtusely, 
one of the nossibilities not accounted for in Likert's (1961) 
'system IV' model of participative influence within the organisation 
was the possibility of some degree of 'external threat', that might 
constrain the ability of that model to operate effectively in 
particular sets of circumstances. 
The main thrust of the models of matrix and project management 
discussed in Chapter 1 is that, in conditions of high task uncertainty 
and interdependence, traditional bureaucratic mechanisms and forms of 
co-ordination and control are insufficient for achieving simultaneously 
the ~ e g r e e s s of functional differentiation and integration required. 
The relevant dynamics are the problems of 'segregation' that occur 
and associated power disparities in interaction. The relevant 
mechanisms for achieving a sufficient level of co-ordination and 
control then involve the establishment of a framework for interaction 
that allows for these tendencies by incorporating and internalising 
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in the structure the ambiguities and conflicts involved. Consequently 
the problems are not removed, they are internalised (Knight 1977) 
and manifested in the contradiction of long-standing principles of 
organisation (eg unity of command) and in problems for those involved 
in the organisation (eg role ambiguity and conflict, stress and so 
on). The prospect that is raised here is that, faced with an external 
'threat' (eg another organisation adopting an aggressive bargaining 
strategy), then there are two broad options available. Either the 
organisation is left vulnerable to this threat, or it responds to 
counter it. It is hypothesised here that, if the latter option is 
taken, it will tend to be more successful to the extent that the 
strategy reflects a contradiction of the principles inherent in 
developing and maintaining a matrix system of management. 
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Footnotes 
1 "Mandated" bases for interaction have been identified as a 
third alternative to exchange and power-dependency relationships 
in interorganisational networks (Hall et al 1977, Warren 1967, 
Turk 1970, 1973, Schmidt and Kochan 1977, Raelin 1980). The 
distinguishing feature here is the existence of a structured, 
and evolving, legal-political framework for interaction (Raelin 
1980, pp58-59). The most common application of the construct 
has been in the study of non-commercial relationships; 
although formal agreements between business organisations in 
mergers and joint ventures form a relevant subset (Pfeffer 
1972, Pfeffer and Nowak 1976, Aiken and Hage 1968, Clark 1965). 
Exchange, power-dependence and 'mandated' bases for interaction 
are inter-related: for instance, the latter may 'evolve' 
historically from less formal exchange relationships, and their 
operation may be characterised by exchange relationships (within 
a formal legal framework). Indeed, in many ways the situation 
described here (ie the construction industry) crosscuts the 
three models: the relationship is a voluntarily entered-into 
exchange transaction between parties, which occurs within the 
context of a contractually-based legal system of definitions 
of their respective rights and obligations; further, as noted 
in Chapter 2 and to be discussed further in this chapter, the 
terms and conditions reached may substantially reflect conditions 
of power-dependency in the broader economic relationship 
between the parties. 
2 A related, but distinct point concerns the degree of "domain 
concensus" or "dissensus" at a more macro level within the 
industry. For example, the question of the role of building 
firms in product design, or of design firms in direct construction 
management (eg Higgin and Jessop 1965). The broad debate in 
the interorganisational literature centres around whether 
relationships can be formed - and if so, how are they characterised 
- in conditions of 'concensus-dissensus' (eg Cook 1977, Aldrich 
1979). A discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, it should be noted that the basis of the 
relationship in construction may embody some degree of 'domain 
dissensus' to the extent that differ'ent interest groups (clients, 
the professions, builders) have an interest in expanding or 
contracting their domain in order to reduce dependency on the 
other groups. It should also be noted that the situation is an 
historically developing and changing one (see, for instance, 
Higgin and Jessop (1965) for a more detailed discussion of the 
historical development of client - professional - builder 
relationships). The general point is that locating the status 
quo at a particular point in time presents only a static picture 
of what may be significant changes in the positions, roles and 
relationships of parties within the industry at a broader 
institutional level. 
3 In 1980 a new form of standard contract was introduced by the 
Joint Contracts Tribunal to replace the earlier (1963) edition. 
For a discussion of the implications for the legal rights of the 
respective parties, see for instance Fellows (1981). 
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4 A close analogy here is in the developments and changes in 
the relationship between trade unions and employers within an 
institutional collective bargaining framework. For a 
discussion of the implications see, for instance, Lumley (1980). 
5 A similar point is made with respect to industrial relations 
phenomena: it might be argued here that the diverse literature 
on interorganisational relations, industrial relations and 
economic transactions in industry share some common ground 
which is seldom explored and integrated. 
6 The history of case law in construction provides, of course, 
a multitude of illustrations of debates centred upon the 
exercise of discretionary authority. 
7 Such conditions of price consistency and performance 
specificity have been taken by Williamson (1975) and Ouchi 
(1980) as those conditions appropriate to the establishment 
of a market-based mechanism of control. 
8 Which suggests, according to Williamson (1975) and Ouchi (1980) 
the appropriateness of a hierarchical mechanism of control. 
9 In an intraorganisational context, these factors have also been 
shown to be of significant importance as antecedent conditions 
in the emergence of conflict between subunits (Walton, Dutton 
and Cafferty 1969, Filley and House 1969). 
10 For a review, see for instance, Johnson ( 1 9 8 1 ~ ~ Esland et al 
(1975, chs 18 and 19). 
11 See, for instance, Blau and Scott (1961). 
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CHAPrER FIVE 
A STUDY OF CONSTRUCTION ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT 
The previous thctLchapters have involved a review and critique 
of models of the structure and processes of interaction within 
complex (project) organisational settings, and have attempted to 
relate the issues raised to the circumstances found within a 
construction project setting. In doing so, particular attention has 
been directed towards the apparent contradictions that emerge when 
one considers a situation in which the preconditions for inter-
organisational interaction conflict with the requirements posed by 
the nature of the task. It is this 'tension' in the relationship 
between, respectively, "business" and "technical system" requirements 
that has been the centre of interest in the foregoing discussion and, 
it is argued, a set of £ Q " c . \ ; C ~ $ " , ' ' the implications of which tend 
not to be addressed fully in t ~ e e literature and research upon forms 
of matrix or project management. The discussion has suggested 
something of a central paradox: namely, that the centrality of the 
interorganisational dimension puts a premium upon an organisational 
response that inVOlves the contradiction of many of the facets deemed 
requisite of complex organisational forms operating under conditions 
of task complexity, uncertainty and interdependence. 
In addre3sing this paradox, particular attention has then been 
directed towards assessing the factors which may contribute towards 
an understanding of patterns and processes of interaction observed 
in a construction project setting. The discussion has centred 
upon those factors which one might expect to affect the motivation 
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and ability of the actors involved to exert influence in decisional 
processes, and the manner in which this may be exercised - through 
negotiation and bargaining strategies for instance. Factors 
including the relationship between project and organisational goals, 
the power-dependence relationship between parties, and the breadth 
and longevity of interorganisational linkages have been highlighted 
as central components in studying the movitational basis underlying 
interaction. Factors including the work relationship pattern between 
organisations, the formal framework for interaction, the degree 
of clarity and coverage in the task remit, and internal structural 
characteristics of each firm in interaction l have been highlighted as 
central components in studying the ability of organisations to 
realise their wider organisational goals in interaction. 
The- intention of this chapter is two-fold. In the first 
half of the chapter, the strands from this earlier discussion are 
brought together in a model of the structures and processes of 
interaction in the organisation and management of construction 
project taskwork, from which a series of explicit propositions are 
derived and formally stated. The intention here is to keep the 
discussion brief, since the propositions derived have been discussed 
in more extensive detail in the foregoing two -chapters. In the 
second half of the chapter details are given of the methodological 
approach adopted for the investigation of these propositions, and 
of the sample of construction projects upon which the research 
reported in this study was undertaken. particular attention here 
will be directed towards: the nature of the sample and basis for 
selection; the fieldwork undertaken and the methods employed; the 
procedures used in the collation_ and presentation of the data 
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obtained and reported in Chapters. 6 to 10; and the rationale 
u n d e r l ~ n g g the stages of analysis and interpretation and their 
presentation in Chapters 11 and 12. 
5.1 A Model of the Structure and Processes of Interaction 
in Project Management 
There are a number of sets of propositions to be advanced in 
this section. The first set concerns what may be expected in terms of 
a broad model of organisation and management in conducting construction 
project taskwork, and relates to the issues described and commented 
upon in Chapter 1 above. This reflects a general interest in the 
understanding of the association between task attributes and 
structural characteristics: the broad question is one of the 
association between the nature of the taSk and extant characteristics 
of the forms and processes of interaction. Whether, specifically, 
the patterns and processes observed in the organisation and management 
. , 
of construction task work are 'conducive' to the effective performance 
of the task. Or whether, in contras,t, they tend to reflect characteristics 
other than the immediate requirements of the task (for example, whether 
the procedures adopted and enacted are habitual or 'contract-inspired' 
and static, as opposed to being responsive to the circumstances faced 
and change in those circumstances over time). The later sets of 
propositions are more specific and concern what may be expected 
in terms of processes of interaction between organisations in the 
management of construction work given the situation earlier described. 
These propositions relate to the more specific issues raised in 
Chapter 4, and reflect an interest in examining the range of 
Possibilities in the form and content of interaction (for example, 
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whether decisional processes exhibit tendencies towards concensus, 
compliance or compromise through negotiation strategies; whether, 
" and to what extent, conflict or cooperation characterise the 
relationship). Due to the potential complexity in the inter-
relationships between the sets of independent variables that will 
be looked at, and the potential range of observable outcomes with 
respect to these two sets of issues, the intention here is not to 
supply a complete formulation that allows one to account for the 
full range of empirical possibilities. Instead, these sets of 
propositions are presented rather more as a set of guidelines for 
the later analysis, interpretation and discussion of the empirical 
findings. 
Figure 5.1 below depicts the sets of variables of interest 
to this study and their possible interrelationships. It should 
be emphasised that, while the lowest box represents what constitutes 
the set of dependent variables in this study, interest is as much 
centred upon the c o m p l ~ x i t y y in the interrelationships amongst the 
sets of variables depicted, ;.aa in the dynamics of the mechanisms 
involved. Consequently, two-way directionality in the relationships 
between the sets of variables has been specified. The following 
constitute the four sets of factors of interest to this study as 
'contextual' factors which will help to explain observed patterns 
and'processes of interaction in the management of construction 
project work on site: 
'-" 
'-" 
TASK 
ATTRIBlrrES: 
Complexity/Uncertainty 
Interdependencies 
Scale/Duration 
ORGANISATIONAL 
ATTRIBUTES: 
Domain/Specialisms 
Size/Resources 
Autonomy/Dependence 
Goals 
CONTRACTUAL 
FRAMEWORK: 
Legal Rights/Obligations 
------1-------
Substantive Procedural 
Content Content 
STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES 
OF INTERACTION 
INTRAORGANISATIONAL 
ATTRIBUTES: 
Specialisation 
Structuring 
Centralisation 
S h a r e d / U n i ~ C o n t r o l l
Clear/Ambiguous Jurisdiction 
Integrative Mechanisms 
Subunit Goals 
Figure 5.1 A Model o:f Structures and Processes o:f Interaction in the l-fanagement o:f Construction Project Work 
(i) Task Attributes: The specific teatures ot the task 
- namely the objectives to be achieved, the resources 
and techniques involved and spatial and temporal 
constraints. t10re generally, levels and types ot 
complexity, uncertainty and interdependence in the 
performance ot taskwork and the total scale and 
duration of operations. 
(ii) The Contractual Framework: The nature, level and 
extent ot the specification of the work to be 
performed, and ot the procedural mechanisms employed 
in the management ot taskwork. Also the basis ot 
the agreement (eg whether negotiated or not), and 
the juxtaposition ot the process of reaching the 
agreement with the design/planning processes that 
were involved. More generally, the patternot 
legal rights and obligations conferred upon the 
parties under the contract. 
(iii) Interorganisational Relationships: The attributes 
of the organisations involved in terms of their 
goals, scale, autonomy and resources; and the 
broad relationships between the organisations 
inVOlved in these respects. More specifically, 
the 'location' and importance of project 
objectives and the interorganisational relationship 
with respect to each organisations' mainstream 
operations as a whole. 
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(iv) Intraorganisational Attributes: Structural and 
processual characteristics of the organisations 
involved (in terms of degrees of centralisation 
and structuring of activities, etc), including 
the extent to which dual patterns of management 
occur, and the types of mechanisms employed to 
achieve integration, and the coordination and 
control of subunit operations. 
The aim is to explore the nature and extent of the impact of these 
sets of factors upon, and to assess their interrelationships and 
implications for, the forms and processes of organisation and 
management within the 'project organisation'. Of interest here is, 
broadly speaking, the occurrence of an 'organic' or 'mechanistic' 
model of interaction in the management of project work on site. 
Of particular interest also is the potential occurrence of dual 
patterns of influence and control in the management of the task, 
and the manner in which problems are solved and decisions reached 
in this context. 
5. 1. 1 Task and Organisational Attributes 
The first set of propositions concern the association between 
attributes of the task being performed and the extant forms and 
processes of organisation and management necessary for the effective 
coordination and control of taskwork on site: 
1 The greater the complexities, uncertainties and 
interdependencies in the performance of work on 
site, the more appropriate will be tendencies towards 
an 'organic', as opposed to 'mechanistic' model of 
organisation and management. 
2 The greater the complexities, uncertainties and 
interdependencies in the performance of work on site, 
and the more that this is manifested in a high level 
of functional and role specialisation, the more 
appropriate will be a structure of interaction that 
involves the use of integrative mechanisms. 
These are essentially the propositions put forward by Burns and 
Stalker (1966) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) respectively. The 
types of ~ n t e g r a t i v e e mechanisms' expected here correspond to the 
more sophisticated forms described by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) -
such as committees and the use of integrators; they also perhaps 
extend to the possibility of some form of matrix management 
(Knight 1977). The questions of what specific forms may be expected 
and whether they are established formally or 'emerge' ·more informally, 
are left open as empirical questions to be investigated. 
The scale of operations is expected to have an impact here. 
Generally, it is expected that larger scale will be associated with 
tendencies towards a more 'mechanistic' framework for interaction: 
this is because of the effect that increasing size has upon levels 
of formalisation and routinisation in work procedures at the 
operational level (Hull and Hage 1982), and also due to the tendencies 
towards greater specialisation in functions and roles that are likely 
to occur. Given the latter tendency also, it is expected that larger 
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scale will be associated with the greater use of (formal or 
informal) integrative mechanisms: this due to the greater need to 
co-ordinate and control the contributions of a multitude of diverse 
specialists involved in work on the project. Consequently: 
3 In conditions of high task complexity, uncertainty 
and interdependence, the larger the scale of 
operations, the more 'mechanistic' the model of 
organisation and management that will occur. 
4 In conditions of high task complexity, uncertainty 
and interdependence, the larger the scale of 
operations, the more extensive the use of 
integrative mechanisms in the structure of 
interaction. 
In other words, if a more 'organic' model is appropriate, then it is 
suggested that the ability of this model to effectively operate, or 
even perhaps occur, will be constrained by the effects associated 
with the size of the project organisation. 
At the same time, however, size is expected to affect the 
'location', as it were, of these mechanisms. Generally, one would 
expect increasing size to be associated with a pattern of more 
decentralised control over the construction process within the 
project organisation as a whole, and with a greater significance 
attached to managerial interaction in problem-solving and decision-
making processes at the operational level (or 'on the ground'). 
To the extent that this is the case, then it is expected that: 
5 The larger the scale of operations in conditions 
of high task complexity, uncertainty and inter-
dependence, the more likely that structural 
mechanisms established or emergent to achieve 
integration will be found at the operational 
level (ie on site). 
It is suggested here, for instance, that a (formal or informal) 
pattern of matrix management will be observed at varying levels 
of the administrative hierarchy dependent upon the scale of 
operations involved. A similar suggestion is made for other 
'integrating mechanisms' (eg committees, integrators, managerial-
linking roles, etc). 
5.1.2 The Impact of the Formal Agreement 
The above propositions have been made assuming the neutrality 
of any effects upon the extant forms and processes of interaction 
observed associated with organisational differentiation within the 
project team as a whole. Relaxing this a$sumption allows for a set 
of propositions that concern the association between task attributes 
and extant forms and processes of interaction in the context of a 
formal business agreement and a contractually-based administrative 
f r ~ e w o r k k that links the parties. In particular, it is predicted 
that given goal divergence and a more even'power differential 
amongst the parties, the more likely that these factors will emerge 
to the fore in decision-making processes, and. consequently, the 
more important will become "business system" considerations (Sayles 
and Chandler 1971) in joint interaction. The conditions that are 
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likely to give rise to such a situation are explored in more 
detail in propositiom8 - 22 below. The general' propositions to be 
made here are: 
6 The greater the salience of "business system" factors, 
in interaction, the less likely that an 'organic' 
model of organisation and management, conducive to 
performance in' conditions of high task complexity, 
.uncertainty and interdependence, will emerge and be 
maintained. 
In other words, the greater will be the tendencies towards the 
'rigidities' in interaction described by Sayles and Chandler (1971): 
a stance in interaction informed by role not process, and by one's 
formal position under the contract. Conversely, the more routine, 
certain and lower in interdependencies the nature of the task, the 
more likely that such a model based upon formal 'business system' 
considerations will occur and be appropriate. Also it is expected 
that, given a tendency t o ~ a r d s s a greater degree of 'structuring of 
activities' in large scale operations (proposition 3), any problems 
associated with a 'mismatch' between the 'technical' and 'business' 
systems are likely to be greater where the scale of operations is 
small. Thus: 
7 The smaller the scale of operations, the more 
inappropriate will be a more 'mechanistic t mOdel of 
organisation and management based upon 'business 
system' considerations in conditions of high task 
complexity, uncertainty and interdependence. 
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In other words, it is these conditions (smaller scale, more 
complex task, etc) that are taken to be most conducive to the 
emergence and maintenance of a framework for interaction with 
the small, 'organic' task team group at its centre. On larger 
scale operations, such a framework is perhaps less likely to occur, 
anyway and, correspondingly, the impact of formal business system 
considerations may be less profound. In comparison, where the 
task is routine, certain and low in levels of interdependence, and 
where the scale of operations is large, the least inappropriate 
is expected to be a model of organisation and management run on 
formal business system, 'mechanistic' lines. In other words, 
in this situation one might expect the observed tendencies to 
approximate more closely towards those of the classic bureaucratic 
model. 
So far, the propositions made have been concerned with attempting 
to p r ~ d i c t t the association between task attributes, the formal 
framework and structure of interaction, and extant or actual 
conditions. This next set of propositions is concerned with addressing 
the dynamics of the processes involved in the establishment and 
development of the relationship(s) as antecedent and d e v e l o ~ m e n t a l l
conditions that may help to explain the juxtapositions between the 
three set of factors described above. Bearing in mind the predicted 
. 
moderating impact of the scale of operations involved and variability 
in the characteristics of the task in exploring any divergence 
between the extant and formal structures and processes of interaction, 
the specific focus here is upon the types of conditions that may 
prompt tendencies towards an interactive stance based upon 'business 
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system' considerations in conditions where the scale of operations 
is relatively small, and·the task is high in levels of complexity, 
uncertainty and interdependence. Conversely, interest is focused 
upon how these conditions may be consistent with more 'organic' 
tendencies in interaction, despite the salience of business system 
considerations. 
The antecedent conditions refer to the nature of the relationship 
in terms of its 'pre-history' and early establishment. It is 
predicted that a greater attachment to more formal patterns and 
processes, in at least the early stages of the relationship, will 
occur to the extent that: 
8 The relationship between the parties involved is 
.a new experience. 
In this case, one would expect the level of confidence and trust of 
each party in the other not to be initially sufficiently high enough 
to engender a more informal, flexible approach, and for caution and 
greater formality to characterise the relationship in its early 
stages. Conversely, the longer-standing the relationship, and the 
greater the familiarity and experience of working with each other, 
the more likely that the early stages of the relationship will be 
characterised by greater flexibility, openness and commitment in 
joint interaction. 
Secondly, the extent to which: 
9 The parties differ in their expectations and 
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assumptions concerning how the work is to be 
organised and managed. 
This possibility is likely to be associated with that described 
in proposition 8. However, despite familiarity and experience, 
it may be the case that attitudes simply conflict: the parties have 
worked together before and essentially agree to disagree on the 
appropriate way of handling the project. In this case, one would 
expect the outcome to be a tendency towards an emphasis and reliance 
upon 'business system' rather than 'technical system' considerations, 
given the salience of the contractual dimension. 
The following proposition pertains also to antecedent conditions 
in the relations, but refers more specifically to the particular 
attributes of the current relationship and its initial establishment. 
Whereas propositions 8 and 9 refer to potential 'difficulties' 
experienced in interaction, proposition 10 relates to a more 'proactive' 
response based upon 'business system' considerations. As such it 
reflects the motivation on the part of at least one party to further 
their interests in subsequent joint interaction, and the likely impact 
that this is expected to have upon the form of the relationship -
at least in its early stages. Specifically, a tendency towards more 
formal patterns and processes of interaction based upon the contractual 
relationship will be exhibited if one or more parties has the 
motivation to pursue their own goals in interaction. This will be 
the case to the extent that: 
10 The establishment of the relationship has been 
characterised by processes of interaction 
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(eg bargaining) in which at least one of the 
parties has been left feeling disadvantaged 
with respect to the terms and conditions reached. 
Further that the outcome of the project with 
respect to organisational goals is critical to 
at least one of the parties, and developing a 
'good working relationship' with the other 
party is less critical to organisational 
fortunes in the long run. 
Corresponding to this set of antecedent conditions, are a set 
of conditions that pertain to the development of the relationship, 
as work involved on the project proceeds. The broad question here 
is whether a 'virtuous' or 'vicious' circle will arise. In other 
words, whether an 'appropriate' model of interaction, given task 
characteristics, will emerge. Firstly, assuming that the parties 
experience relatively few 'problems' in interaction with one another: 
11 The more likely that the longer the duration 
of the relationship will promote tendencies 
towards mutual accommodation. 
In other words, a 'convergent' model of processes of interaction 
will'be observed. Conversely, the shorter the time period involved, 
the less opportunity there will be for this convergence to occur. 
This possibility relates to one aspect of the 'learning period' -
the time scale of i n t e r a c t i o ~ ~ In terms of the events that occur, 
it is further expected that: 
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12 The greater the number of 'problems' experienced 
by at least one party during the course of interaction, 
the greater the likelihood that starting assumptions 
and expectations will be reinforced, and the more 
likely that a 'vicious' circle may occur. 
Conversely, the fewer the 'problems' experienced in interaction, the 
more likely it is expected that starting assumptions and expectations 
will be modified and adjusted in response to events, and the more 
likely a 'virtuous' model - or 'convergence' in the parties' stance 
towards one another - will be observed. 
In parallel with the more 'proactive' motivational responses 
highlighted in proposition 10, it is expected that: 
13 The more that specific issues emerge that allow 
at least one of the parties to redress an initial 
imbalance in the relationship; the more critical 
that these issues are to the pursuance of 
organisational goals on the project; and the ~ ~
critical is felt to be the maintenance or 
development of the quality of the existing 
working relationship between the parties - then 
the more likely that this 'vicious' circle may 
occur. 
Conversely, the fewer the issues that occur, the more insignificant 
they are, and the more importance is attached to the working relation-
ship, then the more likely that a 'convergence' in the parties' 
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orientation may occur. 
5.1.3 Influencing Outcomes in Interaction 
The foregoing propositions have focused upon characteristics 
of the relationship, its development, and the context of its 
establishment and development, as·factors that may explain why certain 
circumstances may arise. The following propositions are concerned with 
~ ~ these may arise. In other words, assuming the motivation to 
influence processes of joint decision-making (given propositions 10 
and 13), the question now arises of what factors determine the 
ability6fthe parties to effectively influence the processes of 
decision-making, and, conversely, what factors determine their 
vulnerability in joint interaction. The general argument pursued 
here is that the greater the motivation of at least one party coupled 
with their ability to exert influence in decisional processes in 
order to pursue organisational interests in interaction. then the 
greater the tendency for decisional processes to be characterised 
by bargaining and negotiation processes (or attempts at), the more 
likely that recourse will be made to formal mechanisms to secure 
compliance (rather than acceptance), and the greater the likelihood 
of conflict and/or competition between the parties (cf Kochan et al 
1975). 
Firstly, it is expected that, in relation to the task being 
performed: 
14 The more unambiguously and fully specified the 
task remit {in terms of the specification of 
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objectives and means to achieve those objectives), 
then the less scope available to the participants 
to pursue their own interests in interaction. 
Here attention is directed towards the degree of coverage and level 
of sUbstantive detail specified in the contract; the extent to which 
it allows for unambiguous interpretation; and the less susceptible 
is the specification to change and variation as the work proceeds. 
Generally, the more fully explicit the remit established by the 
demand-side party and accepted by the supply-side party, the less 
the former's vulnerability in interaction, and the less likely to be 
successful any attempts made by the latter party at pursuing their 
own interests in interaction. Conversely, the more vague, ambiguous 
and changeable the remit, the greater the former's vulnerability, and 
the more likely the success of influence attempts. 
Secondly, in relation to the formal structure of interaction, 
it is expected that: 
15 The more clear cut, consistent and unitary the formal 
pattern of control (in terms of the parties' formal 
roles, relationships and jurisdictions), then the less 
scope available to the participants to pursue their 
own interests in interaction. 
Here attention is directed towards the formal position power of 
one party vis-a-vis the other under the contract and the extent of 
access to realisable formal sanctions. Also incorporated are the 
extent to which patterns of control are unitary as opposed to dual, 
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and the extent to which each parties' jurisdiction is clear as 
opposed to ambiguous. Generally, the more that these conditions 
hold, the less likely that the demand-side party will be vulnerable 
in interaction, and the more unsuccessful will be the supply-side 
party's attempts at exercising influence to achieve their goals. 
Conversely, the less formal positional power the demand-side party 
has at their disposal, the more that areas of control and jurisdiction 
are open to question, the greater their vulnerability, and the more 
likely the success of influence attempts made by the supply-side 
party. It is here that the earlier-noted significance of 'grey 
areas' of contractual responsibility are relevant. 
Thirdly, and in relation to the broader relationship between 
the parties: 
16 The more evenly-dispersed are more informal bases 
of power amongst the participants (in terms of 
economic power and independence, the possession 
and control of needed expertise and information), 
then the ~ ~ likely that interaction will be 
characterised by successful attempts by the 
parties to pursue their own goals in interaction. 
Here attention is directed towards the degree of 'balance' in the 
power-dependence relationship between the organisational participants. 
Generally, the greater the degree of dependence of one party on the 
other for relevant economic and informational resources as well as 
expertise, the more likely that that latter party will be able to 
successfully influence the decisions reached jointly by the parties 
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in interaction. Conversely, the more 'balanced' the relationship 
in these respects, the less able will either party be to 
exert their influence effectively on a continuing basis. In these 
latter circumstances, the relationship is likely to be characterised 
by a high degree of 'give and take'. 
Fourthly, and in relation to the intraorganisational attributes 
of each organisation, it is expected that: 
17 The more unitary and cohesive the internal setting, 
and the greater the power vested in organisational 
agents in external interaction, then the more likely 
that that organisation will be able to effectively 
pursue their interests in interaction. 
Here attention is directed towards the extent to which wider 
organisational goals are internalised by the team operating at the 
boundary; their level of authority and status within the 
organisation; the degree of control over needed resources, expertise 
and information coupled with wider support in these respects for 
those operating 'on the ground'; and the degree of clarity and 
consistency in areas of jurisdiction and patterns of control. 
Generally, the more (less) these conditions hold, the less (more) 
vulnerable and more (less) influential is expected to be that 
party in external dealings. In other words, it is here that the 
implications of tendencies towards either a 'united front' or a 
'divided front' are relevant. 
Corresponding to this last set of four propositions (14 - 17), 
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are a further, and final, set of four propositions to be made which 
relate to the outcomes that are s u b s e ~ u e n t l y y achieved by the parties 
in interaction. If one party proves either vulnerable to the 
influence attempts successfully made by the other, or alternatively, 
is unsuccessful in achieving their desired outcomes in interaction, 
then one would expect one or a combination of the following four 
broad strategies to be pursued in order to either lessen their 
experienced vulnerability or to help ensure success in future 
dealings. Firstly, to the extent that the characteristics of the 
specified task to be perfor.med have proved to be problematic, one 
would expect that: 
18 Problems experienced in interaction due to shortfalls 
in the specification of the task, are likely to be 
countered by attempts made to clarify, cover and 
make certain the sUbstantive details of the work 
involved as they impact upon organisational outcomes. 
The initiation of these moves is expected to come from the most 
affected party. Two broad sets of possibilities are apparent here. 
On the one hand, one might expect moves to specify the details 
involved, based upon a process of agreement or negotiation aimed 
at resolving this source of 'operating conflict' (Molnar and Rogers 
1 9 7 9 ~ . . On the other hand, attempts to delineate and demarcate 
responsibility for the omissions, ambiguities, inconsistencies, 
variations and so on may occur •. Thus for instance, parties may 
attempt to place the blame at the other's door, make unrealistic 
requests for details and decisions, rely on their contractual ~ o w e r r
to instruct and enforce the other's compliance, and so on. One 
would expect the broad approach taken to depend upon the salience 
of the issue to the parties involved, its significance as a source 
of dispute, and the quality of the existing relationship. If the 
latter approach is adopted one might expect that similar problems 
in future joint interaction are more likely to' emerge, since the 
issues have not been resolved and the source of potential conflict 
remains 'latent'. 
Secondly, to the extent that jurisdictional and other 
structural problems have emerged, one would expect that: 
19 Problems experienced in interaction due to 
characteristics of the structural framework for 
management of the work, are likely to be 
countered by attempts made to clarify, make 
consistent and more certain areas of ambiguity 
and shared control and responsibility as they 
impact upon organisational outcomes. 
Again the initiation of these moves is expected to come from the 
most affected party, and again there are two broad sets of 
possibilities. On the one hand, one might expect moves to specify 
more clearly and precisely areas of juriSdiction and control based 
upon a process of agreement or negotiation aimed at resolving this 
source of 'structural conflict' (Molnar and Rogers 1979). On the 
other hand, attempts to extend control over areas in dispute or 
to 'offload' the responsibility of the organisation with respect 
to those areas may occur. Thus, for instance, attempts to avoid 
or minimise one's responsibility, to 'cover' oneself, to 'pass the 
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buck', to debate others' authority to take decisions and so on may 
occur. Again one vould expect the broad approach taken to depend 
upon the salience of the issue to the parties involved, its 
significance as a source of dispute, and the quality of the existing 
relationship. Again too, if the latter approach is adopted, one 
vould expect that similar problems in future joint interaction are 
more likely to re-emerge, since the issues have not been resolved, 
and the source of potential conflict remains 'latent'. 
Concerning the broader relationship betveen the parties: 
20 Vulnerability or lack of influence in joint 
interaction may be countered by the 'mobilisation' 
of resources. 
Here, the possibility of coalitional strategies to redress pover 
imbalances betveen the parties is of potential relevance. Hovever 
other strategies related to differing bases of power may be observed: 
notably, countering expert power by bringing in one's own experts 
(eg technical or legal personnel); or attempting to control and 
make use of information needed by other parties • 
. With respect to internal characterisucsof each of the parties 
in i ~ t e r a c t i o n , , it is expected that: 
21 Vulnerability or lack of influence in joint 
interaction may be countered by a strategy of 
'tightening up' internal procedures and mechanisms, 
and by exerting more direct and centralised 
control over interaction processes. 
This may include a higher level of involvement and influence of 
senior management personnel in joint interaction at the operational 
level; the strengthening of integrative mechanisms with respect 
to functional staff - including extending the authority and influence 
of those performing integrator roles; the adoption of more 'obtrusive' 
mechanisms of control (eg more extensive documentation, more 
formalised procedures and so on); and attem,ts to clarify and make 
more consistent areas of shared or ambiguous authority and 
responsibility within the organisation with respect to management 
of the work involved on the project. 
Given these final four propositions, the final one to be stated 
is that: 
22 The more extensivelY these strategies occur in the 
dynamics of interaction between the parties, the 
less likely that orientations towards managing 
the work will 'converge' over time, and the less 
likely as a consequence that an 'organic' model 
of organisation and management conducive to 
performance in conditions of ' high task complexity, 
uncertainty and interdependence will be realised. 
In other words, the greater'the tendency towards the employment of 
these strategies, the more likely that, within the project organisation 
as a whole: problems and decisions will be 'escalated' to higher 
levels for resolution; more centralised and. 'Obtrusive' mechanisms 
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of control will be adopted; processes of interaction will become 
more 'rigid' with greater use of formal procedures and extensive 
documentation; areas of dispute will either remain disputed or be 
avoided; conflict will characterise the relationship; and the 
management of work on site will be generally approached much more 
with a view to 'business system' than to 'technical system' 
requirements. 
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5.2 Research Strategy 
The research strategy chosen to investigate these phenomena vas 
to focus attention upon a small number of case studies explored 
longitudinally, and to rely extensively upon the use of qualitative 
research techniques (eg Van Maanen 1979). A case study, rather 
than more broadly-based survey approach vas adopted due to the 
essentially exploratory nature of the research. Given the broad 
propositions described in the previous section, the concern vas as 
much with identifying the reasons why particular factors may 
influence processes of interaction in a project setting, and how 
they may do so, as vith establishing the ·strength of association 
between particular variables. The very complexity in the variables 
made explicit in the foregoing, and the likely variety of conditions 
in practice, Put a p ~ e m i u m m upon taking a more holistic approach 
towards the study of phenomena in specific instances, rather than 
separating out individual'variables to test more broadly their 
association across a large sample of cases. Consequently, the aim 
was to obtain as complete a picture as possible of circumstances and 
events in just a small number of illustrative cases. 
A longitudinal, rather than cross-sectional approach vas taken, 
due to the interest expressed above in the dynamics of the processes 
involved over time,' and the changes in circumstances and events that 
occurred across each case. It was felt that employing a cross-
sectional approach would produce too static a picture of the situation, 
whereas a central interest 'in change and development vas part of the 
raison d'etre of the study. Added to this vere methodological 
considerations related to problems of investigation in a situation 
defined more by its 'cyclical' pattern of activity. Specifically, 
adopting a longitudinal approach would assist in lessening the problems 
associated with attempting to standardise points of entry in order 
to allow for inter-case comparability, and make for less of a 
reliance upon retrospective commentary, given the type of information 
sought. These issues, together with other methodological issues 
concerning the timing of field research in case studies in situations 
where the phenomena investigated have a cyclical logic to them, will 
be returned to in more detail below. The point to emphasise here 
is that an interest in change and development coupled with significant 
methodological and pragmatic considerations informed the choice of 
a longitudinal study, rather than a more-static, cross-sectional 
approach • 
An extensive reliance upon qualitative research techniques vas 
predicated upon the types of information being sought, and the 
methodological implications of adopting a longitudinal, case-study 
approach. The use of quantitative data. in a case study setting is 
not an epistemological inconsistency (Bryman 1976). However, in 
this instance, a reliance was placed upon qualitative information 
due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the type of information 
sought was highly individualistic. As will be described below, a 
case 'databank' of information concerning project task and organis-
ational characteristics was obtained for each case. This more 
'factual' data was both highly project specific and high in its 
level of detail. The second broad type of information sought and 
obtained, was that concerning individuals' own perceptions and 
attitudes towards the project, its organisation and management. A 
particular concern here with the respondents' own frames of reference 
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for the description and interpretation of circumstances and events, 
. . 
placed a premium upon a less rather than more structured ex ante 
categorisation of possible response sets. The intention vas to allov 
for as full as possible a range of responses in line with the 
exploratory nature of the research, rather than to inhibit the 
range of possibilities. 
A second reason vas due' to the comparatively small number of 
respondents vho vould be involved relative to the range of variables 
under investigation. The large number of variables explored in the 
study and the potential complexity in their interrelationships made 
a more structured approach to data collection and a more standaraised 
statistical treatment of the data thus obtained an impossibility. 
This vas particularly the case, since the numbers interviewed vere 
to be c o m p a r a t i v ~ l y y small (approximately 10 - 15 in each case). The 
aim was consequently to obtain data in the form of responses to 
series' of particular 'themes' with respect to each case (and further 
to explore these themes more fully in subsequent interviews vith the 
same respondents over time), rather than to employ a set of 
standardised techniques amenable to rigorous statistical treatment 
(and perhaps to apply these. at later points in the form of a 'panel' 
design). The onus was upon allowing for the full potential variation 
in response, such that more o p e n ~ e n d e d d questions for the exploration 
of particular themes and their development over time became the 
appropriate means of obtaining the type of data required. 
A third, more pragmatic, reason for employing this type of approach 
was due to the level and type of detail sought in a situation in vhich 
full familiarity with the types of circumstances encountered could not 
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be assumed. An openness to, and awareness of, the peculiarities of 
the construction process in practice (for instance, technical aspects 
and legal frameworks) was deemed essential if one were able fully to 
understand the processes of management found on site in practice. At 
the same time, it was recognised that the range of possibilities in 
these respects could not be fully, or perhaps even adequately, specified 
in advance, given lack of familiarity with the circumstances found 
in construction. Consequently a reliance upon a more qUalitative 
approach was lent weight by encountering a situation which, compared 
with other industrial settings (eg manufacturing), has quite distinct 
characteristics. 1 A strong interest in this study in the centrality 
of situational conditions predisposed the researcher to pursue a 
strategy that would allow for investigating as fully as possible the 
characteristics of those conditions as they were perceived to have 
influenced the process of management on site, and as they were 
understood and articulated by those concerned. In other words, an 
understanding of the full context of social interaction was deemed 
to be of central importance (Van Maanen 1979, Ch 1). 
The broad strategy ,described above'has a number of implications 
which need to be noted at this point, and which will be referred to 
again in the more detailed description of the methodology employed in 
the remainder of this section. Broadly speaking, these concern the 
issues of the reliability and the validity of the case data obtained. 
These issues are of central importance to all forms of social and 
behavioural research. However it is acknowledged that the employment 
of a strategy such as that described above accentuates the types of 
p r o b l e m ~ ~ commonly experienced, and'requires a greater degree of 
attention than might be the case where a more routinised and 
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standardised research approach is employed. 
5.2.1 External Validity 
Firstly, the use of case studies severely restricts the extent 
to which one can generalise the findings obtained to a wider 
population of which the sample of cases is a part. The problem is 
of the external validity of the findings. In this study, the projects 
selected (see below) were not systematically sampled in any way, 
and consequently no claims are made here as to the representativeness 
of the sample. At best one might say that the cases studied 
appeared to be by no means untypical'of the types of projects 
undertaken within the industry. However, this is not to suggest that 
they are so in any technical, sampling sense. By the same token it 
is not possible .to generalise the findings to the wider population 
of similar projects undertaken within the industry. The projects 
have been approached as highly individualistic cases. Indeed, an 
importance has been attached to allowing for the full individuality 
of the cases in exploring the phenomena of interest. Consequently, 
no claims are made concerning the generalisability of the findings 
to other cases. However, a claim is made as to the broader 
analytical generalisation of the findings to the propositions 
investigated. Yin (1984) for example, draws an important contrast 
between case study and survey research in this respect: 
"The external validity problem bas been a major barrier 
in doing case studies. Critics typically state that 
single cases offer a poor basis for generalising. 
However, such critics are implicitly contrasting the 
situation to survey research, where a 'sample' (if 
selected correctly) readily generalises to a larger 
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universe. This analogy to 'samples and universes 
is incorrect when dealing with case 'studies. This 
is because survey research relies on statistical 
generalisation, whereas case studies (as with , 
experiments) rely on analytical generalisation." 
(ibid, 1'39; emphasis in original) 
The author concurs with this view, and recognises the importance of 
replication (ibid) as a means of strengthening the case tor arguing 
for the external (analytical) validity of the findings obtained. 
The method of replication made in this study was in the form of 
a multiple case design in which a sufficient number of cases were 
selected such that worthwhile comparisons and contrasts might be 
drawn between them with respect to the propositions investigated. 
The analysis is consequently conducted within the bounds of the 
sample of cases selected; although it is argued that sufficient 
number of cases were investigated and in sufficient detail to allow 
for analytical generalisations to be made on the basis of the 
findings obtained. The use of five cases here explored in great 
detail created problems in the comparative examination of 
circumstances and events between projects (and indeed within 
proj ects), due to their variation across a sUbstantial number of 
dimensions. Consequently it should be noted that the comparisons 
and contrasts drawn have been done so while attempting to allow 
for the highly idiosyncratic nature of the cases explored at the, 
level of detail that information about them was both sought and 
obtained. However, in relation to the external validity of the 
findings, it is argued that the inclusion of five cases allowed 
sufficient ground for analytical generalisations to be made. 
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5.2.2 Construct Validity. Internal Validity and Reliability 
. " .,. . ( . 
Important implications stem from the use of an extensive reliance 
upon qualitative data in this study for ensuring construct validity, 
internal validity and the reliability of the data obtained (cf Yin 
1984, Ch 2). Concerning construct validity, the problem is one of 
ensuring that correct operational measures for the concepts being 
studied are established. Concerning internal validity,the problem is 
one of being able to draw causal inferences. Concerning reliability, 
the problem is one of ensuring that the operations involved in the 
study could be repeated with the same results. These issues relate 
to the methods employed in data collection which are described in 
more detail below, with attention there being more directly focused 
upon specific procedures and potential threats to validity and 
reliability. 
With respect to construct validity, a general point to be made 
is that the study involved a more phenomenological approach of 
relying upon respondents' own frames of reference in describing the 
situation on each project, changes and developments over time, and 
their view of the importance and relevance of specific conditions 
and changes. As a consequence the measures that were used, insofar 
as they may strictly be termed 'measures', were highly perceptual. 
reflecting an interest in obtaining data not only upon attitudes, 
views and opinions themselves, but also data upon'issues as their 
meaning, salience and importancp. was ,defined by those involved. 
For the collection of the dataset used, use was made of multiple 
sources of evidence (namely a questionnaire, interviews, documentary 
evidence and direct observation); and establishing a chain of 
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evidence relying upon corroboration of data and accounts from different 
sources and individuals, and the repeat questioning with respect 
to,·' the development of issues over time (Yin 1984'). The type of 
data collected ranged from the more 'factual' descriptive information 
concerning the case and its participants, to attitudinal data concerning 
the attitudes, views, opinions and perceptions of those involved. The 
importance of this latter type of data made for a careful treatment 
of the information during the subsequent analysis in order to ensure 
that the requirements for construct validity were met: in particular 
in ensuring that the meanings assigned to particular phenomena 
were consistent with the definitions of the constructs employed in 
this study. 
This issue dovetails with a concern for ensuring the internal 
validity of the dataset. The issue is not seen as particularly salient 
for exploratory case studies (Yin 1984, p36). However, in this study 
an attempt was made to explore to some'extent causal relationships 
between the variables investigated. While the central intention was 
to explore patterns of association between sets of factors, the question 
of causality is implicit in ,a number of the propositions listed 
earlier. Moreover, a longitudinal approach, coupled with the fact 
that much of the ( a t t i ~ u d i n a l ) ) data was given directly in the form 
of (often lengthy and broad)' causal statements, meant two things. 
Firstly, that some opportunity was available for studying the 
question of causality; secondly, that, in the interpretation of 
the data, haying to confront causal mechanisms that were articulated 
by the respondents themselves could not be ignored. This is not 
meant to overstate the importance to the study of drawing causal 
inferences. Rather it is to acknowledge that the study reported here 
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was conducted in such a way as to make a consideration of the issue of 
minimising threats to internal validity an important feature. The 
issue is related largely to the procedures used in the analysls of 
the cases, and will be discussed in more detail below. The point 
to be made here is that the analysis of circumstances and events 
on each case presented a picture that was based on often variegated 
(and, of course, often conflicting) accounts, of the same issue. 
Consequently, an important part of the data collection, presentation 
and analysis part of the research consisted of an attempt to 
disentangle the mass of often competing and conflicting claims: 
bearing in mind the need both to strengthen internal validity, and 
to allow for valid differences in interpretation. In particular, as 
will be described below, the presentation involved a considerable 
effort to develop an e!planation of circumstances and changes, based 
upon the accounts·given and also upon a longitudinal, time-series 
type of analysis in which causal developments over time could be to 
some extent assessed. Yin (1984) has described three analytic 
tactics aimed at securing internal validity: pattern matching, 
explanation-building and time-series analysis. The approach adopted 
here, given the longitudinal basis'of the research, combined elements 
of the latter two tactics. 
Concerning reliability finally, the procedures described below 
for the COllection of more 'factual' case data represent the main 
mechanisms employed in establishing a case study 'data base (deemed 
as a primary tactic for helping to ensure reliability (Yin 1984, 
p4o)}. However, it should be recognised that the approach adopted 
inVOlved a good deal of interdependence between the pattern of 
questioning and the responses given, particularly since the aim was 
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to explore circumstances and change over time, and to follow through 
particular issues as and when they arose. In a sense, the approach 
adopted in this respect contained elements somewhat closer to a f o ~ ~
of 'investigative journalism', in which 'leads' were followed through. 
While the highly. individualistic nature of each project could be 
recorded in the form of a definitive data base, the highly individual-
istic train of events largely could not. Nevertheless these aspects 
were deemed of considerable importance' to an understanding of the 
case as a whole. Consequently. in these respects, it is ·difficult 
to unambiguously assert the full reliability of the data in the 
technical sense described earlier, since lines of questioning were 
developed as circumstances occurred and changed, and a considerable 
emphasis was put upon the discretion exercised by the researcher in 
pursuing particular lines of enquiry. Consequently, the implications 
of this more 'reactive' response need to be set aside the fuller 
degree of reliability-obtained by the collection of data to provide 
a definitive data base. 
As a brief summary, before describing the sample of the cases 
studied and the methods used in more detail, the author acknowledges 
the particular problems presented in conducting a research strategy 
such as that discussed here. However, the author agrees strongly 
with the views that the employment of such a strategy is particularly 
appropriate given certain lines of enquiry, that case stUdy/qualitative 
research has a 'validity' (used in a broader sense) ot its own and 
that efforts to compare it directly with more broadly-based/structured 
models of enquiry are sometimes erroneous or ill-founded; that the 
type of research strategy. pursued here is not the 'easy option' that 
it is often depicted as, and should not be taken solely as the 'poor 
5.35 
cousin' of survey/quantitative methods; and that it is important to 
, , 
describe in some depth the methodology employed in order to allow 
as full an assessment as possible of claims to validity and 
reliability (eg Yin 1984, Van Maanen 1979). The raisons d'etre of 
this type of strategy - the richness of detail if yields and the 
holistic interpretations that'are possible - at the same time 
succeed in being the betes noires of researchers in the field. This 
discussion is aimed at confronting the problems of the latter, in 
order to ensure the maximisation of gains from the former. 
The Sample of Cases 
5.3.1 The Unit of Analysis 
As 'noted a number of times already, 'the unit of analysis for 
investigation was taken to be the project itself, rather than the 
work undertaken by one of the firms involved as part of that project. 
Given this choice, two significant methodological 'problems associated 
with defining the 'boundaries' of investigation need some attention 
before continuing. The first is in allowing for the variation that 
occurs in the nature of activity undertaken at different stages 
in the total project cycle. More specifically, if the aim is to 
undertake some form of comparative examination between cases, one 
needs to ensure that a broad basis for comparability in time exists. 
For the purposes of this study, the 'boundaries' of the project in 
time were defined as corresponding to the construction period on 
site only. A good deal of importance was attached to obtaining 
information and views concerning the situation and developments in it 
prior to the start of construction activity on site (ie in design and 
tendering). This 'prehistory' of the project needed to.be investigated 
. . . 
as a set of contextual factors,due to their importance in defining 
the situation and influencing current conditions and developments on 
site. However, non of the cases investigated were explored at a 
sufficiently early enough stage for information to be obtained in 
'real time' as it were. Instead, the methodological implication 
was that a good deal of reliance was placed upon key informants' 
retrospective commentaries. The potential for selective recall, 
post hoc rationalisation and simply forgetting d e t a i l ~ n e e d s s therefore 
to be recognised with respect to the pattern of events prior to 
the period of central interest here. Similar issues arise with 
respect to events during the construction process itself prior to the 
period of fieldwork. These issues will be returned to again below. 
The second problem is related to the first, and concerns 
allowing for what mar be highly variable patterns of involvement of 
members of the 'project team' ih the performance and management of 
work on site. Specifically, it is the problem of inclusion or 
non-inclusion of participants within the respondent set. A good deal 
of importance was attached in the study to obtaining information and 
views concerning the organisational backdrop to the management of the 
current project in the case of each organisational sub-grouping 
within the vider project team. In other words1there was a concern 
with exploring the intraorganisational context of . interaction at 
the operational level, and the impact that broader organisational 
characteristics and attributes may have had, or be having. upon the 
conditions observed on site. The approach chosen was to draw the 
'boundaries' of the project organisation to inclUde those individuals 
who were most directly involved in the management of work on site, and 
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to use them as key informants from whom were obtained data on 
organisational attributes and practices which had some direct or 
indirect bearing upon the performance of work on that project. In 
many cases, this 'focal group' in fact appeared comparatively easy 
to identify. However, in one or two cases, where circumstances 
changed as the projects developed, the 'boundaries' of the group 
changed such that it was necessary to recognise flexibility in the 
boundaries of investigation to allow for this variation. These 
changes and their more specific methodological implications will be 
returned to below. The general point to make here is that, in 
focusing upon the project as the unit of analysis, one is concentrating 
upon only a subset of wider organisational activities in the case of 
each participant organisational group. In the case of research in 
more stable and static settings (such as manufacturing), taking the 
individual group, section, department, division or the total 
organisation as the unit of analysis, means that establishing the 
boundaries for investigation is less problematic due to the relative 
consistency of those units' constituents over time. In the case of 
projects, however, such a degree of consistency is by no means 
guaranteed. Indeed, if one accepts some of the earlier propositions, 
one would expect variability in patterns, level and degree of 
involvement as an empirical likelihood. Consequently there is a need 
for an approach that recognises this possibility by being responsive 
to the types of changes that can, and indeed do, occur over time. 
5.3.2 The Case Studies: Selection and Access 
Five cases for in-depth study were selected as the swmple. Each 
case had in common the fact that it involved the construction of a 
fairly large-scale project on a 'green field' site. However, the scale 
of operations and duration of the projects varied, as did the sectoral 
location (public or private sector), the type of work involved 
(ie what type of structure), and the contractual system employed. 
Consequently, t h e ~ e e was a considerable degree of variation across the 
cases according to a number of dimensions. A more detailed comparison 
and contrast of the cases in these and other respects is given in 
Chapter 11 below, following the descriptions of the cases in the sample. 
In terms of the type of contractual system employed, the first four 
cases reported involved what may be considered to be a 'traditional' 
form of delivery system in which the design team and main contractor 
were hired/employed separately by the client. 2 The fifth case study 
was of a management contract in which a separate agent was employed 
to m a n a ~ e e e only the work on site (see above, Chapter 3). It was 
intended that a sixth case study would be included - of a design 
and construct contract (see also Chapter 3). Contacts were made (see 
below) with a view to undertaking the research on a design and construct 
contract; and preliminary discussions and, indeed, initial interviews 
were held with a number of respondents. However, these access 
negotiations and preliminary interviews occurred only at a very late 
stage in the course of the fieldwork stage of the research project. 
Consequently, inSUfficient time was available for exploring the issues 
of interest in this type of setting, and in following up events upon 
the project where access had been negotiated, and where work had only 
recently begun. As a result, none of the (limited amount or) material 
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obtained from the interviews held are reported here, and the 
sample of projects consists only of the five described in Chapters 
6 to 10. 
The selection of the projects was based essentially upon the 
access obtained and the agreement to co-operate on the part of all 
the main participants. other than the projects being new constructions 
and sufficiently large in scale, such that a tairly sizeable site 
management organisation was likely to occur, no parameters were set 
for the inclusion or exclusion of projects (ie public/private sector, 
building/civil engineering). Consequently, the selection of the cases 
was based very largely upon pragmatic considerations: the availability 
of personal c o n t a c t s ~ a n d d the ease of negotiating access and obtaining 
the agreement of the parties concerned. The process of negotiating 
access involved in each Case establishing personal contact with 
senior management staff in at least one of the organisations 
involved; then attending meetings with those staft and perhaps others 
involved on the project, in order to explain the nature and purpose 
of the research, and to find out further information about the project 
and those involved; and then in repeating the process for gaining 
the co-operation, and agreement to participate, of representatives 
from the other organisations involved. This procedure for obtaining 
access and agreement to participate was largely successful: only in 
one case (which was subsequently dropped from the sample) was the 
agreement to co-operate on the part of one of the parties not 
forthcoming. This degree of co-operation on the part of those involved 
(particularly given the amount of fieldwork involved as described 
below) was perhaps greater than anticipated, and entirely to the credit 
of the participants in the study, their interest, enthusiasm (and patiencelt 
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Before continuing, it is important to stress, however, that the 
procedure for obtaining access varied in one respect between the cases. 
In the first two cases (the RAW and AFU projects in Chapters 6 and 7) 
an initial introduction to the project and its participants was 
obtained via the main contracting organisation; in the third and 
fourth (the NSS and MTS projects in Chapters 8 and 9) it was via the 
clients' main design team representatives; in the final case (the 
PDL project in Chapter 10) it was via one of the larger subcontracting 
firms that were employed on the project. Because of the nature of the 
research and, in particular, the focus upon the relationships between 
the main participating organisations, this pattern of initial 
introduction may have had an impact upon" the perceived position of 
the observer vis-a-vis one or other of the participating organisations. 
Strenuous efforts were made to ensure that 'the neutrality and 
independence of the researcher vis-a-vis one organisation or the other 
were fully understood by those involved. Written and verbal statements 
were made to this effect, as well as the more usual guarantees of 
confidentiality and anonymity in the use of all reported information 
and comments. The general candidness of those interviewed and their 
willingness to co-operate fully and respond to the questions asked 
suggests that such assurances were accepted and understood. However. 
it is pertinent to point out that the type of research undertaken 
here involved a need for a continuing awareness and reiteration of 
the researcher's neutrality and independence. This will become 
particularly apparent when the case histories of each project are 
described in more detail at the end of each case study chapter. As 
will be noted below, every effort was made to present alternative 
and otten conflicting perceptions and interpretations of events. In a 
situation in which participants' responses were often informed by the 
perception of others' responsibility or 'blame' for the problems that 
they were facing, a good deal of emphasis was placed upon the 
researcher's need to maintain a neutral, uncommitted and diplomatic 
profile. 
A further point is that those through vhom access was initially 
gained were allowed the opportunity to select the site themselves, 
rather than the researcher exercising the choice. (An exception vas 
the final PDL case, in which an example of a management contract vas 
more actively sought as veIl as being available; similarly with the 
design and construct project mentioned earlier). Such a potential 
source of bias is significant if attempts are made to randomly select 
cases on the basis of a systematic framework for sampling, and if 
claims for representation are to be made. However, no such claims 
are argued for here. In the cases researched here, it might be 
suggested that the projects.vere selected as exemplary examples of 
each firm's, activities and performance on site. However, with the 
possible exception of the second ( A F U ~ ~ case, the accounts given and 
expanded upon in the case descriptions and analyses lend no convincing 
support to the argument that the researcher was diverted to situations 
of 'exemplary good practice' where no problems occurred in the 
management of the project.· More importantly, the aim was not to 
compare or judge conditions in this respect, since a normative 
framework did not underly the research strategy, and the concern was 
much more with events and processes and their relationships with 
outcomes, rather than upon 'judging' the outcomes themselves. Such an 
i n ~ e n t i o n n vas articulated while ·obtaining access, and subsequently in 
interviews with those involved directly. Consequently 'bias' in this 
respect is argued to be of little relevance given the research 
strategy chosen. 
5.3.3 Fieldwork 
An important initial point to be noted with respect to the 
fieldwork undertaken is that the cases differed in the point of entry 
in time at which they were first investigated, and also in the 
duration of fieldwork. It is argued here that the longitudinal approach 
adopted towards the research served to lessen the impact of variation 
in this respect that malf occur in cross-sectional designs - where 
variation in the point of entry into a situation defined by its 
'cyclical' pattern of activity may exacerbate problems of comparability. 
However, it should be stressed that variability in the point of entry, 
the timespan of fieldwork and the number of visits to each site did 
occur. This was largely due to practical difficulties associated 
with obtaining access to sites at comparable stages of development, 
and in following through to completion projects whose duration well 
outlasted the period of time available for fieldwork. The length 
and timing of the projects studied, together with the period of 
fieldwork involved on each are given in Figure 5.2 to illustrate 
the problem. The more general point is that the choice of the project 
as the unit of analysis causes methodological difficulties due to the 
time dimension. In the study of phenomena in more stable, permanent 
conditions (eg manufacturing), such a problem is much less a critical 
constraint upon methodological options. 
More specifically, the research undertaken on the 'RAW' case, 
which constituted the pilot study, was concentrated in the early 
stages of its development. Further visits to this site were intended 
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as a follow-up during ~ h e e main period of fieldwork. However, some 
six months after the last early visit, the company involved on the 
project was put into liquidation, and no further follow-up visits 
proved possible. In the AFU case, the lengthy timescale of develop-
ment meant that access was only available for a period half way 
through the project's completion. In the remaining three cases, 
the projects were followed through to eventual final completion, 
although the period of time available from negotiating access through 
to final completion varied as can be seen from the diagram. The order 
of the projects corresponds to the sequence of chapters (6 to 10) 
used to describe the cases. The chronological order of obtaining 
access was in fact: RAW (Ch 6), PDL (Ch 10), MTS (Ch 8), AFU (Ch 7) 
and NSS (Ch 9). The reasons for this shift are given below. 
This variety in the pattern of fieldwork raises one or two issues 
of importance. Firstly, the projects were investigated at different 
stages in their development with respect to the types of activity 
undertaken. Details are given in each chapter of the situation at 
the time of the visits made.' The point here is that the data holds 
only in relation up to and including the time of the final visit. In 
the RAW and AFU cases, this corresponds to points early on and part 
way through construction respectively; in the other three cases it 
corresponds to the project through to its completion. Consequently, 
the context for the description of events varies between the cases: 
in the RAW and AFU cases the picture is of a subset of the total 
construction period, whereas in the other three cases it tends to be 
a more 'global' perspective of circumstances on site over the entire 
period. This point is particularly important with respect to 
performance,criteria: in the latter cases, views and opinions were, 
expressed with regard to performance outcomes that had been realised. 
As will be seen from the PDt case in particular, quite different 
pictures of performance were given at early and late stages of the 
projects development respectively: reflecting the extent to which 
realised (as opposed to anticipated) performance outcomes informed 
the views of those involved. In relying upon respondents' frames 
of reference, one has to be aware of these distinctions and their 
import for the frames of reference employed. 
The longitudinal approach adopted to some extent militated 
against these effects. However, a second, and related, point 
is that the case descriptions and accounts varied a good deal in the 
extent to which retrospective, rather than 'real time' commentary 
formed a part of the data base. The potential problems of 
retrospective commentary were noted earlier. What 'is of particular 
importance to note here, is that the fieldwork on two of the projects 
(the MTS and NSS) .was timed such that the projects/when first visited, 
were close to completion. In these cases, not only was a more 
'global' perspective on the project as a whole an important frame 
of reference, but also retrospective commentary (what ~ ~ happened) 
was a more important component in responses. In the other three 
cases, due to a synchronisation of construction and research periods, 
a fuller opportunity was available for e x p l o r ~ n g g events and change 
as they occurred, and not as they were subsequently reported. Even 
here, however, retrospective commentary was an important feature, 
since in no cases were the very early stages of construction studied. 
In the description of all the cases studied, references have continually 
been made to the timing of events and to the framework of response, 
in order that issues that arose, and views upon them can be • located' 
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in the timespan of the project, and in the timespan of fieldwork 
(or, alternatively, before fieldwork began). However, it should 
be stressed that the MTS and NSS projects are somewhat different 
in the extent to which 'global' developments were addressed by the 
respondents, due to the practical difficulties in being able to 
achieve a more consistent synchronisation between stage of 
development and period of fieldwork. 
5.4 Methodology 
5.4.1 The Programme of Visits 
Each site was visited on average once a.month during the period 
of fieldwork for periods lasting anywhere between one and three days. 
The exception to this pattern of visiting was in the first, pilot 
case (the RAW project), where two blocks of fieldwork of three and 
two weeks duration respectively, and where local residence in each 
caseJmeant that the opportunity was available for more intensive 
stud7 and the visiting of the site' on a daily basis for quite 
extensive periods of time. In this case the access given was fully 
agreed and established in advance, and the site was used as a field 
base from which interviews with other personnel (eg head office 
representatives) could be arranged by telephone. 
In the other cases, once the principal of access had been 
agreed, specific visits were arranged in advance by telephone with 
staff on site. 'Busy' days were avoided, due to the likelihood of 
people not being available for interview, anda concern on the part 
of the researcher not to be a potential cause, of disruption. 
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The visits were usually timed to, coincide with the dates for formal 
, ' 
contractual meetings involving the main participants. Once on 
site, the main site offices were used as a base from which interviews 
could be arranged: either by direct personal contact, or by telephone. 
(It should perhaps be noted at this point that the extensiveness 
and intensiveness of the fieldwork involved was constrained not so 
much by the readiness of those involved to participate (which was 
considerable), but by the limited funding set aside and available to 
grant holders for pursuing field research of this type. With a more 
generous allowance for fieldwork provision, it is argued that a more 
frequent and intensive programme of field research could have been 
conducted, with obvious benefits for the-research study as a whole). 
5.4.2 The Participants 
Interviews and discussions were held with all those participants 
on site described in the case study texts, plus representatives from 
head office organisations where appropriate. There were one or two 
exceptions to the former rule which are noted in each case description. 
The many subcontractors involved, and the variation between the cases 
in the numbers involved at different times posed problems for 
gaining access to subcontractors' representatives and conducting 
interviews. In the event, interviews were held with site represent-
atives (eg forman, site agent) from at least two subcontracting firms 
on each project. In addition, in one or two cases, interviews were 
held with subcontractors' head office representatives (eg contracts 
managers) where access was available to the researcher. The information 
and views given by subcontractors' representatives proved highly useful 
as a means of obtaining extra detail, cross-checking accounts, 
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providing corroborative evidence, and as a source of alternative 
interpretations of events. However, it should be noted that practical 
limitations meant that the position of all subcontractors vis-a-vis 
the main parties could not be fully and systematically explored 
across all the cases. For example, while representatives from the 
three subcontractors involved in the early stages of the RAW project 
could be interviewed, in a case such as the PDt project, where the 
number of subcontractors at anyone time averaged 10 to 12, such a 
degree of coverage was largely impractical. Moreover, at different 
site visits corresponding to different stages in the work, 
different subcontractors were involved. Consequently, the 
transience of subcontractor involvement militated against effective 
and full coverage across the site. Moreover, referring back to the 
earlier problem noted of the stage at which the point of entry 
was made (and the stages covered by the fieldwork), subcontractors' 
involvement was mostly episodic, and the accounts given specific 
to certain sections of the work'and not necessarily to the situation 
on the project as a whole. As such, information and views given by 
subcontractors' representatives were used to corroborate (or not) 
more general accounts given of the project and its management. and 
specific examples are given in the case study texts as illustrative 
of the themes discussed, or of alternative interpretations of events. 
The interviews that were conducted reflected a somewhat 
opportunistic approach. Apart from the initial series of interviews 
which were arranged with the respondents in advance, and for which a 
specific time was set aside, later interviews and discussions occurred 
largely as and when people became available. The interviews 
conducted thus varied considerably in their length (from ten minutes 
to three hours). Also, the intention of 'following through' 
. . 
particular issues meant that, once '::initial interviews were held, 
later interviews as the site progressed were held variouslY with 
those who were centrally involved and could act as key informants. 
Consequently, it should be noted that some participants were 
interviewed more frequently, and for longer periods of time than 
others, throughout the course of the fieldwork as a whole. This 
more flexible approach was predicated upon the need to explore 
change and developments over time, and reflected the different level 
and nature of involvement of staff at various times. In presenting 
the case studies below, a particular care has been taken in 
ensuring that the location in time of events and views expressed is 
made clear. Care has also been taken to make explicit the greater 
part played by some participants than others in the description 
.and interpretation of key issues and events. At the same time, it 
is acknowledged that the approach that was taken cannot fully allow 
for the potential spread of response in relation to central issues 
and events. Again the discretion and judgement exercised by the 
researcher was an important part of the methodological approach 
pursued. 
5.4.3 The Methods Employed 
A combination of four methods was employed to obtain the data 
that was needed. The main methods were: the use of a questionnaire 
to act as the basis for collecting information concerning the project, 
the organisations involved, and the patterns and processes of 
management with respect to that project; and the holding of semi-
structured and unstructured interviews with participants to supplement 
this information and, more importantly, to elicit responses concerning 
the attitudes, views and opinions of those involved with respect to 
the manner in which the project was organised and managed. Use was 
also made of information available from documentary sources (eg contract 
documents, company manuals and procedural guides, minutes of meetings, 
etc) to supplement the more 'factual' material obtained, and to allow 
for the cross-checking of information obtained from the accounts given. 
Direct observation, through attendance at meetings on and off site, 
and more generally in the periods of time available on site between 
interviews, also served as a useful method: particularly for 'gaining 
a feel' for the situation and allowing for a greater familiarisation ~ i c ~ ~
the procedures and practices that occurred; but also in picking up 
'leads' (in the investigative journalism sense) that were worthwhile 
following up. Field notes were taken from documentary sources and 
from direct observation that becmne part of the database for each 
case study. All the data obtained from these four sources was 
recorded manually in the form of field notes, and a diary was kept 
of times of visitq,meetings attended, interviews held and issues that 
arose. 
(i) The Questionnaire 
A lengthy questionnaire was used in order to obtain 
detailed information on: the nature of the project; its 
development during the stages prior to work starting on site; 
the procedures involved in pre-site design and planning; the 
roles and relationships between the personnel involved at that 
stage; the nature of the work being performed on site; the 
structures of organisation and processes of management involved; 
and the roles and relationships among the personnel involved 
in the management of work on site. The aim was to provide 
a checklist of information concerning the project, its 
management, and the roles of those involved to use as a 
descriptive backdrop to the analysis of the situation and 
events upon the project during its construction period. 
The full questionnaire is attached in Appendix A. It 
should be noted that the response categories were left open. 
The intention was to use the questionnaire as a guide for the 
specific information to be obtained across the case as a whole. 
It differed in this respect from the type of questionnaire 
normally employed in field research, in that the intention was 
to obtain a databank of information about the case as a 
whole, rather than to obtain responses to specific questions 
asked of individual respondents. This intention meant also 
that the questions need not be asked of specific respondents. 
Those who were asked were used as 'key informants' to provide 
much of this more 'factual' data concerning the project 
and its management. Additionally, the examination of docu-
mentation and, to some extent, direct observation, allowed 
for the completion of a checklist of information concerning 
the project and its management. 
It should be noted here that interest was centred upon 
the actual practices of management that were adopted. As 
such a good deal of effort was expended in cross-checking 
details that were given concerning what was actually 
happening in order to ensure the reliability of the information 
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given by the respondents. At the same time, any divergencies 
that emerged between accounts of the same process were not 
discarded, since they amounted to potentially significant 
analytical features (ie differences between official, assumed 
and actual patterns of management). In the event, given the 
type of information sought via this method, the number of 
. divergencies that occurred in the accounts given were found 
to be minimal and of little direct analytical significance. 
(ii) Semi-Structured Interviews 
_The information given, and the views and,opinions expressed, 
in interviews held with the participants in each case form the 
central analytic 'core' of each case study. In these interviews, 
the focus of attention was largely upon the manner in which 
the project had been run and managed. Interest was upon the 
respondents' viewpoints concerning: the role of their own 
organisation in the running of the jab; the types of problems 
that had been encountered; the characterisation of relationships 
with other parties involved in the project; the manner in which 
problems had been resolved (or not) and decisions reached 
(or not); and their own feelings about their position and role 
on the project. 
The interviews held were semi-structured in form. A 
schedule of information that was designed to yield supplementary 
information to that obtained from the questionnaire was used as 
a guide for the initial stages of the initial interviews, but 
more as an aidememoire for the researcher, than as a fully 
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structured set of questions to be specifically asked of each 
respondent. This has been attached as Appendix B. Questioning 
in detail about the aspects described above was more loosely-
structured, with the intention of , allowing as sufficient scope 
as possible for the respondents to air their views and employ 
their own frame of reference for describing situations and 
events. The pressure this type of approach puts upon the 
researcher's ability to conduct interviews effectively cannot 
be overstated. The fact that the line of questioning pursued 
is dependent upon, rather than independent of, the types of 
responses given puts a premium upon the skills of the researcher 
in following a line of questioning without being diverted too 
much from the central issues; and in responding appropriately 
to the flow of the conversation without hazarding the loss of 
p o t e n t i a l l ~ ~ important information or gaining a mass of interesting 
but irrelevant information. In conducting these interviews, 
a broad set of lead-in questions corresponding to the issues 
noted in the above paragraph were phrased, and the respondent 
was prompted to give further details and views as it was felt 
to be appropriate. 
Consequently each respondent was asked the same broad 
set of questions. However, not surprisingly the types of 
response, the 'themes' identified, and the importance attached 
to them varied often from respondent to respondent. The accounts 
reported in the latter part of each case study chapter are given 
with an a c k n o w l e d g ~ e n t t here that the issues raised and the views 
and emphases given'varied quite considerably. In some instances, 
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it should be added, important themes addressed in this study 
. . 
were not always given attention by those interviewed, and 
deeper prompting failed to generate a response. In those 
instances, and particularly in instances where corroborative 
accounts were not given, and where alternative interpretations 
were made, explicit and detailed attention has been directed 
towards the issues in the case analyses. 
The Collation, Presentation and Analysis of the Data 
Collation 
The methodology adopted yielded a mass of information pertaining 
to each case in the form mainly of field notes. The procedure for 
collating and 'coding' this data involved establishing an indexing 
system by which data could be picked out and grouped under relevant 
specific headings and then combined in the common descriptive 
format that is described in the next section. The procedure was a 
lengthy and laborious one, and one fraught with problems in 
specifying the appropriate 'location' for specific data points. 
This was particularly so in the case of the less descriptive, more 
perceptual data; where the idiosyncracity of events was an 
appropriate dimension; and where accounts given cross-cutted 
conceptual lines of e n ~ u i r y . . Every care was taken to ensure that 
a rigorous and systematic scheme for the collation and presentation 
of the data was adhered to. However, it should be noted that the 
idiosyncratic pattern of events on the projects studied marked 
something of a departure in defining the appropriate logic underlying 
the description of developments on each project. As noted below, 
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this material, together with the more perceptual data obtained, is 
." " 
largely withheld until the latter" part of each case study chapter. 
5.5.2 The Presentation of the Cases 
Data from each of the five case studies is presented in 
Chapters 6 to 10. As noted earlier, the cases are not presented in 
the chronological order in which contacts with the participating 
organisations were initially made. The AFU case has been brought 
forward to stand in comparison with the first (RAW) case which was 
similar in scale, and similar in being part of a longer-term 
development. The PDL case has been left ~ i l l l last due to its 
essential difference from the other four in being run as a 
management contract. 
The names of the projects and the organisations involved have 
been replaced with pseudonyms in order to ensure the "anonymity of 
those involved and the confidentiality of their views and opinions. 
A further means of helping to ensure anonymity has been the omission 
of information on the actual location of the project (the town, city 
and even region). For the purposes of this study, the location of the 
project relative to the central establishments of those organisations 
involved is of some potential interest, and this data has been 
retained. However, there was no a priori reason for needing 
information on the absolute geographical location of the projects, 
other than in the form of information concerning the geophysical 
conditions on site and . the immediate neighbourhood. The only 
descriptive piece of information that will be given here in this 
respect is that the sites were located in England. 
A further alteration to the data presented has been made in 
the job titles assigned to those involved. The nomenclature used 
in the industry presents what can be a confusing picture to those 
interested in investigating it. For example, the person in charge 
of the site on behalf of the main contractor may be given any of 
the titles: Project Manager, Site Agent, Senior Site Agent or Site 
Manager. The picture is confused further if one considers the 
synonym 'engineer' for instance. In the first case to be reported, 
nine engineers were involved on site, together with many at 
respective head offices. In a civil engineering job, as that one 
was, the confusion is exacerbated by the tendency to use the 
nomenclature "the Resident Engineer" to refer to both the particular 
individual in charge and to the site organisation as a whole: using 
the term in a generic sense. In that case, it is to be hoped that 
the presentation given clarifies rather than confuses the picture. 
In all five cases, attempts have been made to standardise the job 
titles of the key participants involved to reflect their relative 
roles, and to ease the process of drawing comparisons and contrasts 
between cases. At the same time, it should be stressed that this 
represents only a terminological 'adjustment and is not meant to 
reflect an exact comparability in position, influence and status 
of the respondents compared across the cases within their 
respective organisations. Indeed, a good deal of the analysis is 
concerned with addressing the implications of variation in these 
respects for the observed patterns and processes of project 
management. 
Each case is presented under a series of subheadings which deal 
with specific aspects of the case. These are: 
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(i) The Project, Client and Context: A description of the 
project, its objectives, the client, and the 'location' 
of the project with respect to the client's activities 
as a whole. 
(ii) The Client's Representatives: A description of the 
design team employed, their relationship to their wider 
organisation and the client, and the 'location' of the 
project with respect to their activities more generally. 
(iii) The Main Contractor: A description of the main contractor 
employed, their size and specialisms, and the 'location' 
of the project with respect to their activities more 
generally. 
(iv) The Design Process ann Design Organisation: An account 
of the procedures involved in the design and its 
management, and the roles of groups and individuals 
in these processes. 
(v) Characteristics of the Design: An account of factors 
influencing the design process, and of the nature and 
extent of the design at the tendering stage and the 
start of construction. 
(vi) Tendering and the Main Contract: An account of the 
tendering procedure employed, the selection of the main 
contractor, and the terms and conditions of main contract 
established. 
(vii) 
(viii) 
(ix) 
The Main Contractor's Site Team: An account of the 
composition of the site team, and its relationship 
with head office staff. 
The Client's Supervision: An account of the composition 
of the team supervising the work on behalf of the client, 
and their relationship with the wider organisation. 
The Organisation and Management of Work on Site: A 
description of the organisation and managment of the 
work, including main contractor, design team and their 
respective head offices' involvement in planning, 
co-ordinating and controlling activity. 
(x) Performance: An account of performance levels achieved 
and the status of the project at the times visited. 
(xi) A Case Analysis: An account of events recorded during 
the course of activity on site, and their association 
with performance levels achieved. 
It should be noted that this plan of presentation is departed from 
slightly in the two smaller cases (the MTS and NSS), where the 
smaller scale of operations meant a much smaller site staff, and 
a correspondingly less complex picture of the information included 
under heading (ix). C o n s e ~ u e n t l y , , in these two cases, that 
information has been included under heading (vii) instead. 
The information contained under headings (i) to (x) was 
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essentially derived from the descriptive information obtained 
. . 
from the questionnaire, the examination of documentation and 
supplemented by details given by the respondents in interviews. The 
information contained in sections (iv) and (vi) needs special attention 
here, since they involve a reliance primarily upon accounts given 
retrospectively concerning the 'prehistory' of each project. It is 
also important to note that the descriptions given under section 
(ix) are necessarily somewhat static in nature. This point will be 
returned to below. The bulk of the perceptual data obtained via 
interviews with those involved is presented under the final section 
( x i ~ w h i c h h is concerned with describing more the pattern of events 
on the project as viewed by those inVOlved, and the implications 
of these events for performance and the outcomes achieved. This 
section is of particular importance in the later analysis and 
deserves attention here, since it is also methodologically the most 
problematic, in terms of ensuring the reliability and validity of the 
data. 
The section has been labelled 'A Case Analysis' for two reasons. 
Firstly, because much of the data presented and discussed therein 
is in the form of analyses of events made by the respondents 
themselves. Secondly, because in disentangling the arguments 
presented as such, and in attempting to create an accurate picture 
of what occurred in the view of those involved, and to establish 
whether this was corroborated by others or not, and whether it was 
a consequence of different and valid interpretations, the investigator 
is also involved in an analysis of the data. The problem is severe 
in qualitative research, since the actual 'data' as such often 
consist of causal statements or inferences as well as holistic views 
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used to interpret events. This study proved no exception in this 
respect. It was the disaggregation of multidimensional data, 
rather than the aggregation of unidimensional variables which 
proved to be one of the most difficult activities involved in the 
presentation and analysis of the data here. 
In Undertaking this task, every effort was made to minimise 
the threats to validity and reliability that have already been 
discussed. In particular, conflicting views and interpretations 
were given equal weighting in the case analyses, in order to 
present a balanced view that reflected the divergencies in attitude 
and opinion that were often expressed; and instances in which 
parties offered 'no comment' on the issue at hand have been noted 
and recorded. An importance was also attached to the degree of 
corroboration given. However. sources of (non)corroboration have 
also been noted, since they arise as points of analytical 
significance in themselves (eg who corroborates others' viewpoints 
and why). Taken as a whole, the general interpretation of 
circumstances and events on each case is that of the researcher, 
informed by the views and opinions expressed by the participants 
involved. Every effort has been made to ensure the validity of 
this interpretation by giving as complete, detailed and accurate 
a picture as possible in each case. 
The Interease Analysis 
As a final set of points in this chapter, a brief summary of 
the strategy p ~ s u e d d in the subsequent analysis of the data needs 
to be given. As noted above, the analysis of the data in fact 
begins with the presentation of the data itself: the latter section 
. . 
of each case study chapter involves to some extent an intra-case 
analysis, for the reasons described above. The subsequent inter-case 
analysis (which also draws upon within-case comparisons and 
contrasts) is a two-stage procedure. In the first stage (Chapter 11), 
a broad comparison and contrast between the cases is undertaken, 
based upon the information contained in sections (i) to (viii) 
described above. This relates essentially to the descriptive 
information contained in each case, concerning the project, the 
organisations involved and the 'pre-history' of the projects. As such 
it describes the contextual factors of interest to this study, and 
examines similarities and differences between the projects in these 
respects. 
The second stage of the analysis (in Chapter 12) is centrally 
concerned with exploring the patterns and processes involved in 
the organisation and management of each project in the context of 
the factors described in the previous chapter. Here, the focus of 
attention is upon the information contained under sections (ix) 
to (xi) in each case, and an analysis of circumstances and events) 
taking into account the situation encountered on each project. 
The analysis in this chapter forms the springboard for the latter 
discussion (in Chapter 13) of the findings in relation to the 
propositions stated at the start of this current chapter. 
5.5.4 An Illustration of the Methods Employed 
Before turning to the cases in detail, an illustrative example 
can be given of part of the research strategy employed. Figure 5.3 
below is given here as an illustration of the procedures involved 
in the design, manufacture and assembly on site of just one component 
of the building process as identified using the procedures for 
data collection described above. The information depicted there 
pertains only to the information obtained on the managerial functions 
associated with the performance of the project task (and does not 
extend to more perceptual data obtained concerning how the firm was 
organised and run, etc). The firm was a'manufacturer and supplier 
of precast structural concrete units (columns, slabs, external 
cladding and floors), and was in fact the subcontractor employed in 
the final PDL case, described more fully in Chapter 10 below. The 
information that formed the basis for this production flowchart was 
gathered during a three week period of research at the company's 
central offices, manufacturing plant and depot, and on a number of 
their sites. The fieldwork occurred between the final visit to 
the RAW project and the first visit to the PDL project, and involved 
the procedures for data collection' (questionnaire, documentation 
study, interview and direct observation) described above. 
There is a pertinent set of points to be made here concerning 
the centrality of the time dimension in this depiction of the firm's 
activities. Firstly, the chart gives a somewhat static picture of 
activities. While a flow of activities over time is presented 
(from project initiation to completion), no attempt has been made to 
specify the relative time periods involved as one might do, say, in 
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role: on the one hand, as "the engineer" within the wider project 
. system; on the other hand, as the "organisation's engineer", 
representing that organisation's interests in external interaction. 
In terms of patterns of accountability, the picture is complex. 
The "organisation's engineer" is co-accountable to the organisation's 
project manager for results on the project, and to the functional 
head for the use of techniques. Within the wider project 
organisation, an orientation towards client welfare and loyalty 
and one's peer group at a professional level suggests a mirror 
image (albeit less formal) of these internal patterns of account-
ability. These correspond to the professional's relationships 
with subgroups within agencies external to the organisation, but 
to which agencies the organisation has been contracted to provide 
professional services of some description. The general point to 
be made here is that, in not fully or clearly differentiating 
between internal and external processes of interaction within a 
matrix or project management setting, this potential complexity 
and its ramifications in terms of patterns of internal 
co-ordination and control and the role experiences of specialists 
within the organisation has tended to be missed. Whether such 
factors emerge and how they do so are, of course, empirical 
questions. That they are theoretical possibilities due to the 
nature of the setting is the line of argument that has been pursued here. 
The position and role of the 'integrator' or 'project manager' too 
is here of some significant interest. As noted in Chapter 1, the 
integrator is seen as the individual who is expected to facilitate 
processes of joint problem-solving and decision-making and bring 
wider organisational (project) interests to bear on decisional 
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employing a 'critical path' method of network analysis. This has been 
done in recognition of the'variety in the projects undertaken in 
terms of their type, complexity and scale, and the implications they 
have for the timespan of specific activities. 
Secondly, and related to the dynamics of the entire process, 
a distinction has been drawn between 'routine' and 'non-routine' 
practices and procedures undertaken. The former refer to those 
activities necessarily involved in the undertaking of a project. 
The latter refer to those activities contingent upon variations 
and changes occurring throughout the course of the 'project cycle'. 
Thus for instance, changes to the work dUring the broad stages of 
design, manufacture and on-site assembly have been illustrated 
according to what implications these would have for the flow of 
activity if they were to occur. 
Thirdly, the chart describes events on one project only. The 
firm was, of course, involved in currently undertaking work on a 
series of projects of different scale and duration. The diagram 
provides a model of the firm's activities in relation to a specific 
project in order to give conceptual clarity. However, it should be 
recognised that such clarity is gained at the expense of not 
allowing for the complexity of the set of concurrent processes 
associated with the performance of a variety of projects, located 
at different temporal stages in the total project cycle. 
Finally, a 'smooth', sequentially-related flow of activities 
between the broad stages of the project ( d e s i g n - m a n u f a c t u r e - a s s ~ b l y ) )
is depicted. In practice, however, a greater degree of overlap 
between these stages in relation to one project did tend to occur. 
Excepting the impact of variations and changes (to the design or 
the programme dates for assembly), internal constraints served to 
condition what happened in practice. For instance, production 
runs on one type of unit to be delivered to site may have proceeded 
while other types of units were still being designed in more detail. 
Also the costs of storage and double-handling of large units of 
output presented the need for a more tightly-coupled and integrated 
flow of operations between manufacture, delivery and assembly. 
Given the limitations that these dynamic considerations suggest, 
some important features emerge if one looks at the interdependencies 
between the activities involved. The chart has been colour coded 
to illustrate two important features of the pattern of work 
organisation and management. Firstly, the pattern of cross-functional 
i n t e r i ' I ~ ~ i o ~ S h i p s s in the activities performed throughout the project 
cycle. The diagram is vertically segmented according to the part 
p l ~ e d d by different organisational groupings (ie functional departments) 
in the project. No attempt has been made here to distinguish fully 
between sequentially-interdependent and reciprocally-interdependent 
sets of activities as such. However, it should be clear from the 
diagram that the susceptibility towards variation and change in 
the details of the work involved heightens the tendency for 
relationships involving the latter to be 'activated' during the course 
of the project. The periods of detailed design/production planning 
in particular is notable for the extent to which interdepartmental 
interaction emerges to the fore. The process of assembly On site 
also illustrates the p o ~ e n t i a l l importance of these mechanisms 
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contingent upon encountering and needing to respond to external 
constraints and contingencies. The firm was somewhat unusual 
perhaps in that it specialised in the prefabrication of manufactured 
system components (assembling, rather than building, on site). Its 
'technical core' was the manufacturing system. However, the pattern 
of interdependencies does illustrate the vulnerability of its 
technical core to changes in production plans and schedules, and to 
the degree of cross-functional interaction associated with establishing 
these production plans and changing them)as conditions and events 
altered at stages throughout the entire cycle. 
Secondly, the pattern of potential aealings with external 
agencies with respect to the one project has been depicted: both 
with respect to 'routine' and 'non-routine' activities. As can be 
s ~ e n , , these dealings serve as important sources of constraints and 
contingencies that penetrate 'deep' into the core of the organisation 
and which include interaction with most of those functional 
groupings inVOlved in the management of project work. The diagram 
has simplified the situation by broadly distinguishing between 
demand-side and SUpply-side organisations (ie the client, designers, 
main contractor, and suppliers, subcontractors respectively). It 
should be borne in mind that the complexity in the pattern of 
(potential) external dealings is heightened considerably when the 
variety of these organisations is taken into account. The point 
to be made here is simply that these patterns of external dealings 
(to the extent that they are 'activated' in the processes of 
design, planning, manufacture, delivery and assembly) present the 
firm with considerable and salient sources of external constraint 
and contingency in their internal organisation and management of project 
w o r k ~ ~
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The foregoing has been presented as illustrative of the 
processes of managerial interaction explored as a central component 
in this s t u ~ ~ on the five cases explored below. The focus on the 
firm's total activities in relation to one project as the unit of 
analysis in this example, made the data obtained amenable to the 
type of presentation given in Figure 5.3. In the five cases to 
be explored in more detail in this s t u ~ , , such a form of presentation 
was not possible. This was because the organisational work involved 
in the management of the project on site was recurrent in nature: 
that is, the planning and control of work on site was undertaken 
on a periodic basis (weekly, say, or monthly). Consequently, 
different sections of the work on site (eg the plastering, the 
electrics) were managed in the context of an a l r e a ~ ~ specified plan 
of work that set total periods for their execution, and interim 
targets against which work was monitored. This process of management 
related to the occurrence of activities across the site as a whole. 
However, the episodic nature of sUbsections of the work, and their 
temporal integration and overlap, meant that it became highly 
problematic to separate out the management of one section of the 
work (eg the plastering), if allowance was to be made for the 
constraints and contingencies in its management suggested by the wide 
and varying range of other activities being concurrently, or partly 
concurrently, performed on site. Moreover, the interest was in the 
management of the ·site works as a whole. Separating out and focusing 
upon one particular activity to the exclusion of all else would 
have simplified the extant complexity and variability in the situation. 
The above diagram has been given as an illustration of the complexities 
in the process of p r o j e ~ t t management involved for one organisation, 
and as an example of the use of the methods emoloyed to obtain some 
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of the data of importance to this study. The comparable information 
for each of the five cases investigated is contained in the relevant 
section which describes the organisation and management of work on 
site (see above). However, in the cases investigated, the 
complications that emerge when one takes the time dimension into 
account has meant that a more appropriate mode of description was 
found in employing words to describe the situation, and not 
diagrams. Hopefully, however, the above illustration has given a 
flavour of the mechanisms of interest, and of the means of 
exploring those mechanisms employed in this study. 
Footnotes 
A more general point here concerns the question of whether 
the construction situation is 'different' to other types of 
industrial activity, and with what implications for social 
science research. Several broad contrasts have already been 
drawn, and the intention here is not to delve fUrther into 
the question, other than to note two additional points with 
methodological implications. Firstly, the construction 
industry is noted for its comparative absence in studies 
by social scientists of social and behavioural phenomena 
in work organisations. Despite the manifest importance of the 
industry, and its particularly interesting mode of 
organisation, social scientists,with a few important exceptions 
(eg Stinchcombe 1959) have rarely sought to make comparisons 
and contrasts that may allow for a fuller cross-fertilisation 
of ideas when such similarities and differences in situations 
are taken into account (eg it was noted earlier that Woodward's 
research specifically excluded construction firms. It has 
also been noted that social science studies of project 
management focus rarely upon mainstream construction project 
work). One of the consequences has been that social science 
and construction management research has tended not to 
dovetail particularly well. Another is that the social 
scientific research base into phenomena across industries 
including construction is not sufficiently strong or well 
developed. It.is then difficult to assume that the phenomena 
of interest are being studied in the full confidence that 
salient situational conditions (and an understanding of them) 
are being taken into account. A further methodological 
implication, discussed below, relates to the mode of investigation 
in situations characterised by change rather than relative 
stability and concerns issues of comparability, such as surround 
the question of entry into the case. 
2 Under the ICE, JCT and GC!Works/1 (for public sector building 
works) f o ~ o f f main contract. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CASE STUDY: The Riverside Advance Works Project (RAW) 
6.1. The Project, Client and C o n t e ~ t t
This Project involved the construction of the infrastructure 
of access and drainage facilities required for a new Council housing 
estate that was to be built by a large Metrapolitan Local Authority 
(the City Council). The volume of work involved was relatively 
small by civil engineering standards : it consisted of the in situ 
construction of nine permanent reinforced concrete structures (3 
road bridges, 5 footbridges, 1 cycle bridge), the laying of four 
miles of roadway with pavements and footpaths, and full drainage 
facilities to serve the planned estate. The site for the works 
was on formerly unoccupied land bordering a river. It consisted 
of low-lying marshland which had been reclaimed and consolidated 
with packed sand 'surcharge'. 
The RAW project constituted the first stage of development by 
the City Council of that site for housing. The second stage, which 
would follow on after completion of the advance works, would involve 
the actual construction of (over 300) Council flats. Consequently, 
while forming part of a housing development programme, the scope of 
the RAW itself was to include only advance engineering works. The 
l a y o ~ t t and design for this work would be dependent upon the Council's 
plans for housing on the site. However, the building of the flats 
themselves was to form a distinct and subsequent stage of the 
development, undertaken under a separate contract. Some of the 
work involved on the RAW project was directly related to this 
subsequent development. In particular, t h e ~ o p e e of the contract 
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was to include the building of temporary works for later use by 
housing contractors (namely access roads, offices, fencing and a 
water pumping station). In addition, bulk earthmoving to level 
the site was involved : this reflected a continuation in the 
development of the landscape of the site itself. 
The site for the RAW project was situated near a number of 
similar Council house developments that had already been completed 
and were currently occupied. Indeed, the eventual building of an 
estate on the RAW site in turn represented only one in a series of 
such developments. Taken together, these constituted the City 
Council's "Riverside Programme". This was an extensive p r o g r ~ m e e
of Council house building being undertaken within the locality. It 
had started some 12 years previously, and the aim was eventually to 
provide accommodation and local services for a projected local 
population of 50,000. At the time of investigation, about half of 
that total programme had been completed, and a number of similar 
estates in close proximity to the RAW site were already occupied. 
The advance engineering works to be built in the RAW project. 
similarly represented only a small proportion of the total volume 
of advance works that would be constructed for the programme as a 
whole (according to the City Council's official estimates, in the 
region of 1 0%) • 
The City Council was a large public sector client which 
controlled an annual expenditure on building work in excess of 
. 
£50 million. While the Riverside Programme as a whole was the 
largest single current development being undertaken by the Authority, 
it nevertheless represented a relatively small proportion of turnover 
on an annual baSiS, since the estates were constructed individually 
and in sequence. Indeed, work on the RAW project was the only 
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advance works contract currently in the process of construction at 
the time. With an estimated budget of £2 million for the work over 
a 20 month construction period, the RAW project was relatively small 
in scale - in relation both to the total programme, and to the 
volume of construction work being undertaken by the client at that 
time. 
6.2. The Client's Representatives 
The work associated with the design and management of the RAW 
contract - and indeed of the Riverside Programme as a whole - was 
undertaken entirely in house, within the City Council's own 
Architectural and Engineering Services Department (AESD). The 
Department was headed by a County Architect who reported directly 
to the City Council. The Board of Directors of the Department 
consisted of the County Architect, the heads of the three architectural 
branches within the Department (specialising in Education, Housing and 
'Special' Works), the Director of the Administration branch and the 
separate divisional heads for each of the engineering and technical 
service divisions contained within the Department (see Figure 6.1). 
The AESD as a whole was a vast organisation, employing directly some 
3000 personnel. It handled all the work associated with the design, 
construction, alteration and maintenance of all the City Council's 
residential and non-residential buildings, acting on behalf of 
specific departments (e.g. education, housing) 'within the Local 
Authority. 
The Riverside Programme as a whole constituted by far the 
largest single current development being undertaken by the AESD. 
Indeed, a separate division (the Riverside Division) had been 
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established within the Special Works branch of the AESD to oversee 
that programme. However, the total advance engineering works for 
the housing estates was undertaken by a separate Civil Engineering 
Division within the Department. This Division was one of six 
'technical support' divisions establ1shed to prov1de services for 
the AESD's main 'operational' divisions that were located in the 
three main architectural branches. In add1t1on it too performed 
an 'operational' role - involving the design and management of 
advance engineering work projects, of which the RAW project was 
the latest example. The Division employed about 80 personnel -
consisting in t h ~ ~ main of design and construction engineers and 
technicians. Taken together, the total volume of advance works 
for the R1verside Programme constituted the Division's largest 
single continuous programme of works, involving concurrently both 
design work for future contracts and supervision of existing ones. 
However, the spread of the Programme's advance works over a number 
of years, meant that, at anyone time, individual Riverside projects 
comprised only a,proportion of the division's total activities. The 
RAW project itself was small relative to the capacity of the Division, 
and the type of work involved was similar in many respects to that 
involved in previous advance projects. As noted earlier, it was the 
only advance works project in the process of construction at the time 
of investigation • 
. 
6.3. The Main Contractor 
The main contract for the construction of the RAW project was 
let to Roadbuilders Ltd. The company was a private firm registered 
as a 'marine and public works contractor'. It operated almost 
exclusively in the one region, and its head office was located 
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approximately 60 miles from the RAW site. It was a relatively small 
company, which employed some 500 personnel, about 80 of whom were 
managerial, technic.al and administrative staff based permanently 
at the head office. In the accounting year that fell between the 
start and finish dates of the RAW contract, its annual turnover 
approximated £10 million, which compared with the previous year's 
level of £12 million. Its fixed capital was £2 million and net 
current assets £250,000. In that year, the firm had experienced a 
pretax loss of £150,000, compared with a comparable figure in pretax 
profit the year before. 
The firm was therefore relatively small in scale. It 
specialised in marine and civil engineering works undertaken for 
public sector clients and, according to senior managers within the 
firm, tended to concentrate upon competing for 'medium-sized' 
projects : the RAW project was here quoted as an example. It was 
also noted, however, that the company had the capacity to undertake 
larger contracts as main contractor: the company's recent past 
record had included completion of two large contracts valued at 
around £10 million. In addition to undertaking work as main 
contractor, the company also housed its own specialised piling 
division, which undertook subcontracted piling work for other main 
contractors. At the time of investigation, the RAW contract was 
the only work that the company was currently undertaking for the 
City Council, and it represented their only i n ~ o l v e m e n t t in the 
. 
Riverside Programme to date. While the project itself was 
relatively small in scale, it was a sizeable project in relation 
to the company's turnover, and indeed was one of the (2) largest 
projects the company was currently engaged upon as main contractor. 
6.6 
6.4. The Design P ~ o c e s s s and Design O ~ g a n i s a t i o n n
The design for the RAW project - like the design for all 
Riverside advance contracts being undertaken by the Civil Engineering 
Division - had taken place within the context of the b ~ o a d d and more 
detailed plans for housing established by architects, planners and 
surveyors working within design groups in the Riverside Division. 
Their plans, in effect, provided the 'brief' and outline specification 
for the design of advance works by engineers working within the Civil 
Engineering Division. There were two groups within that Division that 
were established to provide a strategic 'overview' of the Division's 
advance works programme and to co-ordinate engineering design work 
within the plans for housing. The 'Master Plan' group was involved in 
the overall planning and monitoring of the Riverside Programme as a 
whole in respect of advance works. The 'Operations Group' was a 
multi-professional group of engineers, architects, p r o g ~ a m m e r s s and 
technicians, involved in the planning and design of advance facilities 
on individual sites based upon architectural specifications for 
housing. Both groups performed an indirect role in the management 
of advance contracts - consisting essentially of translating the 
architectural brief into a plan for advance works and securing 
approval, the placing of contracts for construction, and the general 
monitoring of the work in relation to the architectural plans. 
Like other (architectural and service) Divisions within the 
AESD; the Civil Engineering Division was composed of a number of 
'groups' (in this case 11; in the rest of the AESD the number of 
divisional groups ranged from 4 to 7). Each group consisted of a 
group leader and staff from a similar professional background - rather 
than being multi-disciplinary groups. Apart from the two groups 
described above, the Division consisted of groups involved in 
specialised work, construction supervision and providing specialist 
services (see Figure 6.2). A number of these groups of designers 
and construction engineers specialised exclusively upon the design 
and supervision of advance works projects for the Riverside Programme. 
The work associated specifically with the RAW project was 
undertaken by one of the two construction groups in the Division, 
which consisted of a section housing design engineers and technicians, 
who had prepared the layouts and designs for the project; and a s e ~ t i o n n
employing construction engineers, technicians and survyeors, and 
whose staff were involved in the drawing up of contracts and tendering 
arrangements, and the direct supervision of work on site. It was 
from this latter section that site supervisory staff were seconded. 
Consequently, there was a formal distinction marked within the client's 
representative organisation between staff involved in design and those 
directly involved in its implementation on site. 
6.5. Characteristics of the Design 
To some extent the similarity of the RAW project with earlier 
developments made for a routinisation of the design process for that 
project. While the specific plans for the RAW site were based upon 
a distinct architectural specification for housing and, thereby, a 
specific layout of the advance works, the type of work to be produced 
was similar in many respects to the type of work that had been 
prodtlced in previous advance projects. The scale of the project was 
also somewhat similar. The characteristics of the ground conditions 
on the site for the RAW project did have implications for the design 
of the works to be built on it. In particular, the susceptibility of 
the site to r i v e ~ ~ flooding had meant the need for an extensive 
drainage system to be built. Further, the use of sand as the base 
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for foundations meant a greater intensity of piled foundations for 
the drainage system and the structures to provide sufficient stability. 
However, these factors contributed more to a greater intensity of the 
work involved, rather than to any fundamental shift in design direction 
when compared with earlier projects. 
There was also very little, if any, design 'overlap' into the 
construction phase. The design for the works had been prepared over 
a 4 - 5 year period prior to the award of the main contract, and the 
documentation for tendering (the bill of quantities, specification 
and outline drawings) had come available nine months prior to the 
start of work on site. Representatives of the client who were 
interviewed on site reported that the design was fully detailed and 
that the bill contained little in the way of provisional sums - a View 
that was shared by contractor's staff who were interviewed. 
Consequently, the design for the works was considered by those 
involved to be substantially completed. Concurrent design activity 
during construction would largely be limited to the issue or 
modification of detailed working drawings, and to the design of 
temporary works (established by the contractor and subject to the 
client's ~ p p r o v a l ) . . Furthermore, the number of variations to the 
basic design was likely to be low, since the work was 'fixed' in 
relation to the intended layout for housing. At the stages at 
which the site was visited, it was agreed by both client's and 
contractor's representatives that there had been no baSic amendments 
• 
to the overall design of the works, and that there were likely to be 
few, if any, such changes as the work progressed. Only minor 
detailing and correction to the drawings were expected. Consequently, 
there was a fairly clear delineation of the design and construction 
stages of the RAW project, and attention would be directed towards 
the actual process of construction of the works, and to performance 
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in relation to the established design for the works, rather than to 
any major alterations in the actual design itself. There was also 
broad agreement amongst staff that were interviewed that the nature 
of the work, in terms of the methods of building and types of 
materials that were required did not pose any particularly difficult 
technological problems. The RAW project was not considered 'complex' 
in this respect. 
6.6. Tendering and the Main contract 
The tendering procedure for the award of the main contract to 
build the works had involved a single-stage, selective competitive 
tender on the basis of a priced bill of quantities. According to 
staff in the Civil Engineering Division, contractors were selected 
for tender from a shortlist of 'qualified' firms on a 'rotation' 
basis. That is, the AESD held lists of firms who were capable of 
undertaking the type and scale of work, against which were set any 
available ratings of performance from previous City Council projects. 
The use of 'rotation' was a policy adopted to avoid the placing of 
too many contracts with too few firms. Given the criteria involved 
in the selection of firms to tender, the decision to appoint 
Roadbuilders had been made on the basis of the lowest submitted 
price. 
The main contract was let under standard (ICE) conditions of 
contract (the 5th Edition), and comprised these conditions together 
with the bill of quantities, specification and working drawings 
(both those already prepared and those to be issued during construc-
tion). The value of the contract was set at £2 million (with 
allowance for price fluctuations), and the specified period of 
construction was 85 weeks (February to November). Work was to be 
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evaluated, and the issue of interim certificates and payment to the 
contractor to be made, on a monthly basiS with a 5% retention 
withheld. The period allowed for final measurement and evaluation, 
the issue of the final certificate and payment was 6 months after 
the finish of work on site. This corresponded to the length of the 
defects liability period. 
While subcontractors and suppliers that were to be used by 
Roadbuilders were to be subject to client approval, there were no 
formal nominations made. All subcontractors were to be employed 
under standard <ICE) conditions of subcontract, and were to be 
paid fortnightly, with a 5% retention witheld. To undertake the 
work, Roadbuilders had taken the decision to sublet most of the 
work involved. Separate contracts were to be established with 
'domestic' subcontractors for the earthmoving, piling installation, 
fencing, underground drainage, road surfacing and kerbing. The main 
work to be undertaken directly by the main contractor included the 
concrete works on the main structures, the laying of access roads 
and qrainage pipework. However, the firm was to use concrete, 
gullies and pipes and 'hardcore' supplied by other firms, rather 
than supply directly its own materials. 
A programme of works had been submitted by the main contractor 
as part of the tendering procedure, as a plan for completion of the 
works within the contractually specified period of 85 weeks. The 
work was to involve, firstly, the laying of the piled foundations 
for the drainage system and main structures, followed by the laying 
of the drainage system and the concurrent erection of the structures. 
The roadworks were to overlap with this stage, but to constitute 
mainly the latter part of the programme. The bulk earthmoving was 
to run in parallel with the construction of the permanent works, but 
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was to be more heavily concentrated in the earlier stages. This, 
together with the extensive foundations work that was needed, 
implied quite a heavy concentration of activity in the earlier 
stages, much of which was to be associated with ensuring the correct 
layout of the work. 
6.7. The Main Contractor's Site Team 
A full-time, resident site team was employed by Roadbu1lders 
to manage the work on the RAW project. The company's senior 
representative on site was a Site Agent. He reported directly to 
a visiting Contracts Manager from the firm's head office, who was 
also currently supervising work on four other company sites in the 
region. The team on site consisted of supervisory, technical and 
administrative staff as illustrated below (Figure 6 .. 3). The Site 
Agent had a background in estimating and considerable years' 
experience in working for the firm. He described his role on the 
project as being concerned with its overall management, and in 
particular, with financial and contractual aspects. 
His deputy - the Sub-Agent - had a background in engineering, and 
described his job as being concerned with managing the more detailed 
production and engineering aspects of the work on site. While the 
Sub-Agent had worked for the company a number of years as a (site) 
engineer, he had only recently been appointed to his current 
position. This was the first project he had managed as Sub-Agent 
and the Site Agent remarked that he saw his own role as to some 
extent acting as a "guardian" for the Sub-Agent, making up for 
the latter's lack of experience in managing contracts. The two 
were transferred from other company sites, and were the only 
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members of the site team who had been involved in the project in 
any way prior to work starting on site. They reported that they 
had both been involved in familiarising themselves with the project, 
and in the detailed planning and scheduling of resources needed for 
the early stages of construction over a two week period at the 
company's head office. This had been immediately prior to work 
starting on site. 
The supervisory staff (Works Manager, General Foreman) and 
Office Manager had also been transferred from other company sites, 
and had considerable years' experience of working in the industry 
and for that firm. In contrast, the remainder of the site team 
(with the exception of the OS) were comparatively recent recruits. 
The engineering staff, in particular, were relative newcomers to 
the firm : the senior Site Engineer had worked on sites for six 
years, but had only recently been recruited (by the head office) 
and specifically to work on this project. His staff consisted of 
a recent Graduate, a company trainee, and a sandwich student (by 
the time of the second visit to the site (see below), the Graduate 
engineer had left and been replaced by an engineer hired through 
a local agency). Consequently, there was a marked distinction 
between the production and engineering staff in their level of 
experience - both of working in the industry and with that 
particular company. In addition, the Storekeeper and Secretary 
had been recruited locally (by the Site Agent) and specifically 
. 
for the RAW project. With the exception of the Works Manager, all 
those mentioned above were employed for the full duration of the 
project : the Works Manager was not seconded to the project until 
approximately a quarter of the way through the contract period. 
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The contractor's OS was the member of staff whose pattern of 
involvement on the RAW project was quite distinct. He was seconded 
to the project twelve weeks into the construction period, and from 
the head office's Surveying Department (rather than from another 
company site). He was only employed part-time on the contract, and 
was not resident on site; his other duties involved the final 
settling of accounts on another company project elsewhere. The OS 
described his main job on the RAW project as undertaking the 
financial measurement and evaluation of the work, and in "advising" 
the Site Agent on alterations and negotiations. He described his 
direct i n v o ~ v e m e n t t with other members of the site team as "minimal". 
The OS had worked for the company a number of years, and described 
his own experience as being based mainly on post-contract evaluations, 
payments and claims, adding that he had not actually worked on site 
for a number of years, and then not on "so small" a contract as the 
current one. He expressed the view that the volume of routine 
measurement and evaluation work involved on this contract was limited 
due to its ~ i z e , , and described the surveying work involved as being 
ideal for an inexperienced OS to develop on. He attributed his 
secondment to this project from head office to the unavailability of 
suitable surveying staff in the firm at that time. 
To undertake the direct work on the contract, Roadbuilders 
employed a small direct workforce of general labourers, joiners and 
concrete workers, most of whom were recruited ~ o c a l l y y (by the 
General Foreman and Works Manager). In the early stages of the job, 
the number employed was only five, three of whom were 'chain-boys' 
assisting the engineer 1n setting out the work on site. As the work 
on site developed, the total direct workforce reached a peak of 
around 20 to undertake the work involved in the building of the main 
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structures, and for 'attendances' for subcontractors. The total 
numbers employed by subcontracting firms reached a maximum of 
around 50 at the same stage in the project. 
~ . 8 . . The Client's Supervision 
The construction of the RAW project was supervised, on behalf 
of the client, by a site team headed by a Senior Resident Engineer 
(SRE) and consisting of two Assistant Resident Engineers (AREs), two 
Design Engineers, a Surveyor, two Clerks of Works and a Secretary 
(see Figure 6.4 below). The SRE was also involved at the time in 
supervising four other C1ty Council contracts in the area, but was 
based on the RAW site. With the exception of himself and the two 
Des1gn Eng1neers, all other personnel had been seconded to the s1te 
full-time, for 1ts durat10n, and had been transferred in from other 
City Council sites. 
The SRE had been seconded directly fr0m the construction 
eng1neering section of the group in the Civil E n g i n e e r i n ~ . D i v i s i o n n that had 
undertaken the pre-s1te plann1ng work for the RAW. The two engineers 
were also seconded (full-time) - but from the des1gn section of the 
same 6rouP, in which they had been involved to some extent in 
the 1nital design of the works. According to one ARE, this was 
essentially for training purposes : to supplement design office 
experience with on-site experience. By the time work on the site 
was ~ b o u t t 25% complete it was noted that one Design Engineer had 
left the resident site staff. According to the ARE it made little 
difference to the capacity of the site team to supervise the work, 
and he expressed the opinion that the site had formerly been 
overmanned with Resident Engineers' staff anyway. 
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The ARE further expressed the view that he found the SRE's 
residence on this site unusual, since the contract was 'too small' 
to warrant his presence, and also noted that he assumed the 
original intention had been that the SRE was "not supposed to be 
running the job". When asked about this, the SRE attributed his 
residence to the practicality of having a 'local base' from which 
to supervise the contracts that fell within his jurisdiction, and 
also to what he described as the relative "inexperience" of }lis 
staff. 
6 .8. The Organisation and Management of Construction 
As noted above, the contractor's Site Agent and Sub-Agent had 
been involved in a brief period prior to construction in planning 
out in detail the work associated with setting up the site and the 
early stages of construction. In addition, prior to this, many of 
the early and major subcontracts (e.g. for piling and earthmoving) 
together with major supply orders (e.g. for steelwork and concrete) 
had already been let. This had involved the contractor's head office 
Engineer who had supplied the appropriate technical information, and 
the company Buyer who had conducted the tendering arrangements and 
formally placed the orders with successful bidders. In these 
instances, the site team were then involved in agreeing or negotiating 
detailed plans of work with subcontractors' representatives on site, 
and in requisitioning materials as work proceeded set against the 
bulk orders that had already been placed. Where subcontracts or 
supply orders had not already been placed (as was the case for the 
kerbing work, for instance, which was subcontracted later on in the 
project), the site team were also involved in the forward planning 
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for the work based on the start and finish dates given in the 
overall programme, and in then appointing firms to undertake the 
relevant work, or supply the materials needed. Where new sub-
contracts were to be let, allowance needed to be given for the 
lead-in times associated with the tendering and detailed planning 
stages inVOlved before work could begin on site. The apPOintments 
that were made, and the substantive content of the agreements as 
they affected the deSign for the works (i.e. the speCification for 
permanent materials, and s u b c o n t r a c t o r ~ ~ proposed methods of build1ng) 
were to be subject to the approval of the client's representatives 
supervising the work. For the RAW project, the t ~ n d e r i n g g arrange-
ments for new subcontracts and supply orders were conducted from 
site, involving the Site Agent, Sub-Agent and the contractor's OS. 
According to them, decisions on appointments were made at site level, 
although formal approval for the decisions made had to be given by 
the company's Buyer (concerning the cost) and Engineer (concerning 
methods and 'materials) before the orders were actually placed. The 
processes of placing the awards and administering,the contracts 
(including making payments) were handled at head office level, on 
the basis of information forwarded from site. Consequently, the 
main contractor's head office staff performed a largely administrative 
function in managing subcontractors' work during the course of 
construction. According to members of the site team, only major 
'exceptions' (such as claims) were likely to be referred up to head 
office level, and all the correspondence and negotiations with 
subcontractors (and suppliers) concerning the substantive content 
of the agreement (programmes of work, resources and methods) were 
dealt with on site once particular subcontractors had been appointed 
to the job. It was the contractor's Sub-Agent who was most directly 
involved in the detailed management of subcontractors' operations on 
site. The Site Agent, it was generally reported, became more 
directly involved in this process (with the OS) in the event that 
issues that arose on site in dealings with subcontractors or suppliers 
had financial or 'contractual' implications. 
Given that subcontract and supply orders had already been 
placed, the detailed management of work on site was then based upon 
a series of medium- and short-term programmes of activity that were 
established as work proceeded. These were derived from the overall 
contract programme that had been prepared by the contractor's head 
office P I ~ n n e r , , and accepted by the client, during tendering. A 
monthly 'works programme' was established for work across the entire 
site, which represented the medium-term plan of work, and which 
formed the basis from which detailed design information was 
requested from the client, and resources could be ordered and 
delivered to the site. It was the Sub-Agent who drew up the programme, 
which took account of the planned duration and s e q u e n c ~ ~ of specific 
aspects of the work (such as the piling), their interdependencies with 
other aspects (such as the programme for the main structures construc-
tion), and current performance levels achieved on site. The programme 
was in the form of a bar chart, and formed the basis against which 
performance on site was monitored. 
The monthly works programme was submitted to the client's staff 
for approval and, once approved, it formed the ,basis from which 
weekly (and from these, more detailed daily) schedules of work across 
the site were derived. These programmes in turn were translated into 
weekly programmes of work which were then issued to the subcontractors 
Who were performing the work on site. The Sub-Agent drew up the 
weekly programmes of work together with the Site Engineer and 
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production staff, who were the members of staff most closely involved 
in the day-to-day supervision of the job, and who supplied the daily 
output reports and general information on progress (both in relation 
to directly-produced and subcontracted work) that fed back into the 
weekly planning process. Copies of the weekly programmes for work 
across the site were sent by the Sub-Agent to the client's staff and 
the contractor's own head office, together with weekly progress 
reports that were compiled on the basis of the information supplied 
by the production staff and Site Engineer. The day-to-day supervision 
of both the main contractor's own, and subcontractors' work on site 
was the main task of the contractor's Works M a n a g e ~ ~ and General 
Foreman. They supervised the work being undertaken by the direct 
labour gang, and handled the recruitment of labour to the site. 
During the early stages of the project, before the Works Manager was 
seconded, it was the General Foreman (and his trainee) who supervised 
work across the entire site. With the secondment of the Works Manager 
to the project, an extra level of supervision was introduced into the 
site organisation, and it was reported that the G e ~ e r a l l Foreman then 
tended to supervise the work of the (expanded) direct labour gang, 
while the Works Manager supervised directly-produced and subcontracted 
work across the site as a whole. 
A concurrent set of activities were associated with planning 
out the details of the work to be constructed on site. Once detailed 
working drawings from the client's staff became available, the 
contractor's Site Engineer and his staff were involved in checking 
the drawings, and in establishing any details concerning the methods 
of building that were to be used by the main contractor. The actual 
methods of building used followed, in large parts, from the broader 
method statement and preliminary designs (for the temporary works) 
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that had been prepared by the contractor's head office Engineer, 
and accepted by the client, during tendering. On site, the main 
work in this respect was associated with the detailed design of 
the temporary works being used by the contractor (notably the 
formwork needed for the main structures), and with planning the 
detailed layout of the works (for instance the location of piles 
and their sequence of construction). For the work produced by 
subcontractors, the main contractor's staff were involved in 
passing on relevant design information, and agreeing methods of 
building with them. Both temporary works designs and methods of 
building p r ~ p o s e d d by the main contractor for their own work, and 
those agreed with subcontractors, were to be submitted to the client's 
staff for approval. The contractor's Site Engineer (and his staff) 
were then involved in setting out lines and levels on site for 
subcontractors and the contractor's own team to perform to, and in 
supervising and monitoring the work produced in line with the 
'quality' standards described in the contract specification and 
drawings. ~ t t was noted that the Site Engineer was also made 
responsible for making sure that permanent materials needed for 
the work directly produced by the main contractor (e.g. steelwork 
and concrete for the main structures) was delivered to the site in 
time for when it was needed and 'checked' in terms of its quality 
once delivered to site. 
The Sub-Agent's involvement in these activities was at a more 
general level : he was involved with the engineer in establishing 
details of methods that were to be used, and in translating the 
client's working drawings into a more detailed specification for 
the ~ u i l d i n g g of the temporary works. He also became more closely 
and directly involved in these processes when problems or 
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'exceptions' occurred - either with inconsistencies or changes in 
the detailed plans, or when problems occurred in the setting out or 
building of the work. In these instances, the Sub-Agent would deal 
directly with his counterparts within the client's team (see below), 
and with subcontractors' representatives on site. At the same time, 
however, it was also noted that, in many instances, the clarification 
of specific design details and methods involved the Site Engineer in 
direct contact with members of the client's staff on site and 
individual subcontractor foremen. This was particularly the case 
when it came to setting out the work for subcontractors to build to, 
and in directly supervising their work, as well as w h ~ n n supervising 
the temporary and permanent works being built by the main contractor, 
which were also directly supervised by the client's representatives. 
For the work that was being produced directly by the main 
contractor, plant and materials resources needed were obtained by a 
requisition procedure that involved order1ng materials deliveries 
(against the bulk orders placed with suppliers) and plant (from the 
company depot) to suit the monthly and weekly p r o g r ~ e s s of work. 
The new orders that needed to be placed during the course of 
construction referred mainly to materials needed during its later 
stages, to temporary materials, and to smaller items of plant and 
eqUipment (e.g. handtools). For the direct provision of plant, 
eqUipment and temporary materials, the company's formal procedures 
marked a distinction between small items (costing less than £100) 
. 
which could be purchased or hired locally by the site team, and any 
larger items, which had to be requisitioned from head office, via 
the Buying Department. The decision then whether to supply existing 
plant, purchase new stock, or hire plant was then made by the 
company Buyer, although only for large items (over £2000) was the 
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hiring option made available. Under the firm's accounting procedures, 
the site was credited or debited respectively with the recovery value 
or charge rate of the supplied stock. All permanent materials to be 
used were requisitioned via the Buying Department, against the orders 
already placed at head office. The types of resources to be supplied 
in the case of permanent materials followed from the design specifica-
tion for the works, and the quality of the materials delivered to site 
was to be subject to the approval of the client's representatives. 
The resourcing of the work that was directly produced by the 
main contractor was an activity in which various members of the site 
team played a p ~ r t . . The Sub-Agent was the person on site who was 
given the authority to place major requisitions for materials and 
plant via head office, and to place orders for smaller items of plant 
and equipment that were purchased or hired from local suppliers. 
However, it was also noted that, in practice, the requisitioning of 
recurrent items (such as concrete deliveries), and minor items (for 
instance small tools and equipment) was undertaken on a routine basis 
directly by the.production staff and Site Engineer. The latter was 
particularly involved in this respect in putting in requisitions for 
recurrent deliveries of permanent materials, as noted above; the 
former were more closely involved in putting in requisitions and 
orders for items of plant and equipment that were needed on site. 
In these instances, the Sub-Agent effectively 'rubber-stamped' 
requisitions and orders submitted by the p r o d u ~ t i o n n and engineering 
• 
staff, giving approval to the decisions they had already made on the 
baSis of short-term operational needs. 
In directly managing operations on Site, the Sub-Agent was 
involved in generally supervising and co-ordinating the work done 
by the production and engineering staff, who were the individuals 
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most closely involved in the day-to-day planning and supervision of 
directly-produced and subcontracted work on site. As described 
above, there was some degree of overlap in the roles performed by 
these members of staff, particularly in relation to ordering 
materials and directly supervising the construction of the work. 
They held weekly in-house co-ordination meetings that were intended 
to plan out the work to be done by each group 1n advance, which 
included assessing the resources needed to be ordered for the week, 
and any outstand1ng detailed design information that was needed to 
perform the work. It was noted that the Sub-Agent tended not to be 
involved in these meetings. 
Generally speaking, there was quite a clear dist1nction on site 
between the roles performed by the main contractor's Site Agent and 
Sub-Agent in the management of the RAW project. Namely, it was the 
Sub-Agent who was most closely involved in managing and co-ord1nating 
the actual construction process across the site, while the Site 
Agent was concerned more directly with the contractual aspects of 
the work on s1te (in which the OS was also involved). It,was 
generally agreed amongst members of the site team that the Site Agent 
only tended to become directly involved in detailed operational 
management in situations in which problems that occurred 1n the 
programming, detailing or resourcing of the work had financial or 
contractual implications and involved negotiations with the client's 
staff or subcontractors' representatives on site. Otherwise, the 
main functions performed by the Site Agent were in placing new 
subcontract and supply orders, and in generally monitoring the 
financial progress of the work on site, based upon the OS's 
measurement and evaluation of the 'main contractor's and 
subcontractors' work on site. 
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In describing the role performed by head office staff in the 
management of work on the RAW project, the site staff were in 
general agreement that they were given a relatively 'free hand' in 
conducting operations on site. This was attributed in large measure 
to the presence of senior staff on site. The Sub-Agent, for instance, 
described head office as a "back-up", providing services and support 
when they were needed and requested from site. This was in accord 
with, a view of the head office's managerial role expressed by the 
Planner : he described head office's role as being concerned with 
:ilonitoring progress on the job and "assisting" and "advising" the 
site team - if ~ e c e s s a r y y "approving" decisions, but not "instructing" 
the site staff. Apart from the formal procedures established for 
monitoring work on the project (involving the receipt of progress 
reports, copies of all correspondence and instructions passing between 
the client, contractor and subcontractors, and financial information), 
and the activities associated with resourcing the work described 
earlier, progress on site was generally monitored by a series of 
visits to the s ~ t e e - on a weekly basis by the supervising Contracts 
Manager, and less frequently and in response to specific issues arising 
by the office Engineer, Planner and Surveyor. As will be described 
later, a greater degree of involvement of head office. staff through more 
frequent visits (notably by the Planner) did occur about a third of 
the way through the contract period in response to a major slippage 
in the programme that threatened the final completion date. Otherwise, 
. 
however, the more routine management of the project was decentralised 
to the site level. The detailed plans and programmes of activity 
that were established for the work were agreed or negotiated with 
the subcontractors' representatives on site, and were to be accepted 
Or approved by the client's staff. There was general agreement on 
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site that any non-major alterations in these respects requiring 
agreement, approval or negotiation were handled on site by the 
Site Agent and Sub-Agent, and did not require approval from higher 
levels within the firm. Consequently, the site team had a good 
deal of discretion in managing relationships on site with other 
parties involved in the contract. 
The direct supervision of work on site involved a good deal of 
contact between members of the respective teams on a daily basis. 
Within the client's team on site, it was the two AREs who were most 
closely involved in checking the contractors plans for the work and 
in directly monitoring the job's progress on site. They were the 
direct point of contact for the Sub-Agent in discussing and agreeing, 
any detailed operational changes to the programme or plan of work on 
site. They issued the working drawings to the contractor's staff, 
(which were mainly produced by the two design engineers seconded to 
the project). The AREs were also directly involved in checking the 
quality of materials and any proposed methods of building and 
temporary works designs submitted by the contractor (or by 
subcontractors via the contractor). However, it was the SRE who 
formally approved the contractor's programmes and designs for the 
work, and who issued all formal instructions to the contractor and 
accepted the contractor's recommendations for subcontractor and 
major supplier appointments. In describing their pattern of 
. 
involvement in the detailed planning of work on Site, the AREs 
pointed to a contrast between the expected and formal pattern of 
their involvement in checking designs and what actually happened 
in practice. Specifically, they noted that the contractor's 
engineers were formally responsible for noting any inconsistencies 
in the specification or drawings and reporting these to the Resident 
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Engineer's staff. The procedure would then be for the AREs to 
correct the drawings and reissue them with an instruction to the 
contractor. However, in practice, they suggested that the tendency 
instead was for them to become more directly involved in checking 
the design themselves. 
The setting out and actual construction of the work on site 
was also monitored by the AREs, both directly and on the basis of 
weekly reports submitted by the Clerks of Works who actuallY 
supervised the construction on site, and who reported back to the 
AREs on a daily basis if any problems occurred in setting out or 
construction. It was interesting to note here a further contrast 
between the formal and extant patterns of involvement, specifically 
in relation to the supervising subcontractors' work on site. The 
AREs suggested that the "normal" procedure was for them to work 
"through" the main contractor to the subcontractors. However, when 
problems occurred in the setting out or construction of the work 
(as described in more detail below), the tendency was for this 
channel to be c i ~ c u m v e n t e d , , and for the AREs and Clerks of Works 
to directly check subcontractors' work. The AREs suggested that 
this was "not really their job", and was a role that would 
ordinarily be performed by the contractor's production and 
engineering staff. 
It was generally agreed by those interviewed in the client's 
team that the level at which most problems t e n ~ e d d to be dealt w1th 
on site was at the ARE - Sub-Agent level between the two groups of 
representatives. At the same time, however, it was reported that 
problems that occurred with a financial or 'contractual' dimens10n 
WOUld, on both sides tend to involve the organisation's senior 
representatives - specifically the SRE and 'Site Aaent. 
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According to the AREs, the involvement of the SRE tended to be in 
issuing formal instructions to the contractor, and in response to 
any problems in the plans for the work or its construction with 
financial or contractual implications. 
It was also generally agreed that the client's site team 
operated with a high level of autonomy from their own central office 
(i.e. the Civil Engineering Division). The SRE stated that he had 
been given the authority to authorise any changes to the work that were 
not "substantial". The relationship with the central office consisted 
in the main of transmitting progress reports, details of any altera-
tions or negotiations, and certificates authorising p a y m e n ~ ~ to the 
contractor. Again the central office, according to the SRE and AREs, 
provided 'back up' administration and support services: for instance, 
the formal settling of accounts and payment, any offsite materials 
testing or advice on methods that were needed, and the general 
administration of site staff salaries and wages. 
The main formal forum for monitoring progress on site was a 
regular weekly contract meeting held on site. It was attended by 
the SRE, the AREs, the as and Clerks of Works on behalf of the client, 
and by the Site Agent and the Sub-Agent on behalf of the main 
contractor. At this meeting, the contractor presented a (weekly) 
report on progress, set against the agreed monthly programme of works, 
and the Clerks of Works' own summary of progress on site. Other 
items on the agenda included the contractor's requests for information 
and drawings from the client's staff, details of subcontract and 
supply orders placed and the checking of advance orders, plant and 
labour resource usage on Site, and general items stemming from 
inspections of the works, etc. The details of the meeting were 
minuted and copies sent to the client's and contractor's respective 
head offices. 
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~ . 1 0 0 Performance on the RAW Project 
At the start of the first occasion when the site was visited 
(see Chapter 5 ,above), the site had only recently been set 
up, and work was being undertaken by three separate sub-contractors 
on the piling, earthmoving and perimeter fencing work. Overall 
progress on the contract was estimated (by both client and 
contractors' staff) to be approximately a week ahead of schedule. 
The fencing work was behind schedule, although that activity was 
not 'critical' to the job as a whole. The earthmoving and 
excavation work was' on schedule. The critical work of piling 
- for which only one rig was employed by the s ~ b - c o n t r a c t o r r -
was estimated to be about four weeks ahead of the schedule for 
the drainage system work. By the last week of the first 
visit, the drainage system piling was completed, and work had 
started on the foundations for the main structures. However, 
during the course of that week, progress on piling slowed considerably 
from a previous average of, 30 piles driven a day, to only 3. This 
was attributed by those involved in its supervision to the loss of 
the crane driver employed by the sub-contractor. 
By the time of the second visit (starting week 30), the piling 
and earthmoving work was finished, and the emphasis had turned to 
the. construction - in sequence - of the main structures, of which 
two by then had been built. For this ,the direct workforce 
employed by Road Builders Ltd had risen'to the expected maximum 
for the project of 20 joiners, concrete workers and general 
labourers. Work was also in progress on the installation of the 
main drainage system and the laying of one roadway by separate 
subcontractors. 
However, by that stage, overall progress had fallen an 
estimated one month behind the original contract programme. 
The delay was attributed mainly to a shortfall in progress by the 
subcontractor employed to install the main drainage system. It 
was estimated by the Sub-Agent that this work - which was scheduled 
to last six months - was now four months behind schedule, and that 
it had now 'gone critical'. The target completion date was 
viewed as no longer realistic, and consequently the master 
programme had been modified substantially (by the company P l a r i n ~ r ) )
to try to account for the delay and allow for an acceleration in 
the drainage work to achieve the contract completion date. Both 
contractors'-and clients' staff attributed the delay to the 
performance of the subcontractor. However, the opinion was also 
expressed (by the resident en31neer's staff) that -the contractor had 
experienced problems initially in obtaining an appropriate 
contractor, and that the original plan had been somewhat 'unrealistic' 
and ambitious. 
There was general agreement amongst those interviewed that, 
at this stage, the main contractor was faced with significant 
problems in aChieving the performance levels required on site to 
keep the job on programme. In addition, apart from the damages 
that would be incurred if completion were delayed, it was also 
noted that at that time the main contractor was incurring 
additional costs-and penalties associated with other, non-critical 
delays. Firstly, 3 - 4 weeks of delay had been caused by the supply 
of manhole rings which had been rejected by the resident engineer. 
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The Site Agent reported that Roadbuilders had not up to then been 
able to claim back the full cost of the supplies already bought and 
paid for. Secondly, the 20 week task of constructing a temporary 
pumping station had been delayed by 4 months, and the contractor 
was incurring a weekly penalty of £100 for failing to comply with 
the terms of the contract that had specified a completion date for 
this work. The delay was attributed to problems in obtaining 
approval for the contractor's plan for the work from the local 
electricity authority. Additionally, it was reported by the resident 
engineer's staff that the contractor's monthly eValuation of the 
work was a month late, and that the contractor was also behind in 
its (fortnightly) payments to subcontractors. The money was 
available for payment to the contractor, but no evaulation had 
been made and no claim for payment submitted. The ARE suggested 
that a contract of this type "should be sewn up at a profit", 
but that "it hasn't really got going yet". Consequently the main 
contractor was also experiencing financial problems on the project 
- problems that, according to the ARE, were enhancing "any liquidity 
problems" the firm might be experiencing. 
Indeed the firm was experiencing financial problems at the 
time which were not, however, specific to the RAW project. 
Towards the end of the second visit to the site (in week 31 of the 
contract programme), the contractor's staff reported a "shake-up" 
at their head office and a "purge" of senior surveying staff, 
including the surveyor'seconded to the RAW project team. No 
specific reason was given by members of the contractor's staff 
for these particular dismissals, except insofar as they were a 
response by the company to a major cash-flow crisis across the 
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range of the company's operations. The ARE afforded a final 
commentary upon the performance on the RAW project at that 
stage, by expressing the view that the main contractor would 
"probably be bankrupt by Christmas". His words proved prophetic: 
within six months after the end of the second visit to the site, 
Roadbuilders had been put into voluntary liquidation and the 
involvement of the firm in the RAW project had come to an end 
within-a year of the work starting on site, and some 8 - 9 months 
before completion was dUe. As described in the earlier Chapter, it 
was intended to visit at a later stage in the course of work on 
site. However, in the circumstances this was not possible and 
the following discussion relates only to the development of the 
project up to and including week 31 (two-thirds through the 
construction cycle). It should also be stressed that the 
following discussion pertains only to characteristics of the 
management and organisation of work upon the RAW project, and 
not to the circumstances leading to the problems within the 
firm as a whole. However, the situation within the firm should 
be borne in mind as an important contextual factor in the 
discussion that follows. It was stressed by those interviewed 
that the problems facing the company were not unique to the RAW 
project, and not an outcome of performance solely on that 
project. Rather, the problems of-the RAW project were viewed as 
p a ~ t t of a larger crisis within the firm, and -symptomatic of the 
company's problems at that time. 
6:. 11 • The RAW Project: A Case Analysis 
During the course of the second visit to the project, 
attention was drawn to significant internal problems within the 
main contractor's team that accompanied the performance levels 
achieved on site. The recently-seconded W o ~ k s s Manager was the 
most critical: he described the site as the "worst organised" 
he had been on in a number of years, and attributed the problems now 
faced by Roadbuilders on the contract to "a planning and management 
failure". While he, like others interviewed attributed the main 
delay problem to a "lack of planning" and performance by the 
subcontractor involved, his main criticisms were directed 
towards his own management team who he felt had not responded 
appropriately to the situation. He felt that the site team were 
not "chasing" the subcontractor enough to get either recompense 
for the delays or better performance. In particular, he stressed 
the importance of fully documenting the delay and its causes to 
'cover' Roadbuilders in the event of a claim for delay from the 
client at the end of the job. He suggested that the subcontractors 
file "should be full of letters of complaint to them - but it's 
not". In not doing so he felt that the firm was being left in 
a vulnerable position. He compared'Roadbuilders "lack of paperwork" 
with the amount of correspondence entered into by the client's staff: 
"all the correspondence is being made by the RE and non by 
(Roadbuilders)". This view was corroborated by the Office 
Manager who suggested that the correspondence'with the RE should 
be ·much more detailed. The point being made here is that, in 
subsequently arguing the case for an extension of time and 
against damages, Roadbuilders would be vulnerable to the case put 
forward against them by the Resident Engineer, and at the same 
time powerless to extract damages from their own subcontractor. 
The Works Manager added a further comment: that the site team would 
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be in a difficult position, vis-a-vis their own head office, in 
arguing that the problems on site were due to the subcontractor's 
performance if they were not seen to have taken sufficient 
steps to expedite the work. In relation to the detailed day-to-day 
management of the work, he added that the failure to commit to 
paper all the agreements reached with the Resident Engineer on 
site meant that the production and engineering staff were often 
not fully aware of what was going on'on the project. 
To a certain extent, this situation was attributed (by the 
Works Manager and Office Manager in particular) to a lack of 
clerical staff on site to handle all the necessary paperwork. 
They both described an "imbalance" in the firm's expenditure on 
staff overheads which, in their view, needed to be rectified in 
favour of the clerical and administrative side. The Works 
Manager's solution to the problem was in keeping with his views 
on office efficiency: namely, he felt that procedures needed to 
be more formalised, and documentation and correspondence much 
,more detailed and extensive. However, a deeper underlying 
reason was given by both which was widely corroborated amongst 
members of the site team - namely, that there was a lack of 
centralised co-ordination and control of the work being under-
taken on site. The Works Manager was again the most outspoken, 
although his opinions were representative of those expressed by 
the Office Manager and by the production and engineering staff. 
In the Works'Manager's view, the Site Agent had by that stage 
become somewhat "divorced", from what was happening on site, and 
the Sub-Agent did not have sufficient experience to be able to 
fully cope with the project and the circumstances on it. This 
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was particularly perceived to be the case in relation to handling 
external relationships with the subcontractors on site and the 
'Resident Engineer. The Works Manager suggested that there was 
a limit to the extent to which he himself could "cajole" the 
subcontractors into performing, and that "chasing" them was the 
job of senior management on site. He attributed the continuing 
problem on site to "the Sub-Agent not getting on the subcontractor's 
back". On the main contractor's internal management, he stated that 
ordinarily he would expect to be the one who was 'chased' rather 
than"doing the chasing" himself: "I'm used to a strong Agent and 
Engineer telling ~ ~ to get on 'with it - not me telling the 
engineers what to do". In the opinion of the Works Manager it 
was the Sub-Agent and Engineer who responded to his initiative 
rather than vice-versa. 
This last comment gives a hint perhaps of the impact that such 
a situation had upon the quality of working relationships amongst 
members of the site team. With the programme having 'gone 
critical', it was widely agreed that the main contractor's 
performance on site was heavily dependent upon the level of 
co-ordination achieved between the production and engineering staff. 
However, the Office Manager, for instance, characterised their 
working relationships as essentially lacking in co-ordination 
and. communication. Stressing that, in his experience, such a 
situation was "untypical", he said that the foremen and engineer 
did not plan ahead any more; that weekly co-ordination meetings 
had now become "more post mort ems than serious attempts to plan 
ahead". In particular, he described the engineers as being in a 
"biased" position: due to their relative inexperience, they could 
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"never win against the production staff". It was generally agreed 
(amongst both contractor's and client's staff) that the contractor's 
engineers were being expected to cope with too heavy a workload 
on the project. The ARE, for instance, commenting upon the 
contractor's internal organisation, suggested that the contractor 
should be employing more senior engineering staff and have 
properly-trained junior engineers on site to cope with the 
workload. It was also reported that a 'gap' had developed between 
the Sub-Agent and engineering staff. This latter opinion, 
expressed particularly by the Works Manager and Office Manager, 
was echoed in the comments given by the Site Engineer, who 
described what he felt was a lack of s ~ p p o r t t given to the 
engineering staff, and increasingly infrequent direct contact 
with the Sub-Agent. He and his staff felt that the Works 
Manager was continually "hounding" them and "interfering" in their 
work. The ARE supplied some external corroboration for this by 
expressing the view that the Site Engineer was being "pushed around" 
by the production staff. The net effect, according to the Site 
Engineer, was that a situation had developed in which everyone 
was "talking behind each other's backs". It was noted that the 
Site Engineer, criticising the level of central support given 
himself and his staff, was at that stage considering leaving the 
company. 
From these comments, what appears to have happened is that, 
in the absence of a co-ordinating role between the engineers and 
production staff being performed by the Sub-Agent, it became 
the more powerful of the groups - specifically in the person of the 
Works Manager - who stepped in to fill the gap and attempt to 
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restore control of the situation. However, in doing so, it was 
generally perceived to have exacerbated rather than eased the 
problems of co-ordination between the two groups: the engineering 
staff resented what they viewed as the pressure brought to bear 
upon them by, the Works Manager, particularly given an already 
excessive workload, and felt that their interests were no longer 
sufficiently represented. 
It is interesting to note that this situation as it was at the 
time of the second period of fieldwork, represented a manifestation 
of latent problems within the team that had been identified during 
the first period of fieldwork upon that site. During the course of 
the first visit, both the Engineer and General Foreman (and their 
staff) had expressed the view that there was to some extent a 
lack of trust between the production and engineering staff, and a 
lack of appreciation of the work done by each group. Specifically 
the General Foreman had complained that the engineers tended to 
leave him "problems to sort out", while the Engineer felt that 
the General Foreman did not'appreciate the engineers' workload. 
At that stage, the role of the Sub-Agent in co-ordinating the 
two and resolving any difficulties t h a ~ ~ emerged had been emphasised 
by all those involved. However, by the second visit, the approach 
had altered. The Sub-Agent reported that 'his own response to 
this situation was to tend to let the production and engineering 
staff '''sort things out amongst themselves", in order not to 
"disrupt co-ordination completely". In other words, his inter-
pretation was that attempts to exert firmer control would exacerbate 
rather than ease the existing situation. In contrast, the Office 
Manager's opinion of what was needed was to have a major agent 
&.39 
responsible for the whole job, and an intermediary to manage and 
co-ordinate the work of the production and engineering staff. 
With both a Site Agent and Sub-Agent on site it would appear 
that there was sufficient managerial capacity on site to do this. 
However, as the earlier comments make clear, this was not happening. 
The consequence appeared to be an imbalance in the level of 
influence exerted in the running of the job which favoured the 
production staff. 
At the same time, it should also be noted that relationships 
between the production staff themselves were not considered to 
be particularly close. The engineers, for instance, expressed 
the opinion that the General Foreman had by that stage "opted 
out", a view shared by the Trainee Foreman and Office Manager. 
The latter suggested that, with two experienced foremen on site, 
both of whom believed they were "right", a situation had arisen 
where there was little co-ordination between the two. Both the 
Office Manager and Storesman-- involved in administering and 
accounting for stock held on site - cited numerous examples of 
the dual ordering of materials and tools by the Works Manager 
and General Foreman to illustrate the point. From the Sub-Agent's 
description of the division of responsibilities between the two 
following the secondment of the Works Manager, it appeared that 
no ~ l e a r r demarcation of their respective roles on the project had 
been drawn: the Sub-Agent made explicit the lack of any status 
differential between the two, and the expectation that they would 
work together "as a team" in managing the entire site. In the 
previous section (b.9) it was reported that the tendency was for 
the General Foreman to supervise the directly-produced work, 
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and for the Works Manager to supervise both direct and subcontracted 
work. It should also be reiterated that prior to the Works Manager's 
secondment, the General Foreman supervised the entire site, 
including subcontractors' work. What this suggests is that, in 
the absence of a mechanism to provide sufficient Clarity as to 
who was now'responsible for what aspect of the work, a more hier-
archical patterning'of the relationship between Works Manager and 
General Foreman actually emerged following the former's secondment 
to the job. The comments reported above lend weight to an 
interpretation that the Works Manager's efforts to exercise control 
were the more successful, and that the consequence was a breakdown 
in co-ordination between the two and the General Foreman's 
'withdrawal'. This situation provides further evidence of the 
internal problems faced by the main contractor at that stage. 
What appears clear from the foregoing discussion is that a 
'vacuum' had developed within the site team where it was felt there 
should have been more centralised co-ordination and direction of 
the work. In the previous section (b.9) a distinction was drawn 
between the 'operational' and , contractusl'. roles performed by the 
Sub-Agent and Site Agent respectively. By the time of the second 
visit however, it had become clear that the Sub-Agent was more 
directly involved in 'contractual' aspects of the job in place 
, , 
of the Site Agent, particularly with respect to handling 
relationships with external parties. For instance, it was reported 
that the Site Agent no longer attended weekly contract meetings with 
the Resident Engineer and that it was the Sub-Agent who had to 
"cope with the client". In being drawn more into the 'contractual',' 
management of the work, the Sub-Agent was drawn away from the 
b.41 
more 'operational' management role he had previously been performing, 
with the consequences described above. Clues to why this had 
occurred were found in accounts given of the Site Agent's 
relationships o.n site - both with members of his own team, and, in 
particular, with the client's representatives on site. 
In regard to the former, as noted earlier the Site Agent had 
described his role as dealing specifically with project costs, 
including negotiating alterations to the work. At the second visit 
to the site, this emphasis was strongly reiterated. Yet, during 
the first visit, symptoms of a split within the team that was 
perceived to have emerged by the second visit were visible and 
which related to this aspect of the division of roles upon the 
project. This was manifested most clearly in a number of 
exchanges that were observed involving the Site Agent, Sub-Agent 
and General Foreman, of which two might serve as illustrations: 
one involving the decision whether or not to purchase a particular 
piece of equipment (a pump); the other involving negotiations 
with the earthmoving subcontractor to undertake additional digging 
and backfill work that was needed. On both occasions the General 
Foreman argued for additional expenditure, whereas the Site Agent 
argued strongly against expenditure. The nature and validity of the 
respective arguments given are not at issue here. What is 
relevant here is the significant difference in attitude towards 
the project that they represnted - this at a very early stage in 
its development. From the General Foreman's viewpoint, the Site 
Agent was "behind the times" in his views on appropriate methods of 
building, and too concerned with cost minimisation. This view was 
shared by the Sub-Agent and Site Engineer (and also, subsequently, 
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the Works Manager}. From the Site Agent's viewpoint, his staff 
did not appreciate the importance of minimising the costs of the work 
to the contractor, and also were not giving him adequate "feedback" 
on what was happening on site. A stylistic dimension was also 
identified: the Sub-Agent in particular made explicit his own 
view of the Site Agent's 'stubborn attitude': "he only likes 
things run one way - his way ••• he doesn't like it when you ram 
things home". To the General Foreman, the Site Agent's approach 
was formed by his attitude to his staff: that the Site Agent had 
expected to work with a more senior site staff, and that they were 
"being treated like, kids". Consequently, by the end of the first 
visit, reference was already being made to ~ ~ g a ~ ~ that had developed 
between the Site Agent and his staff. In part this related to 
characteristics of the style of management adopted, and in part 
it reflected a difference in perspective and approach towards 
the project - particularly with regard to costs. 
It is interesting to set this picture in the' context of the 
main 'contractor's approach to the management of the project from the 
head office angle. The Site Engineer's comments that in previous 
firms he had experienced far greater head office support and back-
up for the site team, was an exception to the ,general view held 
amongst the site staff that the head office's involvement on the 
RAW project was expected to be limited and indirect, and that the 
site had SUfficient staff to enable it to operate largely as a 
self-contained autonomous unit. Within the constraints set by 
the administratjye 'procedures described in the previous section, 
the expectation was that the bulk of the decisions needed would 
be taken on site. This was to such an extent even, that both the 
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Works Manager and Office Manager stated that head office could not 
possibly know all that was happening on site, since the job had 
been purposely delegated, and was in practice run in that way. 
In that respect, they felt that head office were "not to blame" 
for the problems, or for any lack·of support to the field. However, 
the comments concerning head office's lack of knowledge of the full 
circumstances on site, do perhaps' lend weight to the Site Engineer's 
remarks, which implicitly suggest that the site was left 'to go 
its own way', although towards the end of the second period of 
fieldwork it was observed that visits by the supervising Contracts 
Manager, head office Planner and Engineer did become more frequent. 
Perhaps more significant however, were comments made 
concerning the firm's modus operandi. In describing Roadbuilders 
there was a noticeable tendency amongst the main contractor's staff 
(particularly the more longer-serving ones) to suggest that, 
while the firm was 'a good one to work for', it was somewhat 
outdated in its methods (of building) and (management) procedures. 
The General Foreman, in particular emphasised the former, while the 
Office Manager focused upon the latter. The SRE afforded further 
commentary in describing Roadbuilders'as "a little old-fashioned". 
The Office Manager, for instance described the firm as being 
"reluctant to face Chance", and the head office as somewhat 
"removed" from conditions on site. To illustrate the point, 
he cited instances in which he had discontinued forwarding 
information on what he felt were "obsolete' and "useless" forms 
used as part of the company's personnel management procedures. 
He added that, having done so, he received no further requests 
for these forms. 
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A further point concerns the approach to project costs. 
The Office Manager, for instance, described the firm as "skinflints". 
More specifically, that they appeared unwilling to countenance 
extra expenditure to ensure completion of time and quality 
objectives. The situation with the underground drainage subcontractor 
was cited as one manifestation of the consequences. The ARE, for 
instance, suggested that the problem may have been avoided had 
the contractor not accepted the lowest bid for the work. His 
opinion on the need for more engineering staff mentioned earlier 
he set against the contractor's "attitude" of keeping overhead costs 
down. Looking back further at the origins of the contract and the 
position of Roadbuilders as a small firm tendering for work with 
a large and important public sector client, it is perhaps self-
evident why the contractor may have put in too low a bid -
particularly given the current economic climate. There was also 
a recognition (emphasised by the Sub-Agent) that the job had been 
underpriced in the first instance. It is also fairly clear 
why project costs may have been regarded as so critical, given 
the current cash-flow problems within the firm. However, the 
comments noted above, in relation'to both the contractor's approach 
to costs and their modus' operandi, also suggest a 'cultural' 
component in the contractor's approach to the management of projects: 
the firm was considered to be both somewhat o u t ~ d a t e d d in its 
methods and cost conscious in its management. These were not 
facets which arose solely in response to circumstances on this 
particular project, but which appeared to be more deeply embedded 
in the operating culture of the organisation. 
The point to'be made here is that such characteristics 
compare closely with what was perceived to be the manner in which 
the Site Agent - as the company's senior representative on site -
approached the p r o j e c t ~ ~ In other words, the role that he performed 
as perceived by his staff, was the embodiment of the values 
and norms thought salient to the firm. It was not possible to 
establish to what extent this reflected an 'internalisation' of 
the firm's values on the part of the Site Agent, or was more 
directly based upon his remit for the project, given both the 
financial problems of the firm at that time, and also the fact 
that the job was underpriced. Whatever the mechanism, however, 
it suggests that the Site Agent represented the firm's interest 
in a very real sense - not only in his official capacity as 
"Agent" for the firm, but in the premises that underlined his 
orientation to the project, given the situation facing the company 
at that time and its traditional approach to contracting. 
Whether such an orientation to the RAW project was appropriate 
or counterproductive is, and certainly was, a matter of contention. 
What is less contentious is the impact upon working relationships 
among key members'of the site team which stemmed from these basic 
differences in perception towards the approach that should be 
adopted towards managing that contract. Furthermore, the 
subdivision within the site team between the more senior staff 
involved in 'contractual" matters (the Site Agent and QS) and 
the rest of the team involved in the 'operational' side - given 
that it coincided with a clear hierarchical patterning of 
relationships on site - formed a structural backdrop against which 
relationships developed within the team on site. 
Reference was also made to the nature of working relationships 
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between the main contractor and resident engineer's staff. 
During the first visit to the site, as early as week 13 of the 
contract programme, a level of tension was reported in the 
relationship between the two groups - specifically at the most 
senior level - ie between the Site Agent and SRE. It was reported 
by the Sub-Agent that exchanges in weekly contract meetings 
were often "heated", and the General Foreman also expressed concern 
at the possibility of conflict between the two causing problems on 
site. The reasons suggested for this situation had as much to 
do with the 'style' or approach of the two to managing the work 
on site, as with positions held on p a r t i ~ u l a r r substantive aspects 
of the work. According to the Sub-Agent, both the Site Agent and 
SRE wanted to "call the tune" and having things 11their own way". 
The" stubborn attitude" of the Site Agent was compared with the 
perception of a desire by the SRE to control- fully what was 
happening on site: the contractor's Site Engineer, for instance, 
described the SRE as a "frustrated contractor". To the Site 
Agent, efforts to exert this control by the SRE were interpreted 
as "interference" in the contractor's right to manage the job. To 
the SRE, allowing the contractor too much discretion amounted to 
giving the contractor leeway to "wheel and deal" which was 
inconsistent with what was contractually required. In effect, 
the consequence was a personal contest between the Site Agent 
and SRE over who controlled work on the project. As might be 
expected, it was issues relating to the cost of work that formed 
the 'agenda' for-these exchanges. Staff from both teams, 
including the Site Agent and SRE themselves, reported that the 
arguments commonly centred around financial or contractual 
aspects of the relationship between the two. The SRE for instance, 
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noted the contractor's attempts to sUbstitute less costly items 
than those described in the contract specification, while the 
Site Agent noted the resident engineer's refusal to accept more 
'cost-effective' methods and cheaper materials than those specified. 
Specifically it was in obtaining the resident engineer's approval 
for the contractor's methods and materials (or those agreed 
with subcontractors) that the arguments arose. From the SRE's 
viewpoint, his job was to ensure that the main contractor stuck 
to the detailed terms and conditions of the contract: there was 
little, if any, scope for negotiation between the two on the 
detailed specification of the work. Attempts by the contractor 
to do so he interpreted as "wheeling and dealing". From the Site 
Agent's viewpoint, informed variously by the factors described 
earlier (the job being underpriced; the financial state of the 
company; the firm's approach to financial management), there ~ ~
scope for negotiation in introducing SUbstitute items or employing 
cheaper methods. 
While cost factors were an important sUbstantive element in 
the areas of disagreement, it is interesting to note the procedural 
mechanisms that were employed. During the course of the first 
visit a significant event occurred in this respect. At issue was 
the approval of a design submitted by a subcontractor who was to 
be appointed which contained "minor" modifications. This was 
according to the ARE, Sub-Agent and Site Engineer who had discussed 
the design informally. From this discussion, the contractor's 
staff had interpreted acceptance being given for the design by the 
resident engineer (subject to formal confirmation in the form of 
an instruction). However, on being informed of this by the 
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contractor's 'staff, the SRE rejected this interpretation and 
withheld approval; the ARE was 'dressed down' by the SRE for 
overstepping his authority in approving design changes; the ARE 
in turn criticised the Sub-Agent and Site Agent for assuming 
that approval had been given and then formally informing the SRE 
- hence undermining the ARE's position; the SRE meanwhile 
threatened that in future more formal mechanisms only.would be 
used; the Site Agent countered by suggesting that in that case 
he would make sure that such dealings were escalated to head 
office level on both sides. The Site Agent's interpretation was 
that the SRE was "sticking rigidly to the 'contract" and, in 
"interfering" in this instance, had "thrown a handful of spanners 
into the works". The SRE's interpretation was that the contractor 
was "taking liberties" - both with respect to the specification 
for the work, and with the appropriate procedures for dealing 
with such issues. The interpretation of the event offered by both 
the ARE and Sub-Agent was that the issue had been blown up out 
of all proportion to its significance. Though a relatively 
minor issue, it was located in a contractual. 'grey' area, upon 
which a point of principle had then been fought between the SRE 
and Site Agent. 
It is interesting that this event happened so early on during 
the· course of the project. What it suggests is a process of 
establishing what (both in content and procedure) would and 
would not be acceptable at a very early stage in order to lay the 
basis for subsequent interaction between the parties. In this 
respect the c o n t r a c t u a J J . ~ . . authority of the resident engineer -
approving changes or proposals made by the contractor was' asserted, 
together with the SRE's own personal authority as the client's 
senior agent on site. Perhaps what is of equal interest is the 
implication for the level of discretion afforded by the SRE to 
his own staff in discussing operational details with the contractor's 
staff. In other words, a clear signal was transmitted, not only to 
tbecontractor, but also to the SRE's own staff - that any changes 
or proposals that were discussed required his own formal approval 
before they ~ e r e e agreed.' As noted in the earlier· section (b.9) 
the level of involvement of the SRE in supervising the project was 
enough to elicit the comment from the ARE that such a situation 
was unusual. On the client's site team's internal structure, he 
also described it as one that was characterised by being highly 
formal and bureaucratic, as ~ e l l l as centralised. What these 
comments suggest is a high level of direct control exerted by 
the SRE in the running of the job and the close monitoring of 
decisions taken by his staff. As an additional and more general 
point that will be returned to in the later analysis, it is 
interesting to note the limits that were' set to the pattern of 
informal working relationships that tended to characterise 
interaction between Sub-Agent and ARE as the individuals most 
directly involved in the operational management of the work. In 
other words, once an issue had 'contractual' implications, recourse 
was to formal procedures and mechanisms. 
It is interesting to review the situation as it had developed 
by the time of the second visit to the site. At that stage, as 
noted earlier, it was felt that the site Agent had "advocated" 
{the Works Manager} from conducting negotiations with the 
resident engineer's staff, and that the Sub-Agent had been left 
to perform this role - although the Sub-Agent was seen to be too 
inexperienced "to be able to cope with the SRE" (Works Manager). 
By that stage, no further reference was being made to 'problems' 
in the relationship between resident engineer and contractor's 
staff with respect to the type of encounter described above. The 
Works Manager, for instance, described the resident engineer's 
team as "good to work with". To the rest of the contractor's site 
team, together with the client's staff who were interviewed, the 
nature of the relationship was no longer at issue. The 
noticeable change from the situation at the time of the first 
visit suggests that the SRE had managed to exert control over the 
project. This in turn perhaps suggests a factor which helps to 
account for the perceived 'distancing' of the Site Agent from 
the management of the project; given the comments made earlier 
concerning the personal contest between the two and the divergent 
perspectives that they represented. 
Finally, in interpreting events on the RAW project it is 
important to bear in mind the position of the two senior 
representatives within their respective organisations. Firstly, 
the level of autonomy of both parties on site vis-a-vis their 
respective head offices suggests a high degree of discretion for 
the senior representatives on site in defining their own and 
their staffs' orientation towards the project as a whole. 
Further, their senior status, and in both cases their perception 
that their own staff were relatively inexperienced, formed the 
basis for expectations that the contract would be run in the 
manner in which they decided. That such expectations were disputed 
or challenged in one case,' and imposed quite explicitly in the other, 
suggests a point of departure in understanding the internal 
mechanisms of the two teams, and a clue to understanding the 
development of the relationship between the two. Put more simply, 
in being contractually in the more powerful position, and 
being in direct, central control of his own organisation, the 
SRE was at a distinct advantage in dealings with the main contractor, 
whose internal workings were characterised by clear divisions 
between the key staff involved. It is ar3ued here that the 
dynamics that have been described above suggest that the two 
processes - internal and external - were related on the RAW project. 
Secondly, in their dealings with one another, the SRE and Site 
Agent quite clearly reflected the goals of their respective 
organisations in relation to that project: in the case of the SRE, 
his approach was informed by the concern to stick to the 
specification tha.t had been established for the work and the time 
and cost constraints within the contract. Particularly with respect 
to the design of the work, the SRE's approach was to regard it as, 
in the main, fixed and definitive. In the case of the Site Agent, 
his approach was informed by the concern to profit from the job, 
or at least to avoid or minimise losses in a situation in which 
the job had been initially underpriced. This meant, in relation 
to the methods and materials to be used, that there was viewed 
as-being scope for alteration and negotiation. Clearly, these aims 
were somewhat opposed, and it became the more powerful of the 
representatives who held sway on the project. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
CASE STUDY : The Advance Factory units Project (AFU) 
1.1 The Project, Client and Context 
This project involved the construction of a series of 36 
advance factory units on behalf. of a new town Development Corpor-
ation, for subsequent sale to private sector clients. Each unit 
consisted of a single-storey building containing basic amenities 
(water, gas, electricity). They were to be constructed to one of 
three size categories (12 x 24 m, 24 x 36 m, 36 x 48 m) of which 
t h e r ~ ~ were 12 of each planned. They were to be built, as connected 
units, on a 'green field' site that was located on the outskirts of 
the town, on land owned by the corporation. 
The project represented part of a continuing long term 
factory and warehouse-building programme being undertaken by the 
corporation as client, and which was being financed jointly by the 
corporation and private sector financial institutions (who provided, 
on average, 66% of the capital). The total expenditure to date on 
the programme had amounted to around £8.5 million, and a number of 
similar projects on other nearby sites had been completed, and 
the individual units sold to private companies. The units that were 
part of the AFU project were to be sold and occupied as they were 
completed. Consequently there was to be some degree of overlap 
between'building'work and user occupation: the project would be 
phased to allow the handover of groups of factory units before full 
completion of the works. 
The D.evelopment Corporation was a sizeable public sector client 
whose annual level of capital expenditure on housing, industrial 
and commercial buildings amounted to approximately £27 million. 
The bulk of this (£15 million) was expenditure on new housing. 
Investment in industrial facilities, of which the AFU was an 
example, amounted to just over £1 million annually (or less than 
4% of this total). The AFU project, which was budgeted at 
£3.75 million spread over a two year construction period, was the 
only advance factory project currently in the process of 
construction. It was a fairly large project in itself, but 
constituted only a small part of the Corporation's total annual 
building activity" The size of the project was also relatively 
small compared to other projects (eg 'one-off' office buildings and 
shopping centres) undertaken by the client. Moreover, it 
constituted only one in a series of such projects within the longer-
term development programme. Consequently, the type of project was 
one in which the Corporation had a good deal of previous 
experience. 
1.2 The Client's Representatives 
The work associated with the design and supervision of the 
AFU project was undertaken entirely in-house - within the Development 
Corporation's own Architects' Pivision. The division overall was 
headed by a Chief Architect who reported directly to the Ebard of 
the Development Cvrporation. In total it employed approximately 50 
professional, technical and administrative staff. and consisted of 
a number of separate departments, each specialised according to 
their technical function (namely, architecture, surveying, 
structural engineering, mechanical and electrical engineering, 
administration)." The division was directly involved in the design 
and supervision of most of the building work undertaken for the 
corporation as client. Consequently, work on the AFU project 
represented only a small proportion of the division's activities, 
albeit constituting part of a l o n g e ~ t e r m m programme. Previous 
advance factory projects had also been designed and managed by the 
division's staff, and this type of work was considered to be the 
more 'routine'side of the division's work in comparison with the 
larger-scale 'one-off' commercial and institutional projects that 
were also designed in-house. 
It was noted that, at the time of investigation, there was 
an increasing tendency on the part of the corporation to sub-let 
work to private consultants - particulanyfor mechanical/electrical 
services design and (to a lesser extent) surveying functions. 
However, this was not the case for the AFU project, where all 
services were provided in-house. (It was also noted that where 
consultants ~ ~ engaged, it would not be"for the full duration of 
the project. Mechanical/electrical consultants, for instance, 
would be contracted to provide design services only, while on-site 
supervision of the work would be undertaken internally). 
1.3 The Main Contractor 
The main contract for the construction of the AFU works was 
let to Tower Construction (UK) Ltd - a private company registered 
as a 'building and civil engineering contractor'. The company was 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tower Holdings Ltd, which operated a 
group of companies engaged in construction and related activities 
(eg property; housing development) both in the UK and,overseas. 
Tower Construction (UK) Ltd was the group's main operating 
subsidiary in the UK construction market (excluding speculative 
house building). It was a large firm, with some 20 regional 
branches throughout the UK. In the accounting year that fell 
between the start and finish dates of the AFU project, its 
turnover on construction work was over t400 million (which 
amounted to about 40% of group turnover). It was a profitable 
company, w h o ~ e e fixed assets stood at t64 million and net current 
assets at t475 million. Its head office was located in London, 
and it employed some ~ O O o o people nationwide. 
The AFU project was managed and controlled from a r.egional 
branch of the company. That branch undertook all the company's 
work within a region covering five counties, and the branch office 
was located approximately 60 miles from the AFU site. It employed 
about 50 branch office staff and'a total site-based staff and 
workforce amounting to 200. The volume of building activity it 
controled was fairly sizeable - 'it accounted for an annual turnover of 
about £20 million. Consequently, the AFU project was relatively 
small in scale in relation to the volume of work being undertaken 
by the firm within the region, and much more so in relation to 
the size of the company's operations as a whole, It did not 
c o n ~ t i t u t e e a major project for that branch, and consisted of a type 
of work that was'well within the'capacity and experience of the 
company.' However, it did represent part of a continuing 
relationship with the Development Corporation as client: the 
branch had recently completed work on 38 advance factory units on 
a nearby industrial, estate, and had also built housing developments 
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for the corporation in the past. Therefore, there was some 
familiarity - both with the specific type of work involved in 
advance factory development, as well as with the client and their 
representatives across a range of types of project. 
7.4 The Design Process and Design Organisation 
The design process for the AFU project had involved the 
establishment of an architectural specification and drawings for 
the work, which were based upon a brief prepared by the Architects' 
D.ivision, and approved at senior levels within the corporation. The 
drawings and specification, together with preliminary costings 
prepared by the surveyors had then provided the basis for the 
establishment of detailed architectural and engineering services 
designs, and the preparation, by the surveyors, of documentation 
for tendering. 
The procedures and structure adopted for the design process 
had followed the normal practices of the division in its 
management of the design process. Indeed, it was "noted that these 
procedures were formalised in the form of a detailed plan outlining 
the steps to be taken in the preparation of "broad and detailed 
designs, the points for key decisions (eg obtaining approval for 
outline proposals,) and the level and extent of staff involvement 
during design. Such a degree of detail reflected the continuing 
basis of the division's project work, and an emphasis upon 
achieving regularity and consistency in project management 
procedures. 
It was architectural staff within the division which formed 
the 'core' of the project teams involved in the design and 
supervision of projects generally. The overall management of 
individual projects from their initial brief through to completion 
on site was designated the formal responsibility of an architectural 
Project Hanager. The detailed design and day-to-day supervision 
of the work on site would be undertaken by a Job Architect who 
reported directly to the Project Manager, and who was involved full-
time on the particular project. This was the case for the AFU 
project: the Project Manager had been directly involved in the 
establishment of the original, broad proposals, and was then 
involved in co-ordinating work amongst members of the design team, 
while the Job Architect specifically undertook the detailed 
architectural design work. 
Engineering and surveying personnel from other departments 
within the division worked collaterally with the architects during 
design (and construction). According to the Project Manager for 
the AFU project, they acted in effect as "consultants". The 
engineers (structural and mechanical/electrical) provided detailed 
designs on the basis of the brief and within the context of the 
architectural proposals for the project. They then monitored 
the implementation of their designs on site. The surveyors undertook 
the jnitial castings, prepared bills of quantities, managed the 
main contract tendering procedure, and followed through in the 
financial monitoring and eValuation of the work on site. 
Within each of the four main departments (architecture, 
structural engineering, M & E engineering, surveying) there was 
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no formal specialisation or grouping of staff according to the 
type of work that was being designed and built. Instead each 
department consisted of a number of 'groups' which were assigned 
individual projects. Individual staff (eg architects and 
technicians) were seconded to project teams largely on the basis 
of their availability within each department, those allocations being 
made by the appropriate representative of each department at the 
'project manager' level. Staff at that level from the engineering 
and surveying departments were seconded by their departmental 
heads, and followed the project through its design and c o n s t r u ~ t i o n n
stages. Their level of involvement would depend to a large extent 
upon the size of the project and the extent of the work involved for 
their particular discipline. For the AFU project, the involvement 
of senior 'consulting' staff, as well as of the architectural 
project manager, was not full-time. 
1 .• 5 Characteristics of the Design 
The design for the AFU project - like those for previous 
advance factory projects - had been based upon no prior knowledge 
of specific user requirements, since these would only become 
apparent once the units had been sold to private sector clients. 
The fact that the users of the facilities were initially unknown, 
meant that the units had been designed with a view to providing 
multi-purpose factory and office space with only basic services and 
amenities provided. Consequently, the complexity of the finished 
product in each case was minimised, and the design for each unit 
was, to some extent, a replication of a basic structural model 
applied to each of the 36 units, with adjustments made for their 
variation in size. The ~ r o j e c t t Manager, for instance, reported 
that the design effectively covered only five separate design 
aspects. Furthermore, the low volume of services work in this 
project meant that the work was relatively' routine' when compared 
with the work involved in other (laboratory building) case studies 
included in the sample. 
In relation to the overall programme of advance factory 
development by the corporation, the broad schematic plans for the 
AFU project were also'similar to those for previous projects. The 
Project Manager did note that new changes were still being 
incorporated into the basicdesign as the development as a whole 
progressed. However, the similarity of this to previous projects, 
in addition to the factors described above, did help to reduce 
any 'new design' input. According to both the Project l1anager and 
Job Architect, the tendency on these types of project was for the 
number of variations ordered to be substantially fewer in 
comparison with other, less standardised work that the division 
undertook. This was particularly the case given the absence of 
specific users' briefs and changes that might follow. It was 
reported that variations in the existing design tended to occur 
at later stages in the construction period, and in relation to 
d e t ~ l e d d particulars, rather than to basic changes in design. 
For the AFU project, there was little 'overlap' between the 
design and construction stages of the project. , Most of the design 
information needed by the contractor for tendering and starting 
work was available by those stages. Further design activity was 
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to be associated mainly with the provision of detailed working 
drawings by architectural and engineering staff. According to the 
~ r o j e c t t l ~ a n a g e r r and Job Architect, the bulk of the design information 
needed was early on in construction. Since the units were 
essentially similar, and also since they were to be built 
sequentially to allow for phased handover and occupation by users, 
then the same broad, and similar detailed designs for individual 
units or groups of units were applicable to the construction of 
further sections of the work. 
In relation to the major features of the design for the AFU 
project described above, it should be noted that these points 
were corroborated by members of the main contractor's site 
staff. The project was characterised as one that was low in its 
design complexity, for which most of the design information was 
available, and on which there were few variations and no basic 
amendments during the project's course. In terms of the types 
of materials and methods of building that were to be involved, 
there was broad agreement amongst client and contractor staff, 
that the process of construction involved the use of standard 
materials and relatively 'routine' methods of building. The 
project was not considered complex in this respect. 
,.q Tendering and the Main Contract 
The tendering procedure for the award of the main contract 
had involved a single-stage, selective competitive tender on the 
basis of a priced bill of quantities. According to senior staff 
in the architect's division, 'approved' contractors were selected 
for inclusion on the tender list. That is, contractors were 
selected on the basis of their capacity to perform the work, taking 
into account previous performance records held by the division. 
(The same procedure was used in the selection of nominated sub-
contractors.) The view was expressed by senior staff that the 
corporation had found in the past only about 3 or 4 main contractors 
who it was felt were capable of doing "such large jobs". Tower 
Construction were cited as one of these. Given the criteria 
accounted for in the selection of firms to tender, the decision 
to appoint Tower Construction had been made on the basis of the 
lowest submitted price. 
The main contract was let under standard (JeT) conditions c£ contract 
(the local authorities editions) and comprised these conditions 
together with the bill of quantities, specification and working 
drawings (both those already prepared and those to be issued 
during construction). The value of the contract was set at 
£3.75 million (with allowance for price fluctuations), and the 
specified period for construction was 104 weeks (November to 
November). Work was to be evaluated, and the issue of interim 
certificates and payment to the contractor to be made, on a monthly 
basis with a 3% retention withheld. Provisional sums had been 
set aside in the bill for contingencies, dayworks, additional 
work and various fees and charges - mainly associated with the 
installation of statutory services (ie water, gas, electricity, 
telephones). The damages for delay varied between £100 and £700 
per unit per week, depending upon the unit's size. The period 
allowed for final measurement and evaluation, the issue of the 
final certificate and payment was six months after the finish of 
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work on site. The defects liability period was also six months 
(except for the M & E services and landscaping where it was extended 
to 12 months). Included in the contract was the option for the 
Development Corporation to negotiate a continuity contract for 
further advance factories with the successful bidder, subject to 
t h a ~ ~ firm's "satisfactory" performance and "agreement" on price. 
. Approximately 50% of the prime cost value of the work was 
to be undertaken by nominated sub-contractors, employed under 
standard (JCT 'green' form) conditions. Separate nominations were 
to be made for the cladding, roofing, glazing, steel erection, 
electricity, heating, mechanical work and suspended ceilings. 
In addition it was noted that. certain items of the work (eg the 
doors, plumbing components) were 'specified'. That is, the 
specification allowed for only a particular type of component 
to be supplied. This in effect meant the nomination of suppliers 
in some instances, without them being formally employed under 
nominated supplier terms and conditions of contract. The 
installation of services (gas, water, electricity, telephones) was 
to be undertaken directly by the relevant statutory authorities. 
A condition of the main contract was for Tower Construction to 
provide attendances and to co-ordinate their programme of work 
with the authorities' own programmes of work. 
It was noted that no detailed programme of work was submitted 
by the contractor as part of the tendering procedure. Instead, 
the contractor was formally required to submit a programme within 
four weeks of the award of the contract (which corresponded to 
the start date on site). This would include a bar chart, a labour 
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and plant resources estimate, a materials supply schedule, a 
summary method statement and site layout plan. The programme of 
works would be planned to allow for the sequential handover of 
groups of units at contractually specified interim completion 
dates, and would incorporate the programmes of work agreed with 
the statutory undertakers. In addition, it would account for 
the programme of work already established for the main steel-frame 
construction, for which the nominated sub-cont'ractor had already 
been appointed by the division. 
7.7 The Main Contractor's Site Team 
A full-time resident site team was employed by Tower 
Construction for the management of work on the AFU project. 
The site team was headed by a Site Agent, who reported directly 
to a visiting Gontracts ~ ~ n a g e r r from the firm's head office, who 
was also currently involved in supervising four other sites in the 
region. The site team consisted of production, engineering, 
financial and administrative staff as illustrated belo" ( F i ~ e e 7.1). 
All the staff involved had been transferred from other company 
sites in the locality (rather than being either seconded from the 
firm's head office or recruited locally). With the exception of 
the Site Engineer, who was transferred from the AFU project to 
another site once the earlier, structural work was completed, all 
the staff were employed on site for the project's full duration. 
The Site Agent had been the only member of staff involved in 
any way in the pre-site planning process. He reported that he had 
worked with the company's Planning Engineer at head office over a 
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two- week period prior to the start of work on site. This had 
involved developing a detailed programme of work based around 
programmes of work that had been received from nominated sub-
contractors. He had also been involved in arranging and 
negotiating domestic ~ u b - c o n t r a c t o r s ' ' programmes of work, ordering 
materials or plant that were needed early on in construction, 
and checking (with the Site Engineer) the drawings that had been 
received from the client for 'snags'. 
The Site Agent described his own role on the ~ r o j e c t t as 
being concerned with its overall management, including'the handling 
of 'contractual' matters with the client and sub-contractors. 
It was the Sub-Agent who was primarily r e s ~ o n s i b l e e for the detailed 
production and engineering aspects of the job in relation to 
the main structural building work. The latter's staff consisted 
of two General Foremen, each of whom was given responsibility for 
supervising separate aspects of the work across the 36 units -
specifically the groundworks/substructure and the superstructure/ 
finishing trades. Working for them were, respectively, a trades 
and finishing foreman, and a direct workforce of 40 concrete 
workers, joiners and general labourers. They also supervised the 
work on site of a sub-contract workforce that totalled around 50 
(these figures for the numbers employed represent the estimated 
peak level of employment on site which corresponded to between a 
half and two thirds of the way through the programme of work). 
It should be noted that, because the work was 'phased' to allow 
for the sequential handover of groups of units, the inVOlvement 
of the ~ r o d u c t i o n n supervisory staff.was more or less concurrent 
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(rather than the two distinct aspects of the work - the groundworks 
and superstructure - being associated with a pattern of involvement 
of supervisory staff that corresponded to earlier and later stages 
jn the overall programme of work). 
The Site Agent described his previous experience as being 
centred mainly on managing housing contracts. He described the 
work on the AFU project as "less demanding" and "a change". It 
was also noted that he, together with the Sub-it.gent and Site 
Engineer, had previously been involved in the construction of a 
nearby housing estate for the same client. ' Consequently, there 
was some familiarity amongst members of the contractor's site 
team, with the corporation's methods and procedures of building. 
'.8 The Client's Supervision 
The work on site was supervised, on behalf of the client, by 
the Project Hanager and Job Architect who had been involved in 
its design. Both were based in the architect's department office, 
and visited the site at relatively frequent and regular intervals -
the latter on average two or three times a week, the former on a 
weekly basis to attend meetings and in response to any operational 
problems on site. A similar role to that performed by the Project 
Manager was undertaken in the earlier stages or construction, by 
the Structural Engineer who had been'involved in its design. 
Additionally, a :f'Ul1-time, resident Clerk of ~ - J ' o r k s s was appointed 
to monitor the building work on a day-to-day basis. The Clerk or 
~ o r k s s had been transferred from another of the corporation's sites 
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and was seconded to the project tegm from the architecture 
department's 'works' section. The appointment of the Clerk of Works 
was made by the Senior'Architect within the department, and his 
involvement on the project was to come under the direct jurisdiction 
of the supervising architect. At the sgme time, the 'works section' 
employed a liaison officer, whose job it was to oversee the work of 
all the section's clerks of works seconded to architectural teams, 
and to act as a 'go-between' in the event of any problems arising. 
In addition to staff on the architectural/building side, 
work on site was supervised by the surveyor and M & E engineer 
who had been involved during the design stages. The involvement 
of the former consisted mainly of the (monthly) measurement and 
evaluation of the work, done in conjunction with the contractor's site 
quantity surveyor. The latter's involvement related to the 
supervision of the mechanical and electrical services work 
installation on site. Towards the latter,half of the project, 
when the services work was at its most intense, two part-time 
non-resident clerks of works were seconded to the team to 
supervise the installation of the mechanical and electrical services 
work respectively. Their appointment was made by the Senior 
Engineer within the M & E department, and they were seconded to 
the team from the'equivalent 'works section' within that 
department. Their involvement on the project'came under the direct 
jurisdiction of the M & E engineer and not the architectural team 
and the supervision of the M & E works on the project in effect 
'paralleled' the structure of supervision on the architectural side 
(see Figure 1.2). 
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Figure 1.2 The client's 'project management team' on the AFU project and relationship to 'head office' 
------! 
J.9 The Organisation and Management of Work on Site 
Like the RAW project, the detailed management of work on 
site was based upon a monthly works programme, derived from the 
overall programme for completion. This formed the basis upon 
which detailed design information was requested from the client's 
representatives, and resources could be ordered and delivered to 
site. From the monthly programme, weekly schedules of work were 
drawn up, and issued to the sub-contractors on site. Directly-
employed resources were requisitioned and delivered to site to suit 
the programmes of work - in the case of materials, via the Buying 
D.epartment- in the case of plant, via the company's head office 
depot. The contractor's site team were then involved in setting 
out the work on site, and in supervising construction. Like the 
RAW project, the contractor's staff were also involved in placing 
new supply orders for materials (that were needed towards the later 
stages of construction) and placing sub-contracts (with 'domestic' 
sub-contractors also employed later on in construction) as the 
work progressed. In relation to materials and plant, it was 
reported that only minor items were purchased (or hired) directly 
from site and paid for at site level - all other resources were 
obtained via a requisition procedure against orders that were 
formally placed at head office. With sub-contracts, the tendering 
arrangements were conducted from site, and all subsequent 
correspondence between the main contractor and its (domestic) 
sub-contractors were handled on site. Again, contracts were 
formally placed and administered at head office level on the basis 
of information forwarded from the site. 
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As noted earlier, much of the work involved on the AFU project 
was undertaken by nominated sub-contractors. In addition, Tower 
Construction had sublet'most of the remaining work to its own, 
domestic sub-contractors. Consequently, a good deal of the work 
associated with the management of work on site pertained to the 
main contractor's management of sub-contractors, rather than its 
own direct workforce. In terms of programming the work, it meant 
that an emphasis was placed upon agreeing or negotiating programmes 
of work with individual sub-contractor representatives, and in 
co-ordinating the work of interdependent trades on site. It was 
reported that fortnightly "co-ordination meetings" were held 
separately with nominated and domestic sub-contractors' represent-
atives on site, involving the main contractor's Site Agent and Sub-
Agent. According to the Site Agent, the meetings with nominated 
sub-contractors were mainly to discuss and agree programmes of work, 
while those with domestic sub-contractors extended to the 
co-ordination of trades' work on site, and "chasing up" sub-
contractors who were falling short on progress. The Site 
/gent reported that the different,ial completion dates for groups of 
units coupled with the extensive use of sub-contractors 
(particularly in the finishing trades) put a greater emphasis 
generally upon the planning, sequencing and'co-ordination of work on 
site. However, he also suggested that this helped to reduce the 
c o m ~ l e x i t y y of the work, since the work undertaken by any individual 
trade was not 'bunched' in one area. He also suggested that it 
made it easier to control: the repetition of the work from unit to 
unit made it easier to spot "exceptions" and for the contractor 
to compare the performance of sub-contractors. 
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In terms of design-related activities, the use of sub-contractors 
meant that the main contractor's role in these activities was limited 
to the checking of drawings, the agreeing of methods to be employed 
by sub-contractors, the setting out and general supervision of the 
work. Only for a relatively small proportion of the total volume 
of work in the AFU project was the main contractor involved in 
establishing their own designs (for temporary works) and methods of 
building. In most instances the main contractor effectively acted 
as a conduit for the transmission of detailed design information 
between the client's representatives and the sub-contractors who 
were actually performing the work. 'The nature of the work 
involved on the AFU project was such that rather less emphasis was 
placed upon these aspects of the work than was the case for the 
previous and following three case studies in the sample. Firstly, the 
use of steelframes for each unit limited the volume of temporary 
works to be built (ie formwork). Secondly, the basic similarities 
in the design for each unit, and the relatively. 'routine' methods 
of building that were involved, meant that detailed specifications 
and methods used were both relatively standard and repeatable across 
sections of the work. Thirdly, the services work that was to be 
installed was relatively unsophisticated (compared to the following case 
studies) and low in i n t e n s i t y ~ ~ This meant that the co-ordination 
of the M & E designs with sub-contractors' own shop drawings and 
d e t ~ i l e d d designs would be a less critical aspect of the job (than 
in other cases). The establishment of details and methods of 
building for the AFU project were therefore areas in which the main 
contractor performed largely an indirect role since the bulk of 
the work was undertaken by sub-contractors, and in which dealings 
at a SUbstantive level would reflect the comparatively 'routine' 
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nature of·the work involved. It was reported by the Site Agent 
and Sub-Agent (and corroborated by a senior representative from the 
firm installing the suspended· ceilings) that the project was rather 
one in which the planning, sequencing and co-ordination of work on 
site - rather than its design - was the most critical feature of 
management on site. 
This was reflected in the tendency for the main contractor's 
Site Agent to be more closely involved in the planning and 
co-ordination of work on site. He drew up the monthly programmes 
of work and, together with the Sub-Agent, established the more 
detailed weekly schedules, dealing directly with sub-contractors' 
representatives on site in establishing them. It was these two 
who were also most closely involved in conducting the tendering 
arrangements for new sub-contract and supply orders, and in putting 
in requisitions for bulk deliveries of materials and major items of 
plant that were needed on site. According to them both, it was 
the Sub-Agent who then handled the more detailed day-to-day 
management of direct and sub-contracted work on site, including 
checking drawings (with the Site Engineer), making sure directly-
provided resources· (plant and equipment) were available, and generally 
supervising the setting out of the work and its construction. The 
Site Agent tended to become more closely involved in the management 
of ~ u b - c o n t r a c t e d d work: in "chasing up" sub-contractors and in 
response to any problems occurring· in the planning, setting out 
and performance of sub-contracted work on site. It was reported 
by the staff involved in the direct supervision of the work that 
any problems in these respects would be internally "referred up" 
to the Sub-Agent; the Sub-Agent reported that he would tend to refer 
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up to the Site Agent any problems that had "contractual" implications, 
. . . 
and needed agreement or negotiation with individual sub-contractor 
representatives on site. Similarly with any problems occurring in 
the drawings or specification that could not be sorted out on site 
by the Sub-Agent with the client's Clerk of Works. 
The Sub-Agent directly supervised and co-ordinated the work 
done by the Site Engineer in checking drawings and setting out the 
works, and by the supervisory staff who, as noted earlier, specialised 
in supervising separate aspects of the work on site. It should be 
noted that most of the direct labour force on site were involved 
in working on the groundworks/substructure aspects of the job, and 
as such were supervised by that General Foreman. At the same time, 
however, the General Foreman supervising the structure and finishing 
trades work had access to members of the workforce to undertake 
'general services' work in relation to the finishing trades and for 
'attendances' on the sub-contractors who were performing the bulk 
of that work. The Sub-Agent was the individual who provided the 
information on daily output on site which formed the basis for weekly 
reports on progress drawn up by the Site Agent and distributed to 
the client's staff and the contractor's own head office. 
The involvement of the contractor's head office staff in the 
detailed programming, resourcing and design of· the work on site 
. . 
was generally limited to the receipt of information on these aspects 
supplied from site. They received copies of the monthly and weekly 
programmes of work and progress reports in relation to them; copies 
of correspondence between the contractor and sub-contractors and 
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client's staff - the latter including all the instructions formally 
given by the Architect; details of plant costs and materials 
deliveries; and details of the measurement of domestic sub-contractor's 
work. The head office, in the form of the company Buyer, formally 
approved and placed any sub-contracts and supply orders that were 
let during construction. The role of the head office then consisted 
of arranging deliveries of plant and materials to site on the basis 
of requisitions put in from the site, and the general administration 
of sub-contracts and supply orders, including their payment. Only 
minor items of materials and equipment were purchased directly from 
the site, and paid for from site. All other resources were obtained 
by requisitions against orders 'that were formally placed at head 
office level. 
The site was visited, on a weekly basis, by the supervising 
Contracts Manager based in the locality. According to the site staff, 
visits made by other head office staff (ie the Engineer, Surveyor, 
Planner in particular) were rare on this project, and only occurred 
in response to specific operational problems, of which it was 
reported (and corroborated by the client's staff) few had occurred. 
There was general agreement, amongst members of the contract's site team, 
that their head office's direct involvement in this project was 
minimal, and that the site operated fairly autonomously. The Site 
Agent reported that he had been'given the authority to take most 
of the actions and decisions that would be needed on the project, 
and that, in practice, this was the way in which the job had been 
run. Any decisions that he felt needed approval, he would refer 
to the visiting Contracts Manager. However, he noted that this 
had rarely happened on this project. He also noted that he and 
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his staff had direct access to "service" department staff at head 
office (eg the Planner, Engineer, Surveyor), and that they could 
be called upon to give 'information and advice' if need be. 
However, he also suggested that a project of this type and scale 
did not warrant a great deal of involvement at head office level, 
and that in practice these channels had rarely been used. The 
main contacts with head office instead tended to stem from the 
more formal procedures associated with the supply of plant and 
materials to the site, and the re'Corcmg and transmitting of 
information on progress, alterations and negotiations with the 
client and sub-contractors, and the financial measurement and 
eValuation of the work on site. For the latter, it was noted 
that the site Quantity Surveyor had a "direct line" to the 
Surveyor' at the regional office - although both Agent and Quantity 
Surveyor pointed out that any direct dealings in this respect 
would "go through" rather than "by-pass" the Agent on site. 
The involvement of the client's staff 'in the contractor's 
programming and resourcing of the work consisted mainly of 
giving approval to the (monthly) programme of works established 
by the Site Agent, and in approving the appointment of sub-
contractors and suppliers, the quality of permanent materials 
supplied and detailed methods of building proposed by both the 
m a i ~ ~ contractor and their. domestic sub-contractors. It was the 
Project Manager who formally gave the approval for these, although 
it was noted that it was often the Clerk of TVJrks or Job Architect 
who were most directly involved in discussing these items with the 
Site Agent or Sub-Agent and in checking the relevant details. 
Apart from these more formal mechanisms, the direct supervision 
of the work on site - its setting out and 'construction - was 
undertaken by the resident Clerk of':·rorks on a daily basis (and also, 
in the latter half of the project, the M & E Clerks of "Torks), 
and by the visiting architectural and engineering staff. According 
to the Clerk of W'orks, any problems that occurred in the building 
of the work that were minor tended to be sorted out on site 
between himself and the Sub-Agent or Site Agent, or with the 
individual sub-contractors' representatives on site. Any more 
serious problems, particularly those with financial or contractual 
implications, he " r e f e ~ r e d d up" to the supervising'Job A.rchitect. 
Formally, the Clerk of Uorks was empowered to issue 'Site Works 
O r d e r ~ ~ to the main contractor provided that they had no cost 
implications, and that they related to the structural work only. 
Those that were issued were subject to official confirmation in 
the form of an ~ c h i t e c t ' ' s Instruction issued by the Job A.rchitect. 
Any with cost implications had formally to be referred back to the 
Job Architect for approval, before the contractor could be 
instructed to go ahead with the work. Any variations to the 
design that were introduced were to be supplied by the Architect 
(or Engineer) to the client's Quantity Surveyor who woUld then 
pass the details on to the contractors ~ u a n t i t y y Surveyor based on site for 
costing. The costed variations would then be sent back to the 
Project Manager, who was required to obtain higher level approval 
within the corporation for the expenditure of additional funds. 
If approval was given, the variation would be issued in the form 
of an Architect's Instruction to the contractor to perform the 
work (who would then issue it to the appropriate domestic sub-contractor). 
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According to the client's staff interviewed on the project, 
any queries or problems in relation to the M & E side of the works 
came back through the ,architectural channels. The supervising 
Engineer was required to "consult" with the Project Manager/J ob 
Architect concerning any variation to the work or problems in its 
construction, and formal instructions relating to the M & E work 
came in the form of Architects Instructions, issued by the 
rroject Manager, to the contractor (and thence to the (nominated) 
sub-contractor who was performing the work). On site, the M & E 
Clerks of Works did not have the formal authority to issue instructions 
and were required to refer back any problems to the supervising 
Engineer. It was reported that, while the supervision of the work 
on site involved a close working relationship between the 
building and engineering services' Clerks of lvorks, the formal 
channels for monitoring and controlling the work on site were quite 
separate. The 'cross-over' point in the organisation was at the 
Project M,anager/M & E Engineer level, rather than lower down within 
the project hierarchy. 
The main formal fo'rum for'monitoring progress on site was a 
regular three-weekly contract meeting held on site. It was attended 
by the Project Manager, Job Architect (who formally acted as chair), 
and the (building) Clerk of W'orks on behalf of the client, and by 
the. Site Agent and Sub-Agent on behalf of the'main contractor. At 
the meeting, the contractor presented a report on progress, set 
against the monthly plan of work"and the Clerk of ~ o r k ' s s own 
summary of progress in relation to the contract programme 
(measured by the proportion of work actually completed by that 
stage against the proportion planned). Other items on the agenda 
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includedtherontractorsrequests for (design) information and working 
drawings, sub-contract and supply orders needed and placed, plant 
and labour levels on site, and more general items stemming from the 
Architects' and M & E's inspections of the work. The details of 
the meeting were minuted and copies distributed to other members 
of the client's team, the corporation head office and the 
contractor's head office. In addition to those attending on a 
regular basis, it was also n o t ~ d d that a representative from the 
corporation's estates department attended the meetings at a later 
stage as groups of units became ready for handover by the 
contractor. 
;.10 Performance on the AFU Project 
By the time of the first visit to the AFU site, the project 
was just under halfway completed. The main structural work had 
been completed on most of the units, and the contractor was 
virtually ready to handover the first completed section of six 
units in which the services had been installed and the internal 
finishing work and external landscaping were being completed. 
Overall, the job was estimated to be "on programme" by the Site 
Agent - an assessment corroborated by the architectural staff. 
Financially, the work was estimated to be well on budget - again 
by both main parties. According to the contractor's QS, there 
had been few and only minor variations to the work. In terms of 
profit, the QS estimated the contract to be running marginally 
under an expected profit rate of 5%, the only significant loss 
so far at that stage stemming from supplies of hardcore materials 
employed directly by the main contractor. For the client, the 
Site Agent' suggested that they may have lost some potential 
savings through insisting on 'preferred' ,fittings in the contract -
although this was not viewed in any way as a significant element. 
He regarded the client's budgeting for the job overall as "pretty 
good". With respect to the relationship between the two focal 
organisations (the Architect's Division and the main contractor), the 
job.was characterised as one upon which there 'had been few and 
relatively minor hiccups in the co-ordination of its design and 
construction, and on which working relationships were good. 
According to the Project'Manager the site was "running very well". 
He noted that he had had personal experience of working with the 
main contractor on (3) previous projects (including working with 
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the c u r r e n ~ ~ Site Agent) and that he had developed "a good working 
relationship" with the firm. The Job Architect and Clerk of 
Works similarly confirmed that the relationship between 'client' 
and contractor had been "good" on this project; From the contractor's 
viewpoint, the job was running "smoothly" (Site Agent). By that 
stage the quantity of outstanding design information needed by the 
contractor was relatively low, due to the factors described earlier. 
No reference was made to any significant delays in the receipt of 
design information nor to any major changes in the nature of the 
design itself. On the fixing side, few problems were reported by 
the client's staff in making sure the job was built as designed 
and specified, and no major problems were reported as having 
occurred in this respect. The aspect of the job which was generally 
accepted as being its most 'complex' feature - namely, the 
co-ordination of subcontractors' work on site to allow for the 
'phased' construction of the units - was reported by the Site Agent 
as having created few problems in the running of the job. Success 
in this respect was attributed to the control exercised over the 
subcontractors' performance on site. According to the contractor's 
QS, for instance, the Site Agent was managing "to keep a tight rein" 
on subcontractors. With the nominated subcontractors on site, the 
Agent noted that whether problems occurred or not on site for the 
main contractor (with respect to design issues particularly) 
depended upon the relationship between the subcontractor and the 
client's representatives. In thi's case, he described the 
relationships as being tI goodtl • 
A similar picture in relation to performance on the AFU project 
was given in subsequent visits to the site. As noted in the earlier 
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chapter, the span of the project over a two-year period meant that 
it was difficult to conduct further follow-up investigations towards 
the end of the construction period, and consequently the details 
reported here extend only to the situation on the project as it 
stood at week 70 of the contract programme. At that stage, the 
project was reported as still being on programme and within budget, 
and reference was still being made by both parties to the 'team' 
approach that characterised working relationships between the 
client's representatives and the main contractor on site. What was 
made clear was that the relatively 'routine' nature of the work, 
and the advanced state of the design in relation to it had meant 
few changes to the work (ie variations or additional work) and no 
major problems in its construction. 
1.11 The AFU Project: A Case Analysis 
Given this situation, it is interesting to set it in the context 
of what were perceived to be the dynamics of the relationships within 
and between parties during the course of construction. In particular, 
clear reference was made to undercurrents in the pattern of working 
relationships amongst members of the design team supervising work 
on behalf of the client. As will be seen, these factors were 
attributed as having no real direct impact upon the course of events 
duripg the construction of the AFU. However, in analysing the 
relationship between intra- and inter- organisational patterns of 
co-ordination and control, it is as relevant to address the issue 
of the perception of the situation as it informed each party's 
approach, since it raises important points that will be pursued more 
fully during the later comparison of cases and theoretical analysis 
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of the findings. 
An early hint of internal differences within the design team 
was given by members of the main contractor's site team. In 
describing the pattern of interorganisational working relationships 
on site, the Site Agent for instance described what he felt was a 
degree of "tension" amongst members of the supervising team (the 
Project Manager, Job Architect, Clerk of Works). Specifically he 
felt that there appeared to be a "lot of conflict" between the 
Project Manager and Job Architect, and that this was manifested 
in contract meetings in exchanges between the two. He gave no 
specific reasons for this, other than to suggest that it was 
"internal" to the department, and possibly having something to do 
with the fact that it was the Job Architect's first project of 
this type, with which the Project Manager had considerably more 
experience. At a later site visit he was to suggest that it had to 
do with the degree of centralised control exerted by the Project 
Manager, and to the 'style' of management he adopted in relation 
to his staff. It should be stressed that these comments received 
no corroboration by the architectural staff, and that they 
represent only external perceptions of internal differences. 
However, to the extent that they informed the main contractor's 
approach to the design team, further comments made by the Site 
A ~ e ~ t t are of some interest: namely, he suggested that internal 
differences should not be being aired 'in public' although he 
felt it was of "no advantage to us" •. In other words. these 
differences were directly visible to the main contractor - a point 
that will be returned to below. 
A similar perception was offered of the relationship between 
the architectural staff and the Clerk of Works. Here the Site 
Agent felt that the architects lacked "confidence". in their Clerk 
of Works, and that this was manifested through exchanges in 
meetings during which the Site Agent himself became a virtual 
spectator. Interestingly, this aspect of relationships amongst 
the client's staff was confirmed by those from the team who were 
interviewed. The Project Manager, for instance, identified a 
lack of 'control' exercised by the Clerk of Works over the work 
on site. The Clerk of Works for his part suggested that the Job 
Architect was 'indecisive' and slow in taking decisions and 
supplying information. The factors that informed these opinions, 
and the reactions of those involved to the situation are important 
elements in'an understanding of the relationship between the 
organisation involved and will be returned to below. At this 
point, however, it is useful to give some examples of the types of 
disagreements that arose and the stances which were adopted, as 
they were directly observed by the researcher during the course of 
meetings, to give some depth to the comments reported above. 
At an early meeting, for instance, there occurred a 
disagreement between the Job Architect and Clerk of Works over the 
construction of sills on the units' roofs to allow for drainage 
a n d ~ v o i d d leaks. The basis of the disagreement was whether the work 
was to be built as drawn (Job Architect) or modified to account for 
problems that were occurring in fixing (Clerk of Works). In this 
discussion, the Project Manager ,appeared to act as a 'mediator', 
eventually coming down in support of the solution offered by the 
Clerk of Works. The contractor's Site Agent remained silent 
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throughout the discussion. At an earlier point in the same meeting, 
the Site Agent had reported a two-week delay in the delivery of 
fittings (for the plumbing work), adding that he felt that these 
components were "uneconomical", but that 'alternatives he had 
suggested had not been accepted. Interestingly the Project Manager 
agreed that the fittings were uneconomic and the supplier 
"unreliable", and asked the Job Architect why those components had 
been specified, and who had specified them. As an additional 
general comment, he also asked the Job Architect why "changes" 
were occurring to the specification and who was initiating such 
changes. At a later meeting, in the absence of the Project 
Manager, the positions were juxtaposed: the Job Architect raised 
the issue that he had not been informed about details that had 
been discussed and agreed between the Project Manager and Site 
Agent, for which an instruction was requested by the Site Agent 
at the meeting. This seems to suggest that the Job Architect had been 
by-passed by the Project ~ a n a ~ e ~ T h e e Clerk of Works openly expressed 
his own view: that "there wouldn't be any delay if (the Project 
Manager) was here". Interestingly the Clerk of Works appea.red to 
play a much more vocal part in the proceedings than had been the 
case in previous meetings at which the Project Manager had been 
present. According to the Site Agent, the Project Manager 
generally did not bring the Clerk of Works into the discussion 
"except as a sort of token gesture". 
These 'snatches' of data by no means adequately describe 
relationships as they were or had developed within the design 
team. However, they do provide illustrations of the comments given 
above concerning the existence of divisions within the design team 
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and, in particular, the extent to which these divisions had a high 
'public profile' vis-a-vis the main contractor. The main point 
to be emphasised here is in relation to the perceptions of the 
situation, and how it informed the main parties' approach towards 
one another. From the contractor's point of view, the Site 
Agent reported that he viewed the Clerk of Works as the direct 
channel of contact with the client's team, and through whom 
everything (information, instructions, exceptions) would be 
directed. He reported that he relied heavily upon a good working 
relationship with the Clerk of Works, and that while the situation 
allowed the contractor to "ride a little roughshod" over tlie Clerk 
of Works, he would tend not to because' it might "damage" the 
relationship they had developed. He stated his preference not 
to "rock the boat" by putting the Clerk of Works in an awkward 
position with the design team. 
Interestingly, his perception of the. Project Manager -
Clerk of Works relationship included the observation that possibly 
the Project Manager "feels that (the Clerk of Works) may be 
colluding too much with us". While this point was not specifically 
referred to by the Project Manager, it was however addressed by 
him in'more general terms. In describing at some length the role 
of the clerk of works in supervising the work, he. drew a firm 
distinction between clerks of works who "let the contractor know 
(that) he is in charge", and those who "let the contractor run 
rings about them". In other' words it was the capacity to 'handle' 
the main contractor, in terms of asserting their authority, that 
formed a major criterion in the Project Manager's assessment of the 
capabilities of clerks of works. As a general commentary he 
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identified 'strategies' adopted by some clerks of works early on 
during construction aimed at ensuring the contractor "knows 
who's boss, and that he's not putting up with any nonsense" 
(specific examples were given of the clerk informally mentioning work 
was not up to standard, letting the contractor do it, and then 
rejecting the quality of the work). From the Project Manager's 
and Job Architect's view, a situation where a 'balance' was achieved 
between a 'hard line' and 'soft line' approach was the most 
preferable since the former meant the likelihood of antagonism 
between the parties, while the latter encouraged a degree of 
manipulation by the main contractor. A more general point relates 
to the inferences that these comments hold for the position and 
role of clerks of works in relation to the design and construction 
teams. On the one hand the clerk of works comes under the 
direct jurisdiction'of (architectural) members of the design team 
and represents their interests in the construction of the work in 
relation to the design. On the other hand, his orientation towards 
the job takes a building, rather than design, slant. In describing 
his working relationship with the Job Architect for instance, the 
Clerk of Works suggested: "he thinks in very different terms from 
the way I do ••• he looks at it differently". While by no means 
conclusive, these comments ~ o o suggest an element of divergence in 
orientation towards the work,which forms a counter-point to the 
structural position of the clerk of works in relation to staff 
from the design side. Set in this context, the earlier comments 
upon the role of a clerk of works suggest a degree of dependence 
upon personal control exercised in the performance of this role 
that mayor may'not be matched by the level of internal control 
exerted by members of the design team. For the clerks of works 
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it suggests that their position is to a certain extent ambiguous 
as well a ~ ~ demanding. At what point, for instance, is 'cooperation' 
or 'collaboration' regarded as 'collusion'? In terms of the basis 
of their authority in dealing with both design and construction 
teams, at what point does 'expertise' in building matters give way 
to the 'position' power within the internal hierarchy and in the 
contractual relationship between the parties. These issues will 
be returned to in more detail in the later analysis. The perceived 
characteristics of the situation on the AFU project are interesting 
in these respects, since they suggest both an awareness of these 
factors, together with some insight into the strategies employed 
by the respective parties to respond to the situation. 
Specifically, the clear reference by the contractor for the need 
to have a close working relationship with the Clerk of Works 
contrasts·somewhat with the perception of the architectural staff 
of the need for the Clerk of Works to exert direct control. 
A further point of interest on this project pertains also to 
the iss'ues described above, but this .time in relation to lateral 
working relationships among members of the design team -
specifically between the architectural and engineering staff. 
Again, the Site Agent recognised the visibility of internal 
processes: "there was a lot of internal wrangling earlier on in 
the.Corporation between the architects and (structural) engineers". 
This time, however, it ~ ~ perceived as having implications for 
external relationships: " t ~ o u g h h it didn't affect us directly, 
we could use it to our advantage, ~ n n that we could gain the 
support of the architects in disputes with the engineers ••• that's 
quite beneficial as you can imagine" (Site Agent). The suggestion 
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here is that internal inter-functional disputes offered the main 
contractor the opportunity to secure a degree of leverage - or 
to play one party off against the other'to a certain extent. This 
situation that was described occurred before the first visit to 
the site, and interviews were 
not conducted with members of the engineering group involved on 
the project. Moreover, the architectural staff offered no 
corroboration on the occurrences of disputes, and no further 
details were given of the substantive issues involved by the 
Site Agent. Consequently it is impossible to infer anything 
directly about what happened , except insofar as it affected the 
contractor's own strategy. In this respect two points are of 
interest. Firstly, that inter-functional disputes within the 
design team were seen to be to the 'advantage' of the main 
contractor. Secondly, that this contrasts with the perceived 
lack of (advantage' afforded to the main contractor of differences 
within the architectural supervisory team. 
On relationships between the architectural/building and 
mechanical and electrical engineering services side, there was 
general agreement amongst those interviewed that the two ran 
almost in parallel. Unlike the situation on the PDL project 
(Chapter I 0 bclew:) and the MrS and NSS proj ects (Chapters g 
and 9 below), the co-ordination of structUral and services 
work was regarded as neither particularly complex nor 
particularly critical. At site level the Site Agent reported 
that: "we have very little to do with the M &; E side ••• we 
let them get on with it". Similarly, the Clerk of Works described 
his direct dealings with the M & E Clerk of Works as minimal, 
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any problems on site being referred up to the project manager 
level. All parties emphasised the more specialised nature of the 
work, and a corresponding tendency to let the specialists deal 
with it. In a series of general comments that will be returned 
to in more detail in the later analysis, the Project Manager did 
describe a degree of "reliance" upon" the M & E engineer, due 
to the specialised nature of the work, and a corresponding loss 
of "control" over that aspect of the work. For instance: "its 
very difficult to get what you want, because subcontractors pick 
up new products and you have to rely on the judgement of the 
(M & E engineer) ••• because we don't know enough ••• its not 
always the case that the M & E work is fully in accordance with what 
we want". However, working relationships in respect of this 
aspect of the work on the AFU project were not regarded as 
problematic, a situation attributed to the nature of the work 
involved and its almost s e ~ s r a t e e management ,Y.lthin the project. 
7.38 
CHAPTER ' EIGHT 
CASE STUDY: The Materials Testing Station (MTS) 
~ ~ 1 1 The Project, Client and Context 
This project involved the construction of a new building, 
which was to serve as a materials testing laboratory for a central 
government-funded research establishment. The research establishment 
was attached to a central government department which was formally 
to act as the client for the project and the project was financed 
from central government funds. The building was to be three storeys 
high and would measure about 50 x 30 metres in area, yielding a 
floor space of some 4000 m2 to be used for laboratories and offices. 
The location for the building was to be on a formerly unoccupied 
site within the existing grounds of ' the research establishment. 
It would be built close to existing occupied buildings and the site 
itself was fairly constrained by the close proximity of these 
existing facilities. 
The project was a 'one-off' undertaking, geared to the expansion 
of the research establishment's existing facilities for conducting 
research on materials and energy consumption. It would house staff 
and e ~ u i p m e n t t involved in this aspect of the establishment's 
work, and was itself to be designed with a view to achieving low 
l e v ~ l s s of energy consumption. There was to be no overlap between 
the construction of the building and its occupation: staff, furniture 
and special e ~ u i p m e n t t would only move in or be installed about four 
months after the final completion and certification of the ~ u i l d i n g g
work. 
s. , 
While the project represented a significant extension of the 
research establishment's existing facilities to house research 
staff and equipment, it'represented only a small capital investment 
by the client department. Indeed, that department was ~ ~ largest 
public sector client for building work, controlling a total annual 
level of capital expenditure on new building work, r ~ p a i r s s and 
maintenance well in excess of £1000 million. It undertook the 
full range 'of building work associated with the development and 
maintenance of the central government's entire building stock. 
With an estimated budget for the MTS works of £750,000 spread over 
an 18 month construction period, 'the project was therefore small' 
relative to the expenditure plans of the client, and represented 
only one in a large number of new construction'projects of varying 
size being commissioned by the client. 
8.2 The Client's Representatives 
The work associated with the design and management of the MTS 
~ ~
project was undertaken in-house, within the Building Services 
Organisation (BSO). The BSO was a property and building management 
agency that was attached to the central government department 
that acted as client for the MTS project. It was a vast organisation 
which was charged with meeting the needs'of government departments 
and. other public sector clients for land, accommodation, installations, 
supplies and transport services both in the UK'and abroad. At the 
time of investigation, it employed, some 40,000 staff at home and 
overseas, including some 4000 architects, 1200 engineers, and 750 
surveyors. It managed a total level, of annual capital expenditure 
on major new building works in the UK in the region of £200 million. 
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Additionally, it accounted for £70 million worth of small building 
works and site purchases. According to official estimates, the 
total current volume of work being undertaken included some 2000 
projects in the design stages, and about 1500 under construction at 
home and overseas. 
The BSO consisted of four main divisions: a centralised design 
services division (offering architectural, engineering and 
surveying services across the BSO's operations); a division 
involved in defence and diplomatic-related work; a division 
responsible for non-defence services; and a civil accommodation 
division, which was responsible for the BSO's non-defence building 
projects in the UK (see Figure 8.1). Each of these divisions was 
headed by a Deputy Chief Executive who reported directly to the 
Chief Executive of the BSO, who was a Second Permanent Secretary 
within the overall government department. 
It was within the latter division - civil accommodation -
that the work specifically associated with the ~ 1 T S S project was 
undertaken. More precisely within the Civil Design Department 
of the civil accommodation division (CDD). (The division housed 
one other department providing estate surveying services.) The 
CDD was headed by a Director who reported directly to the 
division's Deputy Chief Executive, and it consisted of a number 
of sections specialised' according to the type of professional 
services provided (namely architecture, structural engineering, 
mechanical and electrical engineering, surveying). In total the 
CDD employed some 100 professional, technical and administrative 
staff. It handled all of the new building work for civil 
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The Bui1ding Services Organisation and the Civi1 Accommodation Division 
accommodation that was commissioned by·the central government 
department, and also undertook renovation and maintenance work 
for central government and other public sector clients. The 
type of projects it was' involved in designing and managing similarly 
reflected the full range of government-financed civil works: at 
the time of investigation the projects being undertaken ranged from 
large warehousing and depot development to small scale renovation 
work on listed buildings. Moreover, many of the projects that 
came under the jurisdiction of the'CDD were one-off developments. 
The MTS project was, therefore, well within the capacity of the 
department - both in terms of its scale, and in the type of work 
involved. 
For the financial monitoring and evaluation of the work on 
site following the main contract 'award, a private consultant 
(the PQS) was appointed. Contractural arrangements with the 
consultants were handled by senior surveyors within the CDD. The 
PQS's role was limited to the construction stage of the project: 
it was in-house surveyors who had undertaken the initial costings 
for the project and. who had prepared documentation for tendering 
and managed the main contract tendering process. Consequently, 
for the MTS project, there was a separation of r o l e ~ ~ between 
staff involved in financial ,lanning and moni t.oring functions. 
It should be noted that while the MTS and other current projects 
were· being designed and managed internally by the eDD, the view 
was expressed, by' some senior members of the department, that 
future design work for any government projects other than the 
smallest.was likely to be let out to private consultants. This 
was attributed to cutbacks in central government expenditure. 
The view expressed. was that the role of the department would then 
consist mainly of the design and management of small building 
works, and the briefing and co-ordination and supervision of 
external consultants" detailed designs for larger works. 
8.3 The Main Contractor 
The main contract for the construction of the MTS works was 
let to Claypipe 'Contractors Ltd - a private company, registered 
as a 'general building contractor'. The company was a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Claypipe Holdings Ltd, which operated a group 
of four companies engaged in construction, and seven companies 
in related activities (eg timber, plant, land developments, 
(speculative) housing). The group as a whole employed some 4800 
personnel n a t i ~ n w i d e , , and had an annual turnover level of 
£150 million. It was a profitable company, and held fixed assets 
of £21.5 million and net current assets of £10 million. Each of 
the four construction companies, of which Claypipe Contractors 
was one, were regionally-based operating subsidiaries of the 
holding company. They each had an annual turnover in the 
region of £16 - 18 million, and together accounted for just under 
half of the group's turnover. 
The head office of Claypipe Contractors Ltd was located some 
30 miles from the MTS site. The firm undertook work within the 
surrounding region, and employed about 80 central office staff, 
and a site-based staff and workforce totalling around 200. The MTS 
project by itself was small relative to the total volume of 
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building work undertaken by the company, and in comparison to 
other projects with which' it was involved at the time. However, 
it did represent work being done for an important client, and one 
with whom they.had previous working experience. The company had 
in the recent past completed work for the same research 
establishment whose members were to be the users of the MTS 
facility, and this project had involved working directly with the 
CDD. It had also involved some familiarity with the type of work 
associated with the MTS as a 'one-off' l a b o r ~ t o r y y building ~ r o j e c t . .
8.4 The Design Process and Design Organisation 
The design process for the MTS project had involved the 
preparation of an outline design and costings of the work on the 
basis of the brief supplied by the user (the research establishment). 
This had been undertaken by an architect appointed as 'Design Team 
Leader' together with other members of the design team who had 
by that stage been seconded from other sections to work on the 
project. Following the approval of the outline proposals by the 
user representatives and the client department, the design team 
was involved in the detailed design of the works and the preparation 
of contract documents. It should be noted that the procedures 
that were established to deal with projects from their very earliest, 
initial conception stages through to completion on site, hand over 
and occupation, were described in full detail in a formal document 
which ran to some 80 pages in length. The document was intended 
as a 'procedural guide' to the management of projects and contracts, 
and described in full detail the expected nature and level of 
involvement of staff throughout the various stages of a project, 
the points for key decisions, and the nature of involvement of 
staff in these decisions. 
The Design Team Leader reported directly to a senior 
architect who acted as Project Manager for the MrS job, and who 
had appointed the Team Leader from his own team of architects 
within the department. This basic structure of management 
established for the MTS project followed the CDD's normal practice. 
Within the CDD, it was architectural staff who formed the core of 
the project teams involved in the design and supervision of 
building contracts. A Project Manager from the architectural 
section would be appointed by the architectural section head to 
oversee the entire project through from conception to completion. 
They would appoint, from their own team a Job Architect, who 
would "manage the building contract", and who would often be 
expected to have acted as Design Team Leader - as indeed was the 
case for the MTS project. Although a formal distinction was 
drawn between these two roles, it would only be in the case of 
large projects (unlike the MTS) that the roles were performed 
separately. According to the department's procedures, the 
Design Team Leader was expected to be a member of the predominant 
design discipline (in the MTS case, and normally within the 
department as a whole, an architect). The role of the Design 
Team Leader was formally specified as inVOlving the 'co-ordination' 
of design activity throughout each stage of the design process. 
The involvement of staff from other sec,tions for the ~ 1 T S S
,!%,oj ect, similarly followed normal procedures. That is engineering 
and surveying staff were seconded by their section heads, and 
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"on request" by the Project Manager, to work in conjunction with 
the Design Team Leader/Job Architect. Engineers (structural and 
mechanical/electrical) provided outline designs to the brief 
supplied by the user, within the context of the broad architectural 
specification for the works. They were then involved in 
establishing detailed designs - in conjunction with specialist 
sub-contractors in the case of the M & E - and in monitoring their 
implementation on site. Surveyors were involved in initial 
costings, the preparation of contract documentation, the tendering 
procedure, and the financial monitoring and eValuation of work 
during construction. (As noted earlier, it was a PQS who performed 
this latter function on the MTS project.) The secondment of 
staff to individual projects was largely influenced by current 
availability within each of the sections in the eDD. There was 
no formal specification - either between groups in each section, 
or within those groups - according to the type of 'Work, its 
geographical location or the client department. 
With regard to the involvement of individual members of 
the MTS project team (during both design and construction stages) 
it should be noted that each of the principal design roles 
(ie Design Team Leader/Job Architect; Structural Engineer; 
M & E Engineer) was performed by a number of different personnel 
during the course of the project cycle. Specifically, by the 
time that work on site had finished, there had been three 
architects, five structural engineers and five M & E engineers 
involved in the ~ r o j e c t t at various stages and for varying lengths 
of time. Consequently, while there was expected to be consistency 
in the ~ ~ of design team members throughout the project, this was 
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not in practice equivalent to the continual involvement of specific 
role-holders. According to senior staff within, the department, 
this tendency, which was not specific to the MTS project, 
reflected the department's staff placement practices, rather than 
any form of specialisation according to the stage of work or 
process, or the removal of particular staff from the project. 
It had implications for the organisation of the project, in terms 
of the relationship between'design and construction. It meant 
that, despite the size of the project implying a combination of 
the roles of the Design Team Leader and Job Architect and for 
them to be performed by one individual, in practice they were not. 
The same was true for the engineering design specialists involved 
in the project. Consequently, there was a de facto distinction 
between design team members and job supervisory staff. Indeed, 
there was a fUrther f r a ~ e n t a t i o n n of individual d e s i - ~ n n t e a ~ ~ members' 
involvement in the project due to the sheer number of individuals 
involved in its design and management over time. The implications 
of this situation will be returned to below. 
8.5 Characteristics of the Design 
As noted earlier, the MTS project was a 'one-off' development 
to be built to the user's specification. Consequently, the design 
f o ~ ~ the building was also one-off, although as mentioned earlier, 
it was not a type of work with which the CDD was unfamiliar. The 
function of the building as an experimental laboratory meant that 
allowances had to be made for the installation of extensive 
mechanical and electrical services, coupled with specialised 
fixtures and fittings (eg fume cupboards, lab benches etc). 
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Consequently, a major design feature of the building was the 
emphasis upon services work, and its integration with the overall 
structural design of the building. (Unlike the other two 
laboratory case studies in the sample, the design for the building 
did not specify the use of a suspended ceiling. The services 
instead were to be 'visible' within it.) 
The structural design for the building specified the in situ 
construction of a reinforced concrete frame clad with precast 
panels and external tiles. The internal structure of the building 
(office walls etc) was to consist of block and brickwork walls 
with plaster and paint finishes. Externally, the work involved 
the connecting up of the building with existing drainage and gas, 
water and electricity supplies, the laying of access paths and 
general landscaping. Consequently, the methods of building 
and materials to be employed for the building itself were relatively 
standard. It was in the installation of the services within the 
building that work was to be less routine, in terms of the types 
of materials used and the detailed methods of building. 
The design for the MTS project had been prepared over a five 
year period prior to the work actually starting on site. During 
that time, an extensive and fully detailed set of documents for the 
b i l ~ ~ of quantities and specification had been drawn up. This 
meant that there was intended to be no basic design 'overlap' 
into the construction stage: a clear separation of the design and 
construction stages for the project was intended, according to 
design team members. This was not the case, however, with the 
mechanical and electrical services designs. The specification at 
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the main contract tendering stage incorporated only broad M & E 
designs which were then to become more detailed when designs 
were SUbmitted by the appointed M & E sub-contractors and agreed 
with the design team. Consequently, this important part of 
the design for the MTS project was to occur during the course of 
construction. As a corollary to this, any variations or additional 
work that occurred would be expected to arise when integrating 
the detailed M & E designs with the main structural design, or 
as a result of the installation of the services work on site. 
According to the Job Architect, it was the policy of the CDD to 
"design the basics beforehand", and for the M & E detailed design 
work to occur during construction, when the main services 
sub-contractors had been nominated and appointed. He also noted 
that, while the basic structure of the building was specified in 
detail, this did not necessarily preclude design changes - even 
major alterations - once the main contract had been let, and 
construction was in progress. 
8.6 Tendering and the Main Contract 
The tendering procedure for the award of the main contract 
had involved a single-stage', selective competitive tender on the 
basis of a priced bill of quantities. ' According to senior staff 
witpin the CDD, contractors with the capacity'and experience to 
perform the work were chosen for'the shortlist for tender on a 
'rotation' basis, to avoid the placing of too many contracts 
with too few firms. Ratings of previous performance on central 
government contracts were taken into account in their selection. 
Given these factors, the decision to appoint Claypipe had been 
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made on the basis of the lowest submitted price for the job. 
The main contract was let under the GC/Works/1 conditions of 
contract, which is the standard form of contract adopted for' 
central government-commissioned work. The contract between the 
BSO and Claypipe consisted of these conditions, together with 
the bill of quantities, specification and working drawings (both 
those already issued and those to be issued during construction). 
The contract was let for £750,000 (with allowance for price 
fluctuations), and the specified period for construction was 78 
weeks (June to December). The work was to be evaluated, and the 
issue of interim certificates and payment to the contractor to 
bemade, on a monthly basis with a 5% retention withheld. 
Provisional sums, totalling 4% of the main contract value, had 
been set aside for contingencies and extra work. An important 
feature of the BSO's contractual policy was its emphasis upon 
the settling of claims only after full completion of the work. 
That is, claims from the contractor for delays or variations were 
not negotiable while work was still in progress. 
A large proportion of the prime cost value of the work was 
to be undertaken by nominated sub-contractors, employed under 
standard (JCT 'green' form) conditions of contract. Separate 
n o m ~ n a t i o n s s were to be made for the windOWS, heating systems, 
p l ~ b i n g , , mechanical snd electrical work. Sub·contractors 
were to be paid fortnightly with a 5% retention withheld. An 
important point to note is that, under the GC/Works/1 form of 
contract, a greater onus is put upon the main contractors in their 
management of nominated sub-contractors than is found under the 
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standard JeT form ( e ~ ~ 'i"ol"lrcr \ ,,\!So ). In particular, 
the'grey area' of c o n t r a c t ~ a l l responsibility for the performance of 
nominated sub-contractors is made more directly the main contractor's 
responsibility. This point will be 
returned to below. 
A programme of works was submitted by the main contractor 
during tendering. It formed 'the basic plan for the construction 
of the works within the contractually specified time limit of 78 
weeks. Essentially, it involved the 'building up' of the work 
from its foundations with each of the trades following on from one 
another. With much of the services and fittings work nominated, 
the external walls consisting of prefabricated units, the work 
undertaken directly by the main contractor was limited in the main 
to the groundworks and in situ concrete works and the internal 
structure (brick and blockwork). The main contractor employed 
'domestic' sub-contractors for the bulk of the work in the main 
finishing trades (eg plaster, decoration). 
g.7 The Main Contractor's Site Team 
The number of staff involved in supervisory work on the MTS 
project on behalf of the main contractor was small, reflecting 
the relatively small scale of the project in financial terms. 
It consisted of a Site Agent, whose 'team' included a General 
Foreman, Trades Foreman and Site Engineer (see Figure fl. 2) • Each 
of these had been transferred from other company sites and were 
employed full-time on the project. With the exception of the Site 
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Figure 8.2 Claypipe Contractors Ltd: Site management team and relationship to head office 
Engineer, who was transferred to'another site after the structural 
work was complete, each was employed for the full duration of the 
construction stage. The site was visited by a supervising Contracts 
Manager (on a biweekly basis) and by a Surveyor from head office 
(less frequently, for evaluations, etc). The contracts Manager 
who was interviewed in the latter half of the project, reported 
that he had "come in quite late" on the project, replacing a 
predecessor. He was currently involved in ~ u p e r v i s i n g g (4) other 
sites. The Site Agent was the only member of the contractor's 
staff who had been involved in any way in the pre-site planning 
period. His involvement had been in a two-week 'familiarisation' 
period based at the firm's head office. He stated that he had no 
previous personal experience of working for the BSO, although he 
had had experience of doing a similar type of work to that 
involved on the MTS project. According to him, the structure of 
supervision on site was "the usual set-up": the size of the project 
did not warrant a bigger staff than they had on site. The site 
had airect access to services provided by head office (eg planning, 
engineering) and via the visiting Contracts Manager and Surveyor. 
Within this context the site team reported that they operated 
with a good deal of autonomy: in practice central support services 
were rarely called upon. 
Given the limited number of staff involved in the project's 
management'on site and the size of the project, there was somewhat 
less specialisation of roles amongst members'of the contractor's 
site team than that described in earlier case studies. The Site 
Agent drew up the monthly and weekly programmes of work that 
formed the basis for constructing and supervising the work on site, 
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and placed bulk orders and requisitions for materials and plant 
- the former set against orders formally placed at head office level 
(by the Buying Department", the latter via the company I s depot. 
The Site Engineer was involved in checking drawings issued by the 
client's staff, checking permanent materials deliveries and 
setting out the work on site; the General Foreman was more directly 
involved in making sure that plant and equipment was available, and 
in directly supervising the work of the direct labour force and 
sub-contractors on site. Each member of staff performed these 
activities across the entire site. 
It was, however, reported that the visiting Contracts 
Manager performed a more direct role in placing sub-contract and 
new supply orders, and in dealings with sub-contractors on site 
(in conjunction with the Site Agent). He also attended the 
contract meetings held with client staff and sub-contractors' 
representatives described below. Consequently there was perhaps 
a greater degree of involvement by supervising head office staff 
on the MTS project than that described in the earlier case studies 
(the RAW and AFU). 
S.8 The Client's Supervision 
The m o n i t o r i n ~ ~ of the work on site on behalf of the client 
was undertaken primarily by the Job Architect, who had been 
involved in its design. This was the third (and final) architect 
to be employed on the project (see above). According to the Job 
Architect, he had first become involved during the main contract 
tendering stage, and was to follow the project through to completion 
on site. Supervising the work in conjutiction with the Job 
8.17 
Architect were the structural and M & E Services E'ngineer. 
All three staff were involved part-time on the project, and 
visited the site on a regular (approximately weekly) basis (the 
Structural Engineer only until the completion of the basic 
structure of the building in the first half of the programme). 
In addition to these in house staff, a visiting PQS representative 
visited the site to evaluate the work, and attend contract 
meetings. 
The daily supervision of the building work was undertaken 
by a ,resident Clerk of Works. T he Clerk of Works would be 
involved for the full duration of the construction stage. However, 
he was not employed full-time on the project: during the course 
of the MTS project he was involved directly in the completion 
and handover of two other jobs being run by the BSO. The Clerk 
of Works had been seconded from the CDD's 'works,' department by the 
relevant departmental head, on the "request" of the architectural 
Project Manager to provide a building supervisor for the team. 
During the course of the MTS project, his involvement in its supervision 
would come under the direct jurisdiction of the Job Architect. 
In addition to the (building) Clerk of Works, a full-time 
resident M & E Clerk of Works was involved in the supervision of 
the M & E services installation on site. He had been seconded 
. 
from within the CDD's M & E Department, and reported directly to 
the supervising M & E engineer, ,being involved only part way 
through the contract and through to its completion on site. 
Consequently a 'parallel' structure for supervision of the M & E 
works existed in conjunction with the structure established for 
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the supervision and monitoring of the basic building work: (see 
Figure g '. 3) • 
In relation to the structure of authority within the client's 
team, the Clerk of Works was not empowered to issue instructions 
directly to the contractor, without first obtaining a formal 
site works order from the Job Architect. The Job Architect in turn 
issued all instructions pertaining to both the main building 
and mechanical and electrical engineering services work. According 
to the BSO's formal procedures, the Job Architect was required 
to "consult" with the Project Manager over the issue of 
instructions involving variations to the work that had financial 
implications and involved spending funds earmarked for contingencies. 
In relation to the main contractor's programme of w o r ~ t h e e Job 
Architect also formally approved the programmes that were 
submitted, and was empowered with the authority (subject to the 
Project Manager's approval) to negotiate any extra time 
extensions to the contract according to Clause 6 of the GC/Works/l 
form of contract. 
The main formal forum for monitoring progress on the job 
was a monthly contract meeting that was held on site. It was 
attended'by the Job Architect (who chaired the meeting), the two 
C l e ~ k s s of Works (building and M & E), and the 'structural 
and M & E Engineer, together with the visiting PQS consultant, 
on behalf of the client. (A representative from the user 
department also attended these meetings.) The Contracts Manager 
and Site Agent attended the meeting for the main contractor, 
and it was also noted that an office representative from each of 
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The client's in-house 'project management team' on the MTS project and relationship to 'head office' 
the nominated services sub-contractors were also present. The 
items on the agenda included a report on progress, based upon 
the (building) Clerk of Works own report, rather than that given 
by the main c o n t r a c t o r ; r e ~ u e s t s s for detailed design 
information by the contractor; design and construction details 
concerning the nominated work; and issues generally raised 
stemming from the design team members' inspections of the work 
on site. The details of the meeting were minuted and 
distributed to those in attendance, as well as to more senior 
(head office) staff from each of the organisations involved. 
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S.9 Performance on the MrS Project 
As noted in Chapter S above, most of the accounts given 
of the course of events on the'tfiS project - and which are reported 
in this section - were given retrospectively, and at a relatively 
late stage in the project's course. In fact visits to the site 
continued beyond the planned completion date, and through to its 
eventual actual completion. The job was eventually completed eleven 
weeks late, only about three of which were reported (by both client's 
and contractor's staff) as being due to inclement weather, and the 
rest due to extra work for which extensions of time had been granted; 
It was also reported that additional extra work had been ordered 
(involving the installation of specialist equipment and corresponding 
adjustments to the structure of the building) and that this had been 
taken out of the original contract to be undertaken as an additional 
contract by the main contractor over a three month period after 
work on the original contract had finished. Excluding this aspect 
of the project, it was reported by members of the client's staff 
that the work on the MTS project had run approximately 10% over the 
original contract price - a good proportion of which was due to 
variations and additional work ordered by the client. Consequently, 
the project was one in which, allowing for the effects of weather 
and changes by the client, the time and cost targets for the work 
had pstensibly been met. This was reflected in the level of 
satisfaction expressed by representatives of both parties at the 
outcome in these respects. The main contractor's staff reported 
that they had experienced no problems in obtaining recompense or 
extensions of time to perform the additional work, and that the 
actual level of profit obtained on the job was 5% (less overheads). 
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The client's supervisory staff similarly reported their satisfaction 
with the time and cost targets achieved on the job. 
At the same time, however, it was reported - by both parties -
that problems had been experienced in achieving the specification for 
the work. This was due to problems in co-ordinating the structural 
and engineering services designs for the work, and in integrating 
the services work during construction. ·While this had neither 
directly affected the overall performance of the job in terms of 
its time or cost targets, nor the level of satisfaction expressed 
at the quality of the finished product by both parties, it was agreed 
that it had led to some problems in the relationship amongst the main 
participants on site and had led to a situation in which at least one 
claim for delay (by the subcontractor supplying the windows) was 
currently being processed. The volume .of additional main building 
work associated with the installation of services and specialist 
equipment which had been taken out of the original contract was also 
regarded as being partly a consequence of the problems that had arisen 
in the· integration of the services work. 
To the main contractor's staff the main problems they had 
experienced had arisen once detailed working drawings for the 
services became available. Both the Site Agent and Contracts Manager 
reported that there'had been many instances in which the drawings 
eventually established by the M & E engineer and the (relevant) 
subcontractor had been inconsistent with the architectural specifi-
cation for the work. In instances where that work had already been 
constructed, integrating the services had involved making adjustments 
to allow for their positioning and routing (eg drilling extra holes 
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in .the main frame to accommodate electrical cables). To the main 
contractor's staff the problem had been one of getting detailed 
information for the services work sufficiently early enough to make 
allowances when constructing the main building work. This was in a 
situation in which the drawings submitted by the subcontractor were 
often late. The Site Agent reported, for instance, that: "(the 
subcontractors) weren't obliged to produce fUll detailed drawings 
until the tender stage. The drawings were late through ••• and we 
had to keep pushing for them ••• (The subcontractors) were very late 
with drawings and this was still happening at the end of the job". 
This factor was also identified as the main reason for an 18 week 
delay in the installation of the windows - a delay which, however, 
was not 'critical' to the overall completion. This event will be 
returned to in more detail later on. The point to be stressed at 
this juncture is that the main problems were viewed as occurring in 
the designs and co-ordination of designs for the M & E work. Members 
of the design team agreed that there had been a problem, although 
the emphasis was 'rather more upon the perennial difficulties 
associated with integrating services work, rather than the problem 
being specific to the MTS project as such. The Structural Engineer 
noted, for instance: "The problem is that, when the structure's 
going up, its very difficult to get any information from the M & E 
and M & E subcontrac'tors (on their) design details ••• so we don't 
know. how its going to affect the structural work until it does". 
The consequence, as far as the main contractor was concerned, was 
that a lot of the detailed design' for the work· "went by the board" 
(Site Agent) because the M & E "hadn't been allowed for". Despite 
the detailed architectural specification for the works, the Site 
Agent reported that the absence, until well into construction, of 
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detailed designs for the M & E work meant 'that in many instances the 
specification was "useless" and "impossible to work to". Those 
interviewed felt that the problems in this respect had neither proved 
'critical' in affecting the'process of construction, nor were they 
untypical of the types of problems faced in the construction of a 
building with a significant and intricate services component. 
However, they did feel that the problems experienced were somewhat 
unusual in that they reflected the distinct characteristics of the 
form of organisation and process of management adopted by the BSO 
to undertake projects. The reasons given for these factors being 
identified will be turned to next. 
S.10 The MTS Project: A Case Analysis 
What is interesting about the difficulties experienced in 
the co-ordination of the engineering services' designs for the MTS' 
project, is the manner in which they were perceived - by all 
parties - to be a c o n s e ~ u e n c e e of characteristics of the organisational 
context within which members of the design team operated. There was 
also an emphasis placed - again by all parties - upon the impact that 
the form of main contract agreement (ie GC/Works/1) had upon the 
process of design co-ordination. Before turning to and examining 
these points in more detail, however, it might first be useful to 
r e p ~ t t the comments made which indicate the perceptions held of the 
level of co-ordination achieved, the expectations against which 
these were based, and the reactions of those interviewed to the 
situation. 
From the main contractor's perspective, the situation had been 
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one in which the Job Architect - whom they expected to perform the 
central role in the co-ordination of the design work - had not been 
fully involved on the M & E side, and often unaware of alterations 
that had occurred in'the M & E designs which had implications for 
the overall (architectural) specification for the building. 
According to the Site Agent, for instance, the Job Architect had 
"turned a 'blind eye' to the engineering drawings". He felt that 
the Job Architect did not have "much appreciation of what the M & E 
work meant. He didn't get fully involved in that side and perhaps 
should have". Both the Site Agent and Contracts Manager described 
instances in which the Job Architect had expressed surprise at how 
the M & E work turned out to illustrate the point. The Contracts 
Manager, for instance, reported: "When the architect actually saw 
what the M & E work was, he was astonished - and ~ ~ were astonished 
that he hadn't known". The Site Agent in describing the same event, 
reported that the Job Architect "threw up his hands in horror". To 
both members of the contractor's team, the Job Architect had tended 
to avoid the responsibility for co-ordinating and integrating the 
M & E design work. The Site Agent felt that the Job Architect had 
tended to 'rely on others': "the architect expected everything to be 
pointed out to him ••• (and so) 'snags' (in the design) weren't 
picked up early enough". The Contracts Manager made a similar 
point in describing the responses given to their own requests for 
clarification of design information: "He would 'tend to say 'I 
don't know, that's the M & E division ••• (He would) just let the 
other divisions get on with their work". Both felt that this left 
them with a problem in getting information and design decisions 
from the design team. The Site Agent suggested: "It left us in 
the dark about what to do ••• and it was very difficult to get any 
decisions". An additional effect that was reported suggested that 
the main contractor's staff were left with no single point of contact 
with members of the design'team: n ••• we always tended to deal 
(separately) with the (individuals) concerned, and this caused a lot 
of problems" (Site Agent). In other words what appears to have 
happened is that the main contractor tended to have to deal directly 
with the M & E engineer (and subcontractors), but without any clear 
indication of the likelihood of acceptance or rejection by the 
architect of the designs for the M & E work in relation to the 
architectural specification for the job. 
In part, this outcome was attributed to a conscious strategy 
adopted by the architect to put the responsibility for co-ordinating 
subcontractors' drawings onto the main contractor. The Contracts 
Manager, for instance, suggested: "Normally all the main contractor 
has to do is make the right structural openings for the (M & E work) 
from the architect's drawings ••• But the (BSO) tried to push the 
responsibility for co-ordinating subcontractors' drawings onto us ••• 
This isn't our responsibility ••• We had a lot of problems arguing 
with the architect that this wasn't the case". This issue will be 
returned to shortly, as will the observations made by the main 
contractor's staff that it was the internal structure of the design 
organisation that was at the root of the problem. The Site Agent, 
for jnstance, proposed that 'the problem lay in'the fact that 
members of the design team were all "on the same level as the 
(Job) Architect". The Contracts Manager similarly directed attention 
towards the fact that the Job Architect had not enough authority 
over the M & E engineer. The point to be stressed at this point 
is that the main contractor's perceptions that co-ordination amongst 
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the design team was less than desirable was linked by them to the 
perceived lack of involvement of the Job Architect in co-ordinating 
the M & E side - a situation that contrasted with their expectation 
that the Job Architect would and should play a more direct part in 
co-ordinating the work. 
The observation that there had indeed been problems in the 
co-ordination of designs for the MTS project was corroborated by 
the Job Architect (and also by the structural and M & E engineers 
who were inVOlved at later stages in the project). In doing so, 
a good deal of stress was placed upon the impact that the structure 
of roles and relationships amongst members of the design team had 
in creating the potential for the problems described above. The 
problem was not one that was viewed as specific to the MTS project, 
although it was agreed that the level and intensity of services 
work involved on that project was such that the problems were 
probably exacerbated. The contractor's perceptions that the 
problem lay in the formal relationship between Job Architect and 
M'& E engineer were corroborated and expanded on more fully by the 
Job Architect who contrasted the situation in the BSC with that 
found elsewhere: "In private practice, M & E's depend on the 
architect for work ••• (they) have the incentive to communicate 
more and prepare the design (more fully) ••• The architect has 
m o r ~ a u t h o r i t y . . In the (BSC) the M & E's aren't SUfficiently 
responsible to the architect". Noting that the M & E's were not 
appointed to the team by the architect, he suggested that problems 
of co-ordination stemmed from a difference in orientation or 
'attitude' towards working on specific projects: "Because they 
have the pressure of a lot of work, their attitude is more one of 
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'let's get this one finsihed - and any problems can be sorted out 
later'on on site' ••• (that's) with the result that you don't really 
pick up the problems until the job's built". Describing further the 
implications for working relationships amongst members of the design 
team, he then went on to suggest that ',an element of negotiation was 
involved: "The attitude is more one of 'if you want it done again, 
you'll have to pay for' it' ••• (ie) increase the fees to the M & E's 
for redesign". The lack of any direct formal control over the 
M & E design process was further'hinted at in the description given 
by the Job Architect of the reaction to his attempts to exert 
more direct control on the MTS project: " ••• I had to take on a 
leading role - to get the team together - and get involved in 
the M & E side ••• It caused some bad feeling at the time, but I 
think it helped to sort out the problem". In other words, the 
Job'Architect playing a greater part in co-ordinating design 
work was a response·to a problematic situation that had developed 
and not an underlying expectation or predisposition. Unlike 
members of the contractor's staff who held the view that the Job 
Architect would and should perform this role, the Job Architect, 
in describing the organisational realities, focused upon the factors 
that constrained his ability to do so. 
It is interesting to note that this perception of relationships 
within the design team members·on BSO projects' generally was 
confined to the relationship between architects' and structural 
engineers on the one hand, and M & E engineers on the other. The Job 
Architect stressed that this was not generally a problem that 
occurred with the structural engineers - a view that was shared both 
by the Structural Engineer (who was the last' to be involved on the 
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MTS project) and by members of the main contractor's staff who 
were interviewed. The problem was one that was seen as occurring 
in the relationship between 'structural' and 'services' design 
representatives rather than between all members of the design team. 
The Structural Engineer who was interviewed confirmed that problems 
had occurred on the MTS project in this former respect, and that they 
were symptomatic of more general problems in the BSO's organisation 
of project teams. Interestingly, he suggested that the reason why 
the relationship between architects and structural engineers within 
the BSO was much closer than that between either group and the 
M & E engineers was due to their shared concern with the same aspects 
of the work on a project - ie the main structural work. This 
suggested a further factor contributing towards the divergence in 
perspective or orientation towards specific projects identified 
by the Job Architect in the comments reported above. A similar 
point was made by the Job Architect who, in describing the very 
close working relationships that tended to develop between the M & E 
engineer and the subcontractors concerned, suggested that: "When 
M & E engineers get together they seem to have their own logic". 
What these comments appear to suggest is the existence in general of 
a 'communications gap' between services design engineers and other 
members of the design team, and a high level of dependence upon the 
technical contribution made by the M & E design engineer. However, 
'at the same time, such a degree of dependence on the performance 
of this function was not viewed by other members of the design team 
as being offset by an appropriate structural arrangement that would 
allow for the effective co-ordination and control of that work in 
pursuit of the overarching objectives for the project. 
From the Job Architect's viewpoint the potential for co-ordination 
problems was also exacerbated by the practices employed by the ESC in 
the secondment of design team staff to individual projects. He felt 
that the tendency for individual designers' involvement to be brief 
(as noted earlier, five M & E engineers had been involved on the MTS 
project) mitigated against the integration of M & E engineers into the 
team. (The same was true of other design team members, although the 
points made earlier suggest that it was the divergence in orientation 
between 'structural' and 'services' staff that made this relationship 
more critical.) As well as ascribing the problems to the effect 
that brief involvement had upon the level of 'commitment' to 
individual projects, the Job Architect also suggested that designers' 
different 'styles' or approaches to the work made matters more confusing. 
This point he related directly to experiences on the MTS project: 
" ••• each individual M & E engineer (like architects and structural 
engineers) has their-own way of doing the job ••• (which) made it 
difficult on the MTS jOb". Specifically he described the influence 
this had had upon the performance of one particular aspect of the 
job: " ••• (the predecessor to the current M & E engineer) designed his 
work how he wanted it, and even disagreed with the client ••• He 
had the effect of putting back the job a few weeks '" because he 
insisted (that a certain function) could not be performed, rather 
than trying to find a way in which it could be performed". The point 
h e r ~ ~ is that each designer's individual, approach also contributed towards 
making a consistent approach to the design for the work hard to 
achieve. He further suggested that the degree of M & E involvement 
in SUbcontractors' detailed designs tended also to reflect the 
individual's "attitude" towards getting involved in design detailing 
and co-ordination. Linking these points with the earlier comments 
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concerning divergences in perspective amongst members of the design 
team, it is perhaps then not surprising that problems were identified 
in a situation in which the volume of services work involved was 
considerable, and in which the designs for that work were to be 
established in detail primarily during the course of construction. 
While the discussion so far has concentrated upon the internal 
organisational context of roles and relationships amongst members of 
the design team, attention needs also to be directed towards the 
perceived impact of the form of contractual arrangement between the 
BSO and the main contractor. It should be re-stated at this point 
that the GC/Works/1 form of contract makes no provision for 
'nominated' subcontractors. Instead the responsibility for all 
aspects of subcontracted work - including the co-ordination of 
sub-contractors' drawings -·is formally the main contractor's. The 
client's agents are not formally responsible for checking or approving 
the designs submitted by subcontractors. This contrasts with the 
position under a more 'standard' (JCT) arrangement, where the formal 
nomination of subcontractors and their employment under a specific 
set of contract terms and conditions (the 'green form') implies a 
much closer relationship with the design team in the establishment 
of detailed designs and specifications for the work. In the accounts 
given of events on the MTS project, a good deal of attention was 
directed towards this factor as a significant underlying reason for 
the difficulties experienced on the project in the co-ordination of 
the services and structural work. Specifically - and somewhat 
paradoxically - in the ambiguities that it created in the respons-
ibilities of the respective parties for the co-ordination of 
subcontractors' designs (for those subcontractors performing work 
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for which they would ordinarily be formally nominated under a JCT 
arrangement). 
Reference has already been made to the v i e ~ ~ - expressed by the 
main contractor's staff - that the design team had tried to "push 
the responsibility" for co-ordinating subcontractors' drawings onto 
the main contractor. From the design team's viewpoint, their 
approach to the issue was informed by the expectation that the 
tendency would be for the main contractor to avoid their contractual 
responsibilities under GC/Works/1 in this respect. The M & E 
engineer, for instance, reported that: If ••• (main) contractors try 
to get out of the responsibility of co-ordinating the M & E services". 
A similar point was made by the Job Architect in relation to the 
designs for the structural work undertaken by subcontractors. He 
suggested that main contractors did not generally realise the full 
extent of the difference in working under the GC/Works/1 form of 
contract. One implication he described was the tendency for there 
to be, in practice, a greater degree of involvement of members of 
the design team in checking and approving subcontractors' drawings. 
The Clerk of Works made a similar point when he suggested that main 
contractors often "don't bother" to fully check and approve 
subcontractors' designs, and "rely on the (ESO)" to perform this 
function. These comments were made as general comments and not 
restricted to either the M & E work or the MTS'project. They were 
also applied to circumstances on the MTS project in relation to the 
designs prepared by subcontractors undertaking the structural and 
finishing work - an issue that will be returned to shortly. In 
relation to problems on the M & E side, the Job Architect reported 
that the effect of the (earlier mentioned) M & E engineer becoming 
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more directly involved in detailing subcontractors' designs had been 
to "cut out" the main contractor from performance of their 
co-ordinating role on the project.' The point to be emphasised here 
is that - in respect of the designs for the M & E works - the situation 
appeared to be one in which there were very different perspectives 
held of the responsibilities of each party towards co-ordinating the 
relevant designs for the work. The de facto greater involvement 
of the M & E engineer(s) in this activity, in response to the 
expectation that the main contractor would tend to avoid their 
de jure obligations under the contract compares interestingly with 
the argument put forward by the Contracts Manager that this activity 
was not their responsibility anyway. What this appears to suggest 
is a divergence between the formal and extant patterns of working 
relationships relating to the management of the M & E design process. 
In other words, the type of arrangement actually established was 
one that perhaps was closer to the type of arrangement found under 
more 'standard' (ie JCT) conditions. Linking this in with the 
earlier discussion of co-ordination amongst members of the design 
team, the implication appears to be not that this contractual 
arrangement by itself was necessarily problematic, but that it 
became problematic given the perceived lack of centralised 
co-ordination and control of the total design process within the 
design team. Yet at the same time the organisational features of 
the Aesign organisation, coupled with the clear formal emphasis 
placed upon the main contractor in co-ordinating designs in effect 
precluded architectural members of the design team from approaching 
the situation in any other way. In essence, both parties were 
'by-passed' in the continuing M & E design process: the main 
contractor, acknowledging the close design relationship between 
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engineer and subcontractor, and preferring'not to be directly 
involved in that process, was dependent upon the architect to 
co-ordinate that aspect of the design process; the architect, with 
relatively little authority or influence over that process, and 
given the contractual position, was expecting the main contractor 
to play a fuller part in co-ordination. In the absence of either 
party fully performing this role, the result was the difficulties 
in'integrating the services components ,described earlier. 
Brief reference was made above to the issue of design co-ordination 
for the architectural/structural work in'the ,context of the GC/Works/1 
form of contract not allowing for nominations. One specific example 
was given that compares interestingly with the foregoing discussion 
of the interpretation of responsibility for the co-ordination of M & E 
designs. The issue was centred around an 18 week delay in the 
installation of the windows which had not affected the overall 
completion of the work, although it had resulted in a claim being put 
in by the subcontractor concerned. The details were'given by the main 
contractor's staff who reported it as an'extreme example of the types 
of problems they had encountered upon the job - most of which moreover 
had been associated with the integration of services work rather than 
in the co-ordination of designs for the structural and finishing 
trades. Nevertheless, despite being a separate issue, it does serve 
to highlight some of the points raised in the above discussion 
concerning the' 'grey area' of design responsibility, as well as to 
illustrate a distinction in the orientation of the parties towards 
design responsibilities in the architectural sphere. 
The contractor's staff reported that the problem of the delay 
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to this work was in the main a consequence of the lateness of the 
design information supplied by the subcontractor concerned. At the 
same time, they reported that this problem was compounded by changes 
to the work that were introduced by the Job Architect as the 
detailed design for the work progressed. The problem they felt was 
that these changes were introduced in direct dealings with the 
subcontractor, rather than indirectly via them. This was with the 
consequence that they were left largely unaware of the changes that 
had occurred and therefore of the reasons for the delay. According 
to the Site Agent: "Because of these (incremental) changes (the 
subcontractors') drawings were delayed ••• I think the subcontractors 
were probably covering themselves as well (and) were at fault ••• 
and also at fault because they should have dealt directly with us 
••• But we ended up stuck in the middle, not knowing these changes 
had occurred and pushing for (the subcontractors') drawings". 
Their lack of awareness of the changes that had occurred is also 
illustrated in the Site Agent's description of the events leading 
up to the submission of the claim: "We went to (the subcontractor) 
and told him we were going to press a delay claim ••• It wasn't 
until then that (the subcontractor) threatened to stop work and 
sent reams of letters ••• saying that they were delayed by the 
architect ••• (and that in effect) they'd had to completely redraw 
the scheme". A similar description of events was given by the 
Contj:"acts Manager, who described the Job Architect's preference "to 
get directly in touch" with the subcontractor and for the main 
contractor to be "by-passed" as a consequence. From the point of 
view of the earlier discussion, the telling remark was made by the 
Site Agent, who described design dealings between the architect and 
subcontractor beginning during the tendering stage and carrying on 
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into construction, when: "the architect was putting through design 
changes, despite the fact that once we were appointed the subcontractors 
were our responsibility" (emphasis added). The point to be raised here 
is that such a view contrasts somewhat with the comments given earlier 
concerning the responsibility of the main contractor in co-ordinating 
M & E subcontractors' designs. In other words, the assumption that 
the design team members would be more directly involved in the 
co-ordination of work on the M & E side did not hold in relation to 
design dealings in the architectural sphere (specifically here in a 
component of the finishing work on the project). Here, it was 
expected that design dealings would be, and ought to be conducted 
via the main contractor. 
Again emphasis was attached to the impact of the ambiguities 
latent under a GC/Works/1 form of contract. Specifically, the 
contractor's staff contrasted the'involvement of the Job Architect 
indirect dealings with the subcontractor with the tendency on the 
part of the Job Architect then not to formally approve or check the 
subcontractor's drawings. The Site Agent noted that: "(The architect) 
seemed very reluctant to approve windows, and we had to approve them 
according to the drawings s u p p l i e ~ ~ to us". In the Site Agent's view 
this compounded the problem of variations introduced in the work. A 
similar point was made by the Contracts Manager, who referred to the 
architect's ability to cross-refer to drawings' and the specification 
for the work, whereas the main contractor, in the absence of full 
information concerning the updated d e s i g ~ w a s s going solely from 
outdated drawings. The point to be emphasised here is that, on the 
one hand, negative connotations were attached to the perceived 
tendency for the architect to deal directly vith the ,subcontractors 
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in introducing changes (in contrast with what was expected under 
GC/Works/1); on-the other hand, negative connotations were also 
attached to the perceived tendency for this not to extend to checking 
and approving designs 'that were submitted (in accordance with what 
was expected under GC/,vorks/1). In other words, the extant pattern 
of involvement in relation to the design process (for the windows) 
consisted of a mixture of departing from and adhering to the formal 
pattern made explicit in the GC/Works/1 form of contract. In the 
contractor's view, this mixture represented the worst possible 
outcome: reference has already been made to their concern at being 
"by-passed" by the architect; the view was also expressed - by the 
Site Agent - that a departure from the formal arrangement in checking 
and approving designs,however, would have been more appropriate: 
" ••• the architect has to get involved - even voice some approval of 
detailed working drawings ... because in the end the building is 
his responsibility. He has to pass it at the end of the day ••• 
There's also the problem that is a matter of personal taste (which 
will determine) what he accepts ,or rejects ~ ~ •• (this means) in 
practice you ~ ~ need some indication of approval (or rejection)". 
Taken in conjunction with the earlier comments made concerning the 
parties' expectations of their own and other's roles in the 
management of the design process, and their consequent orientation 
towards that process, a strong impression emerges that each party 
was ~ r y i n g g to 'have things both ways'. While the formal contractual 
position made clear the respective parties' obligations for 
co-ordinating subcontractors' designs, the actual pattern of 
involvement in this respect appeared to derive rather more from 
expectations about how each other would approach the issue based 
upon experiences of working under a more ,standard form of arrangement. 
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Yet, at the same time, the formal position also informed the 
parties' approach towards one another. To the main contractor, 
the Architect informally "by-passing" them but formally withholding 
approval was a double sin; to the Architect, given their own 
expectations of the role that the main contractor would perform to 
do neither would have also been a double sin. 
Before leaving this issue, it should be briefly noted that 
further reference was made to the impact of internal relationships 
within the client's team - specifically to the relationship between 
Job Architect and Clerk of Works - in the' situation in which the 
main contractor was faced with the problem of obtaining design 
information, drawings and instructions. Both the Site Agent and 
Contracts Manager made explicit reference to the Clerk(s) of Works 
lack of authority to issue instructions and lack of awareness of 
changes that had occurred (in both the architectural and engineering 
services work). The Site Agent, for instance, expressed the view 
that: " ••• (they were) put in a difficult' position (because of) the 
limit to the decisions they could make ••• (they) could only go 
back to the architect for approval". Similarly the Contracts Manager 
who also noted that: "(the Clerks of i-lorks) were in the same position 
as us - not knowing the full specification and working to drawings". 
In terms of the position of the Clerk of Works who supervised the 
b u i ~ d i n g g work, a contrast was then drawn between the limits to his 
authority and the degree of influence'he exerted in the running 
of the job. The Contracts Manager stated, for instance: "The Clerk 
of Works, as normal, t ended to run the contract ••• A maj or difti',cU.lty 
was that he (being in control) kept on changing'his mind (as to) 
what he wanted ••• But he didn't have the authority to make the 
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decisions - (he) had to refer constantly back to the architect for 
approval ••• This caused delays". The point to be made here is that 
the role-holder perceived as having perhaps the most direct influence 
over the process of construction'on site was viewed as having 
insufficient authority to back that influence. This was viewed 
by the main contractor's staff as not only not helping the situation, 
but as a positive hindrance, since it 'added to what they viewed as 
the already fragmented control exercised by the client's 
representatives over the process of construction on site. 
Before leaving the ~ 1 T S S case, a final point needs to be made 
concerning broader strategic factors that informed the approach 
adopted towards the contract. The main contractor's Contracts 
Manager expressed directly the factors that had made this job an 
" . t t" t . l.mpor an one 0 the f ~ r m . . Firstly, he regarded the job as a 
'prestigious' one - due to the publicity that the firm would get 
from having been'involved in the construction of a custom-designed 
laboratory building with complex services. Secondly, and more 
importantly from the viewpoint of this discussion', he related its 
significance to the fact that the BSO was an important client, and 
to the need to restore the company's 'reputation' which had been 
jeopardised on a previous project with the BSO in which similar 
problems as those reported on the MTS project had occurred. He 
reported that: "Originally, after the previous' job (for the same 
user establishment), the BSO didn't want us - even though we put 
in the lowest price ••• because 'the job went badly and we got the 
blame ••• We went through the whole rigmarole of interviews (etc) 
to get our tender accepted ••• (because) we wanted the job and were 
determined to prove to the (BSO) that it wasn't our fault •• , (that) 
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we'd been unfairly maligned". The manner in which this was converted 
into a strategy for coping with expected circumstances on the MTS 
project was then made clear in the following quote: "It (the MTS) was 
not as bad as the previous job (had been) ••• (the Site Agent) was 
told to keep on nagging until a decision was reached, (not) let 
them make it in their own time ••• We'd learnt from the other job 
that we would have to keep at them ••• make a stand and ask for 
details of all alterations ••• whether or not these were likely to 
cause any effect". Their success in achieving this objective was 
summed up by the Contracts Manager in reporting the architect's 
acceptance of the outcome at the end of the job: "In the end we 
• 
submitted a list of VO's to the architect ••• distinguishing 
between ·(those caused by the architect changing his mind) and (those 
caused by the client changing their mind) ••• (The Job Architect) 
simply removed (the former) and just listed (the latter) when 
recommending an extension ••• so far we haven't heard anything, 
so it must be OK". Unfortunately no comment was made by the Job 
Architect in relation to this outcome, although it was noted that 
whereas the Site Agent and Contracts Manager both reported that there 
had been in the region of 700 - 800 variations to the work during 
the course of construction, the Job Architect did report that there 
had only been 57 variation orders placed. The important point is 
rather that the contractor's previous experience led to them 
a d o ~ t i n g g a conscious strategy to avoid what would otherwise have 
been a less desirable outcome than that they actually felt they 
eventually achieved on the MTS project. 
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CHAPTER NINE, 
CASE STUDY: The New Science School (NSS) 
-
Q'.1 The Project, Client and Context 
This project involved the construction of a set of three 
inter-connected buildings which were to serve as part of a new 
school of sciences for a polytechnic. The work was being under-
- - - - ~ ~ ~ ,- -.-----------
taken by ~ : ~ - = - ~ : :__ ~ ~ ? - ~ ~ ~ (the County Council) as client acting 
on behalf of the users of the facility, and was financed through 
- --"--. 
~ ~ a J . - - g ~ ~ E ~ e n _ ~ ~ ~ ~ Each of the buildings was to be three 
storeys in height and measure 50 x 30 metres, yielding a total 
floorspace of s o m e 1 2 0 0 ~ ~ m2, to be used for laboratories, lecture 
rooms and office accommodation for teaching and administrative 
staff. The location for the NSS was on a formerly unoccupied 
site within the e ~ i s t i n g g campus grounds of the polytechnic, but 
well away from existing occupied buildings. 
The construction of the NSS project was part of a 'one-off' 
development of the polytechnic's scientific teaching facilities. 
It represented the first stage in a two-stage development of the 
school. The second stage, inVOlving the construction of 'twin' 
blocks adjacent to it, would follow on after completion of the 
first stage. Building on the second stage would be due to start 
about a month after completion of the first. 'The occupation by 
staff of the first stage buildings was to occur after full 
completion and final certification of the works on the three 
buildings and to coincide with the initial phases of construction in 
stage two. 
. ~ ~ . .-
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G ! : ~ Q . Q . . u n ~ ~ ~ : ~ d , , as cUent, controlled a total annual 
capital expenditure on building work in the region of £6 million. 
The scale of the NSS project was relatively small in value terms: 
it was budgeted at approximately £1 Jmillion, to be spent over a 
two year construction period. (The second stage works were 
budgeted lower at £1 million to be spread over a 15 month period. 
These buildings would house fewer laboratories and consequently 
be less 'services-intensive' and less costly.) However, the 
project, and the development in total, represented a sizeable 
investment in relation to the Council's total expenditure plans, 
and constituted the largest single current new building project 
being undertaken by the local- authority at that time. 
9.2 The Client's Representatives 
The work associated with the design and supervision of the 
NSS project was undertaken in house - within the County Council's 
own A r c h i ~ . c t . s - D e p . a l : . . t m e n t . . The Department overall was headed by 
----.--- --t h ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ , , who reported directly to the County Council. 
In total the Department employed approximately 140 personnel, 
consisting of around 36 architects, 26 surveyors, 13 electrical 
and heating engineers, 8 quality control inspectors and about 
30 administrative and clerical staff., Staff were grouped within 
two, main divisions: Egl_, A r c h ~ 1 ' ~ c j ; , : m : ~ l J l i t i . a i c n , , whose members were 
involved directly in broad and detailed planning and design work 
and supervision of proj ect s during construction; and ( ~ ~ u r y ~ y i I . ! . g g
~ ~ ~ n ~ w h o s e e members were involved in the administration of 
contracts, and which was responsible for the allocation of personnel 
and resources around the Department generally. 
It was noted by senior staff within the Department that 
current staffing levels represented about a 30% reduction in 
employment compared to the levels of only three years previously. 
It was suggested that this reduction corresponded to a 50% fall 
in the volume of work handled by the Department over the same 
period. This was attributed in the main to cutbacks in building 
expenditure by the local authority, coupled with an increasing 
tendency on the part of the County Council to sub-let more design 
work to private consultants, rather than to provide in-house 
design services to cope with additional demand. The Department 
nevertheless continued to undertake most of the work commissioned 
by the local authority, and at the time of investigation controlled 
an annual budget on building work of around £6 million. 
The NSS project (and the development as a whole) therefore 
represented quite a sizeable venture, in relation to the 
Department's total activities. Indeed, it was the largest single 
project being currently undertaken. Moreover, it was the first 
major project being done on behalf of the polytechnic, which had 
previously hired private consultants to design the majority of 
its new building work. Success on this project would increase 
the likelihood of the Department obtaining future work from 
that source. 
At this' stage it should be noted that an important feature 
of the NSS project (and the second stage buildings) was the use 
of a t system' method of building.OThat is, the structural 
-"- - ~ ~ - -, .. , ' , . . . ~ . . '- ..-'- - - ~ . . - - -- " 
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components of the building were to consist in the main of 
components that were fabricated off-site and then delivered and 
assembled on site, as apposed to. being constructed in situ. This 
was to be so for the basic steel frame of the building, together with 
many of the' internal walls, doors and partitions. The main in situ 
structural work would be limited to the concrete floors, roofing 
and external (brick) cladding. The use of a 'system' method of 
building was a long-standing policy of the Department. Indeed, 
it was noted that a proportion of the professional fees earned for 
design work was contributed towards a consortium of suppliers who 
were involved in developing that particular system. According to 
senior staff within the Department, a system method was used 
because it was felt that dealing with component suppliers rather 
than building sub-contractors contributed towards higher productivity. 
Its use across the full range of departmental work was the reason why 
the department employed no structural engineers. 
For the design and supervision of the mechanical and electrical 
services work on the NSS project, two private consultants were 
, --. . . - . . - . - " ~ ~ -... ~ ~ ..... ~ ~ , ~ , , , ~ - ~ , ~ - ' - - " , , , ....... ~ ~... - - ~ ~ .. "' .. ~ . .
employed - specialising in mechanical and electrical services work 
respective+y. Both firms of consultants were small local 
practices, which had had a good deal of experience in working for 
the County Council,' ,which in turn constituted the major. client 
for their services. The employment of the consultants was 
controlled by the relevant local authority ~ l i e n t t committee, 
(ie. education) and contractual arrangements with them were 
handled by the Surveying Division. 
9'. 3 The' Main Contractor 
The main contract for the construction of the NSS works was 
~ . 4 4
let to Steelframe Ltd - a local fir.m registered as a general 
____ " _ ' ~ ~__ ~ _ " " " " " " " - . ' W ' . > ~ ' " "
building contractor. It was a small firm whose turnover in the 
two accounting years that fell between the start and finish 
dates of the NSS project stood'at £2 million and £1.6 million. 
In the latter year, pre-tax profits as a 'proportion of turnover 
stood at 4% compared to 12% in the previous year. Its fixed 
assets stood at £90,000 and net current assets at -£50,000. 
It employed a total office staff and site-based workforce amounting 
to only about 60. It operated exclusively within the region 
in which it was based. 
Over time the firm had done 'a good deal of work for the County 
Council and had had 'experience of working with the Architect's 
Department and were familiar with their systems and methods. 
The company Surveyor estimated that, on average, about 80% of 
their work consisted of council contracts. The NSS contract was 
at the time also the largest single contract that Steelframe had 
on their books,' and represented a very sizeable proportion of 
their total annual turnover. 
9 ~ 4 4 The Design Process and Design Organisation 
The brief for the NSS project had been supplied by the ~ ~ ~ ¥ ~ ~
technic on behalf of the users of the facility (the particular 
,..---.-..--.. ~ - - ' ' -. ~ ~ ' " ' ~ ~ - " " .... ~ ~ - ' ~ - , ,
departments), and described the requirements for teaching 
-.--"-""-"'-'" 
accommodation, laboratories, offices and communal areas, and 
various other facilities and amenities to be provided. The design 
process had then involved the appointment of an architectural 
group leader to act as Project Manager, and to prepare an outline 
" ' - - ' - ' ~ ~ " " ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - - ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' - ~ . ~ ~ . ' ~ ~ - ... / .. ~ ~ , " " , - - - - - , . . . " . . . . ...... 
9.5 
design proposal to the brief supplied. Following the acceptance of 
the design proposals by the polytechnic, a n ~ / / t , , ~ , : : " ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ' ; j ; ~ ~ t y y
treasury.and c l i ~ n t t COmmittees, the detailed design stage for the 
\ /.' '\ '"-''' ... '''\. / 
,-_.' ' " .. ' ," -," ,,'._---
project had commenced with the secondment of internal staff and 
.. " ~ ' " - " " " " .............. - - ~ ~ ',. 
the appointment o ~ _ . ~ . l : ~ . ~ . . ~ " . E E .. ~ _ o _ ~ s u l t a n t s . .
- - - ' ~ ' . . - ~ ~ - . ~ ~ ~ ~.. - ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ .. ~ . - ~ ~ ' .... "'.'-- ... 
The pattern of involvement in design and the procedures used 
had followed the Department's normal practice in managing projects. 
Within the Department, it was the Architectural Division that 
constituted its 'line'management'and which housed staff which 
were seconded to project teams. The overall management of particular 
projects, through from the establishment of design proposals to 
completion on site, was delegated to architectural group leaders 
acting as Project Managers. Their'project teams would consist of 
architects working within their own groups. A ~ S 2 = J 1 r ~ h i ~ e c t t was 
appointed to undertake the detailed design for the work, and to 
monitor its implementation on site. Working with the Job Architect 
were a group of architects anct,techni chms. Both the Proj ect 14anager 
--,-.. - . . , . - . , - - " ~ ~ . 
and Job Architect followed the project through design and 
construction stages, rather than there being any separation of 
the design and supervisory roles between stages. The latter 
would be involved full-time on the project. There was no formal 
specialisation within the division - either as a whole or within 
parzicular groups - according to the type of work involved. 
Instead, staff availability formed the main criterion for the 
placement of individuals on particular projects, and the 
size of the team and level of staff involvement would then largely 
be dependent upon the size of the individual project. 
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O t h e r ~ I : ~ ~ ~ t ~ f f ) ( i e e engineers and surveyors) ,would 
be seconded full-time to these teams on a job-by-job basis from 
specialist functional sections within the Architectural Division. 
Their appointment again would depend upon availability, and 
would be made by the appropriate section head. Their work on the 
project would then come under the formal jurisdiction of the 
--' \ ) architectural Project Manager. Consequently, staff were 
, 
seconded directly to the project team to work under the super-
vision of the Project 'Manager, 'rather than acting as 'consulting' 
staff to the architectural team. For the NSS project, ( ~ i ~ y ~ ~
was seconded to the team from the surveying group within the 
Architectural Division, and was made responsible for the 
financial monitoring and evaluation of the work on site. The' 
work associated with preparing initial costings and contract 
documentation and the management of the tendering procedure had 
been undertaken by surveyors from the Surveying Division. This 
Division would also be directly involved in the post-site 
administration of the contract (final payment, claims negotiations, 
etc). Consequently, there was a distinction within the department 
between the roles performed by surveying staff: specifically there 
was a separation of surveying functions associated with 
supervision during the course of construction, from the broader 
planning and control functions'associated with pre- and post-
c o n t ~ a c t t administration. An additional function that the Surveying 
Division undertook was concerned with the allocation of staff and 
resources within the department generally. This latter function 
extended to the Division's general responsibility for the 
training and career development. of surveying staff working in the 
surveying team within the Architectural Division. Consequently 
the Division performed more general 'maintenance' functions within 
the department as a whole. 
During the detailed design stage, it was the Project Manager 
who was involved most closely in the co-ordination of the 
architectural and engineering services designs for the building. 
The consultants were appointed at this stage to provide detailed 
designs to the brief supplied by the user, and within the context 
of the architectural design proposal agreed with the various 
client bodies. According to the Project Manager, during this 
detailed design stage fortnightly design meetings had been held 
to deal with consultant's queries, and to co-ordinate the two 
aspects of the design for the project. He also reported that, 
at "appropriate pointsll, in house specialist staff (eg heating/ 
ventilating engineers) had been brought into the design process 
to "advise". 
9.5 Characteristics of the Design 
The nature of the NSS project - as a 'one-off' development 
built to detailed client specifications - meant that the design 
for it was also a one-off undertaking. A similar broad design 
would be used for the second stage of the development. However, 
for·the first stage, there was to be a considerable amount of 
new design work. Furthermore, the function, of the new buildings 
as a science school, and the associated volume of work required 
in the building of laboratories as part of it, meant that the 
requirements'for it were relatively services-intensive. The design 
- ' - - ~ - - ~ - - - - , ,
was to allow for the installation of extensive mechanical and 
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electrical work, special facilities (such as glass drainage), 
and laboratory-specific fixtures and fittings (such as lab benches, 
fume cupboards, etc). C o n s e ~ u e n t l y y the design for the buildings 
was by no means' standardised, and a particular emphasis was placed 
upon the integration of the structural and engineering services 
designs. 
At the same time, the use of a 'system' method of building 
did to some extent serve to standardise the design associated 
with the basic structure of the building. It meant that the 
specification for the basic buildings allowed for the use of 
standardised manufacturers' components, adjusted to take account 
of differences in dimensions. Furthermore, the construction of 
three basically identical buildings' allowed for further standard-
isation of the structural design. In terms of the methods of 
building adopted, the use of the 'system' method m ~ ~ t _ _ .. t : I . ~ ~ ! e . ~ ~ ~ _ ~ ~ o n n
in the volume of work on site associated with the main structural 
----------.-.. -. 
and finishing trades (eg bricklaying, joinery-;. plastering), and a 
much greater emphasis upon on site fixing and assembly of pre-fabricated 
comp(:ments. 
It also meant the use of relatively standard and familiar (to the 
- - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - ~ ' " - - . ~ ~
. 
designers and to the contractor) materials. The more standardised 
and ~ o u t i n e e features of the structural work for the NSS project, 
therefore contrasted with the more specialised materials and 
rather more job-specific fixing patterns and methods of building 
associated with the installation of the services work within the buildings. 
According to members, both of the design team and the main 
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contracting firm, the amount of time that the design team had had 
available for the preparation of detailed working drawings prior 
to work actually starting on site had been very short. Consequently, 
the department had "gone out to tender for the main contract 
with few of the full set of drawings that were needed being 
available. This meant that there was some degree of 'overlap' 
between the design and construction stages of the project: the 
preparation of detailed designs for specific aspects of the work, 
and the issue of a large number of detailed working drawings were 
to occur during the construction stage. It also meant the 
potential for variations to the work occurring, particularly in 
respect of the interrelationship between the structural and 
services components in the buildings. A more detailed description 
of this situation with an assessment of its perceived implications 
will be given below. The point to be made here is t h a ~ t h e r e e was 
no clear delineation between the design and construction stages 
of the NSS project. 
9 ".6 Tendering and the Main Contract 
The tendering procedure for the award of the main contract 
had involved a single-stage, selective competitive tender on the 
basis of a priced bill of quantities. According to senior staff 
within the Architect's Department, the practice was to select 
for tender locally-based contractors who had knowledge and 
experience of the Department's 'system' methods and procedures. 
The tendency then was to employ small local contractors who had 
a continuing working relationship with the council over time. 
It was estimated that, over the previous 10 - 15 years, the 
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Department had used only about six different contractors. It 
was also noted that, at anyone time, the Council might be 
employing 3 - 4 local contractors. A similar approach - hiring 
small local firms who had in the past performed work for the council -
was described in the selection of consultants. Given the factors 
accounted for in selection of tenderers, the decision to appoint 
Steelframe was made on the basis of the lowest submitted price 
for the job. 
The subdivision of the total development scheme for the 
polytechnic school into two stages (and two separate contracts), 
reflected the council's practice of serial building. This 
procedure had been used over the past 20 years or so, and the aim 
was to reduce the volume of design work for s u b s e ~ u e n t t stages of 
individual developments, and to allow for building experience to 
feedback into later design and planning processes. Coupled with 
the use of a 'system,' method, the intention then was to 'routinise' 
work involved at the design and construction stages of the project 
cycle for further developments. This was particularly the case on 
the current project, in that the second stage of the NSS develop-
ment would be structurally similar to the first, and the work 
inVOlved be less services-intensive (there being no laboratories). 
By the same token, the use of serial building also ostensibly 
placed the successful main contractor in a favourable position for 
obtaining follow-up work. Indeed, towards the end of work on the 
NSS contract, Steelframe would be involved in tendering for the 
second stage of the development. 
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The main contract for the first stage was let under standard 
(JeT) conditions (the local authorities edition), and comprised 
these conditions together with. the bill of quantities, specification 
and working drawings (both those already prepared and those to be 
issued during construction). The value of the contract was set 
at £1.3 million (with allowance for price fluctuations), and the 
specified period for construction was 104 weeks (April to April). 
The work was to be evaluated, and the issue of interim certificates 
and payment to the contractor to be made, on a monthly basis with 
a 5% retention withheld. Provisional sums had been set aside in 
the bill for contingencies, dayworks and additional work. 
A significant proportion of the prime cost value of the work 
was to be undertaken by nominated sub-contractors, employed under 
standard (JeT 'green' form) conditions. Separate nominations were 
to be made for the mechanical and electrical services work and 
for the specialist installations. (It should be noted that a 
somewhat unusual feature of the organisation of the project 
was the eventual appointment, for the mechanical work, of the 
same firm which was acting as mechanical services consultant.) 
In addition to nominated sub-contractors, the use of a 'system' 
method of building meant that a number of suppliers were in effect 
nominated by virtue of their products being built into the 
s p ~ c i f i c a t i o n n for the works. All sub-contractors (nominated and 
domestic) were to be paid fortnightly, with a 5% retention 
withheld. 
The programme of works which was submitted by the main 
contractor during tendering formed the basic plan for the construction 
of the work within the contractually-specified time limit of 
104 weeks. The three buildings were to be constructed in parallel: 
that is, they would be built up simultaneously, rather than the 
construction of one following on from completion of another. Within 
this broad scheme, work within each trade (eg the p l a s t e r i n ~ ) ) would 
tend to be done from building to building, rather than across the 
three buildings simultaneously, in order to allow for the smoother 
co-ordination of each of the trades on site. With much of the 
services, internal structure and fittings work being nominated or 
supplied by component, the main work performed directly by 
Steelframe was in the excavations, in situ concrete works and the 
internal and external brick and block work. 
9.7 The Main Contractor's Site Team 
The number of staff involved in supervising work on the NSS 
project on behalf of the main contractor was small, which 
reflected the relatively small scale of the project in financial 
terms (see Figure 9.1). The company's main representative on 
site was a Site Agent, whose 'team' consisted of a General Foreman, 
Trades Foreman and Site Engineer. Each of these staff were 
transferred from company sites elsewhere, and involved full-time 
and resident on the project. 
The project was monitored from head office by a supervising 
Contracts Manager, who in fact was a director of the firm. His 
direct inVOlvement was through regular and frequent visits to the 
site (on average, weekly),. In addition, the financial monitoring 
and evaluation of the work on site was undertaken by the company's 
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Steelframe Contractors Ltd: Site management team and relationship to head office 
Surveyor who was based at head office, and who visited the site 
periodically to evaluate the work, (on average, monthly). Both 
these members of staff were involved concurrently in supervising 
other contracts held by the firm, and in planning and tendering 
for future contracts. 
The involvement of the site staff did not in all cases 
continue through the duration of this project. The Site Engineer 
for instance, was transferred to another site once the basic 
structural work on the project had'been completed. More significantly 
perhaps, the Site Agent left the project to work on another of the 
firm's sites at a relatively early stage in its development. 
Unfortunately this occurred well before the first fieldwork visit 
was undertaken. According to the supervising Contracts Manager, it 
had occurred due to 'problems' in the relationship between the site 
team and the client's representatives - although no specific 
details of this were given. In terms of the supervision of work 
on the project, it meant that the Contracts Manager became more 
closely involved in its running. Those who were interviewed from 
both the client's and contractor's side described the situation 
as one in which the Contracts Manager was acting in effect as a 
non-resident Site Agent for the company, while the General 
F o r ~ m a n ' s s role had been extended to undertake some of the work 
(in planning and resourcing the project) formerly undertaken by 
the Site Agent. In other words there was a shift within the 
organisation towards a greater 'supervisory' role on the part of 
the Contracts Manager, and a more 'managerial' role on the part 
of the General Foreman. Consequently there was a distinction 
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marked between the formal structure of management initially 
established to undertake the work on site and the actual pattern 
of involvement over the course of much of the period of 
construction. The pattern of involvement of the contractor's 
supervisory staff in the programming and resourcing of work was 
similar to that described earlier on the MTS project, with the 
exception that the supervising Contracts Manager performed some 
of the work undertaken by the Site Agent in that case - notably 
placing orders with sub-contractors and suppliers and agreeing 
or negotiating details of work, both with members of the design 
team and with sub-contractors and suppliers once they were 
appointed. His main role in the more detailed operational manage-
ment of work on site therefore related to managing relationships 
with other parties involved in the project. Like the HTS :project, 
this meant a closer .degree of involvement by supervising head 
office staff than that described in the earlier case stUdies 
(ie the RAW and AFU). 
9.8 The Client's Supervision 
The monitoring of the work on site on behalf of the client 
was undertaken by the Project Manager and Job Architect who had 
been involved in its design, together with the surveyor seconded 
to. the project team, (see Figure 9.2). The Job Architect and 
Surveyor were involved full-time on the project, and visited the 
site throughout its course. They were not resident, but visited 
the site o ~ ~ a regular basis - the Job Architect came two to 
three times a week on average; the Surveyor less frequently. to 
undertake the monthly financial measurement of the work, and in 
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The client's 'in house' project management team on the NSS project and relationship to 'head office' 
response to particular issues that occurred. The Project Manager 
visited less frequently (approximately fortnightly) and was not 
involved full-time on the project. 
For the day-to-day supervision of the building work, a 
full-time resident Clerk of Works had been appointed to supervise 
the work throughout its duration on site. The Clerk of Works had 
been appointed from the departmental 'works' section which housed 
the department's quality control inspectors'. The secondment 
had been made by the section head and, as described earlier, the 
Clerk of Works' involvement on the project was to come under the 
direct jurisdiction. of the architectural members of the team. 
In addition to the in house staff involved in the project's 
supervision, senior representatives from each of the two 
consultancy firms were involved in monitoring the implementation 
of the M & E design on site. Both individuals had been involved 
in its design, and were backed up by a staff of design engineers 
based at their offices. They each v ~ s i t e d d the site on average 
about once a week. There was no M & E Clerk of Works appointed 
to monitor directly that aspect of the work on site. It was 
reported that the M & E consultants held their own meetings on 
site with representatives of the (nominated) sub-contractors 
performing the work. 
As part of the Department's formal ~ r o c e d u r e s s for monitoring site 
activity, it was specified that Clerks of Works were not empowered 
to issue instructions to the main contractor, and that all 
instructions issued were to be done so in the form of architect's 
instructions drawn up by the Job Architect. A similar procedure 
operated in relation to instructions issued concerning the M & E 
works. The Project Manager's approval was needed before instructions 
were issued involving variations to the work that had financial 
implications and which involved spending funds earmarked for 
contingencies and additional work. 
The main formal forum for monitoring progress on the job was a 
fortnightly contract meeting that was held on site. It was 
attended by the Job Architect (who chaired the meeting), the Project 
Manager, Clerk of Works and Surveyor on behalf of the client, and 
the Contracts Manager and General Foreman (earlier the Agent) on 
behalf of the main contractor. The items on the agenda included 
a report by the main contractor on progress in relation to the 
overall plan for completion; contractors' requests for detailed 
design information; design and construction details of (nominated) 
sub-contractors and suppliers work; and general matters raised 
stemming from the design team members' and Clerk of Works' 
inspection of the works. The details of the meeting were minuted 
and distributed to those attending, to the M & E consultants and 
to more senior (head office) staff from the Architect's Department 
and County Council. 
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~ . 9 9 Performance on the NSS Project 
As noted in Chapter S above, at the time of the first visit 
to the site, the project was approximately 75% complete, in terms of 
the programme of work. The external work, apart from landscaping, 
was finished; the structural work was complete; and most of the 
services had been installed. Most of the work that remained was in 
the finishing trades and the installation of fixtures and fittings. 
Consequently, at that stage the project was 'running down' to 
completion, although the participants mentioned above were still 
closely involved in its management. According to both client's 
and contractor's staff, the project was running approximately a 
month late. In terms of its budget, the Project Manager reported 
that the job was within the budget established by the client although 
most of the contingency fund set aside for variations and additional 
work had been used up in paying for design alterations. 
It was in this latter aspect of the performance of work on 
site - namely, the establishment of a detailed design for the works 
and changes in it during the course of construction - that received 
prominence in the retrospective accounts given by those involved 
of performance on the NSS project. In the opinion of those involved 
from both client and contractor's teams, the job had been "untypical" 
(in relation to previous Council projects) in the extent to which 
detailed working drawings and.design information had been unavailable 
for the early stages of construction, and also in the extent to which 
changes had occurred in the design during the actual course of 
construction. The Job Architect, for instance, reported that at the 
beginning only a small proportion of the working drawings needed were 
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available, since the period to prepare them had been short and a 
great deal of information had been r e ~ u i r e d d at the billing stage, 
which put pressure upon the designers and draughtspeople. He also 
reported that a significant proportion of the work had been originally 
billed as provisional sum items, and noted that with a good number 
of variations having occurred in the work, the design team were still 
involved at a relatively late stage (ie up to and beyond the first 
visit) in preparing'detailed drawings and specifications and 
answering the contractor's requests for information. The same 
situation was reported by members of the main contractor's staff 
interviewed, who then went on to suggest that it had created 
significant problems for them in the construction of the work, and 
was a major contributory factor towards the delays experienced in 
the programme of work. The Contracts Manager, for instance, who 
reported that in his experience of working for the County Council 
and the Architect's Department this was an "untypical" situation, said: 
"we've had a constant problem with late information and delayed 
(design) decisions ••• on this job its difficult to get decisions 
made and you're always pushing for information". He and his staff 
commented upon the difficulties this had'created in holding back 
parts of the work on site and in hindering the process of placing 
supply orders in sufficient time to meet the programme of work drawn 
up. While agreeing that this had been' a problem faced by the main 
contractor, members of the design team at the same time pointed to 
the part played by the main contractor in managing the flow of 
design information between the parties. The Job Architect, for 
instance, suggested: "I don't think Steelframe are very good at 
planning ••• they don't seem to ask for information at the right 
time, and always seem to do it in a panic ••• (also they) tried to 
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do too much at the beginning". 
On the number of design variations that had occurred, the 
contractor's staff reported similar problems in the advance planning 
of work, and also occasions on which work· had had to be redone when 
decisions were eventually reached. In terms of the implications for 
the firm, the company Surveyor expressed the view that the architects 
were unappreciative of the volume of extra work involved when 
changes were introduced, and that the contractor was, as a consequence, 
"always pushing" for payment. In terms of the performance of work 
on site, the Contracts Manager described the implications of the 
changes to the work on the level of 'morale': "its been so bad 
that many of our men have wanted to be taken off the job ••• because 
they're fed up of doing work, and then having to do it again." 
To the Contracts Manager, the reason for there being delays in the 
issue of design information, and many changes as the work progressed 
lay in the lack of certainty on the part of the arChitectural design 
team. as to 'tfhat they actually wanted: "most of the bill was in 
provisional sums' because they (the architects) hadn't decided what 
they wanted". Similarly, and as a consequence, "there have been an 
enormous number of VO's (variations orders) caused by the architect 
changing his mind". Interestingly, the architectural Project 
Manager provided corroboration of these comments - albeit in a 
somewhat oblique fashion. Moreover, he stressed that the lack of 
understanding was rather on the part of the main contractor, and 
the substance of it a lack of appreciation of the problems of, and 
constraints upon, design: !I(the contractor) just doesn't seem to 
understand that its to be built the way I want it ••• they don't 
understand the problems of design - that I can't issue an order until 
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I know precisely what I want". This lack of understanding was 
manifested in the tendency to respond 'contractually': "if there's 
no order, then (Steelframe) immediately put in a claim" (Project 
Manager) • 
It should be noted at this point that the problems referred 
to centred mainly upon the work involved in the finishing trades 
(decoration, etc) and in the external landscaping. The main 
structural work and, in particular, the mechanical and electrical 
services work, it was generally agreed had 'gone well'. Some 
problems were noted, by both architectural and building staff as 
having occurred in controlling the quality of the services 
installed, and in co-ordinating the services components with the 
structural work . (the M & E 
consultants were not interviewed). Moreover, these problems were 
linked to some extent with the fact that the mechanical firm that 
was employed both installed the services and provided professional 
design services. The Job Architect, for instance, reported: "you're 
not sure who you're talking to - the subcontractor or the 
consultant". His view was that the situation tended to be 'used' 
by the firm in its dealings with the architectural team. Specifically 
that any 'snags' in the mechanical services design were either 
attributed as variations to the work for which the firm (as 
subcpntractors) demanded extra payment; or they were attributed by 
the firm (as consultant) to the lack of detail in the original 
brief or as a consequence of the work having been designed with 
a view to the budgetary constraints 'established for it - in whiCh 
case they demanded extra design fees to redesign the work. A similar 
view was held by the Project Manager, who suggested that the duality 
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of interest, coupled with only a broadly outlined initial specification 
for the M & E works, gave the firm (as consultants) little incentive 
to design to a "high quality" specification. This, he felt, was in 
order to make the work less complex (and less costly) for their 
builders. Any changes occurring on the basis of the architect's 
expressed dissatisfaction with the work as it was produced would then 
tend to be approached in the manner described above. This situation 
is of interest in itself, and will be returned to at a later stage. 
However, both Job Architect and Project Manager felt that the problem 
was not one that should be overstated in relation to the events that 
occurred during the course of the NSS project. In terms of the 
performance on the project overall, 'they, together with the contractor's 
staff felt that the performance of the mechanical subcontractor on 
the whole had been 'good', and that the services installation had 
created no real major difficulties during construction. 
The point to be emphasised here is that it was work related 
to the architectural side of the job - specifically in the finishes 
and landscaping - that had produced the difficulties described 
earlier, and the resultant recriminations directed by each party 
towards the other. The extent of the difficulties experienced in 
the relationship between the design and construction teams was 
indicated by the contractor's Surveyor. In describing the contractor's 
relationship with the subcontractors employed 'on the project as 
"gOOd", he then suggested that the main contractor and subcontractors 
had "united to fight the common foe". The underlying reasons that 
were given for this 'adversarial' state of affairs and the manner 
in which it was seen to have arisen, will be turned to next. 
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'J. 10 The NSS Project: A Case Analysis 
In describing the NSS project and the course of events during 
its construction, a good deal of emphasis was placed by all those 
interviewed upon how 'important' and 'prestigious' the project was. 
In its size and the nature of the work involved, the project was not 
considered unusual or untypical by any· of the parties. Yet there 
was general agreement that the project ~ ~ unusual, and that this 
was due to its status as a major new building project being under-
taken for a new client (the polytechnic). This was set in the 
context, described earlier, of a contraction in the capacity of the 
Architect's Department to design and manage Council projects, and 
the increasing tendency for the Council to contract out design 
services to private consultants. The implication of the importance 
of the project for the process of managing it was seen to be a 
significantly greater degree of centralised control exerted by more 
senior members of the architectural design team. The Job Architect, 
for instance, reported that: "there's more involvement at higher 
levels ••• nor.mally the Project Manager wouldn't need to visit the 
site". Similarly, but from the Contracts Manager's viewpoint, 
"the problem with this job is that basically there are too many 
fingers in the pie ••• usually all dealings we have would go through 
the architect on site (ie the Job Architect) ••• On this job too 
many. senior architects are involved". 
To. the main contractor's staff, the problems they had encountered 
in obtaining detailed design infor.mation and getting decisions made, 
were directly attributable to the greater degree of involvement at 
senior levels, and, in particular, to the influence the Project Manager 
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exerted over the continuing design process: "(the Job Architect) 
seems to live in meetings, and isn't given the time to do his work 
(on design detailing) ••• Information comes through very late 
because it all has to be approved by the Project Manager" (Contracts 
Manager). In their opinion, it was the tendency for the Project 
Manager not to delegate authority,to his staff coupled with a lack 
of understanding of the detailed operational conditions on site 
that was at the root o£ the problem. The Contracts Manager said, 
for instance: "The problem is that (the Project Manager) isn't 
really involved - he doesn't really understand what's going on 
(yet) he has a lot of control over the Job Architect ••• (who) 
... 
hasn't the authority to make decisions and keeps having to go back 
to the Project Manager for approval ••• (the Project Manager) 
interferes rather than gets involved and he doesn't delegate". To 
the Contracts Manager the Job Surveyor was "in the same boat", 
because "any cost implications have to go down the line for approval". 
In his view, the main manifestation of the problem was in the delays 
that occurred before design decisions - particularly those with cost 
implications - were given. In addition he described what he felt 
was the 'interference' of the Project Manager: "Because (the 
Project Manager) doesn't know fully what's happening, it causes 
problems ••• (because) he'll come down on site and disapprove of 
something, because he didn't expect it to come out like that ••• 
The problem then is getting information and instructions". He felt 
that this approach, coupled with the need to refer back for approval 
for decisions, put those most directly involved in the supervision 
of the work (the Job Architect, Surveyor and Clerk of Works) in a 
position of having to "cover themselves". The view was shared by 
the contractor's Surveyor, who directed attention towards the 
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tendency for members of the team not to commit themselves to 
decisions : "The architects are very unwilling to commit themselves 
and accept responsibility ••• (they) don't put anything down in 
writing; don't issue AI's till its too late; ••• (they) even omit 
items discussed and agreed in (contract) meetings ••• (they) 
continually refer back". A similar degree of caution in decision-
making relating to the centralised control of the client's team was 
identified by the Contracts Manager in their direct dealings on site 
with the Clerk of Works: "(The Clerk of Works is) experienced and 
knows that we're often right ••• (but) he hasn't the authority to 
decide, or the power to stand up to the architect and tell him he's 
wrong ••• He has to cover himself ••• he can only say 'I can't 
accept that' or 'I've got to reject that' ••• he can't make 
suggestions". From the main contractor's perspective then the. 
problems they faced in obtaining information and decisions were a 
direct consequence of the level of control exercised over the running 
of the project from higher levels within the design organisation. 
However, to both the Contracts Manager and Surveyor it was the 
internal political context within the department as a whole, and 
the significance of the NSS project in relation to that, that 
formed the backdrop against which these interpretations were drawn, 
and the underlying reasons for why this situation had arisen. These 
latter points will be returned to shortly. At this point an 
a d d i t i o n a ~ ~ feature to note is that the situation was one in whiCh 
the main contractor's more senior management were drawn into the 
detailed management of the project. As noted earlier the original 
Site Agent had left the project at an early stage, although no 
indication was given whether this was related or not to the 
circumstances described above. It was noted that the Contracts 
Manager was visiting the' site at that stage on an almost daily 
basis and, according to the account given by the representative of 
a subcontracting firm eInJ;>loyed on the proj ect " was acting as "the 
decision-maker on site", and had "tended to take over the job". The 
point to be made here is simply that the problems that occurred were 
associated with an 'escalation' in the level of interaction at 
which they were dealt with on both sides. The level at which 
decisions were reached on both sides was higher than that originally 
expected. Rather than the bulk of decisions being taken at site 
level and involving the Job Architect and Site Agent, the situation 
had developed into one in which the Project Manager/Contracts 
Manager level was the focus of decision-making activity on the project. 
It was also interesting to note the strategy adopted by the Contracts 
Manager in dealing with the extant situation. He reported that, 
as a reaction to the problems faced on site, he had taken recourse 
to 'by-passing' the levels within the design team which he felt 
were causing the problems: "The situation was getting so serious 
that in the end I had to go to the County Architect ••• about a 
month ago". In his'view, this had helped to ease the situation: 
"I haven't seen much of the Project Manager or senior architect 
since". 
It should be stressed at this point that the contractor's 
p e r c ~ p t i o n n that the client's team were to a significant degree 
operating with their 'hands tied' was not completely shared by 
members of that team. While it was agreed that the job, because 
it was 'important', had meant a greater level of involvement of 
senior staff, and both the Job Architect and Surveyor agreed that 
they frequently had to seek decisions and approval from above, this 
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was not specifically interpreted as a lack of autonomy or discretion, 
and was not given the same negative connotations as those given by 
the main contractor's staff. The Job Architect, for instance, 
stated that he was expected to report changes to the Project Manager, 
but had the authority to issue instructions and make decisions with 
the latter's "advice". "Approval" in a formal sense was not 
necessary for any changes that did not have cost implications. 
However, while pointing out that all information and instructions 
passed through him to the contractor, he did contrast the extant 
situation of a closer involvement by the Project Manager in dealings 
with the main contractor, with the expected situation in which he 
was the sole architect involved directly in monitoring the work. 
Moreover, the fact that there had been a sUbstantial number of 
variations with financial implications did accord with the 
contractor's perception that the Job Architect was more commonly in 
the position of having to seek "approval" rather than "advice" from 
higher levels. 
The position of the Clerk of Works was similarly set within 
the structural context of the Department. In particular, it was 
emphasised that the Clerk of Works did not operate like a "normal" 
clerk of works. That is, it was Departmental policy that the 
clerk's authority to issue any instructions to the main contractor 
( v i ~ ~ site works orders) was proscribed. According to the Job 
Architect, "he can talk to and advise the Site Agent unofficially 
and does so ••• but he can't instruct". While the contractor's 
staff recognised this restriction, the frustration they expressed 
at its impact on the current circumstances was made evident in the 
earlier comment. The implicit suggestion in that comment, that the 
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Clerk of Works was not in a position where he could 'assist' the 
contractor, compares interestingly when juxtaposed with a statement 
given by the senior architect within the department concerning the 
rationale generally for'this formal limitation on the clerk of 
works' authority: "(they) become too much part of the contractor's team 
- we don't want to pay clerks of works to cover the foreman's 
mistakes". Taken together, these comments again point to the 
somewhat precarious position of clerks of works, and also to a 
resree of wariness on the department's part of main contractors' 
intentions. These issues will be returned to in more detail in the 
later analysis. The'point to be made at this stage, however, is 
that while it was considered by members of the design team to be 
'unusual' for there to be a greater degree of involvement at higher 
levels, it was not necessarily considered inappropriate, given the 
importance of the job and the nature of the design for it. What 
was considered by the contractor's staff to be an excessive and 
inappropriate degree of control exerted by the Project Manager in 
the running of the job was not considered by the design staff to be 
inconsistent with the formal mechanisms established for the super-
vision of jObs in,seneral. In other words, there was a basic 
disagreement between the parties on the way in which a project such 
as the NSS ,should have been approached. 
• The source of this disagreement in many ways reflected 
differential perceptions of the objectives set for the work. The 
discussion so far has concentrated rather more upon the perceived 
organisational and inter-organisational consequences of the job 
being an 'important' and 'prestigious' one, without considering the 
impact that this factor had upon the objectives - particularly in 
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relation to 'quality' and 'cost' - that were to be achieved. In 
describing the nature of the NSS project, the architectural staff -
and the Project Manager in particular - emphasised that it was 
'a quality job'. The Project Manager stressed the department's 
"reputation for good quality architecture" for which they had 
formerly won awards, and emphasised that "its our aim to make' sure 
the quality is right"- this he stressed in describing specifically 
the landscaping work on the project. Focusing upon the same 
aspect of the job, however, the contractor's viewpoint differed 
radically: "too much money is being spent on landscaping which 
isn't necessary ••• the'root of the problem is that the architect 
is after an award; its a prestige jobU (contractor's Surveyor). 
As was noted earlier, it was in the landscaping and finishes work 
on the project - the more 'aesthetic' parts of the job - that the 
main problems were perceived to have arisen. From the point of view 
of the Project Manager his job was to ensure that the quality 
standards he had set for the work (and was setting during the 
on-going design) were adhered to. From the point of view of the 
contractor's staff, however, these standards were too high given 
the budget for the project. The Contracts Manager, for instance, 
stressed the contradiction between the emphasis on a high quality 
job, and the financial constraints upon the project: "they greatly 
overspent in the early stages, because they didn't accept the 
quality that the low prices allowed for •• t' (the Project Manager) 
is trying to get a high quality job from a budget that doesn't 
allow for it ••• its very difficult to convince them that if they 
want that quality, they've got to pay for it". The contractor's 
staff allied what they felt was too Iowa budget tor the quality of 
work the designers'were seeking to achieve, with the 'strict' 
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control exerted within the authority over expenditure on council 
projects to suggest that this helped'to explain both the more 
centralised control exerted in the running of'the job, as well as 
the delays and 'indecisions' that characterised the continuing 
design process. 
It is interesting to note, however, how this perspective on 
the financial' constraints on the project diverged with that given 
by members of the architectural team. The Project Manager, when 
asked, made no explicit reference to 'strict' budgetary control 
being exercised over the project, except to suggest that while 
he had the authority to, 'allocate' funds across the project, any 
increases ,in the budget would require treasury approval. Instead, 
he suggested that given the quality standards set for the work, 
the onus was upon the contractor, having accepted the job at the 
contract price, to achieve these. A similar point was made by the 
department's senior architect. In referring explicitly to the 
"tight control" maintained over project expenditure in general, 
and to it being directly the responsibility of the Project Manager 
to monitor cost to ensure the project broke even or made a profit, 
he stated that a main reason for this was to put the responsibility 
for quality directly onto the main contractor. In other words, 
given the budget for the job and an agreed contract price, it was 
the contractor's job to make sure that the spec'ification was met 
within these targets. The point to be made here, however, was 
that it was in the nature of the ,original specification - namely, 
the fact that the design was incomplete and involved later changes -' 
that the scope for debate about the inconsistency of cost and 
quality objectives arose. To the architectural staff, given the 
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contractual position, budgetary constraints were not inconsistent 
with the standard of work they sought to achieve. To the main 
contractor they were. 
While the accounts given differ sharply in their perception 
of the relationship between cost and quality objectives for the work 
on the NSS project, it was generally agreed that the aim of the 
department was to produce a high quality, low cost job for an 
important new client. If credence can be given to the main 
contractor's reading of the situation, then it suggests that the 
design' team were in somewhat of a dilemma. If the 'political'climate' 
within the authority was such that the longer-term survival of the 
department,was indeed in doubt, and if success on the NSS project 
was a means to help ensure.the continued existence of a full 
in-house professional design capability, then success rested upon 
reconciling a set of objectives that were not necessarily fully 
compatible. On the one hand, producing a 'high quality job' would 
satisfy the client making future orders more likely' and generally 
serve to enhance the department.' s 'reputation'; on the other hand, 
the design team were required to·exercise 'strict' control over 
expenditure on the project - this in a situation in which the 
budget set for the work may already have limited the options 
available. 
If this was the case, then it is perhaps not difficult to 
see how this might have resulted in what was interpreted as a 
greater degree of control exerted over the continuing design process 
or 'interference' on the one hand, and uncertainty or 'indecision' 
on the other. As the individual with overall responsibility both 
for the conceptualisation of the design, and for controlling project 
expenditure, the Project Manager may have been in a particularly 
acute position. The need to make sure that quality was kept high 
and cost kept low might well explain both the'reported tendency 
to exert more direct influence over the work on site, as well as 
the reported tendency not' to make firm and'fast detailed design 
decisions. In other words, rather than the Project Manager 'not 
knowing what he wanted' it might rather more have been the case of 
'not knowing how to achieve what he wanted, given the financial 
constraints'. The points made earlier concerning the structure of 
relationships within the team then suggest that the formal 
mechanisms existed whereby a greater degree of centralised control 
could be exerted over members, of the client's supervising staff 
with the results described earlier. It has been mentioned several 
times that the project was not considered 'typical' in this respect. 
Yet the fact that all members of the client's project team (with' 
the exception of external consultants) came under the direct and 
full jurisdiction of the architectural Project' Manager in their 
involvement as members of the project team was a long-standing 
structural characteristic of the department as a whole. Similarly, 
the formal restrictions placed upon the'Clerk of Works' authority 
to issue instructions. Consequently, there was no difference 
between the formal structure established for supervising work on 
the NSS project and how projects had been managed in the past. 
The implication is that it was the circumstances associated with the 
project which, in a sense, 'activated' these mechanisms to produce a 
high degree of centralised control within the 'client's team that 
was latent in the structure established within the department for 
the management of projects. An additional effect made implicit in 
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the earlier comments concerning the tendency for members of the team 
to 'cover themselves' was the greater degree of formality it 
generated in both their internal and external dealings. 
The effect of these circumstances on the relationship between 
the client's team and the main contractor was made quite clear in 
the earlier comments. In particular the comments suggest a much 
more 'contractual' approach by both parties towards one another 
under the circumstances. The "us versus them attitude" that the 
Contracts Manager suggested informed the Project Manager's approach 
to them was countered by the main contractor uniting with their 
subcontractors "to fight the common foe". At the same time, 
however, there was explicit reference given to the belief that the 
'combatants' were not evenly matched. The contractor's Surveyor 
for instance pointed to the effects that delays caused by rework 
and late information had upon tying ,down the insurance bond taken 
out to cover the work and upon the firm's resources, and suggested 
that the cash-flow implications for a firm the size of Steelframe 
were particularly acute. In addition he felt that a firm of that 
size was disadvantaged since it lacked the legal departmental 
backup that would be available to larger contractors. In his 
opinion, larger firms would also have , not taken up the'job in the 
first place, because the design was in "such broad detail". He 
felt. that as a small, 'local' contractor. dependent upon the council 
for work, Steelframe did not have this option. In effect the 
suggestion was that it was the main contractor (or their 
subcontractors) which had borne the 'costs' associated with the 
attempts made to reconcile the ~ e t t of conflicting objectiVes 
pursued on the project, and that their position - as a small 
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contractor dependent upon the council for work, and for whom this was 
a major project - made them relatively powerless to influence the 
eventual outcome in this respect. The Surveyor certainly reported 
that the job had not been profitable from the firm's point of view. 
The level of dissatisfaction expressed in earlier comments similarly 
points to this conclusion. It is perhaps not at all surprising to 
find that the contractor's staff would be dissatisfied at the lack 
of profitability on the job, and tend to attribute the problems 
they experienced to the design team. However, what was noticeable 
was the stark contrast they drew in these respects between their 
previous experience of working with the council and the department, 
and their experience on the NSS project. Moreover, the interpret-
ation given above - of the. builders bearing the brunt of the costs -
appears to be consistent with the views of members of the design 
team noted earlier: that the onus was upon the main contractor 
to perform to the quality standards established. What is being 
suggested here is that the a c h i e v ~ m e n t t of contradictory objectives 
on the NSS project was contingent upon diverting as much as 
possible of the 'pressure' they created elsewhere. The main 
contractor - as a small, dependent firm in contractually the less 
powerful position - was the recipient of the effects. 
It is important to stress that much of the foregoing 
interpretation rests on the assumption of a basic conflict between 
the cost and quality objectives pursued on the project. Further, 
that this assumption is based most directly upon the accounts 
given by members of the main contractor's staff on the project, and 
drawn rather more inferentially from the a c c o u n t s · ~ v e n b y y members 
of the design team. The importance of both sets of objectives was 
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stressed by members of the design team interviewed. However, any 
perceived contradiction between the two was not directly articulated. 
What were clearly articulated, however, were the respective stances 
taken on the pursuit of these objectives: from the designer's 
viewpoint, given the budget and contract price submitted by the 
contractor for the job, their job was to ensure that the job was 
built as they intended; from the contractor's viewpoint, the 
design intentions were incompatible with the budget available for 
the job. The problem was centred around the fact that the design 
for the work was initially incomplete: by the time work had 
reached the stage at which the 'quality' objective became paramount 
(in the finishes and landscaping), the financial constraints were 
looming large. It was in attributing the responsibility for 
achieving the performance levels in relation to the design 
specification for the work that the opinions of the two parties 
diverged. 
(Finally and as a postscript to the accounts given of events on 
phase one of the NSS development, it should be reported that Steelframe 
tendered unsuccessfully for the second phase of the development, 
valued at £1 million. The contract was awarded to the firm with the 
lowest tender which was reported as being £2000 lower than the 
bid submitted by Steelframe. It was also reported that 7.5% of the 
v a l ~ e e of the contract had been set aside as provisional sums, and 
that twelve drawings were available for tendering for the work.) 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CASE STUDY: The Praduct Develapment Labaratary (PDt) 
10. 1 • The Praject, Client and Cantext 
This praject invalved the canstructian af a new building which 
was to. serve as a new praducts develapment labaratary for a large, 
private sec tar industrial client which specialised in the manufacture 
and retailing af pharmaceutical products. The building was to. be 
three stareys high, and measure 70 x 30 metres in area, yielding a 
floar space af 5800 m2 to. be used. far apen-plan labaratary areas and 
office raams. In additian, the wark was to. invalve the constructian 
of a small ancillary services building adjacent to it. The site far 
the PDL was to be an an area of previausly unoccupied land within the 
perimeter af the campany's main manufacturing and head affice camplex. 
It wauld be sited clase to. existing factary, warehause and affice 
buildings within the camplex. The baundaries of the site itself 
were quite tightly drawn, reflecting the intention af preserving 
existing space and allawing far future passible new building develap-
ments in the immediate surraunding area. 
The building was a 'ane-aff' praject, intended to. replace 
inadequate eXisting facilities available far new praduct research 
and develapment. It wauld eventually house staff from thase 
. 
departments engaged in wark on three af the company's main praduct 
lines. Each of these departments had been allocated a separate 
flaar of the new building. Its accupatian, tagether with the 
installatian af furniture and specialised eqUipment, wauld accur 
only after full completian and final certification of the works. 
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While it was to be designed specifically to the briefs supplied 
by the three users departments, it was also to be des1gned with 
a view to providing multipurpose laboratory facilities that could 
be switched to other users 1n the event of future changes in 
company requirements (i.e. new product lines). 
The company, as client, was a large U.K.-based multinational 
~ o o
firm, which had an annual turnover in the region of £A million. 
Its size, and a corresponding high continual level of investment in 
building work made it a sizeable and experienced private sector 
client. rts involvement in building ranged from the construction 
of new plant, warehousing, office and retail facilities, to the 
maintenance and renovation of its existing extensive industrial and 
retail stock. The PDL project itself was quite a sizeable one-off 
new capital investment, being initially budgeted at ~ 4 4 million to 
be spent over an 18 month construction period. It was one of t ~ e e largest 
current new bu1lding project being undertaken by the client in the 
U.K., and represented a substantial capital investment in new 
building work, albeit a somewhat. smaller fraction of the company's 
total level of annual capital expenditure. 
10.2. The Client's Representatives 
For the design and overall management of work on the PDL 
project, the company made use of its own directly-employed, 
architectural and (structural) engineering staff. They were based 
within the company's Design Division, which was headed overall by 
a Chief Architect who reported directly to the Board of the company. 
The Division was relatively small, employing approximately 30 
architects, structural engineers, technicians and clerical staff. 
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Its staff were mainly involved in the design and supervision of 
contracts for the new building, maintenance and refurbishment of 
the company's retail outlets. Larger-scale 'industrial' projects 
such as the PDL, had formerly been designed and managed by external 
private consultants employed by the firm. This was the first 
project of its type and size to be designed and managed in-house. 
It therefore represented something of a departure from the more 
'routine' side of the Division's work, particularly given the 
intended specialised function of the building as a laboratory. It 
was also a sizeable venture, in relation to the volume of turnover 
on building work that was m ~ n a g e d d by the Division. Indeed, it was 
the largest single project currently being undertaken in-house, and 
involved a substantial level of committment of the Division's 
resources. This was reflected in the fact that, during the course 
of the PDL project, up to about half of the department's staff were 
directly involved in the project - the remainder of the staff being 
employed on the company's continuing retail projects. According to 
senior architectural staff ~ h e e project was therefore of some 
importance to the Division: it was the first of its kind that the 
client had decided to undertake in-house, and success on the project 
would increase the likelihood of the client again using in-house 
facilities for the design and management of futUre major industrial 
projects. 
In addition to its own design staff, the company contracted 
. 
two firms of private consuLtants : one to provide mechanical and 
electrical design services (the M & E); the other to provide surveying 
services (the POS). The former was to be involved in the detailed 
design for, and supervision of, the services installation for the 
project; the latter was to be involved in the initial costings for 
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the project, the drawing-up of contractual documents, the tendering 
process and the rinancial monitoring,and evaluation of work on site. 
Both firms of consultants operated from local branches of larger, 
national practices. Their experience of working for the company as a 
client was extensive, and senior representatives of both firms 
reported that the client was a significant and continual source of 
work locally. The M & E consultancy, for instance, had been involved 
in the design and construction of the company's original central 
complex some 50 years previously. The pas had established its own 
section to deal with major builders and clients with whom they had a 
continuing working relationship over time. This included the current 
client company. 
10.3. The Main Contractor 
The main contract for the construction of the PDL works was let, 
under a management rorm or contract (see below), to Hardcore Contractors 
Ltd - a private company, registered as a 'general building contractor'. 
The company was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hardcore Holdings Ltd, 
which in turn was owned by a large parent company involved in 
international transportation. The holding company owned a number of 
separate firms involved in construction and related activities (e.g. 
civil engineering, construction plant, (speculative) housing). 
Hardcore Contractors in turn owned four trading and non-trading 
subsIdiaries involved in specialist activities at horne and general 
construction management abroad. The company was a large contractor 
which operated nationally, and whose head orrice was located some 
120 miles rrom the PDL site. It employed some 2500 staff in total, 
and in the accounting year that fell between the start and finish 
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dates of the PDL project its fixed assets stood at around £600,000 
and its net current assets at £5.5 million. Its annual turnover 
approximated £150 million, which compared with a figure of £100 
million for the previous year. In both years its pretax profit, 
expressed as a proportion of turnover, stood at around 3%. 
As a company, Hardcore Contractors Ltd specialised in under-
taking work under 'fee' and 'management-only' forms of building 
contract. The essential differences between these and the other, 
more traditional, forms of contracting arrangement, lie in the 
nature of the role performed by the main contractor during both 
design and construction stages, and in the form and manner of payment 
(see, for instance, Co.-.. te..r \ ~ . , 2 . . . ). Specifically, the main 
contractor is paid a fee which is a negotiated percentage of the 
value of the main contract. For this, the contractor is involved 
more intensively in the design and planning processes than would be 
expected under traditional tendering arrangements. During construction, 
the role of the main contractor consists essentially of co-ordinating 
and controlling the work, the majority of which is subcontracted. In 
the case of management-only contracts, of which the PDL was an example, 
this extends to the whole of the work - which is completely 
subcontracted. In other words, the function performed by the main 
contractor is purely managerial, for which the contractor is paid a 
fee in much the same way as consultants are paid a fee for providing 
professional design services. Consequently, the main contractor in 
. 
effect becomes a member of the client's team on the project, and is 
not involved directly in the performance of the actual work on site. 
The manner of operation of this form of arrangement will be 
returned to and discussed in fuller detail below. The paint here is 
that the company had had considerable years' experience of operating 
exclusively these distinctive forms of contract, although the full 
switch away from a more traditional approach within the group as a 
whole and the development, in particular, of a management-only form 
had occurred only within the previous decade. The development of 
the firm's specialism in these areas had been linked with the 
association of the company with one major private sector retailing 
client which had at one time accounted for nearly the entire turnover 
of the company, and which currently still accounted for some 20% of 
the company's turnover. Apart from the work commissioned by this one 
particular client, the range of projects undertaken by Hardcore 
tended to reflect the type of work where the cost associated with 
the management fee was liable to be offset against the perceived 
advantages of the system in allowing for' fas.t-track' construction 
and the co-ordination of work on site. That 
is, the projects tended to be large-scale, 'one-off' and complex 
projects. 
Work on the PDL project was of this type, although it was not 
so large as many of the projects the firm had undertaken, and 
represented only a relatively small proportion of the company's 
annual turnover at the time. However, it was also the first contract 
that the company had been awarded by this particular client, and 
consequently provided the opportunity for the firm to add another 
large scale client to its list. Senior managers within the firm 
• 
reported that the project was therefore important in enabling the 
. 
company to secure follow-up retail and industrial projects 
commissioned by the client company in the future. 
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10 .4. The Design Process and Design Organisation 
The design process for the PDL project had involved the 
preparation of outline design proposals and preliminary costings on 
the basis of the briefs supplied by the three user departments, their 
briefs having been agreed by the company. The outline proposal was 
prepared by architects and engineering staff in the Design Division 
in conjunction with the P ~ S , , who had by that stage been appointed by 
the company. These proposals were approved by the Board of the 
company approximately 15 months before work was due to start on site. 
Following their approval, which set the value of the contract at 
£4 million (plus inflation) to be built over a 78 week construction 
period, the in-house design staff, together with the M & E consultant 
and POS were involved in the establishment of a detailed design for 
the works and the preparation of documentation for tendering (bill 
of quantit1es, spec1fication, working drawings) respectively. It 
should be noted that, at about this stage, the decision had been made 
by the company to opt for the appointment of a management contractor, 
rather than to use a 'traditional' contracting arrangement. This 
point is returned to in more detail below. 
The structure established for the management of the PDL project 
followed the normal practice of the Design Division in their management 
of projects. At the sarne time, senior staff reported that the scale 
and nature of the work implied a somewhat greater level of staff 
invoIvement and committment of resources, than characterised work on 
other more standard (and usually retail) projects that were undertaken. 
The Division as a whole comprised two main sections - Architecture 
and (structural) Engineering - which contained groups of staff, around 
half of whom for each department specialised in the company's 
industrial work, of which the PDL was the single largest current 
source. The management of the POL, like other projects, was 
delegated to a senior architect who was appointed as Project Manager, 
and who reported directly to the senior executive of the Division who 
was the Chief Architect. The Project Manager appointed from his own 
team a Job Architect, who was involved in the broad and detailed 
design for the project, and subsequently in the detailed supervision 
of work on site. Both individuals were to supervise work on the 
project through its design and construction stage. Working for them 
was a team of junior architects and technicians from their own group 
within the d e p a r t ~ e n t , , who prepared details and working drawings, etc. 
The role of the Project Manager extended to the co-ordination of 
aspects of the design and "liaison" with the consultants hired for 
the project. 
Staff from the engineering section within the Division worked 
collaterally with the architectural team, providing detailed designs 
for the basic structure of the building on the basis of the agreed 
design proposal •. Their main representative on the project team was 
a senior engineer, who in effect acted as an internal "consultant", 
and was involved in the POL project through both its design and 
construction stages. The Engineers' own staff consisted of design 
engineers and technicians who had 1:een seconded from wi thin his own 
deSign group to the project. 
10.5. Characteristics of the Design 
As noted earlier, the POL project, and consequently the design 
of the building, constituted very much a 'one-off' undertaking. The 
project was therefore custom-designed, rather than involving the use 
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of a standard overall design. The actual structure of the building 
itself was to consist of a reinforced concrete frame, built in situ, 
externally clad with precast panels. Internally, there were to be 
two main stairwells and a central lift shaft. Offices were to be 
constructed of internal b1ockwork with plaster and paint finishes, 
and the laboratory areas were to be left open-plan. Externally, the 
work involved the construction of a small ancillary service building, 
the laying of access roads, a small car park and general landscaping 
of the immediate surrounding area. The types of materials and the 
methods of building to be used for the broad structure of the building 
were to be relatively familiar. 
On the other hand, the major design feature of the POL project, 
was the intensity and nature of the services work that was involved. 
The function of the building as a laboratory meant that work would 
involve special features (such as glass drainage), and the installation 
of laboratory-specific fixtures and fittings (e.g. fume cupboards, 
lab. benches). There was also a corresponding increase in the volume 
of mechanical and electrical s e r v i ~ e s s work to be installed, which 
was coupled with the already extensive mechanical, electrical, 
heating and ventilation systems associated with the operation of a 
fully air-conditioned building of this type and scale. These services 
were to be contained mainly within a suspended ceiling. Consequently, 
the project was complex, in terms of the design for the M & E works, 
their integration with the main structure of t ~ e e ~ u i l d i n p , , and 
. 
the more unusual characteristics of some of the materials and methods 
of building that were to be employed. An emphaSiS, therefore was put 
upon the M & E design, and its co-ordination with the structural 
design for the works. It was noted that, as well as being employed 
to design the M & E works, the consultant was paid an additional fee 
for providing extensive and detailed mechanical and electrical 
services co-ordination drawings for the project. This was regarded, 
by both the consultant and senior architectural staff, as an important 
element of the design process for the PDL project, and one which 
ultimately facilitated the integration of mechanical and electrical 
engineering services design, particularly given the relatively short 
programme for the construction of the works as a whole. The design 
for the PDL project was by no means complete by the time that work 
was due to start on site. Consequently, there would be a degree of 
design 'overlap' into the construction stage, particularly in respect 
of the services work, where the detailed design work would depend 
upon the details and drawings supplied by nominated subcontractors 
that had been appointed. While 12 months had been allowed for the 
establishment of a full and detailed design following the approval 
of the proposal, in the event a significant change in direction 
occurred towards the latter stages of this period, which had important 
implications for the design process and the subsequent construction of 
the job. Specifically, after the main contractor had been appointed 
(see below), and with about only one month to go in the lead up into 
construction, the Board cut the budget allocated for the project by 
£250,000 (or about 6% of its total estimated cost). The reasons for 
this decision were not made clear by the respondents. However, its 
implications were made clear, and corroborated by all parties. 
Namely, the cut in the budget forced a reappraisal of certain aspects 
. 
of the design of the building, and put pressure upon the architectural 
and engineering staff to produce the design on time as planned. 
According to senior staff from all parties, there was a 'change in 
the direction of the design' at that point to accommodate the reduction 
in the budgeted funds available. The main contractor, it was agreed, 
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had not been appointed sufficiently early enough during the design 
process for the full 'benefits' of their input into the design to 
be realised. However, with the cut in the budget, their involvement 
in the design process became more intensive. A specific example of 
this, which also suggests the significance of the change, was the 
redesign of the drainage system for the building. Specifically, 
the original plan had been to install a 'standard' system that was 
external to the building. The revised plan allowed for the 
c o n s t ~ J c t i o n n of a central 'undercroft' within the foundations of 
the building to house the drainage system together with some of the 
services cabling and ductwork. 
The point to be emphasised here is that any 'overlap' that 
would have occurred between the design and construction stages of 
the project was extended by changes in the design that were 
effected at this stage by the decision to reduce the budget. 
Pressure was put upon the design team to prepare plans for construc-
tion, and, as will be seen, information that was needed was often 
late. Additionally, the changes that occurred increased the 
likelihood of variations to the design occurring during construction, 
a factor likely to compound the number of variations and alterations 
that were already expected to occur given the intensity and complexity 
of the services work involved. More generally, the change in the 
context of an already 'tight' programme for .construction would make 
the co-ordination of work on site no less difficult. 
10.6. Tendering and the Main Contract 
The tendering procedure for the award of the main contract for 
the PDL project was somewhat distinct from the procedures described 
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in the other four cases in the sample. According to the PCS and 
senior staff within the client's Design Division, the original 
intention had been to let the main contract under standard (JeT) 
terms and conditions. The decision to employ a management 
contractor instead had occurred only after approval of the outline 
design proposals and project costings had been given by the 
company's Board. The reason was given as the 'tightness' of the 
programme for construction, which had been set ~ t t 18 months: it 
was felt that employing a management contractor would be the only 
way in which the established programme dates could realistically be 
met. According to the same informants, it had been the company 
Board which had initiated this change. The tendering procedure had 
then involved the negotiation, by the P C ~ ~ of the contract with 
Hardcore Contractors, on the basis of the initial estimate of the 
work prepared by the PCS and a finalised design proposal. This 
process occurred some 4 - 5 months prior to the actual start date 
on site, and Hardcore were formally appointed about four nonths before 
construction was due to start. 
The estimated and negotiated cost of the project at this stage 
was established at £4.5 million, which included a 5.5% management 
fee for the main contractor. (The cut in the budget described above 
made the value of the contract £4 million.) The period for 
construction of work remained at 78 weeks (November to April). 
The contract was let under Hardcore's own form of contract, and 
included these terms and conditions, together with the bill of 
quantities, specification and working drawings (both those already 
issued, and those to be issued during construction). The work was 
to be evaluated, and the issue of interim certificates and payment 
to subcontractors to be made, on a monthly basis, with a 3% retention 
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withheld. Provisional sums, totalling about 3% of the value of the 
works had been set aside in the bill for contingencies and additional 
work. The damages for delay (for which the main contractor was still 
liable under a management contract) were set at £5000 per week. The 
period allowed for final evaluation, certificate and payment to the 
contractor was six months after completion on site. The defects 
liability period for the whole works was 12 months. 
Because the main contract was let under a management form of 
contract, the work that was to be done on site was undertaken entirely 
by subcontracting firms. Further, each subcontractor was nominated 
for each trade (e.g. joinery, cladding, etc.), a 'package' of 
contractual documents, comprising a bill of quantities, specification, 
outline drawings, planned start and finish dates, a method statement 
and terms and conditions of contract were to be drawn up by the POS 
and main contractor. For each 'package', six firms would be selected 
to tender a price, and a recommendation would be made to the client's 
representatives on the basis of the prices submitted and details of 
interviews held by the main contractor with prospective bidders. 
Subject to their approval, the subcontractor would be appointed. 
For the POL project, approximately 40 separate subcontractors were 
to be appointed to perform 40. 'packages' of work. The form of 
contract under which they were employed was the standard (JeT, 
'green' form) set of general terms and conditions of subcontract, 
which had been substantially amended to fit in with the requirements 
. 
for a management-run job. The point to be made here is that the 
'package' system of subcontracting on a management contract project 
meant the establishment of a large number of separate sets of 
documents for each nominated subcontractor, and an emphasis upon 
the individual subcontractor's distinctive role under a management 
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form of contract. This point will be elaborated and explored in 
more detail below. In relation to the earlier discussion of the 
cut in the budget and the design changes that were made, it meant 
that the establishment of a full set of documents for the trades 
involved had to take account of these changes. Consequently, the 
already large quantity of paperwork associated with the establish-
ment of a detailed 'package' for each trade, was added to by 
amendments and alterations to the design and specification in some 
instances (e.g. the specification for the groundworks following on 
from the change from an external to internal drainage system, as 
quoted above). 
The programme of work established by the main contractor 
during the tendering process and the negotiation of the main contract, 
allowed for the completion of the work within the contractualY-
specified period of 78 weeks. The broad plan for the works involved 
the 'building up' of the main structure, after which the internal 
structural work and finishing work would take place siMtutaneously 
within the building. The services work would carry through from the 
earliest stages of the building of the main structure, through to 
full completion. The relatively short period allowed for construction 
would place a particular emphasis upon the co-ordination and 
sequencing of the main services and finishing trades (e.g. plumbing, 
electrics, plastering, decoration) during the latter half of 
construction. Individual subcontractors' programmes of work 
(including expected start and finish dates, duration and sequencing 
of their different activities) were specified in the documentation 
sent out to firms that were tendering for the job. The 'tightness' 
of the programme would mean that there would be little room for 
manOeuvre in the scheduling and phasing in of subcontractors' work on site. 
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A fuller discussion of these aspects related to the sequencing of 
phasing of work within the overall programme will be returned to 
later. 
I C. 7 • The Main Contractor's Site Team 
A full-time resident site team were appointed to the PDL project 
to manage the work on behalf of the main, managing contractor. The 
firm's senior representative supervising the construction of the work 
was a Site Agent, who reported directly to a Contracts Manager who 
visited the site on a weekly basis (on average), and who was also 
currently supervising work on four other company projects in the 
region. The site team consisted of production, technical and 
administrative staff as illustrated below (Figure to.1). Of that 
team, it was noted that one of the General Foremen was in fact 
"between jobs", and left the project at an early stage, having been 
transferred to another company site locally. The Site Engineer's 
involvement in the project similarly ended, with the completion of 
the main structural work about half-way through the construction 
period. All the staff involved on the product1on/engineering side 
of the job had been transferred in from other company sites and, with 
these two exceptions, were to be employed for the full duration of 
the project. It was noted that their secondment to the project had 
followed on from internal interviews conducted by head office 
Contracts Department staff following the award of the main contract 
to Hardcore. The firm also employed directly a gang of (8) general 
labourers who were transferred from other company sites to undertake 
"general service" work on site, and to provide the subcontractors 
with 'attendances'. 
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The appointment of a Services Manager to the site team reflected 
the intensity of services work involved on the PDL project. His job 
was to co-ordinate and supervise the plans for, and installation of, 
the mechanical and electrical engineering services work. Consequently, 
there was a degree of role specialisation within the team according to 
the type of work that was involved on site : the services work, an 
important feature of the project, was separated out and designated 
the responsibility of a specific member of staff. 
The firm also employed two surveyors (OSs) on site. The 
assistant OS was employed full-time and for the duration of the 
contract, having been transferred in from another company site. The 
senior surveyor, however, was involved only part-time on the project, 
albeit for its full duration. He had been seconded from the 
contractor's head office, rather than being transferred from another 
site. According to the supervising Contracts Manager, the nature of 
the job as a management contract me art that the volume of work for the 
OS on site became much more extensive, and the role a much more 
important one. This was given the closer working relationsh1p that 
was expected to develop with the client's POS, and the volume of 
work associated with managing 40 detailed and separate subcontract 
'packages'. He described the relationship between the senior OS and 
the Site Agent on the construction side as one of "balanced authority", 
and himself as forming the 'cross-over point' between the two sides of 
the team. However, he also noted that his own involvement was much 
. 
more at a 'contractual' level in conjunction with the OS, and that 
the secondment of the senior surveyor from the head office made for 
a slight difference in "status" between the 'construction' and 
'contractual' sides of the team. 
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All of the staff mentioned had worked for the company for some 
time. However, it was only the Contracts Manager and Services 
Manager who had had any prior experience of management contracting 
as such. The rest of the staff had worked on the company's 
'management fee' contracts in the past, and had also had experience 
of working in more 'traditional' settings. However, they had not 
been involved in a project before where the main contractor had not 
performed any of the work directly. Their reaction to working under 
this form of arrangement was given in terms of the differences in the 
roles that they performed. The General Foreman, for instance, 
contrasted his role as planner and 'co-ordinator' of subcontractors' 
work with the more direct involvement in its supervision that would 
occur on a "normal" project. The Site Agent pointed to a similar 
distinction in his own role on the project. It was interesting to 
note that the Services Manager and Site Engineer - on the technical 
side - likened their own roles to those performed by client's 
supervisory staff on traditional contracts. The Services Manager 
described his own role as, to some extent, being very similar to 
that performed by an M & E Clerk of Works. The Site Engineer Similarly 
compared his role closely with that performed by a resident engineer's 
inspector on a 'normal' project. 
As a brief diversion, it 1s interesting to note the reactions of 
the staff to this type of arrangement. Generally, the staff on the 
production/technical side found working upon management contracts less 
. 
'satisfying'. A loss of identification with the work, and lack of 
control over it, were cited by the Site Agent, General Foreman and 
Site Engineer as reasons for this. The Site Agent additionally 
pOinted to the greater volume of paperwork on the job, and to the 
greater amount of time spent in the office, rather than out on site. 
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The General Foreman described his role on a management contract as 
"not very good for satisfaction". He felt "less involved" because 
the work was being done entirely by other firms. He described his 
job as "continually going to and fro" between the subcontract foreman 
and Clerk of Works, acting as a 'mediator', but without baving the 
power to be able to give instructions or take decisions without having 
to go back to the office for approval. He described this latter 
constraint as putting him in an often "embarrassing situation". An 
additional and related factor was identified by both the Site Agent 
and Contracts Manager - namely, the reduced flexibility the site staff 
generally had in being able to 'sort out problems' on site, since the 
contractor had very little working capital. The Contracts Manager 
coupled this lack of flexibility in being able to take action to 
expedite the work with the loss of direct control over the work to 
conclude " ••• on balance, it's marginally less satisfying". 
Given these views, it is interesting to compare them with those 
expressed by other staff. The views of the client's representatives 
are described below. To preempt that discussion, on balance, they 
appeared to find this form of arrangement more 'satisfying' than 
traditional forms. Interestingly, the contractors own surveyors 
appeared in favour : the assistant OS described it as "more 
satisfying" and related this to the closer contact he had with the 
subcontractors' own OSs and the PeE, and to the greater "team" 
relationship that existed with the POS. The senior OS echoed this 
latter view, and pointed to the more 'neutral' role of the contractor's 
OS in contrast to the 'adversary' relationship that eXisted under 
traditional forms. He described his job on a management contract in 
this respect as " ••• no less satisfying - certainly different". 
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10.8. The Client's S u p e ~ v i s i o n n
The w o ~ k k on site was supervised, on behalf of the client, by 
the P ~ o j e c t t Manager and Job Architect who had been involved in its 
design. They w e ~ e e based off-site, in the company's design office, 
and visited the site at relatively frequent and r e g u l a ~ ~ i n t e ~ v a l s . .
The Job A ~ c h i t e c t t was the m e m b e ~ ~ of the team who was most d i ~ e c t l y y
involved in the supervision of the w o ~ k k and visited the site some 
two or t h ~ e e e times a week on average. His involvement on the p ~ o j e c t t
was full-time both on site and in the design office. The Project 
Manager, who was not involved in the p ~ o j e c t t full-time, visited the 
site, on a v e ~ a g e , , fortnightly. A similar pattern of involvement in 
s u p e ~ v i s i o n n to that of the P ~ o j e c t t M a n a g e ~ ~ was u n d e ~ t a k e n n by the 
in-house s t r u c t u ~ a l l engineer representative d u ~ i n g g the first half of 
the p ~ o j e c t . . The individual involved was the same one who had been 
involved in o v e r s e e i n ~ ~ its design. 
To supervise the construction of the project on a day-to-day 
basis, a full-time resident Clerk of W o ~ k s s had been appointed, having 
been t ~ a n s f e ~ r e d d from another of the client company's building sites. 
The Clerk of Works was formally employed within the company's 'Works 
Division'. He had been seconded to the project team by management 
within that division "on request" by the Project Manager, His work 
on the PDL project then came under the direct jurisdiction of the 
Job Architect • 
• In addition to the in-house staff, individual representatives of 
each of the two consulting f i ~ s s (the M t E and PqS) were involved in 
supervising the job on a p a r t ~ t i m e e baSiS, involving visits to the 
slte on a fortnlghtly) basis. These representatives had been those 
involved in the pre-site design and planning stages, and their 
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supervision of the work was in each case backed up by staff working 
at their local offices. For the M & E consultant, for instance, it 
was reported that about four office staff (two each from the firm's 
electrical and mechanical services section) were involved full-time 
on the project throughout its course. The visiting consultant was 
an electrical services design engineer who was an associate of the 
practice. There was no Clerk of Works appointed to monitor the 
M & E works. Instead, as noted earlier, the contractor's Services 
Manager in effect performed this role. The structure of supervision 
of the client's representatives is illustrated below (Figurel o.2). 
None of the staff supervising the work on behalf of the client 
had formerly had any experience of working under a management form of 
contract. Their experience had only been of the more 'traditional' 
(i.e. JeT) type of arrangement. Consequently there was some lack of 
familiarity with the particular role requirements involved - a point 
that will be returned to in more detail below. Also, their reactions 
to working under this form of arrangement will be returned to 1n due 
course. However, in reference to the earlier .discussion concerning 
the reaction of the main contractor's staff, it is interesting to 
note that the Clerk of Works - the client's 'construction' representa-
tive - had similar reservations about the method as those expressed 
by the contractor's production and engineering staff. Indeed, he 
expressed a preference for the more traditional arrangement, based 
on the observation that the organisation of work on the PDL project 
made the job more 'fragmented', and made it more difficult for the 
team on site "to gel". These comments differ somewhat from the 
earlier comments reported and the reasons underlying them will be 
returned to later. However, the mterasting feature to notice here 
is the consistency of the reaction towards involvement u n d e ~ ~ a 
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The c1ient t s 'project management team' on the PDL project and re1ationship to 'head office' 
management form of contract : across the organisations involved, it 
was production staff who were less inclined to favour the form, 
whereas specialist, professional staff (i.e. architects, engineers 
and surveyors) found it a preferable way of working. 
The Organisation and Management of Work on Site 
\1'\ P r " ~ S < 2 . . t \ . ~ I ~ j j l:h.l.,S d q . h : ~ ~ tor ~ h ' , s s (.O.se:, full details 
of the process of management involved on the PDL project (as with 
earlier case studies) will not be reported here, due to the 
similarity of many of the basic functions of management involved 
on site between the case studies. Instead, the more salient 
characteristics of the work involved on the PDL contract will be 
highlighted in relation to the organisation and management on site 
by the main contractor. 
Because the job was run as a management contract, the main 
contractor undertook no direct resourcing of the work. Instead all 
labour, plant and materials were supplied by subcontractors. 
Subcontracts had been let - by the time work started on site - for 
the work needed in the early stages of construction (i.e. the 
excavation and groundwater; these were combined with the main 
structural work and let as a 'general building' package to one firm). 
Orders had also been placed with separate firms to undertake the main 
mechanical and electrical engineering services work. With these major 
e x c e ~ t i o n s , , most of the remaining subcontract packages (e.g. the 
plastering, tiling, cladding and roofing) were let during the course 
of construction. Consequently an important element in the resourcing 
of work on site was the forward planning for and plaCing of orders 
with subcontracting firms as work progressed. The 'lead times' for 
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this process was derived from the overall contract programme. Detailed 
design information needed to be obtained at an early enough stage to 
allow for the drawing up of a detailed package of work, and for the 
tendering and detailed planning stages involved before work could 
start on site. As noted earlier the 'package' system involved the 
contractor obtaining formal approval for the subcontractors appointed 
from the client's representatives. 
The tendering arrangements involved in subletting the tpackages' 
to specific firms were undertaken entirely at site level. Because 
each subcontractor was 'nominated t , the decision on which firms to 
appoint required Client approval, but no approval from higher levels 
within the main contracting organisation. Similarly, the administra-
tion of subcontracts once they were let (including payments) were 
handled on site - involving the POS and contractor's OS in measuring 
and evaluating subcontractors' work and the Project Manager authorising 
payment, by certificating the work done, direct from the client to the 
subcontractors involved. Unlike the RAW project (and the other case 
studies in the sample), the fact that the main contractor on the PDL 
project undertook none of the work directly and employed no 'domestic' 
subcontractors, meant that the main contractor's head office played 
no direct part in resourcing the work or in providing 'back up' 
administration in this respect. 
The actual process of placing new subcontracts involved the Site 
Agent and Planner in conducting formal interviews on site with 
. 
representatives from the six companies invited to tender for each of 
the packages. These interviews involved an explanation, by the main 
contractor's staff, of the characteristics of the work and, in 
particular, of the terms and conditions of work associated with it 
being run as a management contract. The Site Agent reported that a 
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strong emphasis was put in the interview upon an explanation of the 
responsibilities of the subcontractor on a management contract, with 
a view to ensuring that the firms that were tendering were aware of 
the peculiar characteristics of this type of arrangement. In 
addition, the interview was used to assess the firm's capacity to 
do the work, the people who would be directly involved in its 
management - at head office and site level, the time that the firm 
would need for planning and tendering, and the overall financial 
standing of the company and its other comm1ttments. Consequently, 
the process involved obtaining quite a good deal of information 
concerning the capacity and experience of prospective subcontractors. 
This information was passed on to the contractor's OS on site who, 
together with the POS, managed the tendering arrangements for each 
individual paCkage. It was generally agreed that the cut in the budget 
for the contract as a whole had led to decisions on appointments then 
being made almost entirely on the basiS of the lowest submitted 
tender price for each package. This point will be returned to more 
fully below. The point to be emphasised here is that the role of the 
main contractor's staff on site in resourcing the work was entirely 
indirect - consisting primarily of making sure that subcontractors 
were placed in sufficient time to meet the contractually-agreed 
starting dates on site. The levels and types of resources then 
supplied by subcontractors were at their own discretion, subject to 
the constraints embodied in the client's specification of the work 
. 
and the programme of work established by the main contractor. 
According to those involved in the process of subcontracting, the 
separation Of the entire project into a series of 'paCkages' meant 
that a good deal of WOrk was associated with defining or specifying 
in detail each separate package, and in delineating the work - in 
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other words deciding what to include in which package. Since the 
main contractor performed none of the work directly, there was little 
scope for allowing items of work to be 'picked up' by the main 
contractor by default. 
Given the appointment of subcontractors to perform the work, 
the main contractor's staff were involved in programming the work 
to be done on a medium- and short-term basis, managing the flow of 
design information between the design team and subcontractors, 
setting out lines and levels on site for subcontractors to build to, 
and in supervising the work produced on site and monitoring performance 
in r e l a t i o n , ~ e e overall contract programme. Medium-term programmes 
covering ten-week periods of the work were drawn up by the contractor's 
staff from the overall contract programme, from which more detailed 
weekly programmes of work were established - both for the job as a 
whole, and for the individual subcontractors employed on site. These 
latter programmes of work described in more detail the duration and 
sequencing of particular activities within each subcontracted trade 
on site based upon the overall start and finish dates for the work 
given in individual subcontractors' programmes included in the 
documentation for tendering. Individual subcontractors' contract 
programmes therefore established the parameters for their work based 
on the overall contract programme: that is, the start and finish 
dates, the broad sequencing of work, and major interdependencies 
with other trades; the more detailed planning ~ f f work was undertaken 
on a weekly and daily basis on site within these parameters. Progress 
on the job was monitored on a daily baSiS, and information and details 
of progress on site were fed back into the weekly planning process, 
and in the form of weekly reports to the client's staff and the 
contractor's own head office. The weekly reports on progress for 
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individual subcontractors formed the basis upon which their 
performance on the project was monitored. 
The management form of contract had an important bearing upon 
the processes related to the design and specification of the work to 
be produced on site. Specifically, the role of the main contractor 
in this situation was primarily to act as co-ordinator and centre of 
communication in the flow of design information between the design 
team and subcontractors. This involved arranging the flow of design 
information and correspondence to suit the programmes of work on 
site, and recording and checking information and drawings as they were 
received from both design team and subcontractors. In setting out the 
work, the main contractor was to provide only broad lines and levels, 
from which subcontractors then set out their own work in more detail. 
The methods of building to be used, and the quality of the materials 
supplied by subcontractors were based upon the individual method 
statements and specifications included in subcontract documentation, 
and were to be accepted or approved by the client's representatives, 
as were the standards of work actually produced on site. In these 
respects too, the main contractor's role was essentially one of 
co-ordination - between subcontractors' detailed plans for producing 
the work on Site, and the requirements established by the design 
team. 
Within the main contractor's site team, the Site Agent drew up 
the medium-term programmes of work, and - with the General Foreman -
• 
drew up subcontract programmes for tender. However, the more 
detailed shorter-term scheduling of the work on a weekly and daily 
baSiS, and its monitoring in these respects, was undertaken by the 
General Foreman, who dealt directly with the subcontractors' 
representatives on site in establishing programmes of work. The 
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Site Agent's role in this process involved 'approving' these 
schedules of work (before they were issued to the subcontractors 
and copied to the client's staff and contractor's head office) and 
dealing directly with subcontractors' representatives at site and 
office level, in the event of any problems encountered in planning 
out the work on site. The General Foreman was also the member of 
staff most closely involved in directly monitoring progress on a 
day-to-day basis, and in providing detailed information on progress 
to the Site Agent who drew up the weekly progress reports Which were 
distributed to the client's staff and copied to the contractor's 
head office. 
It was generally agreed (by both the main contractor's staff 
and subcontractors' representatives who were interviewed) that the 
General Foreman's role in these activities was central, and that his 
involvement in planning and co-ordinating the work was much greater 
than had been anticipated. It was reported that he in effect was 
performing the role of the main contractor's planning engineer on 
site. The Planner seconded to the team, it was generally agreed, 
was much less directly involved in the actual planning process and 
in arranging work with subcontractors on site, and concentrated more 
directly upon performing the admistrative work involved (i.e. 
recording the information and instructions received, issuing 
programmes of work, etc.). In effect, the role that he performed 
was that of administrator of the quite considerable volume of 
paper work between the client, contractor and subcontractors on the 
project. 
While the programming of the work on site was undertaken by 
the General Foreman for all aspects of the work, the activities 
associated with the detailed design and specification of the works 
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(i.e. checking drawings, methods and materials, setting out the work 
and supervising it) involved the General Foreman and Site Engineer in 
respect of the main building trades, and the Services Manager in 
respect of the engineering services work. They dealt directly with 
the respective subcontractors' representatives on site in sorting out 
the details in the work involved and monitoring its construction. 
Their involvement in these aspects of the work was co-ordinated by 
the Site Agent who conducted weekly in-house 'co-ordination meetings' 
held within all the 'construction' staff to plan out the weekly work 
in advance, in addition to generally supervising the work on a day-to-
day basis. According to those involved in the process of .supervising 
the subcontractors work on site, any problems in the drawings, setting 
out or performance of each aspect of the work, or in the integration 
of the structural or services components, were 'internally' referred 
up to the Site Agent who then became more closely involved in dealings 
with subcontractors' site representatives (or office staff) and the 
client's supervisors (the Clerk of Works and Job Architect). It was 
interesting to note that the Services Manager described a Glose degree 
of involvement with the M & E consultant and subcontractors on site 
in respect of these activities, and noted that most problems that 
occurred in the M & E work were resolved through this channel, rather 
than involving the Site Agent directly. He and the Site Agent reported 
that it tended only to be M & E problems with financial implications, 
or ones affecting the programme of work that generated any wider 
. 
involvement from members of the contractor's site team. 
A series of formal meetings were established to deal with the 
co-ordination of subcontracted work, programmes of actiVity, 
subcontractor resource levels and design matters. For the services 
work, the Services Manager held weekly co-ordination meetings with 
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the representatives of the mechanical and electrical services 
subcontractors. According to staff involved on the structural side, 
meetings were held,on average,weekly with individual subcontractors 
on site, although the formal procedure specified a fortnightly 
meeting. In addition to these more formal ~ e e t i n g s , , it was noted 
that numerous ad hoc meetings were held - either to discuss the work 
with individual subcontractors, or with representatives from two or 
three subcontractors to discuss the co-ordination of their work. The 
involvement of the contractor's staff in these meetings varied, as 
did the level of involvement on the part of the subcontractor. 
Depending upon the substantial issue at hand ~ n d d its 'contractual' 
importance, the meetings were held by the General Foreman, Services 
Manager and/or Site Agent on behalf of the main contractor, and 
involved the subcontractors' representatives on site and/or their 
visiting Contracts Managers. 
Apart from the more formal systems (described earlier) to 
monitor performance, the direct involvement of the contractor's 
head office staff was limited to the visits to the site made by the 
supervising Contracts Manager (and to the part-time residence of the 
senior Surveyor). Members of the contractor's site team were in 
general agreement that the site operated with a high level of 
autonomy from the head office, and that the Contracts Manager formed 
the main direct channel for contact between the site and the head 
office. This reflected in the main the characteristics of a 
. 
management form of contract: that is, the emphasis upon perform1ng 
a 'management-only' role on site meant a greater concentration of 
senior and experienced staff on site, which in tUrn meant that the 
need for closer direct supervision and involvement by head office 
functional managers (e.g. planners, engineers) was obviated. While 
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direct access was available to services provided by such head office 
departments, in practice it was noted that they were rarely involved 
directly on the project during its construction stage. In addition, 
as noted earlier, the employment of 'nominated' subcontractors for the 
entire works meant that there was no role performed by head office 
staff in resourcing work on site during construction. Agreements and 
negotiations concerning details of the work were undertaken between 
the client and the subcontractors, with the main contractor performing 
a 'co-ordination' role at site level. 
However, one feature of the site - head office relationship did 
have a bearing upon the discretion,afforded to site management: 
specifically the absence of any working capital that was noted 
earlier. This point will be returned to more fully in the ensuing 
discussion. The point to be made here is that the site needed 
authorisation from higher levels within the firm for direct expenditure 
of any funds other than for 'petty cash' items. The monthly payment 
to the main contractor consisted only of management overheads 
('preliminaries') and a fixed percentage profit. Unlike the other 
case studies in the sample, the site did not operate on a monthly 
profit and loss basis. As will be described later in more detail, 
this placed the main contractor in a contractually 'neutral' position 
vis-a-vis the client. However it also served to reduce the scope of 
management on site in expediting work. 
The involvement of the client's staff in ,the management of work 
on the PDL project consisted of approving the programmes prepared by 
the main contractor, issuing drawings and instructions on the basis 
of requests submitted by the subcontractors via the main contractor, 
checking proposed methods and materials to be used, and supervising 
generally the setting out and construction of work on site. It 
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was the resident Clerk of Works who was most closely involved in 
supervising the main building work on site on a day-to-day basis 
and .in sorting out enquiries concerning the working drawings and 
details of the methods used by subcontractors on site (as noted 
above, a comparable role was performed on the M & E side by the 
contractor's Services Manager). The Job Architect visited the 
site on a regular basis - usually in response to queries being 
raised on site concerning the detailed design or the methods and 
materials being used by subcontractors (the M & E consultant 
performed a comparable role in relation to the M & E works). In 
relation to the issuing of instructions to the con.tractor (for 
transmission to the subcontractor performing the work), the Clerk 
of Works was authorised to issue site orders that had no cost 
implications ~ · 1 h i c h h .... ere to be confirmed by a subsequent architect's 
instruction. Instructions related to the issue of working drawings, 
the clarification of design details, and acceptance of subcontractors' 
materials and methods were drawn up by the Job Architect. In the 
case of instructions related to additional work or. variations to the 
existing work, it was reported that these required costing by the 
P ~ S S and contractor's OS and approval from the supervising Project 
Manager before they could be issued by the Job Architect. A similar 
procedure was established for issuing instructions in relation to 
the M & E work : while the consultant clarified details, approved 
subcontractors' shop drawings, methods and materials, variation 
. 
orders or additional work instructions required an architect's 
instruction approved by the Project Manager. 
The main formal forum for monitoring progress on site was a 
regular three-weekly contract meeting held on site. It was attended 
by the Project Manager, Job Architect and Clerk of Works (and 
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also the Structural Engineer in the first half of the construction 
period), together with the PQS and M & E consultant on behalf of the 
client, and the contractor's visiting Contracts Manager, Site Agent, 
OS, Planner and Services Manager on behalf of the main contractor 
(it was also noted that a representative of the company's Estates 
Department attended the meeting on behalf of the user departments). 
At the meeting, the contractor presented a report on progress, set 
against the overall programme for completion, and a breakdown of 
each subcontract package in relation to the programme of work, 
design and construction details, and resource levels employed. In 
addition, the agenda included a r e v i ~ w w of the tendering procedure 
for outstanding subcontracts that had not been placed, and a list 
of design information required (by subcontractors) from the design 
team. The details of the meeting were minuted and distributed to 
all those involved, as well as to more senior (head office) staff 
from all the organisations involved. 
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lO.10 Performance on the PDL Project 
As noted in Chapter 5 above, the PDL site was first visited 
six months into the construction period, at which point work was 
in progress in erecting the main frame for the building, installing 
the external drainage system and in the early work associated with 
the installation of the engineering services. The bulk of the work 
was being undertaken on site by the two subcontractors undertaking 
the main frame construction'and the excavation and drainage work 
(the latter as part of the 'general builder' package). They employed 
workforces on site of approximately 40 and 15 respectively at the 
time of the first visit. At that stage, the contract was running 
an estimated 2 ~ ~ weeks behind the programme (not including time lost 
- a week - due to bad weather). It was reported by those inter-
viewed at that stage that this represented an improvement in the 
situation as it had stood some 3 - 4 months earlier when delays 
in the construction of the main frame had occurred that had threatened 
to put the date back for final completion some 4 - 5 weeks. 
Retrospective accounts were given of the circumstances which 
surrounded this delay. They will be returned to in more detail 
in the later discussion, since they offer some important insights 
into the manner in which relationships amongst the organisations 
involved developed over the course of the project's construction 
cycle. However, it is sufficient to note at this point that the 
main contractor was in the position at that stage of reducing the 
effects that had been caused by delays in the earlier stages, in 
order to allow for full completion on time. 
The series of visits to the aite continued through its course 
up to and including the final week of the contract programme (as 
described in Chapter 5 ). Progress on the project stayed at 
around two weeks behind the programme until a period surrounding 
the midway point of the contract, when a series of delays to the 
internal blockwork construction, plastering and screeding work 
(ie in the main internal structural and finishing trades) knocked 
back progress to approximately a month behind the programme for 
completion. At that stage the bulk 'of the work being undertaken 
was in the finishing and services trades for which a total 
subcontract workforce of around 130 was being employed. The close 
interdependency of these trades on site, coupled with the already 
'tight' programme for completion meant quite a concentration of 
effort by the main contractor at that stage on replanning work and 
drawing up revised medium-term (finishing) programmes to meet the 
target completion date, and to contain the 'knock on l effects of 
delays in the f1nishng work. (At that stage it was noted that 
most of the subcontract 'packages' had been let. This was with the 
exception of a few (about six) associated with specialist fixtures 
and fittings that were to be installed - and these were in the main 
in the latter stages of tendering. The volume of outstanding 
detailed design information needed was also recorded as being 
very low at that point - not only for the main structural work, 
but also for the 14 &: E services) • 
By the later stages at which the PDt project was visited, 
the total subcontract workforce employed on site had risen to a 
figure of between 140 - 150 (inthe period 2 - 3 months prior to 
completion). The effects of the delays that had occurred earlier 
in the finishing trades had been contained, and the project had 
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been brought back on course for completion on time. This is how 
it stood at the time of the final visit to the site with the 
programme having been achieved - allowing for the effects of bad 
weather. The only issue outstanding at that stage concerning the 
programme of work, was the contraction in the time available for 
commissioning the t1 & E services prior to the handover of the 
building to the client. This point, together with an assessment 
of the factors that were perceived to have been associated with 
the earlier delays to the work, will be returned to in more 
detail in the later discussion. In terms of the cost of the job, 
it was reported {by the architectural staff and PQS} that the 
budget had been met, when allowance was made for price 
fluctuations, the amount paid for coordinated M & E services 
drawings, and certain items not included in the original bill 
(eg the cost of 'protecting' certain items of work on site) • 
At the end of the construction period, members of the client's 
and'main contractor's teams who were interviewed e x p r e s s e d ~ ~ their 
satisfaction at the outcomes that had been achieved in respect of 
the time, cost and quality objectives set for the project, given 
both the early reduction in the budget available and the 'tight' 
programme of work. The architectural staff and consultants all 
expressed the view that the project would not have finished on time 
a n ~ ~ within budget under a more 'traditional' (ie JCT) contractual 
arrangement. They related this mainly to the expectation that a 
main contractor operating on this project under a JCT form of 
contract would have submitted claims for delays stemming from late 
design information in the earlier stages'- a point that will be 
expanded upon below. 
A good deal of attention was given to the way in which the 
characteristics of a management form of contract had influenced 
the process of construction. In terms of the contractor's input 
into the design process, it was not felt that the full benefits 
of a management contracting approach had been achieved in this 
instance. This was viewed as being due to the relatively late 
stage at which it had been decided to switch to this form, and the 
fact that this had meant that the main contractor was not involved 
in the preliminary design stages when variations and 'snags' that 
had occurred in the design might have been picked up. This view 
was shared by members of the main contractor's staff (Contracts 
Manager, Site Agent) who felt that management contracting needed 
to be run "wholeheartedly" (Site Agent) in order to achieve the 
"full benefits" (for the client). They did not feel that this had 
happened in this case. The Contracts Manager for instance, 
reported the difficulty of assimilating all the design information 
available when the main contractor became involved only at a 
relatively late stage in the pre-site planning process. The Site 
Agent additionally noted that for it to be a fully "effective" 
system, it required earlier involvement plus a "freeze" on the 
design: "otherwise design problems keep cropping up and causing 
delays". As noted earlier, this was not a project which had been 
characterised by a clear separation of the design and construction 
p h a ~ e s . . Nevertheless, it was felt that the approach had had some 
'pay offs' in this respect. The Project Manager and Job Architect 
both referred to the savings generated by the change to the design 
for the external drainage system as an example of the benefits of 
including the contractor in the design process. All in all the 
Project Manager expressed his "delight" at the performance levels 
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achieved, and stated that he would like his company to adopt the 
system for future work. The Job Architect appeared slightly 
less enthusiastic, and set the benefits of the method against the 
costs associated with the greater level of supervision involved. 
As noted earlier the role performed by the main contractor 
under a management form appeared to have implications for the level 
of job satisfaction expressed by members of the main contractor's 
staff when they compared it to working under a more 'traditional' 
form of contractual arrangement. The same can be said for members 
of the client's team who were interviewed - although here the ~ ~
of direct involvement in the detailed management of work on site 
was cited as the distinct advantage. The Project Manager, for 
instance, contrasted the greater time available for undertaking 
design work in the office on a management contract, with the tendency 
to get "bogged down" on site and more extensively involved in 
contract administration rather than design work under a JeT form 
of contract. This view was echoed by the Job Architect who referred 
to the tendency not to get "drawn into" direct dealings with 
subcontractors on site as a positive advantage under a management 
form of contract. A similar point was made by the M & E consultant, 
who referred to the main contractor acting as a "buffer" between the 
design team and subcontractors. He suggested that an advantage 
was. that dealings with subcontractors were then conducted "behind 
the scenes" between the main contractor and subcontractors - rather 
than directly involving the design team. What was made clear by 
these comments was the implication that the form of arrangement had 
upon 'distancing' members of the design team from detailed operational 
circumstances on site and from embroilment in direct negotiations 
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and dealings with the subcontractors involved. At the same time 
reference was also made to the impact it had upon 'closing the gap' 
between the design team and main contractor as the central m e ~ b e r r
of the 'building team', and also to the greater degree of 
'involvement' of design team members in the project as a whole. 
The first point was made by all those interviewed - who contrasted 
the 'teamwork' on this project with the more 'adversarial' 
relationship between designer and builder found in other situations. 
The second point was made specifically by the two consultants 
employed on the project. The PQS, describing his experience on 
the management contract as, broadly speaking, more 'satisfying', 
referred to the greater degree of involvement in the project 
through more frequent visits to the site, and a closer working 
relationship with the contractor's QS as important features from 
his own point of view. This he set in the context of a relationship 
with a main contracting firm that was "on your side". The M & E 
engineer described the set-up as "refreshing" and attributed this 
to the more open discussion and greater appreciation of others' 
problems that he felt had occurred. He also felt that it allowed 
him to contribute to discussion on wider aspects of the work on 
site than those concerned specifically with the details of his own 
specialism. 
• It should be stressed that these comments were made 
retrospectively, at a stage when the objectives set for the work 
on the project were on the point of being successfully achieved. 
The comments were also informed directly by experience on that 
particular contract, since none of those cited had had any prior 
experience of management contracting. Indeed many of those 
interviewed commented upon the impact that the process of adjusting 
to the u n f a m i ~ i a r r circumstances on a management contract had had 
in affecting the development of relationships during the course of 
the PDL project. The Project Manager, for instance, stated that 
he had found it "very difficult to change the habit of years 
working on JCT jobs" - where the designer and contractor are 
adversaries. Others involved pointed directly to the impact that 
this adjustment had had upon working relationships at an early 
stage. The Clerk of Works for instance, commented that: "Early 
on ••• a lot of friction was caused and working relationships 
weren't very good ••• I think it was partly because the (architects 
and structural engineer) weren't used to management (contracting) 
and felt they should be pushing the job more". At that early stage, 
attention had indeed been directed towards this factor - particularly 
by members of the contractor's team. The Contracts Manager had 
reported that: "... the architects don't really understand the 
i m p ~ i c a t i o n s s of the management team concept ••• we have good 
relationships with (the consultants), but our relationship with 
the designers hasn't developed so well". The Site Agent had 
also commented: "there's far less communication than there should 
be ••• no-one tells each other what's going on". The implications 
were held to have been a lack of "teamwork" and "communication" 
between the parties at that stage - problems that were widely 
reported by members of the contractor's team at the time, but which 
were also corroborated by members of the client's team both then 
and in subsequent interviews. The Clerk of Works, for instance, 
referred to the tendency to circumvent the 'correct' channels: 
"(the architect) would come on site and say 'that's not right' and 
go straight to (the main contractor) for answers ••• (the main 
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contractor) got caught in the crossfire ' ••• they didn't use me to 
the f ~ l l extent they should have". He commented also upon the 
tendency for the architectural staff to issue instructions direct, 
rather than rely upon the Clerk of Works and the issue of site orders 
by him. These issues will be returned to shortly' since they have 
an important bearing upon understanding the process of management 
on the PDL project. The point to be emphasised here is that 
experience on the PDL project was characterised to some extent 
as a learning process associated with an understanding of the 
parties' respective roles under that type of arrangement. The 
implication of this factor, together with a consideration of the 
impact of other circumstances surrounding the PDL project on the 
development of relationships amongst the parties will be returned 
to next. 
10.11 The PDL Project: A Case Analysis 
What is particularly interesting about the PDt project was 
the fact that the objectives for the work were seen to have been 
achieved successfully despite the impact that the pressure they 
created was viewed as having upon the management of the project, 
and the earlier difficulties associated with an adjustment to an 
unfamiliar type of arrangement., Reference has already been made 
to the 'tight' programme, the cut in budget for the work, and the 
design 'overlap' into'the construction period. These were viewed 
as critical features which affected the orientation of those 
involved in the project throughout its course. It is the inter-
relationships amongst these factors, coupled with the distinctive 
setting of a management contract which forms the backdrop against 
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which developments on the PDt project need to be viewed. 
The first series of points that need to be made concern the 
continuing design process and the characteristics of the design 
that was produced for the works. Firstly, it was generally agreed 
that the early stages of the project were marked by difficulties 
in the production and transmission of detailed design information. 
The Job Architect described the "pressure" that had been put upon 
the structural engineers to produce drawings in time given the cut 
in budget and consequent change in design direction. The main 
contractor's staff had at that stage referred to the difficulties 
experienced in obtaining design information from the structural 
engineer (and architect) sufficiently early enough to allow for 
SUbcontractors' programme dates to be met. The early, critical 
delay to the construction of the main frame, for instance, was 
attributed by them to delays m the receipt of detailed information 
from the structural engineer. However, attention was also directed 
more broadly at the level of detail in the drawings and 
specification - particularly in relation to the architectural 
design - and the corresponding tendency for there to have arisen a 
good many alterations and variations to the detailed design as the 
work on site progressed. The PQS, for instance, noted that: 
"For the purposes of measurement the drawings were adequate ••• 
(bu.t) I don't think they were full enough (for construction purposes)". 
He, together with the M & E consultant, Clerk of Works and main 
contractor's staff, attributed this in large part to the early 
pressure on the design team. The implications were reported as 
being the difficulties in picking up 'snags' at a sufficiently 
early stage, and in responding to subcontractors' requests for 
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detailed and definitive information. Midway through the construction 
programme, the Site Agent estimated that there had been some 800 
instructions issued - many of them pertaining to alterations in the 
details of the design for the work. The Site Agent also identified 
a fUrther characteristic of the design that he felt had exacerbated 
the problems. Specifically, in describing the (architectural) 
design as "vague", he linked this directly to a distinctive "style" 
that he felt was being adopted by the designers in their approach 
towards this particular project. He pointed out.that the job was 
not 'normal' in that respect and that the distinctiveness of the 
design had implications for the approach adopted by 'subcontractors 
towards the job. He suggested that, for instance: "(subcontractors) 
see it as a normal job and won't bother to look through seven or 
eight drawings just to get one detail". The point here is that the 
distinctive character of the design, and its continuation during 
construction, coupled with ambiguities concerning which party was 
responsible for checking drawings and details tended to lead to a 
situation in which 'snags' were either not initially picked up, 
or were picked up and corrected in a somewhat ad hoc manner. 
The point to be emphasised at this stage is that the problems 
associated with the lack of a complete and definitive design for 
the work coexisted with the period of 'adjustment' to an unfamiliar 
f o ~ ~ of contractual arrangement. This' was reflected in the comments 
made at earlier stages· concerning the types of problems that arose 
and the reaction of those involved to them. The Site Agent, for 
instance, describing the lack of "communication" referred to the 
tendency for his own staff to have to "correct" drawings issued 
by the design team if there were errors "out of necessityll. The 
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General Foreman referred to his having to "fend off" subcontractors 
while relevant details were being' negotiated and drawings prepared. 
The assistant QS described the tendency for the design team not to 
accept the contractor's "recommendations". A tendency to bypass 
the 'appropriate channels' was also noted in later comments given 
by the Site Agent referring to direct design dealings that had 
occurred between the architectural designers and subcontractors. 
His point was that.there were occasions on which the main contractor 
was not informed of detailed alterations to subcontracted work 
until the work was actually produced. He referred specifically 
in this instance to the design of the laboratory benches that were 
to be installed, although his view was that this had occurred in 
a wider range of instances'- a view that was corroborated by the 
PQS. The general point to be stressed at this stage is that the 
extant pattern of working relationships on the PDL project -
particularly in its early stages, but also quite a considerable way 
into the construction period - contrasted with what was expected 
should have occurred, given the 'management team concept'. The 
approach actually adopted was viewed as particularly counter-
productive in circumstances in which the design was both initially 
incomplete and somewhat distinctive. 
The second series of points concern the impact that tight 
financial control by the client had in such circumstances. Members 
of both the client's and contractor's teams generally agreed that 
control Over expenditure on the project had been tight. The 
problems experienced midway through the programme in the blockwork, 
plastering and screeding work were cited as being in part an 
indirect consequence of this factor: specifically that the reduced 
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budget had forced the acceptance of the lowest subcontract bids 
which in the event had proved 'calculated risks' given the quality 
of work actually produced by these subcontractors (this 
observation was made by members of both teams). The inherent 
contradictions in the objectives being pursued in this respect 
were summed up by the Clerk of Works, who suggested that: "the 
problem is in trying to get 'value for money' when the money 
you're paying (is less than) what you'd need to get the value you 
expect". More directly, reference was made to the impact that 
financial constraints had upon the continuing design process. The 
point has already been made that the cut in budget effected a 
change in 'design direction'. The point was also made that in 
this context, modifications to the design were continually looked 
at with a view to minimising costs and achieving savings - to such 
an extent that it involved efforts to make savings on 'packages' 
already agreed with subcontractors (this point was specifically 
made by the main contractor's Planner). The importance of this 
factor was highlighted by members of both teams. The Site Agent 
for instance, described how the concern for reducing costs had 
"dominated" events on the PDL project. The Clerk of Works 
commented that: "everything with cost implications has to be 
looked at ••• (the client) is very firm on this". The implications 
were held to be that this situation had "reduced the effectiveness" 
of the 'management team' (Planner) and instilied a degree of 
rigidity in relationships amongst the main participants. This 
suggestion is drawn from comments given - particularly by members 
of the main contractor's staff - which contrasted an ostensibly 
'flexible' approach to managing work under a management form of 
contract, with the more'formal patterns of interaction and a more 
'contractual' approach experienced under current circumstances. 
In relation to direct dealings with subcontractors, it was felt 
that the emphasis upon reducing costs, coupled with problems in 
the design, and in a situation in which the main contractor 
acted in effect only as 'go-between' between design team and 
subcontractors, combined to place the main contractor in an 
invidious position. The consequences from the subcontractors' 
point of view will be explored later. 
Up till now only passing reference has been made to the 
implications of these factors in a situation in which the work 
was subcontracted in its entirety. In describing their implications, 
a good deal of stress was laid upon their effect upon relationships 
between the main contractor and the subcontractors concerned. The 
contractor's Contracts Manager, in describing the main contractor's 
position felt that they were "in the middle - wearing two hats". 
On the one hand, their experience of directly undertaking work on 
site suggested a degree of sympathy with the problems faced by 
subcontractors on this project; on the other hand, their commitment 
to the client as part of the' 'management team' was their main 
allegiance. The Site Agent in referring specifically to the early 
problems in the main frame construction expressed the view that 
their role in upholding the client's interests conflicted with their 
predisposition to support valid subcontractor claims. In other 
words, the members of the main contractor's staff felt they were 
'caught in the middle f - realising the problems faced by 
subcontractors, but obliged to cut down claims to a minimum. The 
Site Agent and other members of the contractor's team felt that the 
consequence was that relationships with subcontractors on the job 
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were "soured" - in that problems in obtaining drawings and inform-
ation and recompense for delays tended to adversely affect the 
subcontractors' reactions to any s u b s e ~ u e n t t problems that arose on 
site. The same was felt to be ,true in the impact that the distinctive 
'style' adopted for the design had upon direct design dealings 
between the architects and subcontractors: the Site Agent, for 
example, pointed out that: " ••• they (ie subcontractors) haven't 
had to provide samptesbefore (ie in previous jobs for the same 
client) ••• but on this job (the architect) has insisted on samples 
and often rejected them (without giving an explanation why)" His 
interpretation was that this then tended to feedback into the 
subcontractors' relationships with the main contractor, with the 
consequence that any 'give and take" in the relationship was exchanged 
for a more uncompromising approach. 
Later in this discussion experience on one particular 'package' 
will be described in same detail to illustrate some of the points 
raised above. At this stage, the point to be emphasised is that 
the main contractor's staff viewed the situation as one in which 
they were to some extent 'compromised' in their position vis-a-vis 
the design team on the one hand, and the subcontractors on the other. 
Interestingly this view was not necessarily shared by members of the 
design team. The Project Manager for instance, referred to their 
initial lack of "trust" of the main contractor that stemmed from 
their own perceptions that the main contractor was "defending" 
the subcontractors too much. Referring to early 'delays on site and 
problems in design dealings, he commented that he had felt the main 
contractor, as part of the professional team, should have been 
"clobbering" the subcontractors more. Although he added that these 
early perceptions changed as the project developed, there was a 
suggestion that this view continued to be held to some extent 
further into the project: the Clerk of Works, for instance, 
reported towards the end of the construction period, that he felt 
that the main contractor's primary aim - of meeting the programme 
completion date - had tended·to·produce a "bias" towards 
subcontractors and a tendency not to "push" them too hard. He 
commented: "I'm not suggesting (the main contractor) has skimped, 
but it has caused problems' (in quality control)". What this 
commentary suggests is the tendency for the approaches of the two 
main parties to the contract as having been informed by somewhat 
divergent expectations of the role that was to be performed in the 
management and control of subcontracted work: to the main contractor 
an 'allegiance' to the client's team was countered to some extent 
by an appreciation of builders' problems and the felt need to 
avoid 'aggravation' with subcontractors which might jeopardise 
the plan for completion; to the design team, a role as the client's 
main 'building' representative meant a full identification with 
the objectives pursued by the professional team, and an emphasis 
upon ensuring that subcontractors fully achieved those objectives. 
The inference is also that the pressures associated with the 
performance of time, cost and quality objectives on the PDL project 
were accommodated in a way which reflected the different priorities 
attached by the parties to the pursuit of these objectives. Before 
looking further at the manner in Which this occurred to produce a 
situation at the end of the job in'which it was felt that the 
objectives had to all intents and purposes been successfully 
achieved, 'it is perhaps useful to give in greater detail a picture 
of developments on one particular package. This with a view both 
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to illustrate many of the points made above, and to provide 
further insight into the manner in which the objectives on the PDL 
project were achieved. 
The specific example is of the' subcontract order placed for 
the manufacture, supply and fixing of precast concrete panels for 
the external structure of the building. The firm supplying the 
units was a local firm which specialised in the off-site manufacture 
and on-site assembly of concrete structural components, and which 
had undertaken work for the PDL client in the past. Since the 
actual construction of the units was undertaken off-site in the 
firm's local factory, the period of involvement on site itself was 
fairly brief (when compared to that of other subcontractors 
building in situ); and the emphasis then was upon co-ordinating 
the work with other trades on site and maintaining progress on the 
units' assembly (rather than simultaneously monitoring the quality 
of work produced as in the case of in situ work). The units were 
custom-built to the architectural specification, and all design 
dealings in this respect were largely to have been undertaken 
before the panels were assembled on site. 
In the lead up to the construction period (during the month 
prior to the subcontractor's start date on site) representatives of 
the. main contractor and subcontractor were involved in a series 
of meetings and 'site/factory visits aimed at planning out in detail 
the programme and sequence of assembly of the panels on site. These 
meetings and visits involved variously the Site Agent and General 
Foreman on behalf of the main contractor and the Construction 
Director, Factory Manager and supervising Contracts Manager on 
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behalf of the subcontractor. At issue was the scheduling ,of work on 
site to meet the programme dates in a situation in which circumstances 
had changed since the original programme had been agreed. Firstly, 
the subcontractor had experienced a week's delay in their production 
of units which had put back the programme of work on site by a week. 
Consequently the subcontractor was vulnerable to a claim for delay. 
However, in the meantime the main contractor's programme had also 
run behind, such that they were now vulnerable to a delay claim 
from the subcontractor. While the delay by the subcontractor was 
made known to the main contractor, the main contractor's delay was 
not made known to the subcontractor. The Site Agent reported that 
the initial delay by,the subcontractor in the event suited the main 
contractor's revised programme of works, and that they had an 
interest in now having the panel erection occur'at the later date. 
The net effect was that a revised start date was accepted by both 
parties and no action was at that stage taken on claims. Secondly, 
the original plan that allowed for a straight and continuous 
schedule of panel assembly on site had been confounded by related 
work which was being currently undertaken on the main structure. 
The problem was that the physical interdependence of the two tasks 
on site meant that the sequence of panel assembly needed to be 
adjusted, but could only be adjusted in a way which led to disruption 
- either in the production schedule for the units (which would 
involve costs associated with storage and double-handling charges), 
or in the programme of work on site (which would involve costs 
associated with maintaining idle resources on site). In both cases, 
the subcontractor would be able to claim for'the associated costs. 
In the event, the solution eventually reached was for the 
subcontractor to'begin work on site a few days later than originally 
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planned, for which they would be able to obtain recompense for 
disruptions to their production schedule. 
What is of interest about these issues is the way in which they 
were tactically resolved. Speaking for the main contractor, the 
Site Agent pointed out that the early delay by the subcontractor 
proved convenient - both in fitting in with the main contractor's 
delayed programme, and in putting the onus onto the subcontractor 
to adjust their own schedule to get past the problem with the 
interdependent work on site. Provided the subcontractor was 
unaware of the main contractor's own delay, then their ability to 
press for claims stemming from the second problem was countered 
by their vulnerability to claims associated with the first problem. 
The Site Agent also point out that the second problem occurred due 
to it being 'overlooked' in the original plan of work. He added 
that if the subcontractor had not· overlooked the details of the 
plan, they would have noted that the original plans were incorrectly 
marked (the wrong elevations were given) and that· this would allow 
them leverage to pursue a claim. Given these factors he described 
the process of reaching agreement with the subcontractor's 
representatives' concerning a revised programme of work as having 
inVOlved an element of "diplomacy" • 
• Having reached agreement over the scheduie of work on site, 
the next problem: arose in installing the panels on site. Specifically 
the main frame columns had been built too high to allow for the 
correct positioning of the panels. The problem was attributed by 
the Site Agent to a confusion in the design dealings between design 
team and subcontractor: that an early variation had been incorporated 
in the drawings for the main frame construction which had 
implications, for the panel fixing, but which had not been allowed 
for in the architectural drawings from which the subcontractor was 
working. The result was that this 'snag' had not been picked up 
until the columns had been built and the panels were ready for 
fixing. The subcontractor was initially unaware that this was the 
cause of the problem and began cutting the panels to fit. According 
to the subcontractor's Construction Director, they approached the 
architect suggesting it would be less costly and time-consuming to 
shorten the columns. However this course of action was not taken 
until it was discovered that the problem had arisen due to a design 
variation, at which point the subcontractor stopped work on site, 
the architect issued an instruction to cut the columns and the main 
contractor expedited this work. The subcontractor then submitted 
a claim for delay due to this work holding them up. 
Further problems occurred subsequent to the fixing of the 
panels when it was found that insufficient 'tolerance' had been 
allowed and the windows would not fit. According to the Clerk of 
Works the design had. allowed for very little cumulative tolerance 
in the construction of the frame, the fixing of panels and windows. 
However, the amount of tolerance available had been' misinterpreted 
(by the main contractor) as being much greater. The subcontractor's 
Construction Director felt that the tolerances available were 
impossible to achieve, but also felt that the subcontractor should 
have picked this up at an early stage. The work was in the end 
expedited by the'main contractor by drilling into the panels to 
fit the windows. According to the Site Agent the subcontractor at 
that stage had accepted some of the responsibility for the problem, 
while the architect had not. The subcontractor was subsequently 
to be issued with a claim from the window fixerefor the delay 
caused to their work. 
At the end it was reported that the work was finished on time 
(to the subcontract programme), although the 'tolerance' problem 
• did have knock-on effects. At the contract meeting at which the 
account was closed, it was recorded that the subcontractors claim 
(for the columns problem) had been withdrawn and that the 
subcontractor had accepted payment for the earlier off-site costs. 
At that meeting the contractor's Contracts Manager and QS and the 
PQS ~ e p o r t e d d that the outcome had been favourable financially. 
The Project Manager, Job Architect and client representative did 
question the payment to the subcontractor - however the contractor's 
staff and consultants all argued against this and for the account 
to be closed. The M & E consultant for instance referred to 
re-opening the account at that stage as "dangerous". The contractor's 
QS commented that the financial outcome "COUld have been worse". 
When interviewed subsequent to this, the subcontractor's 
Construction Director expressed his (to put it mildly) dissatisfaction 
at the way the job had gone from the firm's point of view: "We left 
the job with a very sour taste in our mouth, and no respect left 
f o r . ~ y y members of the design team or main contractor's staff)." 
He attributed this to: "the double-dealing that went on ••• When 
the job was first delayed (which he felt was the main contractor's 
fault) ••• we could have thrown the book at them but we didn't ••• 
After that, every time we put a foot wrong the architect threw the 
book at us without mercy ••• (The main contractor) didn't do anything 
to back us up". He contrasted his experience of this contract on 
which there had been tho team. spirit" with both a "normal" job 
in which "it's the contractor's responsibility to 'look after' the 
subcontractors", and other management contracts on which he had 
not experienced such problems. He expressed the view that the 
architectural staff had given the firm a "runaround" and had been 
unwilling to accept their ideas or recommendations; he felt the 
main contractor's staff had responded to the (design) problems by 
not representing the subcontractor's interests and "hiding away 
from problems". 
While developments on this particular package are not necessarily 
representative of events on other packages during the course of the 
project, they do both supply illustrations of many of the problems 
that were generally perceived to have characterised progress on the 
PDt (specifically in relation to the co-ordination of work and the 
design for the work) as well as direct attention towards how these 
problems were resolv'ed in the context of the distinctive role being 
performed by the main contractor. What are of particular interest 
are the observations that (a) subcontractor's omissions or errors 
gave the main contractor a negotiating ploy that allowed them to 
minimise the claims submitted against the client; and (b) when 
this failed the main c o n t r a c ~ o r r became involved in directly 
expediting the work. The first point echoes the earlier observation 
that members of the client's team. felt that they were not involved 
directly in the 'wheeling and dealing' that went on. Taking the 
panel package as an example, it suggests that this 'wheeling and 
dealing' was conducted in a manner which served to protect both the 
main contractor's interests (in getting the work performed on time) 
and the interests of the design team (who were vulnerable to 
claims stemming from late or undetailed design information). The 
corollary is that this occurred at the expense of the subcontractor's 
interests - a point which links in with earlier comments made by 
both the main contractor's staff and the (panel) subcontractor 
concerning the impact that the situation had upon relationships 
between the two parties. In other words the situation was one in 
which the main contractor appeared to 'protect' the design team to 
some extent. The second point suggests a similar interpretation: 
that shortfalls that emerged in the performance of work on site due 
to the circumstances described earlier were reacted to by the main 
contractor employing a strategy of directly expediting the work -
in contrast to the expectation that they would not be involved in 
performing any of the work directly. and that it was the subcontractor's 
responsibility under a management form of contract to do so. 
These interpretations are given extra credence by reports 
given of other events on the PDL project. The early delay to the 
construction of the main frame for instance had given rise to a 
claim submitted by the subcontractor concerned for delays stemming 
from late information. However, this had been withdrawn following 
a 'deal' that was made between the subcontractor on the one hand and 
the main contractor and PQS on the other. It was reported (by both 
the.main contractor's staff and PQS) that a payment was made to the 
subcontractor to 'accelerate' their work to bring it back on 
programme (the payment was funded 50/50 by the main contractor and 
PQS and did not involve the design team). According to the PQS, it 
was felt that the subcontractor "had a case", and on a 'normal' 
job the main contractor would have pushed for a claim due to late 
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information. Here, to avoid a 'claim situation', expediting the 
work was the only alternative to avoid serious effects on the 
programme. The collaboration on this issue between the main 
contractor and PQS was felt by both parties to reflect a concern 
with avoiding disruption to the programme of work associated with 
the design problems. experienced. The contractor's QS, commenting 
on the part played by the PQS, noted: "they (the PQS) don't have 
any (financial) incentive to do this ••• (But) they do have a 
strong relationship with one or two of the subcontractors ••• 
judging by (the money that's been paid to expedite the work) 
they're interested in seeing that the job runs smoothly". Other 
examples of the main contractor directly expediting the work were 
found (eg the later appointment of a full-time plasterer at no 
cost to the client to do remedial work) which will not be expanded 
upon here. More generally, the point is that such steps were taken 
with a view to achieving the time and cost objectives set for the 
work in a situation in which those objectives were generally 
perceived to be difficult to achieve, and their achievement further 
threatened by problems experienced in the production and transmission 
of design information from the design team. 
The theme implicit in the foregoing discussion is that the 
pressure to achieve time and cost objectives led to the main 
contractor being involved in a variety of tactics aimed at limiting 
the impact of design-related problems (ie directly expediting the 
work; negotiating down subcontractor's claims; colluding with the 
PQS to recompense subcontractor's valid claims). A tactic with 
similar intentions, but notable in the e x t e n ~ ~ to which it reflected 
the success of the main contractor's strategy occurred right at 
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the very end of the construction period. At issue was the time 
available for 'snagging' the building, and, in particular, 
commissioning the electrical services work. At the final contract 
meeting before overall completion was due, the M & E consultant and 
Clerk of Works argued that there was insufficient time left for 
these activities and that the completion date could not be met. The 
main contractor's staff argued that the completion date had to be, 
and would be met - the Contracts Manager instructing the Services 
Manager to directly s u ~ e r v i s e e the subcontractor's work and become 
more directly involved in its commissioning. The various arguments 
were minuted and the question, in effect, left open. 
In a subsequent interview, the Contracts Manager r e ~ o r t e d d
that the electrical subcontractor might ~ o s s i b l y y be submitting a 
claim for delay, and that the intention had been to avoid this 
possibility at such a late stage by "protecting" the subcontractor 
against the ~ r o f e s s i o n a l · t e a m ' s s ~ r e s s u r e e (to expedite the commissioning 
work). Interestingly he noted the architectural staff's lack of 
support for the consultant's ~ o s i t i o n n on this issue and suggested 
that this was informed by the need to avoid any potential delays 
in the final completion of the work. The consultant's (and 
Clerk of Works') view was that they were being "squeezed" at the 
end and - not untypically according to the consultant - not 
beipg allowed sufficient time to perform these activities. The 
M & E consultant echoed the Contracts Manager's comments by suggesting 
that on this issue the main contractor and design team had 
'collaborated' in order not to jeopardise the completion date. 
This final comment was generalised by the consultant 
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to the way in which relationships had developed in the latter half 
of the construction period. In particular he referred to what he 
felt was the critical factor that had influenced developments on 
the PDt project. Specifically he expressed the view that both the 
(in house) designers and the main contractor were in comparatively 
"weak positions" vis-a-vis the client. The former' he felt were 
inexperienced in this type of work: "(they've) been 'shoved through 
the tunnel' They've shown they can do it, but its been 
difficult". He referred to the fact that the job had been the 
"focus of attention" within the client organisations, and as such 
they could not push the main contractor for damages if the work 
was late due to the lateness of the design information. In normal 
circumstances, he felt, the main contractor "would have had a 
field day". Yet here the' combination of it being run as a 
management contract, together with the contractor's aim of 
securing future work from an important client had led to a situation 
in which the two main parties had eventually 'collaborated': the 
"unique set of circumstances" surrounding the project had meant 
that working relationships had "developed well, despite the earlier 
prOblems". In other words, the key to an understanding of the 
outcome of the PDL project appeared to be the mutual dependency 
between the central parties involved in its management. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
INTER-CASE COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS 
The previous five chapters have described in some considerable 
,detail the circumstances found and events reported on five quite 
distinct construction projects. The aim has been to provide as 
comprehensive and detailed a view as possible of the five case 
studies, in an attempt to explore fully the factors which in each 
case contribute towards an understanding of the processes at work 
in that particular project organisation. It should be re-stated 
that, in focusing upon five particular examples of construction 
project organisation and management, no attempt is being'made to 
argue for the typicality or otherwise of these cases; nor is it 
argued that the cases represent in any way discrete models on a 
continuum of 'types' of construction project organisation. Instead, 
the intention has been to fully allow for the variety of circumstances 
found and to analyse within each case the association between 
particular configurations or patterns of such circumstances and 
the course of events on that particular project. The aim of this 
current chapter is to draw together the individual cases, to 
identify and discuss common themes occurring across the case studies, 
and to highlight comparisons and contrasts with respect to these 
themes. As a prelude to this exercise, an attempt will be made 
to broadly compare and contrast the sets of circumstances found 
acrpss the five case studies. This will be done for two reasons. 
Firstly, to provide a r e s u m ~ ~ of circumstances on each case in such 
a way that allows for a direct comparison and contrast with 
circumstances found on other cases within the sample. Secondly, to 
highlight the factors that are of particular relevance to the 
subsequent inter-case analysis. The aim in this respect is to 
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provide a more concise descriptive backdrop for the later analysis and 
discussion. The procedure will be to. compare and contrast the cases 
under broad headings which. relate to the information contained in the 
earlier descriptive sections of Chapters b to 10, before turning, in 
Chapter 12, to a comparison and contrast of cases in respect of the 
structures and processes of management and of performance described in 
the latter sections of each case study chapter. 
11.1 The Projects and their Context 
The projects described in Chapters 6 tolC varied considerably 
in the nature, type, scale, duration and complexity of the work 
involved: from the smaller scale civil engineering work on the 
RAW project, where the objective was to construct an infrastructure 
of access· and drainage facilities, and where the work consisted 
entirely of external groundworks and basic structural work; to the 
larger scale PDL project where the objective was to construct a 
laboratory building with the full range of associated mechanical 
and electrical services, and where the work involved ranged from 
the excavation and laying of foundations through to the installation 
of internal fixtures and fittings. Moreover, these two specific 
projects marked respectively two important 'sectoral' distinctions 
in the sample of cases investigated: the RAW project was the only 
case studied in the civil engineering, as opposed to building, 
sector of the industry; the PDt project was the only case studied 
in the private, as opposed to public, sector. The only broad 
features that the five projects held in common were: that they 
were each 'new build' construction projects (as opposed to the 
refurbishment, maintenance or renovation of existing buildings or 
11'.2 
other types of structure); they.were each located on formerly 
unoccupied land or 'green' field sites' (and did not take place 
directly in existing occupied areas,.as might be the case on a 
maintenance or refurbishment contract); and they were each custom-
built to a client's specification (distinct in this respect from, 
for instance, speculative house-building projects). Apart from 
these broad features the projects varied considerably along a number 
of dimensions. The intention'here has been not to re-describe 
the projects according to these' dimensions, but rather to state 
by illustration the heterogeneity of the cases in the sample 
across a number of dimensions (ie 'size, type, sector, etc). 
However, it is also relevant at this point to direct attention 
to broad comparisons that can be made between the projects that 
have a significant bearing upon the interpretation of .events in 
each case. In particular, when the projects are set in their 
context a notable distinction emerges in the aims and nature of 
the projects. Specifically, the first two case studies - the 
RAW and AFU projects - were construction projects that constituted 
in each case part of a longer-term and larger-scale development 
programme being undertaken by the respective client organisations. 
The remaining three case studies were, in contrast, of construction 
projects that were one-off developments with the aim of fulfilling 
specific and immediate requirements for additional or replacement 
capacity (the NSS project, despite it being linked with a second-
stage contract, is here taken as a single development, rather than 
part of a longer-term series of projects). The RAW and AFU 
projects of course differed significantly in the type and scale of 
work involved. They also differed in their status with respect to 
the wider development programmes: the RAW project constituted 
only part of a stage of development of the programme as a whole 
(ie the advance 'works for one housing estate); the AFU project 
constituted a complete stage in itself (ie the construction in 
total of an industrial estate). However, despite these major 
differences an ',important similarity lay in'them being part of a 
continuing and wider programme of development. The client had in 
both cases commissioned work of a similar type and scale in previous 
stages of the respective programmes and was to continue to do so 
into the future. As such the work involved was of a recurrent 
nature and of a type and scale with which the clients (and 
designers) had had a good deal of direct previous experience. In 
this respect the work involved was not novel or unfamiliar. This 
is not to suggest that the two projects did not have their own 
specific r e ~ u i r e m e n t s s which significantly affected the design and 
construction processes (eg the adjustments'needed to be made 
for variable geological conditions on the RAW site). However, it 
does suggest that elements of continuity and'recurrence in the work 
involved were important underlying characteristics in each case. 
This was not so for the three other projects in the sample. 
Each of these was a single, self-contained project (or development 
as in the case of the NSS), to be designed and built to the brief 
supplied by a known and specific ~ ~ department (or departments) 
and with the aim of achieving a one-off increase in capacity in 
the short-term. While each mayor may not have been linked with 
a longer-term strategy of expansion, as single projects they were 
not part of a continuing programme of construction in the same way 
that the RAW and AFU projects were. Each, coincidentally, also 
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involved the construction of a building (or buildings in the NSS 
case) housing laboratory facilities, and as such they were more 
'services-intensive' than either the RAW project which involved 
no M & E services installation, or the AFU project where only 
essential amenities were installed. Again there were important 
differences in the nature and,scale of the work involved: the NSS 
and MTS projects were perhaps similar in scale in financial terms, 
but the two involved very different types of construction - the 
NSS project being characterised by the extensive use of a system 
method of building for many of the main structural components; 
the PDL project was perhaps more akin to the MTS project in the 
type of construction involved, but was considerably larger in 
scale. Given these major differences, however, each project did 
share the joint characteristics of it being both a one-off 
venture, and one of a distinctive and somewhat unusual type 
(ie a building-housing laboratory facilities). It is the 
nonrecurrent, distinctive and somewhat atypical nature of these 
projects that needs to be stressed here. 
As a corollary to this point, the three projects can perhaps 
be considered less 'standard' or 'routine' than the RAW and AFU 
projects. As noted in Chapter? above, the architects supervising 
the work on the AFU project referred explicitly to that type of. work 
being on the more "routine" side of the department's activities 
taken as a whole. No similar specific comment was made by those 
interviewed on the RAW project. However; the general tenor of 
the comments given concerning the nature of the work, the design 
for it and the process of construction point to a similar inter-
pretation. Additionally the work involved was in each case somewhat 
more repetitious and less fragmented than that involved in the 
construction of the three laboratory buildings: the AFU project 
involved the repeat construction of what the Site Agent called 
"basic shells" with few services; the RAW project involved a 
concentration of activity in a relatively smaller number of 
trades than in the other cases. In contrast, the laboratory 
buildings (excluding the NSS) each consisted of a single main frame 
construction, and (including the NSS) involved a more extensive 
range of types of activity - particularly in the services and 
finishing trades and in the fixtures and fittings and specialised 
equipment installed. This is not to suggest that the work involved 
on the RAW and AFU projects was any less complex, demanding or 
difficult. Rather that the characteristics of novelty, idiosyn-
crasity and fragmentation in the scope of the work being undertaken 
featured rather more significantly in descriptions given of the 
NSS, MTS and PDt projects, than they did in the descriptions given 
of the RAW and AFU projects. 
A related but distinct feature that bears mention at this 
stage is the attention drawn to the 'prestigious' nature of the three 
laboratory case stUdies. The reference to the PDt project being 
the "centre of attention" within the client organisation for 
instance, suggests a level of visibiliti and external interest in 
i t ~ ~ development over and above that found on the RAW and AFU projects. 
A similar inference can be drawn from accounts given that referred 
to the perceived importance of the NSS project for the "reputation" 
of the architect's department, and the perceived usefulness of the 
MTS project in attracting public and trade attention. These 
comments were made from varying perspectives and for varying reasons 
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and will be returned to below in a fuller discussion of the aims 
and objectives pursued on the projects. The point here is that an 
added significance was attached to these three projects which was 
related to their status as one-off and distinctive construction 
projects. 
The general point to emerge from this . section is that, 
despite wide variation in the nature, scale and type of work 
involved on the five projects studied, a broad but useful distinction 
can be drawn between, on the one hand, those projects (ie the RAW 
and AFU) which comprised part of a recurrent series of similar 
projects, and, on the other hand, those projects (ie the NSS, MTS 
and PDL) which were one-off developments, distinctive in nature and 
where the range of types of work being undertaken was extensive. 
U.2 The Participating Organisations 
Before proceeding further, a general point needs to be 
raised concerning the use of the phrase 'the client'. Specifically 
. that the generic sense in which the term tends to be used does 
not sufficiently allow for the complexity of what is the 'client 
body' in practice. A broad distinction has been made for the 
purposes. of this study, for instance, between the client organisation 
as A whole (the Local Authority, Development Corporation, etc), the 
users of the facility (the polytechnic, private companies, etc), 
and the relevant funding bodies (the Treasury, pension funds, etc). 
However, in doing so it should be recognised that this represents a 
simplification of a more complex reality. For instance, only passing 
reference has been made to the specific 'client role' performed 
by the housing and education departments (etc) in the public 
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sector projects investigated. Indeed, the implications of a more 
complex client reality have received a good deal of attention in 
more recent studies of the construction industry (cf Bryant et al 
1969, Friend et al 1974). An assessment of the implications of 
such features is beyond the scope of the current study. However, 
the existence of this complexity and of the ambiguities inherent 
in the use of the term 'the client' needs to be recognised. 
A central feature of each of the five case studies investigated 
was that the main design functions involved were undertaken in-house. 
External consultants were employed for the design and supervision 
of M & E work on two of the laboratory projects (ie the NSS and PDL) 
and also for the surveying functions on two (ie the ~ I T S S and PDL). 
Conversely in other cases, use was made of in-house services for 
the M & E work (ie the AFU and MTS; there were no M & E services 
involved on the RAW project), and for the surveying functions (ie 
the RAW, AFt! and NSS). However, in all cases the main architectural 
and (structural) engineering functions involved the employment of 
in-house specialists (the RAW project of course did not directly 
involve architectural designers; the NSS project, due to the policy 
of employing a system method, did not involve structural engineers). 
The particular configurations of patterns of internal and external 
e m p ~ o y m e n t t in each case are given more fully in Figures ".1 to 
11.5 below. The point to be emphasised here is simply that the 
client's main agents undertaking the central design functions were 
in each case in-house, directly-employed specialists rather than 
external consultants contracted specifically for the project. With 
the exception of the RAW case where civil engineering was the main 
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design discipline, it was the architectural function which was the 
central discipline in this respect. 
The previous section alluded to broad similarities and differences 
between cases in the level of experience in the particular type of 
work involved. In particular a broad distinction was drawn between 
the RAW and AFU projects on the one hand and the three laboratory 
cases on the other, as examples of recurrent and one-off projects 
respectively. No parallel distinction is to be made at this point 
with respect to the pattern of employment of clients' representatives, 
except to note that in both the RAW and AFU cases the pattern of 
employment was wholly in-house, whereas in the other three cases 
consultants were employed. Consequently to the extent that the 
management of the projects required the co-ordination of work 
undertaken by groups within distinct functional specialisms, the 
process was entirely internal to the organisation on the one hand, 
and partly external to the focal organisation on the other. 
A more significant feature appears when the projects are set 
in the context of the relationship between each design organisation 
as a whole (eg architect's department) and their respective client 
organisation. Each case was one in which all the work undertaken 
within the design organisation as a whole was· specific to the 
particular client organisation of which the design organisation was 
a part. In the NSS case for example, the Architects Department 
performed work solely for the County Council. Consequently the 
in-house design organisations were each fully dependent upon their 
client as a source of work, as opposed to undertaking work for a 
number and.range of types of client. (Taking on board the earlier 
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point about the nature of 'the client', in practice the range of 
'clients' may have extended to a number of specific local and 
central government departments - such as housing and education). 
However, in no case did the range extend beyond the umbrella 'client 
organisation' (-the County Councilor Development Corporation, for 
instance.) However the reverse was not necessarily the case. The 
client organisations as a whole did not necessarily use in-house 
facilities to design and manage client-commissioned projects. 
Consultants were employed to varying degrees to perform specific 
functions (particularly M & E and QS) both on the projects studied 
and more generally. The tendency was also noted in some cases for 
there to have been an increase in the volume of work let out to 
external consultants and for this to possibly extend to the 
performance of 'core'design functions (eg architecture) in the 
future. C o n s e ~ u e n t l y y while the 'market' for the services provided 
by the design organisation' in each case was limited to the 
performance of client-commissioned projects, the design organisations 
were to varying degrees in direct competition (or potentially in 
direct competition) with similar services provided by external 
consultants. No firm data was given in the case descriptions which 
allows for a proper comparison of the degree of dependency in this 
respect. However reference was made to this as a background 
characteristic by various individuals interviewed in all the case 
studies bar one (the RAW).' Bearing this situation in mind, an 
important feature then emerges from a comparison of the projects 
which links back to the earlier comments made concerning the 
'prestigious' nature of the work on the three laboratory cases. 
Specifically that in two of the laboratory cases - the NSS and PDt _ 
the projects were significant in scale in relation to the volume of 
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construction activity as a whole managed by the respective design 
organisations. Further, they were c o n s e ~ u e n t l y y viewed as being 
somewhat 'critical' for the maintenance or development of the client's 
in-house design capacity. In the NSS case, reference was made to 
the importance of the project in helping the department secure 
further work from a client (the pOlytechnic) which had previously 
employed outside consultants for their work. In the PDL case, 
reference was made to the importance of the project in securing a 
shift in company policy away from a reliance upon external 
consultants for the design and management of 'industrial' projects 
and towards the employment of in-house services which had hitherto 
been employed mainly on the company's 'retail' projects. The two 
differed in this respect, in that for the PDL design organisation 
a large scale, industrial project represented to some extent a new 
departure in the scale and type of work undertaken, whereas the 
same cannot be said for the design organisation on the NSS project. 
However, in both cases the inference is clearly that the projects 
had a 'wider significance that stemmed from their size in relation 
to the volume of work undertaken generally by the respective 
departments, and from their c o n s e ~ u e n t t 'strategic' significance. 
The data presented in each case do not allow for anything but the 
most tentative conclusions to be drawn in this respect, since little 
information is given concerning internal'strategic decision-making 
p r o ~ e s s e s s at higher levels within the respective client organisations. 
However the accounts given do suggest that this feature was a 
significant underlying dynamic in the view of many of those 
interviewed in each case. 
No similar observations were made with respect to the other 
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three cases in the sample. ,In the case of the MTS project, the 
Contracts Manager referred to the job being a prestisious one from 
the builder's point of view - a point that will be returned to below. 
However, no comments were made that allow the inference to be 
drawn that the projects held in any way a position of strategic 
importance for the respective design organisations. In each case 
the design organisation managed a large number and range of different 
types of construction proj ect, of which the cas'es studied were not 
atypical in either scale or type. The MTS project was perhaps 
distinctive in being a custom-built laboratory building. However 
it was not a sizeable project in itself and was both small in 
relation to the volume of work handled by the design organisation 
for the client, and by no means an exception to the types of project 
the design organisation had undertaken in the past. Similarly, 
the RAW and AFU projects - while in each case forming part of a 
broader and sizeable development programme - were not in 
themselves 'critical' to the design organisation in the same way 
that the NSS and PDL projects were perceived to be. In other words, 
the impression given that the NSS and PDt projects represented to 
all intents and purposes 'test cases' is not an impression that can 
be gleaned from accounts given of the circumstances and events 
on the MTS, RAW and AFU projects. This is not to suggest that the 
achievement of objectives on these latter three projects was in any 
way. a less important consideration than on the NSS and PDL projects. 
Rather that success or failure in achieving the objectives on these 
two particular projects was felt to have potentially wider 
implications for the position and role of the in-house design 
departments with respect to the wider client organisation. 
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Turning to the main contracting firms involved on each of the 
five projects, there were' again major differences between them along 
a number of dimensions. While the firms employed on the AFU, MTS 
and PDL projects were large contractors, operating nationally and 
with extensive interests in various sections of the construction 
industry at home and abroad, the firms employed on the RAW and NSS 
projects were much smaller and operated almost exclusively in their 
regional or local market. The firms employed on the AFU, MrS and 
NSS projects operated as 'general building contractors', while the 
firm on the RAW project specialised in the construction of marine 
and civil engineering works, and the firm on the PDL project was 
distinctive in specialising in management and fee contracts only. 
These features are cited only as illustrations of the differences 
between the firms employed as main contractor across a variety of 
dimensions, and of the factors to be borne in mind in the 
following discussion. At this stage the point to be made is that 
the firms employed differed dramatically in their size, specialisms, 
breadth of operations and types of market served. 
Following the thread of the earlier discussion, it is interesting 
to compare and contrast the status of each project with respect to 
the firm employed to undertake the work. Again circumstances varied 
considerably between cases, and the aim is not to give a complete 
p i c ~ u r e e of each case, but rather to highlight' salient characteristics 
to p ~ r a l l e l l the earlier discussion of the status of the project with 
respect to the design organisations. The first point to be made 
concerns the distinctiveness or otherwise of the project in relation 
to the type and scale of work inVOlved. Here there was no evidence . 
to suggest that the scale or type of work involved was such as to be 
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beyond the capacity and previous experience of the firms employed 
to undertake the work. The RAW and NSS projects were perhaps large 
in relation to the firms' current level of turnover., However they 
were not untypically SOl nor untypical in comparison with the types 
of work that each firm had undertaken'in the past. Steelframe, for 
instance, was a firm that to a certain extent specialised in the type 
of work involved on the NSS, project by virtue of ' a long-standing 
relationship with the County Council as client and a corresponding 
level of experience of working with the department's system method 
of building. Roadbuilders, although they, tended to specialise in 
, the construction of marine engineering works, had in the past 
undertaken large, one-off civil engineering projects. In the other 
three cases the projects were comparatively smaller in relation to 
the company's level of turnover, and not untypical of the types of 
projects that the companies - as' large national contractors - had 
undertaken in the past. This was perhaps most clearly the case for 
Tower Construction on the AFU p r o j e c t ~ ~ For Claypipe on the MTS 
project, the project was distinctive but small compared to other 
projects undertaken in the past. For Hardcore on the PDt project, 
to the extent that the management contracting approach tended to 
be adopted for the management of large, complex projects anyway, 
then the scale and type of work involved on the PDt project was by 
no means exceptional. 
A perhaps more significant dimension emerges when the firms are 
compared with respect to their experience of performing work for 
the same client (and design team) and - a related point - the 
significance of the projects for company objectives and strategy. On 
the latter aspect, it need hardly be mentioned ' that the general 
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economic climate at the time made the industry a 'buyer's market' 
and one in which a contract won with a large and influential public 
sector client was 'good news' for the firms· concerned. Each of 
the clients in the five cases studied was indeed 'an important client' 
from the builders' point of view in terms of their high levels of 
expenditure on new and remedial construction work. The focus varied 
from the national importance of the BSO as the main agent for central 
government-commissioned projects such as the MTS, to the local 
significance of the County Council as a source of work for firms 
like Steelframe employed on the NSS project. However in all cases 
a level of dependency on the client for current and future work 
underpinned the relationship between the parties to the contract. 
The degree of dependency in this respect· differed between cases -
both in relation to the current significance'of each project with 
respect to the company concerned, and in relation to the importance 
of the client as a continual past (and potential future) source 
of work. On the first point, there was a marked difference 
between those firms for whom the projects studied were significantly 
large in relation to their current level of turnover (Roadbuilders 
and Steelframe on the RAW and NSS projects respectively) and the rest. 
On the second point, a continuing dependence upon the client as a 
source of work was most noticeable in the relationship between 
Steelframe and the County Council in the NSS case. However it 
was-also noticeable in the relationship between the client and 
contractor in the AFU and MTS cases, where the current project 
formed one in a series of recent construction projects commissioned 
by the client for which the main' contractor had been employed. 
Furthermore, there was the anticipation- expressed explicitly in 
some cases, more'implicit in others - that this relationship would 
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continue. In other words, having'undertaken (successfully) one 
or a couple of projects for the same client, then the firm's chances 
of being re-employed in future would possibly be enhanced or at 
least maintained. This anticipation was most clearly manifested in 
the PDL case, where the strategic intention was to exploit the 
opportunity'available for capturing a major share of the projects 
commissioned in the future by that particular client. However similar 
strategic intentions also formed part of the backdrop in other cases: 
in the MTS case, for instance, specific reference'was made to the 
importance of the project in winning back client orders after a 
previous and unsuccessful project; in the NSS case the expectation 
was that experience on that project would enhance the firm's chances 
of successfully bidding for the follow-up work; in the AFU case 
the possibility was there of obtaining future orders for work on the 
continuing factory development programme, or other (eg housing) 
programmes undertaken by the Corporation; the same was presumably 
true for Roadbuilders in the RAW case, although here events took a 
rather dramatic turn'with the collapse of the company. The general 
point to be stressed here is 'simply that, while the projects 
varied in their direct significance for the firms undertaking them 
(as a proportion of turnover) and in the extent to which they were 
part of a wider current dependence'upon the client (in terms of 
the volume of work undertaken for that client), in each case they 
assumed a strategic importance by virtue of the client being an 
important and continual source of work in general. In this sense, 
while the projects were each - from the main contractors' viewpoint 
- won as single, one-off contracts, they each represented one in a 
series of actual or hoped for and anticipated future transactions 
with the client organisation. 
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As a corollary to variation in the level of current and past 
dependency upon the client as a source of work, there was variation 
too in the patterns of experience of each of the participating 
organisations (and individuals) of working with each other. Again 
the most long-standing of relationships was that between the County 
Council's Architects Department and Steelframe on the NSS project, 
where the prior experience of working together had been extensive 
at both an organisational and individual level. On the AFU and 
MTS projects working relationships were also to some extent 
characterised by prior experience and some degree of familiarity -
again both between organisations and respective team members. It 
was only the RAW and PDL projects which constituted a completely 
novel and unfamiliar pattern of working relationships between 
organisations and individuals (this refers only to the relationship 
between the in-house design team and main contractor. In the PDL 
case, the consultants had had extensive prior experience of 
performing work for the client - in some cases in conjunction with 
their in-house team; and the PQS consultancy had at least worked 
with Hardcore before.) This point is relevant since the initial 
stages of the projects' development in each case were notable for 
the learning processes which underscored interaction between the 
parties: in the RAW case this was manifested in the head-on clash 
between the parties' two senior representatives; in the PDL case 
this was reflected in comments directed towards the early lack of 
"communication". In contrast, a level of familiarity and prior 
experience of working together in the MTS case, for instance, 
informed the main contractor's approach towards the management of 
this contract: note the account given of the Site Agent's remit to 
keep "nagging" at the design team for information and instructions. 
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Again i ~ ~ should be stressed that patterns of working relationships 
between organisations, groups and individuals differed considerably 
in the extent to which prior experience formed a part. However, the 
notion of recurrence or non-recurrence applied to the pattern of 
working relationships between parties appeared to be a relevant 
dimension in the study of the dynamics of the processes of 
interaction in each case. 
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" '.3 The Pre-Site Design and Planning Process 
The previous two sections have attempted to compare and contrast 
the cases investigated with respect to the broad context within which 
the projects were undertaken. In doing so, attention has centred upon, 
firstly, the nature of the project in terms of the aims it represented 
and the extent to which it was distinctive and non-recurrent. Secondly, 
upon the participating organisations' involvement in terms of the 
extent to which the project represented part of a continuing and 
longer-term dependency upon the client organisation, and its significance 
in this respect; and the extent to which it represented a 'new 
departure': both in the type and scale of work and in the pattern 
of inter-organisational relationships established to undertake the 
work. The argument that is being pursued is that these issues high-
light factors which are of critical importance in an understanding 
of events during construction across the five cases investigated. This 
section deals with a third set of features which, it is argued, also 
have an important bearing upon subsequent events in each case - namely 
the situation and circumstances as they were in the period prior to 
that which is the focus of attention in this study (ie the construction 
period). It should be reiterated at this point that the 'database' 
from which comparisons and contrasts are to be drawn consists of 
information obtained from relevant documentation backed up by 
e n t i ~ e l y y retrospective accounts of the processes involved prior to 
construction. As such the 'data' is both lacking in full detail with 
respect to the processes involved, and selective rather than system-
atic in scope - reflecting a strategy of exploring the 'pre-history' 
of specific issues that emerged during construction, rather than giving 
a panoramic view of the pre-construction period itself. The reliance 
upon retrospective accounts in turn suggests a caution in interpreting 
past events on account of the potential for distortion arising from 
ex poste rationalisation and selective recall on the part of those 
interviewed. This section intends briefly to highlight salient features 
of each of the projects studied in respect of three broad sets of 
issues: firstly, the nature of the work involved and characteristics 
of the design process - specifically the degree of 'overlap' between 
design and construction stages; secondly, the tendering arrangements 
and the procedures involved in the letting of the main contract; 
thirdly, features of the main contractor's plans of work drawn up 
during tendering, and in particular; the pattern of subcontracting. 
The first series of points concern the nature of the work and 
the status of the design for it in each case. As noted earlier, the 
three laboratory cases included in the sample were distinct in the 
level and intensity of services work involved. They were also distinct 
to the extent that the work involved was less recurrent, less 
repetitive across the works as a whole and more fragmented in the 
types and numbers of trades involved than that found in the two 
remaining cases (the RAW and AFU). This greater level of variety and 
complexity in the work was reflected in the comments reported 
concerning the nature of the design, and the extent to which the 
projects were characterised by a continuation of the design process 
into. the construction period. In the RAW c a s e ~ ~ the work was regarded 
as being fully specified by the time work began on site; in the AFU 
case, there was some 'overlap', although the comments made by the 
architectural staff suggested that the degree of 'overlap' and its 
effects were minimal. In the three laboratory cases, however, a 
significant amount of work to be built was not fully specified by the 
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time work began on site: in both the ~ r s s s and PDt cases, this was 
related to the lack of time available for detailed design work; in 
the MTS case, reference was made to the effects of the 1-1 & E design 
process being held over until the appointment of subcontractors, 
despite there being a fully detailed specification available for the 
main structural work. This latter instance points to a general issue 
concerning the design process - namely, the extent to which the 
design for the services work in particular was dependent upon the more 
detailed designs and shop drawings submitted by (nominated) subcontractors 
who were only appointed relatively late on in the preconstruction 
planning period. Corresponding to this, the tendency for the design 
process for the M & E works to run concurrently with the actual process 
of construction on site. That this created problems in the co-ordination 
of work on the MTS project was made clear in the accounts given. The 
difficulties experienced were regarded as less severe in the other 
cases, although the complexity of the work in this respect and the 
potential for problems occurring in the co-ordination of services and 
main building work was nevertheless explicitly referred to. The main 
point to be stressed here, however, is that there was an important 
difference between the laboratory and non-laboratory cases in the 
sample in the extent to which-the continuation of the design process 
into the construction period emerged as an issue. In the laboratory 
cases the continuation of the services design, coupled (in two of the 
t h r e ~ ~ cases) with an initially incomplete detailed design for the main 
building work put greater emphasis upon the co-ordination of design 
and construction processes while work on site progressed. In the other 
cases either a clearer demarcation between the stages or the more 
straightforward characteristics of the work involved - Or both - served 
to reduce the potential difficulties arising from problems in design/ 
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construct co-ordination. As a corollary, the perceived potential for 
variations occurring in the design for the works was somewhat less in 
the two non-laboratory cases - a factor related to the somewhat more 
straightforward nature of the work, but also to the rather more fixed 
and definitive designs for the works, stemming from the projects' 
recurrent nature and their basis in a 'non user-specific' brief. In 
general terms, the design and construction processes in these cases 
were more loosely 'coupled' than they were in the three laboratory 
cases. In those cases a closer relationship between the ongoing design 
process and construction on site was to be expected, and its effects 
were evidenced in the accounts given. 
The second series of points concern the tendering arrangements 
for the letting of the main contract. In all cases bar one (the PDt), 
the main contract was let under a 'standard' form of building contract 
(the ICE or JeT conditions), folloWing a process which had involved the 
choice of the lowest bid for the work from a shortlist of selected 
firms. 2 As such the process followed a 'traditional' pattern of 
letting arrangements in which the main contractor was not involved in 
the early broad and detailed design stages of the project and their 
role in the continuing design process was limited to putting in requests 
for detailed and additional information needed for current and advance 
planning of the work on site. The use of a management form of contract 
on tpe PDt case was quite distinct in this respect in that the main 
contract was n ~ g o t i a t e d ; ; the terms and conditions under which the firm 
was employed as managing contractor reflected their role as a member 
organisation of the client's team; and their involvement in the project 
commenced at a much .earlier stage than that of the firms in the other 
cases - their role in the design process then being much more direct 
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and extensive. An additional but related feature of the PDt project 
was the change that occurred a ~ ~ the tendering/detailed planning stage 
that arose due to the client company decision to reduce the budget 
available for the project. In the four other cases, the main contract 
was let under a set of terms and conditions that contained a fixed 
programme period for completion and, once the contract was awarded, a 
set price for the work. In the PDt case, in contrast, the change in 
the financial target for the work occurred subsequent to the main 
contract negotiation and very much at the eleventh hour in the 
pre-construction design and planning processes. The implications of 
this change were described more fully in the accounts reported in 
ChapterlC. For the purposes of this discussion the point is to note 
that it was only in the case of the PDL project that the baseline 
performance criteria were changed in any way once the main contractor 
was appointed. In other cases, the procedure involved the main 
contractor submitting a price for the work to be produced within a 
contractually-specified time limit, from which point the time and 
cost targets to be achieved for the work were set. 
The final series of points to be made in this section concern the 
main contractor's plans for completion of the work and, in particular, 
the use of subcontracting. Again the PDt case was highly distinctive 
given the purely managerial role performed by the main contractor. 
Apart from providing a direct labour gang to pe'rform 'general services I 
on site, the work was subcontracted (to about 40 firms) in its entirety. 
The main contractor's central aim was to ensure that the contractually-
agreed programme for completion was met. In doing so the main 
contractor performed a key role in managing the two-way flow of 
information between the design team and subcontractors. In managing 
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the process of construction on site, emphasis was attached to the role 
performed by the main contractor in planning in detail the work to be 
done to individual subcontractors' own programme completion dates and 
in. co-ordinating the separate trades work across the site as a whole. 
This specialisation in the actual process of managing construction 
rather than undertaking any of the work directly was a key feature 
of the PDt case, and one which distinguishes it from the other four 
cases in the sample. In these cases some combination of directly 
u n d e r t l ~ i n g g the work ( e s p ~ c i a l l y y in the main trades - eg groundworks, 
joinery, bricklaying), and subcontracting particular specialisms 
was the norm. However, even in these cases; the use of subcontracting 
as a mechanism to perform the work appeared t9 be a widespread modus 
operandi. The reasons underlying the decisions as to whether to 
subcontract or perform various aspects of the work directly - and 
whether this reflected project-specific considerations or broader 
strategic considerations within the f i ~ h a v e e not been given here and 
are beyond the scope of this study (for a fuller discussion of this 
topic see, for example, Bresnen et al 1985).' The point here is that 
each of the cases investigated involve the quite extensive use of 
subcontracted firms - variously providing labour, plant and/or 
materials to perform the work. The complete use of subcontracting in 
the PDt case was an extreme manifestation of this, and a central 
feature of the contractual method employed. A further feature is that 
all the cases bar the RAW and MTS projects involved the employment of 
formally nominated subcontractors to perfor.m work - mainly in the more 
specialist services and finishing trades (eg mechanical and electrical 
services, ceilings, windows installation). In the MTS case, the 
absence of nominations was the consequence of the specific terms and 
conditions employed (ie GC/Works/l), although here an element of tacit 
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recognition, in practice,. of nominations was a feature of accounts 
given on the project. In the NSS case in particular, but also in the 
AFU case to some extent, the use of nomination extended further to 
the employment of materials and component suppliers - in the AFU 
case, this was reflected in the use of 'preferred' suppliers of 
fittings. In the PDL case, the use of a management form of contract 
meant that all subcontractors were formally nominated, and employed 
under the corresponding set of terms and conditions used for nomin-
ations in a more 'traditional' setting. 
The point here is that the main contractor's role in each case 
included a significant emphasis upon the forward planning and on-site 
integration of subcontracted firms' work. With the employment of both 
nominated and/or domestic subcontractors to perform the bulk of the 
work in all five cases, the main contractor's role was concerned with 
providing a largely management-only input to the performance of the 
work, as opposed to directly undertaking the bulk of the work itself. 
The use of nominated subcontractors differed in the extent to which 
the responsibility for their work was shared with the design team 
representatives. However, with both nominated and domestic subcon-
tractors the central feature was that the performance of this management 
function was based upon a relationship that was external to the main 
contracting organisation involved, rather than contained within an 
internal hierarchy. The underlying mechanism was the contractual 
exchange relationship between the parties which specified the terms 
and conditions of employment for the duration of the construction 
period, and not authority relations based upon an internal hierarchical 
chain of command. 
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II .4 The Design Organisation 
The main series of points to be made in this section conc:ern:';:the 
process of design and the patterns of involvement of design personnel 
in that process; also the relationship between the design and 
construction stages in the organisation and management of the project. 
Taking the latter point first, it was only in the case of the RAW 
project that a clear distinction existed between the teams of in house 
staff involved in the pre-construction design process and the 
construction stage itself. In that case, the team involved in 
construction supervision took over from where the design team left off. 
In all the other cases, those involved directly in the project's 
design - the architectural and engineering staff - were directly 
involved in the job's supervision through to completion and handover. 
The situation on the MTS project differed noticeably in this respect 
to the extent that the ESC's secondment practices meant a de facto 
distinction between design and construction supervision personnel. 
However, even in this case, while individual role-holders changed 
during the course of the project cycle, the organisational location 
of participants did not. It was only in the RAW case that the 
disjuncture between design and construction stages of the project 
was matched by an organisational separation of roles - into design 
team and construction supervisory personnel (the secondment of the 
desisn engineers to the site was, as noted, specifically geared to 
staff training and development needs). In all other cases a change 
in the role performed by the client's representatives was the 
significant feature: the architect's role, for instance, changed in 
nature from designer to supervisor as the functions inVOlved changed 
from design to construction supervision. Similarly for the other 
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specialists seconded to the project management team. This continuity of 
involvement across stages of the project cycle and the consequent change 
in roles performed by members of the client's team, contrast with the 
more explicit demarcation found in the RAW case. Unfortunately, this 
demarcation makes it difficult to explore in much detail the pre-site 
design process and organisation in the RAW case, since few of those involved 
at that stage were interviewed. However, the stage-related pattern of 
involvement is itself of some interest. For each project such as the RAW 
project, design engineers from the appropriate group were seconded to the 
project team to prepare a detailed design for the works which was based 
upon an advance works brief translated by the two co-ordinating groups from 
broader architectural plans for the site. From there the construction 
engineering section took over, seconding to the site a team of staff to 
supervise the actual construction of the works. Due to the very specific 
nature of the work involved, there was no direct continuing involvement of 
staff from other specialisms (eg architecture, planning, design engineering) 
during the course of construction in the same way that there was during the 
construction of the other four projects in the sample. Instead, the team 
supervising the construction of the work was contained ~ i t h i n , , and seconded 
from, a single organisational subunit - namely the construction engineering 
section of the relevant construction group within the division. It was 
consequently more uni-disciplinary in its composition. 
The implications of this more 'unitary' organisational context 
during construction on the RAW project will be returned to below. At 
the moment it is noticeable how this pattern of involvement contrasts 
with that found in the other four cases in the sample. In those cases, 
project team members followed the project through from its initial 
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design stages to completion (excepting that the direct involvement 
of particular specialists - eg structural engineers - was of shorter 
duration than others). As with the RAW project, staff were also 
seconded on a job-by-job basis, although in the other four cases 
this was less specific to the type of work undertaken (cf the 
specialisation in the"RAW case between groups involved in the 
design and management of Riverside projects and those performing other 
operational and service work). More significantly however, the 'teams' 
as such consisted of (groups of) personnel from quite distinct 
fUnctional groupings who were seconded to the team (variously on a 
full- or part-time basis) either from departments within the in house 
design organisation, or from external consultancies which had been 
contracted to undertake design and/or supervision work on the project. 
(It should be noted here that the focus is upon the four central 
functions involved - namely architecture, (structural) engineering, 
services engineering and surveying - although it is recognised that 
the 'team' did not in all cases consist solely of members of these 
four disciplines.) Leaving aside for the moment the issue of whether 
the relationship was an internal or external one, the project team 
in each case consisted of a multidisciplinary group of specialists, 
backed up by their own teams of designers and technicians, whose 
involvement continued to varying degrees across the stages of the 
project cycle as a whole, and who undertook complementary functions 
gearQd towards the achievement of project objectives. As such the 
structure of roles and relationships established amongst members of the 
project team exhibited characteristics indicative of the existence of 
matrix management as broadly defined by Knight (1977). That is, 
each senior specialist with their departmental teams was seconded 
(full- or part-time) from their own section to act as the representative 
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responsible for overseeing the work connected with that specialism 
on the project. In the case of those involved part-time, their 
concurrent activities extended to work on other departmental projects 
at various stages of development. Once individual projects were 
completed (or that section's work on them finished) their direct 
involvement ended. The 'home base' in each case was the relevant 
section within each department, and the 'resource manager' (following 
the matrix scheme) was the section head. The individual who 
co-ordinated the project-specific contributions was in each case the 
designated (architectural) Project Manager, and the relevant project 
axis of the matrix corresponded to the chain of command .. within the 
architectural department. ~ { h i l e e some of these relationships were 
external to the focal in house organisation (where M & E and PQS 
consultants were employed), organisationally a similar pattern 
existed with senior individual representatives becoming part of the 
project management team. In both cases (internal and external) the 
representatives managed their own team of designers and technicians 
to undertake the work. Unfortunately no details were obtained on the 
organisational structure and process of management in this respect, 
and consequently no attempt at analysis of this aspect will be made 
here. A similar caveat needs to be made concerning the placement 
and secondment practices of senior specialist staff within each 
design organisation as a whole. In taking the construction project 
as tpe unit of analysis, little information was obtained on the p a t ~ ~
terns of involvement of senior staff (eg whether full- or part-time) 
across the wider range of projects undertaken. Given these limit-
ations, what is interesting to note about the structure of the design 
organisation in each case is the centrality of the architectural 
design discipline in providing the 'core' around Which individual 
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project teams were organised, and the role of senior architectural 
staff as those primarily responsible for the co-ordination of 
project work across the disciplines involved. What this suggests is 
a pattern of matrix management ostensibly similar in broad outline to 
Sayles' (1976) ~ n t e r n a l l consulting services model', with the notable 
exception that the relationships were in some instances external to 
the focal organisation. Hore generally the pattern. reflects features 
characteristic of Knight's (1977) 'secondment model' of matrix 
management in which the balance of power tilts more in the direction 
of the project, rather than fUnctional, hierarchy.3 
However, at the same time, this broad categorisation is mis-
leading, since what is particularly interesting about the five cases 
studied is·the nature and extent of their variation with regard to 
these dimensions of matrix management. Of particular importance are 
the position, role and authority of the Project Manager in relation 
to representatives from other specialisms both within and between 
cases. An illustration of these differences is given vhen circum-
stances on the NSS project are contrasted with those on the AFU, MTS 
and PDt projects. The implications of differences along these lines 
will be explored more fully in the later section that compares case 
histories and the dynamics of the relationship between the main 
parties during the construction period. However the issue is worth 
noting at this point since it is one that assumes a particular 
prominence in the accounts given in each case. In the NSS case, the 
internal structure of the design· organisation was such that in house 
staff were seconded from specialist teams within the architectural 
division to project teams under the direct jurisdiction of an 
architectural Project Manager. The surveying division in this case 
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performed a direct role in pre-contract and post-contract administration, 
but only an indirect role with respect to work undertaken during 
construction. Senior staff within that division retained functional 
authority over members of the surveying team within the architectural 
division; they also performed a 'maintenance' role within the department 
as a whole, being responsible for staff resources and development. 
However, the core project teams consisted of specialist staff within 
the architectural division whose work on specific projects came under 
the direct and full jurisdiction of senior architectural staff. The 
position of the Project Manager in this case extended beyond that of 
being responsible for co-ordinating the work undertaken by specialists 
seconded from separate departments, to a position of more direct 
influence over in house project team members' contributions. The 
employment of M & E consultants in that case corresponded more closely 
to the conditions under which the architectural Project Manager 
performed a 'co-ordination' role. However, the internal structure 
reflected much more closely conditions consistent with a more central-
ised and unitary pattern of control over project team members' 
contributions. As such, the influence of the Project Manager was more 
direct, and the project axis much more clearly the basis of organ-
isation within the department as a whole. 
In the three remaining cases, in contrast, the accounts given 
suggested a much more fragmented pattern'of control, consistent rather 
more with conditions associated with the 'co-ordination model' end 
of the matrix continuum. In the MTS case in particular, explicit 
reference was made to the difficulties experienced stemming from the 
lack of control over the contributions of design specialists (partic-
ularly the M & E) seconded to the project design team, suggesting 
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that the 'co-ordination' role expected to be performed by architectural 
design team staff was hindered by the relative autonomy of these 
specialist sections within the overall design organisation. In the 
AFU case, the implications of similar difficulties emerging were hinted 
at in comments directed towards early 'internal problems' within the 
design organisation, Slthough the lack of data on this point precludes 
anything but the most tentative suggestion that this reflected a 
manifestation of conditions latent in the structure of organisation. 
Perhaps more significantly in this case and in this respect is the 
observation that the management of the M & E function operated in a 
parallel fashion during the course of the construction period, and was 
somewhat distinct from the main architectural chain of command in this 
respect. A similar observation can perhaps be made concerning the 
M & E function on the PDL project, although here an external consultant 
was employed, rather than design services being provided in house. 
Internally, it should be noted that many of the comments made concerning 
the early lack of' "communication" within the'team. as a whole were set 
in the context of' the totality of relationships within the architect/ 
structural engineer/main contractor'triumvirate, and not simply directed 
towards the design team/main contractor relationship. To the extent 
that the problems were located in the relationship between in house 
design groups, then this would point to a similar interpretation 
concerning the rather more limited role and influence of the architect-
ural.staff as co-ordinators of the 'project team'. when compared with, 
say, conditions in the NSS case. 
The above comments are not intended to permit the location of 
each of' the five project design teams along a continuum of patterns 
of matrix management such as described by Sayles (1976), Knight {1977} 
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or Galbraith (1973). The data obtained do not allow for such a full 
classification. Nor, since the focus is on specific projects, do they 
allow for a consideration' of the broader structural features of the 
design organisation in each case. Furthermore, the data suggest a 
variety of circumstances within each case: in the NSS case, for 
instance, distinctions emerge when one compares the internal structure 
of relationships on the one hand with the use of independent and 
separate external consultants on the other. The intention is instead 
to assess broad relative tendencies in the project teams' configurations 
across the cases. What the above commentary does suggest is that the 
tendency on the MTS, AFU and PDL projects was for there to be a much 
more fragmented pattern of control exercised over the performance of 
work'on these projects, than,that exhibited in both the RAW and NSS 
cases. While the architectural (or civil engineering in the RAW case) 
design team formed the 'core' of the project team, and while their 
senior members were the central figures in co-ordinating work across 
the various disciplines involved, their position vis-a-vis other 
departments varied: the' more 'direct influence of senior staff on the 
RAW and NSS cases over team members' contributions, contrasts with the 
greater degree of functional (and/or organisational) autonomy of the 
separate specialisms within'each of the other three cases. As such, 
the tendency in the former cases was for a pattern of matrix manage-
ment that exhibited characteristics symptomatic of a move towards the 
'secDndment model' end of the matrix c o n t i n u u m ~ ~ whereas the tendency 
in the latter cases was for a pattern exhibiting characteristics 
symptomatic of a move towards the 'co-ordination model' end of the 
matrix continuum. 
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1'.5 The Main Contractors' Organisation 
In contrast to the more fragmented pattern of control found 
within the design team in each case, the organisation established for 
the management of work on site by each of the main contracting organ-
isations followed a more unitary and cohesive pattern •. For each project 
a team of .site staff, most of whom were transferred from completed 
projects elsewhere (as o ~ p o s e d d to being recruited or seconded from 
head office departments), were brought together to manage the work 
under the direction of a Site Agent acting as the company's senior 
representative on site. Head office staff who had been involved as 
key members of the 'management team' in the planning and tendering 
period prior to work starting on site (ie the Planner, Engineer, 
Surveyor, Buyer etc) then performed a largely administrative support 
role for the site management team acting in the field. In a manner 
similar to that described for the client's 'staff involved on the RAW 
project, the teams involved in project planning and construction site 
management were separated to some extent. In the main contractors' 
case, the firms' Contracts Departments took over as the 'line' manage-
ment for each project, while head office planning personnel performed 
staff roles in providing services or information requested from site 
on an ad hoc basis, and retained functional authority with respect to 
the administrative procedures adopted (for personnel management, 
reqqisition procedures, etc). The most significant direct part played 
by head office staff was in managing the flow of resources to the site 
- via materials and plant requisition procedures. Otherwise each site 
team operated with a considerable degree of autonomy in conducting the 
detailed management of operations on site - information on progress 
being fed back to the variety of head office staff providing 'back up' 
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support services, but the most direct channel for communication 
between site and head office being via the Contracts Department 
hierarchy. Given the more indirect part played by head office staff 
in the management of work on site, there were few examples of the 
relationships described extending to a more direct and influential 
level of functional influence in the performance of work on site that 
would be symptomatic in any way' of the existence of a dual structure 
of command. While it has been argued that functional authority 
relationships may be included under the umbrella term of matrix 
management (Knight 1977), in most cases this appeared to be the 
limit to the level of direct influence exerted over the site manage-
ment team by functional specialists and, as such, indicative of only 
very incipient matrix features. 
However, one o ~ ~ two instances did occur in which a duality of 
reporting relationships appeared to be a significant feature. 
Interestingly, these instances pertained in all cases to the perfom-
ance of the financial/contract administration function performed on 
site by QS staff. In the RAW and PDt projects, both senior surveyors 
were seconded on a part-time basis from their r e s ~ e c t i v e e head office 
departments. Tbey were not resident on site and their concurrent 
activities extended to performing work related to other projects at 
various stages in their development. The same was the case for the 
MTS and NSS projects, although here these activities were performed 
. 
directly by staff supervising the job from head office level - the 
tendency not to employ specialist surveyors on site being a consequence 
of the limited scale of the work involved in each case. Only in the 
AFU case was the performance of this function contained wholly within 
the scope of the site team, and resident staff employed full-time to 
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undertake the financial measurement and evaluation of the work. 
Elsewhere, the performance of the surveying function was distinctive 
in the extent to which it stood apart from the more operational side 
of the site management team by virtue of the level and nature of head 
office staff involvement in its performance. What is interesting 
about the RAW and,particularly,the PDL projects in this respect is 
the inference - from the comments made concerning the role and 
position of surveying staff on each project - that there existed 
to some extent a 'distance' between the surveying and'operational' 
staff on each site. It will be recalled that on the RAW project 
the QS described his own involvement with other members of the site 
team as "minimal" in a situation in which the day-to-day management 
of the work was characterised bya high level of direct, personal 
contact between staff on the production, engineering and administrat-
ive sides. On the PDL project, reference was made to a slight status 
differential that existed between the financial and operational staff. 
Such a distinction provides an illustration of Sayles and Chandlers' 
(1911) discussion of the distinction between "business system" and 
"technical system" role-holders. The RAW case is particularly pertinent 
in this respect since the account given of relationships within the 
site team centres upon just such a distinction in orientation that 
contributed towards a conflict of interest between financial and 
operational staff. In that case the Site Agent represented the former 
set 9f interests in his capacity as being r e s p o n s i b l ~ ~ for overseeing 
the firm's financial progress on the project. As a more general 
comment, it would appear - given the position and role of financial 
staff across the projects and their position as "aides" or "advisors" 
to the company's senior. representative on site - that the 'balance of 
power' within each team was tilted more heavily in favour of "business 
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system" considerations. Given the centrality of the contractual 
dimension to an understanding of the process of management in constr-
uction this is by no means surprising. What however is noticeable is 
the extent to which this was manifested - in all bar the AFU case -
in an organisational configuration of roles and relationships that 
drew out the distinctiveness of "business system" role-holders in an 
otherwise more unitary pattern within the organisational subunit set 
up to m ~ a g e e the construction process. In other words the distinct-
iveness of the surveying function and of the individuals employed to 
undertake it, and the close working relationship with the senior site 
representative coupled with retained links with head o f f i c ~ m a r k e d d
out the performance of this role from others undertaken within the 
construction site management team. 
With the exception of the surveying staff, for most of the staff 
employed by the main contractor in each case, the pattern was of a 
more straightforward and unitary configuration of relationships, in 
which the Site Agent performed the central co-ordinating role in 
managing the process of construction on site, and the main point of 
contact with visiting and head office based staff. In the earlier, 
larger cases studied - the RAW and AFU cases - the reported level of 
'site discretion' in taking project-related decisions was high, and 
the teams were in general agreement that the site operated with a 
significant level of autonomy with respect to their head offices - in 
effect acting as self-contained, autonomous project units within the 
wider organisation. In the two smaller projects - the MTS and NSS 
cases - the level of involvement of head office supervising (and 
surveying) staff was more pronounced in the sense that more frequent 
and regular contact with the site team occurred. In the NSS case this 
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was manifested in a greater level of head office staff involvement 
in contractual dealings with third parties - a situation that arose 
largely as a consequence of the loss of the Site Agent from the project 
and the problems reported by the main contractor's staff in their 
dealings with the designers. In the larger PDt case too, the involve-
ment of the visiting Contracts Manager centred largely round monitoring 
the financial progress of the work and undertaking contractual deal-
ings with third parties in conjunction with the company's surveyor. 
In the first two cases - the RAW and AFU projects - these activities 
in contrast were devolved more fully to the level of the site. It 
was the Site Agent (together with the semi-resident and resident QS 
respectively) who in each case conducted,'negotiations with clients' 
representatives and subcontractors and whose remit emphasised their 
role in the financial management of the project on behalf of the firm. 
Given the difficulties in establishing a basis for comparability 
between cases in the absence of more exact data, it is difficult to 
conclude that authority was more decentralised in these cases. 
However, given the general tenor of the comments and drawing a broad 
distinction between the site and head office level in each case, it 
appeared to be the case that a greater level of site team autonomy 
was in evidence in the RAW and AFU cases, when compared with the 
situation on the two smaller projects, and, for reasons related to 
the distinctiveness of the management form, the PDt case. A further 
andxelated point is that variation in the level of inVOlvement in 
this respect was linked to the management of the contract as opposed 
to the direct management of operational work on site. The general 
point to be raised from this discussion is that the more significant 
part played by senior company staff in the management of the project 
may have been a feature of the smaller scale of the work (as in the 
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MTS and NSS cases), a response to a change in the organisation and/or 
problems in external relationships (in the NSS case) or the specific 
characteristics of the arrangement employed (in the PDt case). 
However in all cases, it was the contractual dimension in the 
management of work on site that tended to form the nexus in the 
continuum between local site autonomy and more direct central office 
control. 
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Footnotes 
1 In fact the ARE who was interviewed did express his belief that 
a future intention was a merger of the Council's housing and 
transport engineering design capacity, whi'ch would lead to a 
reduction in overall in-house capacity. 
2 The GC/Works/1 form is here included despite its 
dissimilarities, due to the essential similarity of the 
tendering and contract-letting processes. 
3 Given that the project hierarchy was contained within the 
'core' (ie architectural) function. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
AN INTER-CASE ANALYSIS 
The previous two sections have looked at the broad structural 
configurations of the 'design' and 'construction' teams established to 
manage the work on site, and in particular concentrated upon the extent 
to which the location and role of participant team members in each case 
contributed towards a fragmentation of control over the construction process. 
In this respect, the central point to emerge is the contrast between the 
existence of a 'model' of organisation within the design team in which 
features symptomatic of a variety of forms of matrix management occurred, 
and the more unitary and cohesive 'model' found within each contractors' 
team, bearing in mind the broad "business system" - "technical system" 
distinction referred to. The aim of this section is to provide an overview 
of the process of construction management across the cases, with particular 
attention directed towards patterns of lateral interaction amongst the 
participants from the various organisations involved. 
11.1 The Organisation and Management of Work on Site 
The first theme that should emerge from a review of the relevant 
sections in each case concerns the intricate nature of the process of 
management itself at the operational level and in particular the complex 
of factors and changes in circumstances influencing the performance of 
organisational work on site. The essentially static picture given of the 
process of management in each case does not l e ~ d d itself fully to exploring 
. 
either the variety of factors taken into account in planning the work at 
various stages of the construction cycle, given the range and shift in 
the types of work involved (ie through substructure - superstructure -
services - finishing - external trades' task work), or the changes 
involved in this proces.s. 
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However, the descriptions given do suggest the relatively short-
term orientation towards the management of work on site and the 
extent to which the detailed planning of the work was highly iterative 
and dependent upon previous performance with respect to more broadly 
established interim completion dates and targets. In resourcing the 
work, a similarly complex picture emerges of the processes involved 
in ensuring that labour, plant and materials were brought together 
to perform particular tasks at the right place and'the right time, 
given the planned programme of work, current performance levels in 
relation to that work, and interdependencies with other trades. To 
the extent that such work was subcontracted, or resources obtained 
via schedules of deliveries of plant and materials to site under 
orders placed with contracted suppliers then an additional set of 
activities were associated with negotiating and agreeing contractual 
terms and conditions with third parties, organising and establishing 
schedules for construction and/or delivery, and supervising that work 
on a daily or weekly basis to ensure that the planned programme was 
adhered to - given in the meantime that current performance levels 
on site may have affected the ability to meet deadlines for delivery 
and schedules of work agreed with the third parties concerned. The 
picture is of a complex and interdependent set of activities involved 
in the management of work on site where c o n d i t i o n s ~ e r e e highly variable 
and the situation changed lite'rallY in many instances from day to 
d a y ~ ~ Add to this complexity and variability the impact of modific-
ations to the detailed design for the works on the basis of either 
directly-induced design changes or due to circumstances that emerged 
in the construction of the works itself, and one is confronted with 
a more complete picture of the difficulties associated with the 
management of construction work on site. What is particularly 
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interesting about the' entire process is the extent to which it defined 
a situation in which the management of the work as a whole involved 
participation in decision-making across organisational boundaries. 
The management of the continuing design p r o c e s s ~ ~ ~ particularly 
pertinent in this respect: in each case reference was made to the 
process of establishing detailed drawings for the works in the context 
of a contractually established specification of methods and materials 
to be employed and quality standards to be achieved. Yet to the extent 
that design details were not already firmly established (eg with M & E 
services) or variations occurred in the design or 'snags' emerged as 
the work was built on site, then a significant emphasis was put upon 
establishing in detail the work to be done on site involving each of 
the key organisations concerned (designer - main contractor -
subcontractor) in agreeing or negotiating changes to the work with 
consequent implications for their own plans of work. It was the 
undercurrent of change 'and variability in this respect and in relation 
to the broader plans established for the work that provided a central 
dynamic in the process of management during the construction cycle. 
More specifically it was the three laboratory cases in the sample in 
which such dealings during the course of construction appeared to be 
of major significance. 
The issue is then raised of'the implications of this situation 
for the patterns of interaction between parties in t h ~ ~ management of 
. 
the project - particularly insofar as problem-solving and decision-
making processes are concerned. The more general question is to 
what extent the pattern of interaction observed exhibited character-
istics assQciated with a tendency towards a more 'organic' structure 
of roles and relationships (Burns and 'Stalker 1961) within the project 
'organisation' as a whole. The first point that should emerge concerns 
the very variety and complexity of the 'patterns of interaction involved. 
This was particularly the case on the three larger projects in the 
sample in which:, larger resident site teams were employed on behalf 
of the main contractor; a greater number of clients' staff at various 
levels and from various specialisms ~ e r e e involved in the projects' 
design and supervision; and a larger number of subcontractors were 
employed - each consisting of a non-resident head office team which 
had been involved in planning out the work beforehand, and a resident 
site team which directly undertook the work. Simply taking three 
core organisations (designer, main contractor, subcontractor) each 
employing a central office staff and project site team suggests the 
level and complexity of the patterns of interaction involved by virtue 
of the mathematical possibilities (see Figure 12.1l Add to this the 
multiplicity of organisations involved in anyone case (particularly 
the number of subcontractors, but also separate design specialisms) 
and the range of possibilities becomes virtually endless. Before 
moving on, it is useful to c o ~ p a r e e the extensiveness of patterns' of 
interaction between' individuals from separate organisational 
groupings with findings obtained in other industrial and commercial 
settings (Mintzberg 1973; Stewart 1967, 1976). While this dimension 
has not been quantified, it is interesting to note the extensiveness 
of lateral, extra-organisational contacts at the 'operational level, 
s i n ~ e e such contacts in 'other settings have tended to be found to be 
more pervasive at more 'strategic' levels within the firm (Mintzberg 
1973). The extensiveness of such contacts is consistent with the 
findings that relate external contact to the level of interdependency 
between subunits within organisations (Sayles 1979, Yanouzas 1964). 
What is of interest here is the fact that such contacts are ~ r e v a l e n t t
12.4 
Figure 12..1 
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between members of separate organisational subunits. Such a degree of 
contact with 'outsiders' (Mintzberg 1973, p44) suggests perhaps a 
point of departure in the investigation of the nature of managerial 
work in construction. An exercise of charting the patterns of 
interaction and changes in them throughout the course of each 
construction cycle is well beyond the scope of this s t u ~ . . What is 
of interest are the broad tendencies and differences between cases in 
the pattern of interaction between respective team members and the 
factors which determined the levels within the total 'project organ-
isation' at which problems were solved and decisions taken. 
An important feature to note in the pattern of interorganisational 
management of projects concerns the use of 'domestic' and 'nominated' 
subcontractors to undertake major sections of the work in each case. 
In the RAW case, it was noted that members of the client's team tended 
to liaise directly with (domestic) subcontractors' representatives on 
site, as well as "work through" the main contractor in supervising 
the work and resolving any problems that arose on site. Similar 
tendencies were noted in the other (architectural) cases in which 
resident Clerks of Works and visiting Job Architects would deal,to 
varying degrees, directly with subcontractors' representatives in 
discussing the work on site and any problems that arose as much as 
'work through' the main contractor. Such tendencies would suggest a 
mor& complex pattern of lateral interaction between parties than the 
'chain of command' set up in the structure of contractual relation-
ships might imply, and to this'extent, a less structured pattern of 
working relationships between the teams. More important, however, 
was the extent to which the establishment of a detailed design for the 
works to be produced and the monitoring of the work in respect of its 
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design involved direct interaction and dealings between members of the 
design team and the subcontractors concerned. This was particularly 
the case where nominations were involved. In these instances, a more 
direct channel of communication"was set up between design team and 
subcontractor reflecting the aim of producing a detailed design for 
the works and monitoring the quality of production of (off site) 
components. In the M & E work, for instance, the establishment of a 
fully detailed design was dependent upon the preparation of detailed 
drawings and plans by the subcontractor concerning the layout and 
routing of mechanical ductwork and electricity cables. In the main 
building work the production of component units (eg windows, panels) 
involved some level of interchange over the establishment of a 
detailed architectural specification for the work in question. Indeed, 
the use of nominations reflects the intention of there being a closer 
working relationship between design team and subcontractors in the 
establishment of a detailed design. In the case of 'domestic' 
subcontractors, the assumption is rather that all de;ign dealings 
are conducted indirectly - the main contractor in effect being taken 
as the organisation which undertakes the work, whether or not the main 
contractor then chooses to subcontract that particular task or not. 
What was interesting about two of the cases in particular (the 
PDL and the MTS) was the extent then to which perceptions of the 
cont!actual position with respect to nominations had implications for 
the management of the work on site. In the PDL case, where all 
subcontractors were nominated, illustrations were given of the 
tendency for design dealings to be sometimes conducted directly between 
the design team and subcontractor, in the process causing the main 
contractor to be 'cut out' from performance of their co-ordination role. 
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In the MTS case a similar tendency was noted in some instances 
(eg the windows subcontract; the M & E work). In terms of the 
management of subcontractors, such tendencies suggest the existence 
of a duality in the control exercised over subcontracted work to 
the extent that the performance of the work involves continuing 
interaction concerning design detailing and quality control. This 
situation - with respect to architectural and services work 
nominations - is depicted in Figure 1 ~ 2 . . The types of problems that 
occurred during construction centred around the introduction of 
(minor) design changes that emerged as 'snags' later on in construc-
tiona The problem that arose with fitting the panels on the main 
frame columns in the PDt case supplies a useful illustration. In 
that instance, changes that occurred in the design in a situation 
in which there was some ambiguity as to which party was responsible 
for checking drawings and picking up 'snags' in the design, meant 
that the problem did not surface until the last possible moment. 
The argument then arose as to which party was responsible for not 
spotting the effects of the design change at a sufficiently early 
stage. The MTS case perhaps provides the clearest example of the 
extent to which the potential ambiguities of the contractual position 
led to a situation in which direct and continuing design interaction 
created problems in the construction of work on site. Interestingly, 
the MTS case also provided an example of the extent to which such 
dealings were accepted or encouraged or they were not: in the 
. 
co-ordination of M & E designs, for instance, there appeared to be a 
greater acceptance, on the part of the main contractor, of direct 
dealings between the designer and subcontractors; whereas in the 
architectural sphere, such a tendency to 'by-pass' the main contractor 
was not so readily accepted or approved of. More generally, comments 
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Figure 12..2 Patterns of Dual Management in the Performance 
of 'Subcontracted 'Work 
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were made that suggested the importance of maintaining a 'balance' 
between continuing close and direct contacts between designer and 
subcontractor to establish a detailed design for the work, and some 
level of main contractor control over that process in order to 
ensure that problems would not s u b s e q ~ e n t l y y emerge in integrating 
that work with other work on site. 
The more general point is that such a situation suggests the 
existence, or potential for existence, of a dual structure of 
management with respect to the planning, co-ordination and control 
of subcontracted work. It was interesting that the PDL and MTS cases 
provided examples of the types of problems that might emerge given 
such a dual structure, since these two projects were also the two 
that involved distinctive (and to some extent unfamiliar) patterns of 
contractual relationships. In the PDL case, all subcontractors were 
nominated, and the main contractor's role in design dealings was 
purely as a 'go-between' since the firm undertook none of the work 
directly. In the MTS case, although there were no formal nominations, 
the pattern of design dealings appeared to correspond much more 
closely to a pattern characteristic of a more 'traditional' setting. 
In that case in particular, there was interpreted as being some 
confusion, ambiguity or divergence of opinion concerning the 
respective parties' rights and obligations with respect to the 
management of subcontracted work. In the remaining three cases, the 
tendency for such problems to occur was not marked - perhaps due to 
the less complicated processes involved in the RAW and AFU project; 
but also perhaps due to the more 'traditional' contractual arrangements, 
and the clearer mutual understanding of each others' roles, previous 
experience of one another, or a combination of these factors. What 
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this suggests is that a latent contractual ambiguity in the use of 
nominated subcontractors may have been triggered by the differential 
sets of assumptions and expectations brought to a somewhat unusual type 
of arrangement by the parties involved. This led to the jurisdictional 
ambiguities noted in the MTS and PDL cases and the resultant conflicts and 
arguments. It is not intended here to explore in detail the occurence of 
conflict or co-operation between the parties in this respect. However, 
it is relevant to note the existence of jurisdictional ambiguities at the 
inter-organisational level (Kochan et al 1975) and the tendency for these 
to occur in the context of shared control (Filley and House 1969; Kochan 
et al 1975) over the design and construction of subcontracted work. 
The more general point is that such conditions reflect the tendency 
towards a matrix pattern of management at the inter-organisational level 
in which the two main parties (designer, main contractor) both exert some 
level of direct control over the design and construction processes for 
nominated work. It was interesting that the employment of the main 
managing contractor to perform an 'integrator role' in the PDt case 
represented the adoption of a structural mechanism to avoid the problems 
stemming from potential ambiguities. Whereas the ~ 1 T S S case was one in 
which some pattern of mutual adjustment to the formal contractual position 
formed the mechanism. What is of further interest in both cases is the 
way in which differential assumptions and expectations of the parties' 
roles informed their approach towards this issue in a situation in which 
an ostensibly definitive, but at the same time relatively novel and 
unfamiliar, administrative arrangement was used. It was the particular 
sets of assumptions made in each case which formed the basis for a move 
away from the formal contractual position which stressed a delineation 
of each parties' rights and obligations, towards a more flexible - but 
also more ambiguous - arrangement, in which the 'potential for problems 
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stemming from dual control over the work was realised. In other words, 
differences in orientation towards the management of the design process 
with respect to subcontracted work tended to promote conditions in which 
jurisdictional ambiguities stemming from shared control of the total 
design - construction process were realised. 
12.2 Roles and Relationships within the Inter-organisational Matrix 
Figure 12.2 above illustrates some differences between the 
pattern of design management and supervision for architectural and 
M & E nominated work. The difference between the two is that in the 
latter case it operates at one step removed from the central project 
'hierarchy'. The implications of this have been touched upon in 
referring to the situation on the MTS project. The intention here is 
to explore more fully the structure of management established for the 
M & E works since the picture compliments further the picture of 
fragmentation in the control exercised by the design team described in 
the earlier section,I'.4. What is particularly interesting about the 
M & E side is its location within a discrete functional discipline. 
This was viewed as having implications for.patterns of interaction across 
organisational boundaries for the performance of this work and for its 
integration with the main building work. Taking as an example the PDt 
case, what was noticeable about the M & E side was that the M & E 
consultant, the main contractor's Services Manager, and subcontractor 
. 
site (and to some extent head office) representatives formed the key 
figures in the management of the M & E design and construction process 
- forming an identifiable sub-grouping within the project organisation 
as a whole. Where problems arose with the design and construction of 
the works that had no direct implications for the architectural design, 
the budget or the programme of works, it tended to be this sub-group which 
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were directly involved in resolving them. The PDt case was distinctive 
from the other cases in the sample in the fact that an individual 
member of the main contractor's staff (the Services Manager) special-
ised in the co-ordination and control of the M & E work. forming an 
intermediary between the design team and subcontractors. However, the 
existence of a 'parellel' structure for the supervision of the M & E 
services work was not limited to this case: note the description 
given of the pattern of involvement of the design team in the super-
vision of work on the AFU project, and the 'by-passing' of the main 
contractor in the MTS case. The NSS case additionally provides an 
interesting example of the types of problems faced by members of the 
architectural design team in dealings with a firm that both designed 
and built the mechanical components. However, the main point to stress 
is that what was commonly found across the cases (with the exception 
of the RAW project) was a combination of functional specialisation on 
a horizontal basis within the project organisation as a whole, that 
crossed boundaries between the organisations involved in the design 
and construction of the work. The situations Observed in the PDt and 
If.rS cases are given as illustrations of this phenomenon in Figure 1 ~ . 3 . .
While these are only broad depictions of what in reality were more 
complex webs of interlocking relationships, they nevertheless provide 
a useful backdrop to a discussion of the comments made concerning the 
integration of the M & E and main structural work in each case. 
What was of further interest about these configurations were the 
comments made concerning the tendency towards 'differentiation' (Lawrence 
and Lorsch 1967) along the horizontal axis. The clearest example of 
this occurred in the accounts given by members of the design team in 
the MTS case. References were made to problems experienced in the 
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Figure 12.3 The Hanagement of the M & E Function 
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level of commitment of M & E engineers to the project team - an 
observation that has been made of interdepartmental working relation-
ships in other types of project system (Weiner 1970, Schein 1970). 
More broadly, the differential knowledge bases involved in the distinct 
areas were suggested by the comments made concerning team members' 
specialisation on specific aspects of the work and, in particular, 
the reference to a distinct "design logic". The other side of the 
coin was presented in general descriptions given by the M & E 
consultant employed on the PDL project. He commented, for instance: 
"Not many architects appreciate engineering services work because 
they concentrate mainly on what it looks like". In describing one 
particular example, he suggested that: "Architects basically see 
ceilings as a 'membrane' that conceals (the M & E works) ••• (but) 
they're c r i t i c a l ~ . . the M & E design (as) engineering constraints 
••• It's a continual problem trying to educate architects into 
realising the engineers' probletls". Juxtaposed with the earlier 
reported comments given by architectural staff, the implication is 
that a divergence rather than convergence of views on basic design 
issues may tend to be the norm. 'fhile the data reported do not extend 
to a consideration of differentiation across the range of dimensions 
suggested by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) - eg time orientation, 
formality of structure, etc - nevertheless the reported comments do 
supply a flavour of the tendencies towards differing orientations 
t o w a ~ d s s the construction process based upon differing functional design 
perspectives. In the MTS case the configuration of relationships 
between design team members and the peculiarities of the secondment 
practices adopted served to augment the effects of these tendencies -
such that a divergence in orientation towards specific project goals 
was engendered. Hmvever it ,laS the difference in design perspective 
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that appeared to exist as an important underlying factor. 
What was of further interest about the MTS case was that this 
divergence in perspective between design team members was contrasted 
with a perceived convergence in perspective amongst M & E specialists 
across organisational boundaries. The comment concerning a different 
"design logic" was made to suggest a closer understanding of design 
issues between M & E specialists across the organisations involved 
than between design specialists from different disciplines in the 
same team. The point was not only that dealings in this aspect of 
the work involved closer direct contact between members of the respec-
tive teams, but also that such contact was based upon a closer 
cognitive understanding. What is interesting to note about this case 
was the manner in which these factors (divergent orientations within 
the multidisciplinary design team; fragmented patterns of control over 
the design process; the development of close M & E designer -
subcontractor working relationships) combined with the contractual 
ambiguity noted earlier, to produce a level of "dissociation" 
(Kingdon 1973) between the main building and M & E services sides of 
the project. The point here is that the distinctiveness of the main 
building and M & E work generates a tendency towards differentiation 
which, following Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) scheme, puts an emphasis 
upon establishing an appropriate level of integration. In the absence 
of sufficient internal mechanisms in the MTS case to secure the level 
of integration needed, and in a situation in which the contractual 
position tended to encourage the main participants (arChitect, main 
contractor) to 'stand back' from the process of M & E design and 
design co-ordination, it is perhaps not surprising to find that the 
pattern of extant working relationships depicted in Figure 11.3 
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led to a situation in which there was in effect some 'de-coupling' 
of the main building and M & E sides of the project, with the conse-
quences described in Chapter 8 • 
In the two other cases in which the co-ordination of services 
designs and their installation were prominent features (the NSS and 
PDL) such a level of Ue-coupling' did not occur. However, both cases 
were interesting in their own ways. In.the NSS case, the e m p l o ~ e n t t
of the firm to fully undertake the mechanical work may have internal-
ised, hence making closer, the relationship between designer and 
producer. However, according to membe;s of the architectural design 
team it contributed towards widening the gap between design team 
members through allowing the firm to 'play one side off against the 
other'. What was particularly significant about the PDL case was 
the position and role of the main contractor's Services Manager 
performing an ~ n t e g r a t i n g g role in two respects: firstly, by providing 
an extra link between the main building and services sides of the 
team; secondly, in providing the link between the M & E consultant on 
the one hand, and the subcontractors concerned on the other. In this 
case the involvement of an individual to perform this integrating or 
co-ordinating role signified the adoption.of a more explicit mechanism 
to co-ordinate and control work on this'aspect of the project. In 
the MTS case, in contrast, the accounts given suggest that co-ordinating 
and antegrating the work was left to rely rather more heavily upon 
individuals' predispositions and attitudes towards becoming involved 
in that process at one level, and the response of contracted· 
organisations towards undertaking this role at another. 
The discussion. so far has concentrated upon noting tendencies 
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towards differentiation within the project organisation as a whole 
- in this respect the M & E function has been singled out for attention 
and reference has been made to the different integrating roles 
performed. What is of equal interest is the broad relationship between 
'design' and 'construction' ·processes within the project organisation 
and the mechanisms employed and roles performed in the translation of 
the design for the work into its construction on site. The earlier 
discussion of the impact of cross-cutting design dealings with respect 
to nominated work· in particular served to illustrate some of the 
problems involved. More broadly the question was one of securing a 
more tightly ' c o u p ~ e d ' ' working relationship between design team and 
construction team members of the project organisation - particularly 
in those cases (ie the MTS, NSS and PDL) where the design process 
ran to some extent concurrent with the construction of work on site. 
The PDL case was of particular interest in this respect in that the 
main contracting organisation explicitly performed an 'integrator role' 
- acting as intermediary or linking-pin between the design team and 
(nominated) subcontractors. What was particularly interesting about 
the comments made by members of the site team in this respect was the 
attention directed towards the conflicting requirements it then 
engendered. The references towards the conflict between upholding 
the client's interests and supporting valid subcontractors' demands 
- a series of comments validated by the comments made by members 
of the design team and the (panel) subcontractor interviewed - were 
indicative of a form of 'role conflict' (Kahn et al 1964) - albeit 
at an organisational level. For individual members of the t e ~ , ,
the comments made concerning their strategies of coping with 
subcontractors' demands on site illustrated the caution that was 
exercised in a situation in which factors affecting the work were 
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largely beyond their control, and their power to take decisions 
without referring back for approval was limited. It was interesting 
.that, in the early stages at least, few of those interviewed were 
satisfied with the type of arrangement adopted in these respects. 
Ostensibly, the employment of a ' n e u t r ~ ' m a i n n contractor should have 
eased the problems of 'communication' between 'design' and 'building' 
sides, through allowing for a clearer understanding of each others' 
position and problems. In practice, and due to the particular sets 
of circumstances surrounding the project, early developments were 
characterised somewhat more by ambiguities and conflicts surrounding 
the interpretation of the main contractor's role. In the longer term, 
the inference to be drawn from the general tenor of the comments 
given by members of the design team, the main contractor, and at 
least one subcontractor, is that the inherent ambiguities and conflicts 
were resolved by virtue of the main contractor associating itself much 
more clearly with the design team's interests. The comments made by 
the subcontractor representative concerning the level of "support" 
given by the main contractor in the subcontractors' dealings with the 
design team suggest that the aim of allowing for the 'representation' 
of subcontractors' interests as well had not necessarily been 
aChieved. 
What was also of some interest in the relationship between 
" d e s ~ g n ' ' and 'construction' across the cases was the position and role 
of the client I s Clerk of l-lorks as the individual who formed the most 
direct point of contact between the design and construction teams. 
At this point it should be restated that there was a notable 
distinction in the pattern of supervision by the client's team on the 
RAW project when compared with the other, architecturally-based teams 
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inthe sample of cases. In addition to the point noted earlier -
concerning the less fragmented locus of control over the construction 
process - reference was also made to that subunit's ::ailtonomy 
vis-a-vis central office and the discretion of. senior staff on site 
in conducting project dealings with the main contractor's represent-
atives. This picture - of devolved and site-based direct supervision 
of the works - stands in interesting 'contrast to the-pattern in eacn of 
the remaining (architectural) cases, Here design team members rather 
than 'construction' staff were the individuals primarily responsible for 
supervising the work, and reference was made in most cases to the -
extent to which there was also more centralised control exercised over 
the construction process. In the NSS case, for instance, explicit 
attention was directed towards the more extensive involvement than 
usual of staff at higher levels within the design organisation in 
the direct monitoring of activity on site, and the manner in which 
decision-making within the organisation was as a consequence a more 
centralised activity. The observations made concerning the restric-
tions on the authority of the Clerk of Works in- the MTS case, the 
control exerted over the Job Architect and Clerk of Works in the AFU 
case, and the early tendency in the PDt case for instructions to be 
issued directly to the main contractor (rather than via the Clerk of 
Works), point to a similar - albeit less marked - tendency. The 
point here is that the pattern of control exercised within each of the 
architecturally-based design teams described tended not only to be 
more fragmented, but also more centralised in comparison with the 
situation found on the RAW project, where decisions could be reached 
by the staff on site without the need for prior design team, or 
'head office' approval. 
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As noted in many of the architectural cases, the position of 
the clerk of works was also somewhat peculiar in that individual staff 
were seconded from distinct sections or departments within the client 
organisation to the architectural team, and were then directly 
accountable to architectural and engineering design staff for the 
direct supervision and monitoring of the works. This rather more 
explicit instance of matrix management along 'secondment model' lines 
is particularly interesting when coupled with the observation that the 
clerks of works' authority to take decisions and'issue instructions 
to the main contractor tended to be curtailed,and also when juxtaposed 
with comments made concerning expectations of the role to be performed 
by the clerk of works in supervising and monitoring work on site. 
In both the AFU and NSS cases, it will be recalled, reference was made 
by the architectural staff to the potential vulnerability of the 
client's building representative faced by a main contracting organis-
ation pursuing the representation of its own interests in dealings 
with the design team. In the AFU case this was interpreted as the 
contractor potentially "running rings round" the Clerk of Works; in 
the NSS case it was interpreted as a desire not to allow Clerks to 
get in the position of "covering" the contractor's'mistakes. In the 
NSS and MTS cases, the Clerks of Works' authority was formally 
limited; in the AFU and PDt cases, the limits appeared rather more 
to derive from a stylistic interpretation by senior designers of how 
to approach the management of the team. The point here is that a 
dependency upon staff seconded from another section to perform the 
function of direct supervision of the works was combined with a perception 
that the orientation of the clerks of works to the building, as 
opposed to design, process may allow the main contractor leverage in 
their dealings with members of the design team. From the main 
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contractors' viewpoint relationships with the clerks of works were 
important to the extent that they were central figures in the running 
of the project on site (cf comments made in the MTS case). The point 
was also made that they offered the contractor representation for the 
'building point of view'. The Site Agent on the PDL project, for 
instance, commented that: "you need an experienced clerk of works 
who understands building needs ••• otherwise decisions take longer 
and (there's) more hassle". In describing the role he performed, the 
Clerk of Works on the same project emphasised that the job involved 
contributing towards the.co-ordination of design and construction 
processes: "I'll tell the architect if I think his ideas aren't 
practical ••• I can say 'Look, I can see what you're trying to do and 
appreciate it' - I can get inside the architect's head - ••• but if I 
don't think it'll work I can say so ••• ask him what he thinks (the 
main contractor) is going to say". The point here is that in occupying 
the middle position between the 'design' and 'construction' points 
of view a tension exists between an interpretation of the clerk's 
role based upon the need to translate (architectural) design ideas 
into construction practice - allowing for the feedback of the latter 
into the former; and an interpretation in which a latent conflict of 
interest between the parties to the contract informs expectations 
and views of how the performance of the role should be approached. 
In the NSS and AFU cases, for instance, the direct inference from the 
c o m m e n ~ s s given by design team members was that the main contractor 
could not be trusted not to exploit the more tenuous link between 
designer and construction supervisor: in the NSS case the Clerks of 
Works had limited authority to issue instructions as a result. In 
both cases too, comments were made by the main contractors' staff to 
the effect that this allowed insufficient representation for the 
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'construction viewpoint'. In the MTS case, reference was made to the 
level of influence exerted by the Clerk of Works in the running of 
the job but without the authority to take decisions or issue 
instructions without prior approval. Taken together, these comments 
provide a classic illustration of the requirements put on an individual 
performing an 'integrator role' (Lorsch and Lawrence 1967b, Galbraith 
1971) - whose positional authority is limited and whose input depends 
upon the use of expertise, persuasion and not a little tact and 
diplomacy. The difference for the clerk of works in building is that 
this bridging role crosses the boundary between organisational 
groupings - with all the implications for, and constraints upon, the 
performance of the role described above. What this suggests for the 
clerks of works themselves is their somewhat precarious position 
vis-a-vis the design team and main contractor. It suggests the 
potential for individuals occupying this position to be subject to 
conflicting demands from various directions, coupled with ambiguity 
arising from variation in the limits upon their direct influence from 
project to project. The effects of such dimensions were not directly 
investigated. However, it is clear from many of the accounts given 
in each of the four cases that the clermof works operated at the 
centre of what were often milieux of conflicting and ambiguous 
perceptions, expectations and assumptions. 
• Turning finally in this section to the question posed earlier 
concerning the extent to which an 'organic' structure of interaction 
was in evidence, the above discussion generally suggests a 'tension' 
between formal and informal patterns of interaction when account is 
taken of the contractual dimensions. The RAW project is a useful 
starting point for the discussion of the characteristics of inter-
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organisational working relationships on site since it highlights, 
amongst other things, the tension between "business" and "technical" 
system (Sayles and Chand.ler 1971) considerations in the organisation 
and management of work. The description given in the case study 
chapter of the process of management on that project represents - as 
it does in the remaining four cases - only the most generalised 
account of the management process involved. A concentration on the 
more formal procedures for the approval of plans of work and upon the 
regular meetings held between clients' staff and main contractor and 
subcontractors, severely understates the observed direct dealings 
conducted between members of the respective teams and the extent to 
which informal, direct face-to-face contact and discussion of the 
details of the work on site coupled with ad hoc meetings involving 
various staff characterised working relationships. Space limitations 
in describing this and other cases, coupled with the impossibility 
of being fully able to record and chart the regularity and frequency 
of the direct contact that occurred,on a daily or hourly basis, make 
this dimension impossible to quantify. However the comments made 
concerning, for instance, the close involvement of the AREs in 
checking design details, setting out and subcontractor performance, 
and the direct dealings of the'Site Engineer and his staff with the 
AREs, supervising Clerks of Works and subcontractors' representatives 
perhaps give some flavour of the level of direct, lateral int'eraction 
occasioned in the supervision of the technical aspects of the work on 
site. However, despite the more 'organic' tendencies that this would 
tend to imply, it is important to stress the significance of the 
'contractual dimension' underlying the relationship between the groups, 
and its existence as a counterpoint to the more informal and direct 
patterns of interaction between respective team members on site. The 
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early incident reported concerning the conflict that arose over 
design modifications discussed between the ARE, Sub-Agent and Site 
Engineer gives a greater insight into the processes involved and a 
useful illustration of. the conflicting tendencies exhibited in the 
pattern of decision-making. What was remarkable about that incident 
was the manner in which the threshold was crossed between a more 
informal interactive approach and the adoption of a more formal 
stance on both sides. The incident was interpreted as the signalling 
of the limits to which sUbstantive decisions would be reached without 
formal consent, and as such marked a movement towards the use of more 
formal procedural mechanisms to be employed where decisions that 
needed to be taken had a 'contractual dimension'. The reaction was 
of e ~ u a l l interest in that the threat of resorting to more formal 
procedures and, in particular, of 'escalating' the conflict was 
voiced. The incident and its potential ramifications are of some 
interest since they suggest the somewhat precarious balance between 
a flexible and informal working relationship that one would expect 
to be consistent with the r e ~ u i r e m e n t s s for the management of 
construction task work, and the more formal procedures consistent 
with meeting contractual rights and obligations in a legal context. 
In other cases too, the conflicting tendencies were marked. 
The NSS case, for instance, stands as an illustration of the extent 
to which a more formal, contractual stance was adopted by both sides 
in response to a problematic situation. By the later stages of that 
project the position had been reached in which the level at which 
decisions were taken was.effectively one step removed from the level 
at which the work on site was directly supervised and controlled. 
This 'escalation' appeared to be associated with the initial tendency 
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on the part of the supervising design team to delimit the extent 
to which staff involved directly in the job's supervision had the 
authority to reach decisions. The main contractor's response was 
to take the route referred to by the Site Agent in the RAW case, 
such that the state of affairs towards the end of the construction 
period was one in which the contractual 'battle lines' had been 
drawn between the participating organisations. 
The PDt case - albeit a ~ u i t e e distinct set of circumstances -
also offered an illustration of these conflicting tendencies in the 
management of project work. Here, it was the early stages that were 
marked by the tendency for some degree of caution to be exercised in 
dealings between the design team and main contractor with the 
c o n s e ~ u e n c e , , suggested by the Clerk of Works, that it took a long 
time for the team as a whole to "gel" and for working relationships 
to reflect the degree of flexibility that was perceived as being one 
of the advantages of employing a 'neutral' main contractor in the 
first place. It was also noted that the effects of early problems in 
the design team - main contractor relationship spilled over into 
relationships with subcontractors on site. The General Foreman, for 
instance, referred to the continual necessity to "fend off" 
subcontractors wanting information and the need to "refer back" before 
making decisions on site, suggesting a limit to the extent to which 
decisions could be taken on the ground. More generally, the reference 
to subcontractors' reactions to this situation suggests a pattern of 
interaction in which the contractual dimension came to the fore. The 
perceptions of events described in connection with the later panel-
fixing work gives a flavour of the change in attitudes that occurred -
the subcontractor's representative describing the contrast between 
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the early 'accommodations' that were made and the subsequent tendency 
on the part of the design team to 'throw the book' at the firm. 
Again the inference is that a tension existed between conflicting 
expectations and assumptions of how working relationships would 
develop. 
A more. detailed discussion of the processes of problem-solving 
and decision-making in these respects will ·be returned to below. The 
comments made so far are not meant to over-emphasise the level of 
conflict that characterised inter-organisational working relationships 
during construction. Nor are they intended to de-emphasise the more 
'organic' tendencies in the extant structure of roles and relation-
ships within the project organisation as a whole and in the process 
of management on site. Rather the intention has been to emphasise 
the contradictory tendencies and tensions that appear to emerge 
when consideration is given to both operational and contractual 
dimensions in the management of work on site. In other words, the 
contractual dimension had a significant bearing upon the extent to 
which working relationships across organisational boundaries would 
exhibit Characteristics of a more 'organic' interactive climate 
within the project team. Instances from three of the cases studied 
have been given to illustrate the tendency for interaction to be 
formal, more centralised, more hierarchical and based upon a more 
definitive recourse to the parties' own legal rights and obligations 
under the terms and conditions of contract in situations in which 
"business system" considerations becQme salient. What was particularly 
noticeable in the accounts reported across the case studies in this 
respect was the extent to which differential expectations and 
assumptions served to inform the parties' approaches towards the 
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management of the project. In the NSS and MTS cases, for instance, 
the view was made explicit that main contractors would be expected 
to avoid their contractual responsibilities to some extent in 
relation to specific aspects of the work. In the NSS case this 
appeared to result in the tendency for a tighter degree of centralised 
control to be exercised over the work to ensure that quality 
objectives were met. In the MTS case the belief that the contractor 
would tend not to check drawings (a tendency also reported by the ARE 
in the RAW case) was converted into the reported tendency for design 
staff to undertake the checking of drawings themselves (which the ARE 
in the RAW case also reported). More broadly in this case, a belief 
that the main contractor would try to avoid the responsibility for 
co-ordinating subcontractors' designs generated the tendency for 
members of the design team to actually become more directly and 
routinely involved in the process, thereby making the prophecy an 
almost self-fulfilled one. Perhaps the clearest instance of the 
impact of differential expectations and assumptions was that described 
in the PDL case. Here, early problems in the design team - main 
contractor relationship'were felt to have resulted from the design 
team having specifically approached the job as a 'traditional' one in 
which the two were contractual adversaries - an approach which was 
felt to be inconsistent with the type of relationship needed for the 
'management team concept' to operate effectively. More generally, 
theae points suggest a level of mistrust, or at least caution, latent 
in the relationship stemming fram the fact that the relationship is 
first and foremost a contractual one between separate parties. 
Whether the experiences on a particular contract would tend to 
reinforce such expectations (as in the RAW and NSS Cases perhaps), 
or whether some other adjustment would be made (as in the PDt case) 
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would clearly be dependent upon the course of events on that 
particular contract. However the initial assumptions made form an 
important backdrop to the development of working relationships into 
the construction period. A more 'organic' interactive climate may be 
appropriate to the management of the work on site, or at least a 
preferred way of working to avoid delays in decision-making that may 
tend to be associated with a more formally enacted structure of 
management. However, the starting conditions for the development of 
such a 'climate' given a lack of familiarity and experience of working 
together, by no means guarantee that it will occur. On the contrary, 
it appears likely that the earlier stages in the development of the 
relationship would tend to be characterised rather more by caution 
in external dealings - a caution that may be dissipated as subsequent 
events unfold, but one which may equally well be reinforced given the 
salience of commercial objectives and the corresponding importance of 
the contractual dimension to the development of the relationship 
between the organisational subunits. The more general interpretation 
to be drawn from these descriptions (particularly given the situation 
described in the MTS case, where to some extent recourse to less 
formalised procedures and patterns of interaction led to the emergence 
of problems) is that it is not necessarily the case that 'business 
system' factors engender a more 'mechanistic', and therefore less 
effective, response to task circumstances. Rather that, given broad 
familiarity with technical and business system'requirements due to 
extensive experience of performing broadly similar types of 
construction task (in contrast, say, to circumstances on the NASA A 
or similar types of,projects), it is the particularistic relationship 
between the sets of assumptions and expectations made concerning the 
parties' responsibilities with respect to any given task that proves 
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to be the critical set of factors. In other words, it may well 
be that a less lI effective" system in construction operates on 
'mechanistic' lines, other things being equal. However, a 
situation in which a more 'mechanistic' interpretation of roles, 
relationships and procedures is confounded by differential 
expectations and assumptions may prove ~ ~ highly problematic. 
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1%.3 A Review of Case Histories 
The previous section has looked at characteristics of the 
structure of interaction between the parties to the contract across 
the cases, paying particular attention to the relationship between 
the formal structure of interaction as defined by the set of contract 
terms and conditions employed, and the more informal and extant patterns 
of working relationships engendered by the approaches taken towards the 
management of the construction project. The aim has been to demon-
strate the conflicting tendencies' and tensions present in an orienta-
. tion towards the r e ~ u i r e m e n t s s for managing the task on the one hand, 
and an orientation towards the contractual dimension or "business 
system" on the other. The aim of this section is to conclude a 
comparison and contrast of the cases by focusing upon the processes 
this situation gave rise to across the cases. Incorporated into this 
analysis will be features identified in the earlier discussions in 
ChapterlJ concerning the nature of the work, the relationship between 
. project goals and organisational goals, the more general pattern of 
relationships between and within"each participating organisation, and 
factors relevant in the 'pre-history' of each of the projects studied. 
The first salient feature to be addressed relates back to the 
earlier discussion of the broad distinction drawn within the sample of 
c a s ~ s s between the two 'recurrent' projects (the RAW and AFU) and the 
remaining three laboratory cases (the MTS, NSS and PDL). In these 
latter cases, what was most clearly at issue in the accounts reported 
was the problematic of the relationship between design and construction. 
This was manifested in the accounts given reporting difficulties 
experienced in ensuring a flow of design information between the 
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parties, uncovering 'snags', accommodating variations in the design 
and so on. The issue was complicated further by the intensity of 
services work involved on each of the three projects: a further 
problematic occurred in the relationship between architectural and 
engineering services design and construction. These three cases were 
ones in which the work involved was distinct, complex and fragmented. 
The design for the work in each case was also to some extent (and in 
relation to various aspects of the work) incomplete and subject to 
variation in detail as the work on site progressed. In the RAW and 
AFU cases, in contrast, the work involved was similar in type and 
scope to earlier (and future) projects, somewhat less complex and 
fragmented. The design for the work in each case was largely, if not 
fully, complete by the time work started on site, and few variations 
- and none of those 'major' - occurred in the design as work on site 
progressed. There was, as a consequence, a more definite delineation 
of the design and construction stages of the project. 
In each of the three laboratory cases, significant problems 
were described in achieving a sufficient level of co-ordination of 
design and construction processes: in the MTS case, these problems 
centred mainly around the co-ordination of M & E designs and the physical 
integration of these services with the main building construction; in 
the NSS case the problems reported centred mainly upon the finishing 
and ~ a n d s c a p i n g g work; in the PDL case, the early problems were 
identified as occurring mainly in relation to the main structural 
work on the building - although the 'tightness' of the programme as 
a whole was seen to put a good deal of pressure upon the co-ordination 
of design and construction processes across the range of types of 
work undertaken throughout the period of construction. This is not 
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to suggest that the problems reported necessarily had any impact upon 
achieving the performance levels specified in the contract (eg in the 
PDL case, it was agreed that time, cost and quality objectives had 
essentially been met). Rather that the comments were directed towards 
the way in which those objectives had been achieved. As a general 
observation, many of those interviewed referred to the general problem 
associated with managing the two-way flow of design information 
between the parties in the context of a contractual relationship. 
From the main contractor's viewpoint, difficulties in obtaining 
definitive design information caused problems in the advance planning 
of work to allow for offsite planning and production 'lead times' , 
while the level of design detailing sought (eg tolerances) often did 
not allow for the practicalities involved in on-site construction. 
From the designer's viewpoint, builders were too ready to insist on 
'unrealistic' target dates for the receipt of fully detailed design 
information; the problem on site was to ensure that the design was 
built to the details included in the specification and working 
drawings. For the main contractor the issue was one of being able to 
plan the work effectively in advance; for the design team the issue 
was one of being able to control effectively the quality of finished 
work and of supplied components. It was this interdependence between 
product design and production planning that was at the centre of many 
of the comments made concerning the problems that tended to arise in 
the Telationship between designers and builders in general. 
An important point to're-emphasise concerning the use of (often 
retrospective) accounts given by those interviewed from each side of 
the contractual divide - and one that also figures as an analytic 
point in itself - concerns the level of 'blame-placing' (Sayles and 
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Chandler 1971) in many of the accounts given. Not surprisinsly, each 
party directed attention towards the problems it had faced that had 
been 'caused' by the other. The accounts given in each of the case 
descriptions have attempted to explore particular issues through a 
reliance upon corroborative evidence and, to a lesser extent, direct 
observation, while simultaneously allowing for the differential 
perceptions that often marked the interpretation of particular issues. 
Attention has been directed towards the nature of the work 
involved and the design for the work, since they emerge in the case 
descriptions as important conditioning influences upon the character-
istics of interaction between the parties. In the RAW and AFU cases, 
where the work inVOlved was relatively more standard and routine and 
the design to all intents and purposes complete and 'static', the 
outcomes of the strategies adopted by each party to achieve their 
objectives reflected the extent to which the objectives of work on the project 
-.ere perceived as being fixed and defini ti ve. In the RAi-T case in particular, 
reference was made to the divergence of opinion between the client's 
staff and main contractor's staff - embodied in the approaches taken 
by the respective two senior representatives on site - concerning 
the extent to which the design for the works allowed scope for 
bargaining between the parties concerning some of the methods and 
materials specified for use in the contract. To the SRE, the main 
contractor "wheeling and dealing" or "taking liberties" with respect 
to the contract was out of the question, and the full specification 
of the works allowed no scope for negotiation; to the Site Agent, 
this was interpreted as 'inflexibility' or "going by the book". The 
point here is that the 'book' was one that was sufficiently detailed 
and complete, and the contractual position sufficiently definitive 
to allow the client's agent to withstand any attempts made by the 
main contractor to induce changes in it. In this case, what was 
interpreted as a conflict of interests between the parties stemming 
particularly from the contractor's attempts to achieve a profit, (or 
avoid a loss on an underpriced job) at a time of acute financial 
difficulties, appeared to manifest itself in the form of a personal 
contest between the two senior representatives on site. Attempts by 
the main contractor to employ bargaining strategies in the relation-
ship with the client's team were met with the clear signal that there 
was in fact no scope for bargaining over sUbstantive issues and, 
further, that perceived efforts to employ unacceptable procedural 
mechanisms to effect a change in the 'agenda' would not be countenanced. 
In other words, the situation was one in which the early stages were 
marked by the adoption of two competing strategies - on the one hand, 
attempts to introduce a degree of bargaining into problem-solving and 
decisional processes; on the other, an expressed adherence to the 
full terms and conditions of the contract and the formal rights and 
obligations of the parties involved under the form of contract. It 
was the legitimacy afforded through the contract to the Resident 
Engineer's right to exercise discretion in accepting or agreeing 
changes to the work that formed the backdrop to how circumstances 
developed: the SRE's interpretation was that proposed changes to the 
work could not and would not be accepted, and that the main.contractor's 
efforts to secure changes to benefit their own interests were not 
acceptable. It was the choice to stick closely to the substantive 
content of the agreement and to interpret the limits to the discretion 
available to him to make decisions as being tightly constrained that 
appeared to form the SRE's approach to the management of the project. 
The Site Agent's interpretation, in contrast, appeared to be that there 
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was more flexibility available and that the process then involved 
argument, persuasion and bargaining in some instances to elicit 
changes favourable to the company. 
In the AFU case, much less detail was given of the character-
istics of the relationship between the parties in terms of the 
processes of problem-solving and decision-making. The type and level 
of disagreement between the parties described in the RAW case, was not 
at all apparent in the AFU case. Instead the main inter-organisational 
relationship was characterised as being largely free of elements of 
conflict or disagreement between the ~ a r t i e s , , andfewreferences were 
made towards the emergence of issues in which bargaining or negotia-
tion, or attempts to employ these strategies, emerged. The discussion 
in the previous section reported a tendency towards caution in 
external dealings - manifested in views and opinions expressed 
concerning the potential vulnerability of clerks of works. However, 
these were general comments, and no direct indication was given that 
such circumstances were specifically relevant to an understanding of 
events on this case. 
What is interesting in comparing these cases is the particular 
constellations of factors which influenced the parties' motivation 
and ability to engage in strategies aimed at securing some advantage 
with respect to the achievement of organisational goals. In the RAW 
case, the financial situation facing the firm in general - and 
specifically on this project (to the extent that it Was underpriced) -
underpinned the motivation to attempt to secure changes which would 
be favourable to the main contractor. However, the ability to pursue 
such a strategy was limited simply by virtue of the lack of scope 
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available, and also by the lack of acceptance on the part of the 
client's team of the validity of such strategies. In the AFU case, 
there was no evidence to suggest that the main contractor had the 
motivation to make such moves. Indeed, in the context of a longer-
term relationship with the Development Corporation as client (and 
thus with the design team), such moves may more likely have been 
counter-productive in the long term. Moreover, the scope for doing 
so was limited given the more straightforward nature of the work, 
and the completeness and clarity of the design in relation to it. 
However the case did also ~ r o v i d e e evidence of the potential ability 
for the main contractor to pursue more manipulative strategies. In 
~ a r t i c u l a r , , the perceived conflicts and tensions within the client's 
design organisation were interpreted in part in terms of the relative 
'advantages' or 'disadvantages' they offered to the main contractor. 
While problems in the hierarchical chain of command were viewed as 
being wholly an 'internal thing', they were externally 'visible' and 
engendered a cautious a p ~ r o a c h h towards dealings with the client's 
team with the aim of 'not rocking the boat'. The early reported 
~ r o b l e m s s among members of the design team, in contrast, appeared to 
offer the main contractor some leverage in their external dealings 
and an ability to play off one party against the other. Too much 
should not be read into this situation since the instances referred 
to occurred at a very early stage, and the discussion was based upon 
entirely retrospective accounts from only one party's perspective 
(ie the main contractor). However, the comments do suggest the perceived 
opportunities available stemming from a more fragmented pattern of 
control exercised over the total design "and construction process 
described in earlier sections of Chapter' I. In contrast t the RAll 
case has been interpreted as one in which control Over the construction 
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process was much more unitary, direct and centralised. As such the 
inability of the main contractor to effect outcomes more consistent 
with the achievement of their own (financial) goals, was not only 
conditioned by the lack of scope available and by the client's 
representative's interpretation of the illegitimacy of attempted neg-
otiating strategies, but also by conditions related to the pattern 
of control exercised in the running of the project. Put more simply, 
it was the lack of power of the main contracting organisation coupled 
with the power and lack of vulnerability of the client's representa-
tive's position in the RAW' case, that combined to make unsuccessful 
the strategies that'were motivated by a concern with achieving a 
more satisfactory financial outcome for the main contractor on the 
project. In the AFU case, the suggestion is that the ability of 
the main contractor to influence directly their own outcomes was 
there to the extent that internal differences within the design team 
allowed them opportunities. However, the scope for doing so was 
similarly limited, and, more importantly, there was ,no real positive 
motivation to do so. On the contrary, unsubtle attempts to pursue 
direct strategies aimed at improving their outcomes, may have 
jeopardised a working relationship,which on the whole was considered 
to be 'good'. In a sense the general impression that comes through 
from the RAW case is that there was 'little to be lost and much to 
be gained' in attempting to 'take on' the representatives of an 
important, but possibly only one time, client in circumstances in 
which the ~ i r m m was in financial difficulties and had obtained the 
contract by under-pricing the job in the first place. 
In the three laboratory cases in the sample, circumstances were 
such as to create a somewhat more complex picture of the strategies 
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and tactics adopted. In all three cases the work was ·complex, distinct 
and variegated, and the design and specification to some extent open 
to fuller interpretation during the course of construction. Taking the 
two smaller cases first (the MTS and NSS), there were very real 
differences in the outcomes that were perceived to have been achieved 
for each of the main parties concerned. In the MTS case, the accounts 
given suggest that the process of achieving objectives on the project 
had not been unproblematic, but that the outcomes achieved had never-
theless in the end proved satisfactory to both main parties. In the 
NSS case, the accounts given reflect more clearly both a problematic 
process and a level of dissatisfaction with the outcomes achieved on 
the project. Comparing the two cases with the factors described in 
the RAW and AFU cases, it is interesting to note how differential 
patterns of control between the two design teams, coupled with 
differences in the position of the two main contractors with respect 
to the client organisation and project goals combined to affect the 
nature of the relationship between the parties in each case. 
In the NSS case, the substantive issue over which the parties 
disagreed related to problems experienced in the production of a 
detailed design for the later landscaping and finishing work. The 
broader issue, of which this was viewed as being symptomatic, was the 
(in)compatibility of the cost and quality objectives pursued on the 
project. The parties held conflicting assumptions concerning the 
extent to which the construction of a high quality, 'prestigious' 
building was compatible with the funds budgeted for the work. From 
the designers' viewpoint the aims were compatible and not contra-
dictory, given that the main contractor had submitted a price for the 
job that had been accepted. The achievement of project objectives was 
11.39 
then predicated upon m a i n ~ a i n i n g g e f f e c ~ i v e e control over the quality 
of work produced on site. From the main contractor's viewpoint, 
the aims were contradictory, given that the quality objectives the 
designers sought to achieve following from an initially incomplete 
design were incompatible with the amount initially budgeted for the 
work. In other words, there was a clear conflict of interest between 
the parties that stemmed from the inter-relationship between financial 
and quality objectives pursued on the project: the design teams' goals 
could only be fully achieved at the expense of some direct loss to 
the main contractor (and/or the subcontractors employed): the main 
contractor's goals could only be fully achieved if the design team 
were to compromise on the quality standards they set and maintained. 
In the event, it appears that the balance of power in this 
situation, and the resultant outcomes, tilted more heavily in favour 
of the design team than of the main contractor. Reference was made 
to the extent to which problems were 'escalated' to higher levels 
within the respective organisations, and the comment was noted that 
the situation had developed such that the main contractor and 
subcontractors had "united to fight the common foe". As such the 
picture is one almost of a battle fought between the client's agents 
on the one hand, and the building team on the other. However, the 
course of the ~ a t t l e ' ' as such was influenced by broader factors 
related to the natures of the organisations involved and features of 
the relationship between them. In the first place, the contractually 
stronger position of the client's representatives as arbiters of 
decisions reached concerning the adequacy of performance levels 
achieved on the project, meant that they were in the position of being 
able, under the contract, to decide whether to accept or reject 
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materials, components or work on the basis of the quality standards 
aChieved. In a way the situation appeared close to that found on the 
RAW project, in which the senior representative was able to insist 
upon the m ~ i n n contractor producing to a level consistent with what 
was s p e ~ i f i e d d in the contract. The difference in the NSS case vas 
that that 'level' was to some extent ambiguous: the lack of a fully 
detailed design coupled with continuing uncertainty over details of 
the work (in the later stages in particular) left open the inter-
pretation of the standards to be achieved with respect to the 
'quality' of the building; the performance parameters in this respect 
were only really firmly established as the work on site p r o g r e s s e d ~ ~
and, moreover, were also at the discretion of the designer. While 
differential interpretations were drawn over the nature of the 
substantive content of the agreement, it was the client's agents who 
were vested with the contractual authority to pursue their interpret-
ation. The main contractor's response to this was noted in the 
comments made concerning the tendency to respond ~ c o n t r a c t u a l l y ' ' to 
delays in the receipt of information and also in the attempts to 
take their argument and case to a higher level within the design 
organisation. These more aggressive tactics appeared as a response 
to the perceived difficulties in conducting relations with the 
client's team in a less official and more informal way. 
• Looking at other factors influencing this outcome, there was a 
fairly clear recognition of the impact of characteristics of the 
relationship at a broader, organisational level. The situation was 
one in Which the main contractor was undertaking work for a client upon 
which they had a continuing longer-term dependence by virtue of the 
importance of the client within the locality for firms the size of 
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Steelframe. The project was not only of importance in itself - in 
relation to the firm's annual turnover - it was also important in that 
it represented one of a series of projects undertaken for the contractor's 
main client. Furthermore, there were direct potential pay-offs in that 
success on this project might enhance the possibility of achieving 
further work in the second stage development. (Ironically, the 
company's Surveyor reported before the submission of the tender for 
this work that their "experience" on stage one had enabled the firm to 
fully account for the likely difficulties to be encountered in stage 
two: having done so, the tender was rejected as being too high.) The 
point here is that the company was one that was highly dependent upon 
the local authority as client, and c o n s e ~ u e n t l y y in a weak position 
vis-a-vis the client's in-house design team. A related factor was 
the actual size of the firm: it will be recalled 'that reference was 
made to the financial vulnerability of the firm and the 'opportunity 
cost' of resources tied down on anyone project; reference was also 
made to the disadvantages faced by the firm in not possessing a full 
legal capacity to respond to 'contractual' problems. 
At the same time, reference was also made to the vulnerability 
of the client's in house design organisation: the project was 
significant in scale and 'prestigious' from the point of view of the 
type of work involved. It was also important in that it offered the 
posaibility for the design team to obtain further work from a new 
and important client in a situation in which the department's capacity 
to handle new projects was being eroded in the longer-term. The 
importance of the project in these respects was given explicit atten-
tion by members of the design team interviewed, although it was only 
staff from the main contracting organisation who explicitly referred 
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to the impact upon working relationships on the project of factors 
associated directly with this internal 'political' context. The 
interpretation made was that the nature and perception of the object-
ives to be achieved on the project were largely conditioned by the 
complex of factors associated with this internal backdrop. In other 
words, that the peculiarities of this situation forced members of the 
client's team into a position in which success on the project was 
effectively made contingent upon the reconciliation of a set of 
somewhat contradictory objectives. On the one hand these broader aims 
could be achieved by emphasising quality objectives; on the other, 
the designers were faced with fairly stringent controls on capital 
expenditure on the project. The response to this dilemma appeared 
to be in the more direct and centralised control exerted over the 
construction process to ensure quality control, coupled with a more 
explicit articulation of the main (and sub-) contractors' respons-
ibilities to achieve the performance levels that would then be set 
by the design team as the work progressed. It was the dependence of 
the main contractor (and local subcontractors) upon the client that 
then determined the extent to which such a strategy could be success-
fully pursued. 
Two further features of this scenario need to be mentioned. 
Firstly, it was interesting to note that the main contractor coupled 
a perceived "interference" in the job's running with a level of' 
"indecisiveness" or "uncertainty" in the process of reaching 
decisions. While it is perhaps infering too much, such comments do 
point to the likely manifestations of' a situation in which members 
of the client's team were faced with conflicting sets of expectations 
regarding the objectives to be pursued. As noted in the case 
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commentary, it was the architectural Project Manager - who was 
explicitly held accountable for fully achieving project time, cost 
and quality objectives - who was at the centre of this milieu of 
conflicting expectations. The comments reported concerning direct 
control, "interference" and "indecisiveness" do not appear inconsistent 
with the likely response to a situation in which some level of role 
conflict occurred. Secondly, the situation was one in which the 
internal structure of the design organisation lay the basis for the 
exercise of more complete and direct influence over the course of 
events on that project. The level of involvement and influence of 
senior architectural staff in the project was considered greater than 
normal due to the importance of the project. However, this reflected 
no change from previous projects in the structure of authority within 
the in house design team. Rather it reflected the tendency for 
authority not to be delegated in this case due to the factors outlined 
above. The more direct and less fragmented pattern of control 
exercised over members of the client's in house team by senior 
architectural·staff, made for a much more hierarchical within-team 
structure than that found in either the AFU or the remaining two 
laboratory cases (in which the Project Manager performed more of a 
co-ordinating role within a client's team composed of specialists 
seconded from separate departments). The reported tendency for team 
members being in a position of having to 'cover' themselves and 
'refer back' for decisions provides a suggestion of the implications 
of this situation. In this respect, the situation perhaps compared 
more closely with that found in the RAW case than with circumstances 
in the other architectural cases. The major difference in the NSS 
case -' and one whose implications for the level of control exercised 
was noted in the accounts given by the architectural staff - was in 
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the employment of M & E consultants. Here, such a level of direct 
control and influence over members of the client's team was less 
apparent as evidenced in the accounts given of problems experienced 
in the relationship with the mechanical firm. But in terms of external 
dealings between the client's team and main contractor, the 
situation was one ~ x c e p t i n g t h e e position of the consultants) in which 
a 'united front' could be presented. The general tenor of the 
comments given concerning the high degree of centralised control, the 
lack of discretion of the Job Architect, Surveyor and Clerk of Works, 
and so on, suggest that the ability to pursue the architectural 
case (and to withstand counter-strategies adopted by the main contr-
actor) was not impeded by structural conditions within the in house 
design organisation. 
The same was not the case in the MTS project. Here, the main 
focus of attention was precisely upon the difficulties that were 
felt to have emerged due to the structure of roles and relationships 
within the in house design organisation. Reference has already been 
made in the previous section to the extent to which internal 
conditions engendered or enhanced differential and divergent orien-
tations towards project work. The significant feature for this 
discussion was reflected in the reported tendency for inter-
departmental relationships (specifically with the M & E section) to 
involve some level of negotiation in decision-making. The position 
appeared similar to that described in the AFU case in that staff 
from the central architectural department were dependent upon contrib-
utions to the design and management of the project from senior staff 
seconded from other departments or sections within the overall design 
organisation. The difference in the MTS case, and the backdrop to 
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many of the comments made in this respect, was the somewhat more 
limited direct influence of architectural staff, particularly given 
the secondment practices adopted within the division as a whole. It 
was the greater perceived gap in 'communication' between design team 
members and the attendant difficulties in co-ordinating work within 
the team which formed the important underlying factor in the flow 
of events in the MTS case. 
What was particularly interesting about the MTS case, was that 
the problems that were reported also occurred in the context of 
disagreement over the rights and obligations of the respective 
parties to the contract. As such the issues raised pointed to a 
degree of expressed 'structural', as much as 'operating', conflict 
(Molnar and Rogers 1979) - or a divergence of views on the terms and 
conditions of the contractual relationship itself. It was not that 
the parties necessarily differed in their orientation towards the 
Objectives set for the work, but that the parties differed in their 
orientation towards the procedural mechanisms employed to achieve 
those objectives. From the designer's viewpoint; the approach adopted 
was simultaneously informed by their position under the formal terms 
and conditions of contract, and also by the expectation that in 
practice they would have to become more closely involved in the 
management of the design process to the extent that the main contractor 
w o u l ~ ~ attempt to avoid their formal responsibilities. From the main 
contractor's viewpoint, the approach adopted was simultaneously 
informed by a need to exercise control over this process (particularly 
in the architectural sphere), and also by a reluctance to accept the 
validity of the conditions that placed the onus upon them to assume 
full responsibility (in the M & E sphere) for the co-ordination of 
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subcontractors' designs. The ambiguities and conflicts latent in this 
milieu of divergent assumptions, perceptions and expectations were 
given some attention in the previous section. What is relevant to 
note here is that such conditions did not lead to an 'escalation' of 
conflict in the same way that happened on the NSS project. In the 
MTS case, there was a sense in which the fractionalism and lack of 
fully centralised control within the design team coupled with the 
tendency to depart from the more formally prescribed patterns of 
interaction served to counteract the impact of these factors upon 
the interorganisational relationship. Added to this were the strategies 
employed by the main contractor to prevent a similar situation arising 
as had arisen in the previous project. Given the positions of the 
respective organisations under the form of contract, and the power 
imbalance at an organisational level, one might have expected the 
outcome to have been sonewhatdifferent from that reported in terms 
of the impact upon the goals of the main contracting organisation in 
particular. In other words, the potential vulnerability of the 
main contractor was offset by a combination of strategies pursued to 
ease expected difficulties, and by the vulnerability of the design 
organisation itself due to internal divisions and lack of cohesion. 
The examples given in the case study chapter provide useful illus-
trations of this. In the case of the windows subcontract, the main 
contractor was able to fall back on their contractual position of 
having to be informed of design detail alteratlons, and hence avoid 
the responsibility for the impact of changes that had occurred in 
direct dealings between the architect and subcontractor. In taking 
up the initiative in becoming more directly and more intensely involved 
in the continuing design process, the architect was taking some risk 
in departing from the formal procedures. The outcome was the 
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subsequent argument that arose between architect and subcontractor 
concerning the responsibility for delays to the work. The delay was 
not critical and had not affected the main contractor's plans for 
overall completion. This is not to suggest that the delay did not 
cause problems. Rather that the liability for it lay elsewhere and 
not with the main contractor. In the case of the M & E work, it was 
the similar tendency for M & E members of the design tewn to become 
directly embroiled in dealings with subcontractors, coupled with the 
lack of full direct influence and control over the M & E process that 
were the underlying factors. It is suggested here that the design 
team was in some disarray. In such a situation it is quite easy to 
see how their position may then have been weakened with respect to 
external dealings with the main contractor. To the extent that the 
issue concerned the integration of architectural and services designs 
per se, rather than being directly concerned with the translation 
of designs into construction, then the main contractor could avoid 
liability for changes that had implications for the construction of 
the work on site. The more general point is that so long as the 
main contractor was 'covered' - and this is where the main contractor's 
response came in - then it was in the extent to which problems that 
occurred were located and locatable in relationships amongst the 
design team and with subcontractors that a 'let out' was available. 
This is not to suggest either that this gave rise to few problems as 
perceived by the main contractor's staff, or that there was any positive 
incentive to attempt to exacerbate the situation. Rather that in 
pursuing the aim of 'winning back' confidence in their ability to 
perform work for an important client, the approach was to contain and 
control the situation as much as possible in a way that mitigated 
against the knock-on effects of an expected (and actual) level of 
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dissociation between the main building and M & E design and 
construction processes. It was the pattern of dynamics of internal 
relationships amongst members of the design team and t ~ i r r relation-\ ... . ..... , "tr.. . 
ships with subcontractors that formed the crucial dimension in this 
respect. The aim of the main contractor was to avoid potential 
difficulties having a direct bearing upon their own performance. A 
broad overview of the descriptions of performance and events on the 
MTS case would seem to suggest that in this they were largely 
successful. 
The PDL case has been left till last to discuss due to the 
distinctive characteristics associated with it being run as a 
management contract. The previous four cases have focused upon the 
nature of the interorganisational relationship at the point of 
contact between design team and main contractor. In doing so a central 
component has been taken as being the position of each main party as 
defined by the commercial exchange relationship between the parties. 
The PDL case was very different in that the contractual neutrality 
of the main contractor was the point that was stressed. The implic-
ations of this situation with regard to the 'role' performed by the 
main contractor within the project organisation as a whole were given 
some attention in the previous section. The aim of this section is 
to provide an overview of events on the project as with the four other 
cases, but with special regard for this basic difference in the 
administrative set-up. 
What was particularly noticeable in the PDL case was the manner 
in which the combination of circumstances found on the project led to 
a situation in which collusive and coalitional strategies between 
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members of the 'management team' came to the fore. This point was 
most directly expressed by the M & E consultant towards the end of 
the project: .in comparing what happened on the PDL project with what 
he felt would have occurred in a more 'normal' situation, he clearly 
expressed the opinion that circumstances on this project would 
ordinarily have given the contractor a "field day". Instead, the 
situation had been reached in which, despite the earlier problems, 
the relationship between the design team and main contractor had 
developed well. This was to such an extent that he himself was 
effectively outmanoeuvred at the very end of the construction period 
in the face of the architect and main contractor tacitly colluding to 
avoid any potential threat to completing the work on time (the issue 
being that the time available for commissioning the M & E work had 
by then been 'squeezed'; the Clerk of Works was in a similar position 
in the time left available for 'snagging'). In the early stages, 
conflicting approaches to the management of the project had created 
a tension in the relationship between the in house design team and 
main contractor. Yet even at that point counteracting tendencies 
were found in the 'behind the scene' deals with the main frame 
subcontractor in which the main contractor and PQS collaborated. 
Similar tendencies were later found in events reported on the 
subcontracted panel package, from which the interpretation was drawn 
that the main contractor pursued a variety of strategies (directly 
e x p ~ d i t i n g g the work, negotiating down claims, etc) that they were 
not formally required to (since their expected role was more one of 
acting as a 'mediator' in design team/subcontractor dealings), but 
which were undertaken to accommodate the conflicting pressures 
inherent in the constellation of objectives for the work - and in 
particular to contain the effects of problems experienced in the 
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continuing design process. 
The key to an understanding of such events on this case was in 
the development of a (tacit or explicit) understanding of the mutual 
dependency of each of the main parties upon the client. For the 
designers, the project was of some strategic importance, and 
performance on it thereby critical. Similarly for the main contractor. 
Both parties were faced with the opportunity of securing future orders 
in what effectively constituted a 'new market' (the main contractor 
anxious to add another important client to its' list'; the design team 
anxious to have future large, industrial projects undertaken in house). 
As suggested in the earlier discussion, in this sense the project was 
a 'test case'. The early problems surrounded the fact that given 
their positions,the parties were then faced with one another 
perceiving that the stance taken by the other was not one that was 
consistent with achieving these aims in a situation in which the 
objectives set for the work created significant pressures. From the 
design team's point of view, the main contractor was not adopting a 
firm enough line in controlling the work on site and in representing 
the client's interests; from the main contractor's point of view, the 
design team were not attuned to the 'team concept' and were unwilling 
to accept the implications of their orientation .towards the continuing 
design process. By the end of the construction period some level of 
compromise appeared to have been reached, and the objective of 
completing the work on time came to the fore - acting as a unifYing 
influence and focus for collective attention and effort. In between 
times, and if the events reported on the subcontractor panel package 
are anything to go by, the process had inVOlved the main contractor 
in tactical moves to dissipate the pressures stemming from time, cost 
and quality objectives. In part this had involved them directly 
expediting the work. However, given the position of the main 
contractor as part of the 'management team', the inference is also 
that the pressure was also to some extent diverted away from the 
'management team' and towards the subcontractors performing the work. 
In other words the main contractor moved from an initial stance of 
'neutrality' to aligning themselves more fully with the interests 
pursued by members of the client's team. At the same time, in 
changing the state of the relationship from an 'adversarial' one to 
a 'collaborative' one, the main contractor relied upon the develop-
ment and maintenance of collaborative relationships with 'allies' 
amongst the client's team (specifically the PQS) whose dependence 
upon the client was also a significant feature, and whose orientation 
towards the management of the project was more closely matched with 
theirs. The fact that the client's team consisted of a 'core' of 
in house architectural and (structural) engineering staff with 
'satellite' consultancies (the PQS, M & E) made the task of arguing 
the case that much easier, since there was scope for 'detaching' 
members of the team and forming a 'united front' based on specific 
issues. The fact that in the early stages such moves were clandestine 
was symptomatic of the early lack of cohesion of the 'management 
team' • 
• To sum up this section, before moving on to a discussion of 
the implications of the case data and inter-case analysis for theory 
and research into complex organisations, it is useful to provide a 
brief overview of the salient conditioning influences upon the 
conduct of inter-organisational working relationships. Broadly 
speaking, the discussion has focused upon the importance of four sets 
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of factors to an understanding of events on each project: the nature 
of the work, its o b j e c t i v e s ~ ~ and relationship between design and 
construction processes; formal remits and structures of interaction 
associated with the terms and conditions of contract; internal 
structures and processes of interaction and their impact upon 
external dealings; and the broader patterns of power and dependency 
at an organisational level that informed approaches adopted at an 
operational level. The discussion has centred upon the manner in 
which these factors affected the parties' motivation and ability to 
pursue strategies aimed at achieving preferred outcomes and in 
dealing with pressure and/or resistance in external dealings. The 
picture that emerges is complex due to the variety of factors that 
are subsumed under the categories, and the particular configuration 
of associated factors in each case. However some general patterns 
do emerge from the analysis. In particular, the combination of a 
clear operating and structural remit, a more unitary and cohesive 
subunit structure and the economic dependence of the main contractor 
on the client organisation served to promote conditions in which the 
vulnerability of the client's team was lessened and their influence 
in the management of the work heightened. Conversely, and given the 
motivation to engage in goal-directed strategies, the ability of the 
main contractor to do so was heightened by operating and structural 
uncertainties or ambiguities, divisions within the client's team, 
and a less critical dependence upon that individual project and client. 
These sets of conditions and their effects upon the nature and 
development of working relationships between the parties were most 
clearly manifested in .the RAW case. Here the client's representative 
was fully able to withstand attempts made by the main contractor to 
pursue strategies that were geared towards fulfillment of their own 
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aims on the project. The combination of a clear and definitive design 
and specification for the work; a form of contract that lent itself 
to few ambiguities concerning the discretionary authority available 
to the client's representatives and their obligations in this case; 
a pattern of internal control that was both unitary in nature and 
centralised; the lack of potential anxieties stemming from the 
'criticality' or strategic importance of the project to members of 
the client's team; and the importance of this project to the main 
contractor (ergo their dependence upon the client) - all these 
factors served to consolidate and reinforce the position of the client's 
team in interaction and to weaken the main contractor's. Added to 
the latter's problems were the financial vulnerability of the 
company at the time, and a basic lack of internal cohesion within the 
operational subunit. Towards the other extreme was the MTS case. 
Here, design problems and ambiguities latent in the contractual 
arrangement for dealing with such issues coupled with a fragmentation 
of control within the client's team served to weaken the client's 
team's position. This would otherwise have been stronger given 
their contractual authority, the influence accorded by the sheer 
economic power of the client organisation as ~ ~ major public sector 
client, and the lack of any indication that the project was critical 
in having some strategic importance for the design team (as was the 
case in the NSS and PDL projects). Between these two were located 
the.three other cases, although the range of dimensions involved does 
not allow for an attempt to 'locate' them. On the one hand the NSS 
case was closer to the RAW case to the extent that a more unitary 
and centralised pattern of internal control within the client's team 
was an important feature. The configuration of relationships in the 
AFU case suggest some similarity in this respect to circumstances in 
the MTS case. Furthermore there were very basic differences in the 
degree of dependence of the main contractor on that particular client, 
and the criticality of the project to the achievement of organisational 
goals that suggest a similar tendency in the 'location' of the projects 
along this 'continuum'. On the other hand, differences in the clarity 
of the design and operational remit and the implications of this for 
the contractual authority of one party over another, coupled with 
differences in the extent to which the projects assumed some critical 
strategic importance for the respective clients' teams suggest the 
reverse was the case. For the PDt project the circumstances suggest 
a fairly close comparison with'the MTS case in many respects. The 
essential difference here lay in the specific nature of the contractual 
arrangement employed and its implications in a situation in which 
mutual dependency and fragmentation in control on ~ ~ sides of 
the contractual divide (here referring also to the position of the 
main contractor vis-a-vis nominated subcontractors) were critical 
components. What is being indicated.here is the dialectical relation-
ships amongst the dimensions taken into account in the analysis. 
Separating these out to look at the influence of particular factors 
ceteris paribus does throw up some significant points. ·In particular 
that the tendencies noted towards matrix management within the client's 
team tended to weaken their 'position in external dealings with the 
contractor's team (compare, for instance, the AFU, MTS and PDt cases 
with the RAW and NSS cases. In the NSS case reference was also made 
to a within-case distinction in this respect associated with the 
internal situation on the one hand and the employment of consultants 
on the other). However, it is the particular constellations of these 
factors and their inter-relationships that provide the basis for a 
fuller understanding of the dynamics of the working relationship 
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between the organisations involved in each of the five cases 
investigated. 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
DISCUSSION 
13.1 Summary of the Main Findings 
The main set of findings to emerge from this study can'be 
summarised briefly as follows. In the situations encountered 
across the five case studies (and bearing in mind important within-
case variability), there appeared to be some level of inconsistency 
between the more 'flexible' forms and processes of interaction that 
were deemed appropriate given the levels of complexity, uncertainty 
and interdependence in the nature of the work being undertaken on 
the one hand; and the actual more structured and 'rigid' forms and 
processes of interaction that tended to occur, and stem from the 
importance of the relationship as an essentially contractual one, 
on the other. While on the one hand, a generally more 'flexible' 
organic system of management was seen as important, and indeed 
in many resepcts did occur, in practice limits to a desired level 
of 'flexibility' and informality in interaction arose that stemmed 
from the fact that the parties' approaches were guided and informed, 
above all, by their contractual relationships with one another. 
The 'rigidities' that occurred in interaction as a c o n s e ~ u e n c e e
appeared to emerge as relatively more problematic issues in the three 
more complex and 'non-routine' projects in the sample. More 
specifically, they tended to emerge as a corollary to the close and 
continued interdependence between ongoing design and construction 
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processes. The types of problems that were referred to included 
perceptions that decisions were taken too centrally, views and 
opinions were not fully taken into account, interaction was too 
formally conducted,and hierarchical rather than network interaction 
was prevalent. Similar tendencies on the more 'routine' projects, 
though apparent to a similar degree, had by no means the same 
salience attached to them as problems in the management of the 
work on site. 
Paradoxically, those former situations should have been those 
in which one would have expected the heightened efficacy of a 
more 'flexible' approach, given the nature of the 'technical system' 
and the uncertainties and interdependencies inherent in the ongoing 
relationship between design and construction •. However, given the 
organisational (and corresponding contractual) divide, it was 
precisely in those types of situations that such an approach proved 
to be less likely. Indeed, some of the evidence suggests that 
attempts to adopt this approach in such conditions may have served 
only to enhance the parties' contractual vulnerability in inter-
action. The more likely response would tend to be the more 
cautious and guarded approach engendered by the salience attached 
to contractual or 'business system' considerations. 
These 'business system' pressures appeared to place a strain 
too upon the mechanisms employed to achieve integration within 
the project organisation as a whole. In most of the cases, more 
informal patterns of direct lateral interaction formed the main 
means by which a degree of collaboration could be achieved. The 
problem was that in those cases, the limits to the efficacy of 
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direct lateral interaction as a means of achieving a degree of 
integration emerged quickly once issues emerged with a 'contractual 
implication'. The more formal framework established in the terms 
and conditions of the contract then served as the baseline against 
which relationships were conducted. In the only case in which a 
main managing contractor was appointed to explicitly contribute 
towards achieving a sufficient level of integration, their ability 
to do so was constrained by the importance of the contractual 
arrangement in guiding and informing the parties' stances in 
interaction. Again, on the less 'routine' projects, the 
difficulties associated with co-ordinating work, particularly 
insofar as ongoing design issues were inVOlved, appeared to be 
particularly problematic. However across the cases, there was 
some difficulty in achieving a sufficient degree of integration 
between organisational subgroupings across the design-construct 
divide to the extent that the parties' positions were informed 
by a degree of caution and suspicion or mistrust of the others' 
motives. 
On the basis of the data that has described circumstances and 
events across the five projects, it seems possible to conclude 
that it may tend to be only in specific sets of circumstances 
that one might expect the approach actually adopted to be 
compatible with the requirements set by the nature of the task. 
Firstly, where the task being performed was comparatively straight-
forward and 'routine', and where there was a relatiVely clear 
separation between design and construction processes. In such 
conditions, the types of problems that emerge would tend to have 
less 'contractual importance' attached to them. Whereas working 
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relationships may still tend to be conducted more formally. 
reflecting a degree of caution, this would less likely be with any 
particular adverse effects on the running of the job. In other 
words, the more 'mechanistic' tendencies implied here t and which 
were observed to some extent across all the cases, would tend to 
be suitable given a more 'routine' task and fewer uncertainties 
stemming from the interrelationship between design and construction 
processes. The evident irony here is that the greater these 
uncertainties in a situation of a more complex and interdependent 
set of c o ~ s t r u c t i o n n processes, the more likely it is that efforts 
are made to tighten up procedures and conduct interaction more 
. 
formally in the face of the potential contractual 'threat' that 
they imply. Consequently, assuming some degree of latent mistrust 
in the relationship, the more likely that an inappropriate 
'mechanistic' system of interaction in conditions of task 
uncertainty will emerge. 
This picture is complicated further, when one looks in more 
detail at the sets of factors as they combined to produce a 
context within which the latter alternative occurred, or influenced 
its development as the relationship progressed. Across the cases, 
there was sufficient evidence to suggest that this degree of latent 
mistrust was an important premise in interaction and a factor that 
engendered generally a more cautious, guarded approach. However, 
given this baseline premise, two broader sets of factors served 
to account for the direction that events in each case would take. 
Firstly, it appeared that, in order for an appropriate degree of 
collaboration (rather than conflict or competition) to emerge 
, 
" 
13.4 
in the relationship, the parties either would have no positive 
and direct motivation to affect the course of decision-making 
in pursuance of their own interests at the expense of the other; 
or that, despite a latent incompatibility of goals and interests, 
the parties would have sufficient positive motivation not to attempt 
such strategies. Here, the more critical was the project to 
organisational fortunes, and the more 'disadvantaged' felt one 
party with respect to the other, then the more likely that a 
'vicious circle' in interaction would emerge. 
Secondly, the course of events was notably affected by the 
comparative ability of each party to pursue such strategies. 
Here, the formal position power of the participants under the 
contract, informal patterns of power and dependence between the 
organisations concerned at a wider level, and the internal context 
of their involvement on the project, combined in a variety of 
ways in each case to affect the capacity on the part of one party 
vis-a-vis another to pursue their own strategies, or to resist 
those strategies pursued by the other. What were particularly 
noticeable in this respect were two main features. Firstly, part 
of the ability to affect outcomes was contingent, other things 
being equal, upon the scope afforded to the participants, given 
a degree of lack of clarity or full coverage ~ n n both the sUbstantive 
and procedural aspects of the contractual agreement. In other words, 
the greater the uncertainties or ambiguities in the task remit 
and/or in the formal structure that defined the parties' roles and 
responsibilities in the management of the work, the greater scope 
there was available for pursuing their own goals in i n ~ r a c t i o n . .
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A further irony is suggested here: namely that, in conditions of 
task uncertainty as described above, the inability to fully define 
in advance the specification of the task and/or the responsibilities 
of the parties towards the management of the task, enhanced the 
likelihood of problems emerging in the relationship, and consequently 
of a more 'mechanistic' approach emerging in response. Because of 
the contractual vulnerability that this situation engendered, a 
premium was put upon a response that either lessened the parties' 
vulnerability in interaction, or e n h a n c e d ~ t h e i r r ability to take 
advantage of the others' Vulnerability to pursue their own aims 
- assuming they had the motivation to do so. Paradoxically, a 
more 'flexible' contractual arrangement to deal with the uncertainties 
and interdependencies in the nature of the task - a perhaps 
approfriate combination - was more likely to lead to situations 
in which precisely the opposite tendencies emerged, given the 
motivation of at least one party to pursue their own goals in 
interaction,and the scope that vas then afforded through the 
inherent ambiguities and omissions in the set of contractual terms 
and conditions employed. 
The second main feature that was apparent was the extent to 
which an internal lack of cohesion jeopardised the position of 
the parties in external interaction. This w a ~ ~ a particularly 
prominent feature in three of the design organisations (in the 
MTS, PDL and AFU cases) and in one of the main contracting 
organisations (in the RAW case), as noted towards the end of the 
last chapter. The general point to emerge here is that the more 
dispersed was the pattern of power within each subunit, and the 
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more that patterns of influence and control were ambiguous or shared, 
the more vulnerable was that party in their external dealings. 
Conversely, the more unitary, cohesive and clear was the internal, 
situation, the less vulnerable was that party in external dealings. 
This appeared to be so across the cases in the sample. What was 
notable when contrasting conditions between the two more 'routine' 
projects and the three laboratory cases was that such factors, in 
the latter cases, belied the contrasting tendencies towards 
'technical system' and 'business system' considerations noted 
above. On the one hand, the nature of the task tended to complement 
the more variegated pattern of power, influence and control. On 
the other hand, the fact that it occurrea in the context of a 
contractual relationship between· the parties ,prompted severe 
difficulties for the parties concerned in their handling of the 
project. In the previous chapter, the MTS case was singled out 
as giving a quite dramatic illustration of these contrary tendencies. 
In summary, perhaps the main point to have emerged from this 
analysis is that the norm of a fully-fledged 'organic' system of 
management in a setting such as that described here may be to a 
large extent an aberration t given the salience of the inter-
organisational, contractual dimension. As described above, this 
situation appears as if it may only be achieved in particular sets 
of circumstances, contingent upon characteristics of the inter-
organisational relationship, and of the organisations involved 
in that relationship. If the situations and events on the cases 
are anything to go by, then it appears that the more necessary 
becomes ,a more 'flexible' approach to conducting the work (for 
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example, where design and construction processes extensively 
'overlap' in a complex project setting), then the less likely this 
is in fact to occur. Given the scope that such a situation affords 
to the parties to pursue their own sets of goals in interaction 
with respect to the project, then for an appropriate, more flexible 
and 'organic' system of management to occur depends upon quite a 
unique patterning of circumstances that serve to reduce the 
motivation to exert influence, and to reduce the likelihood that 
such attempts will be successful. 
The achievement of a sufficient level of 'integration' between 
the parties is 'similarly made more difficult as the salience of the 
contractual dimension increases. In an interorganisational 
setting such as that studied here, the heightened salience of 
organisational goals in interaction, coupled with disparities in 
the 'power' brought to the relationship by each of the parties 
concerned places a strain upon achieving a high level of 
collaboration and mutual. accommodation. In most of the cases 
in this studr, no explicit mechanism was formally employed to 
achieve integration between the parties. There was no effective 
recourse to a third party to settle disputes, conflicts and 
disagreements, and to supply a forum for resolving problems and 
reaching decisions in the more open and collaborative fashion 
emphasised by i n v e s t i g a t o ~ s s of project management phenomena. 
Instead, the 'main linking mechanism was the contract itself, and 
the main forum was via direct lateral interaction between 
representatives between the main parties. 
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The problems tended to arise, on the one hand, due to ambiguities 
in the for.mal framework of interaction (in both its sUbstantive 
details and procedural aspects), and its openness to competing and 
conflicting interpretation; on the other hand, due to the fact 
that the parties' stances in interaction were informed by separate 
and often conflicting interests, perspectives and assumptions, 
and their positions were bolstered or disadvantaged variously 
according to their organisation's power in interaction and its 
internal structural characteristics. In the case where an explicit 
integrative mechanism was employed (the managing contractor in 
the PDL case), these factors were by no means of any less importance 
to the processes of interaction with respect to the management of 
the project. The difference was rather simply that the outcomes 
were experienced differentially by different parties within the 
total prQject system; and that a tacit acknowledgment of the 
mutual dependence of the main parties upon each other emerged as 
the central dynamic that determined the course of events. 
13.2 Discussion 
The earlier discussion in Chapter 2 raised a number of 
questions concerning the applicability and feasibility of achieving 
preferred 'norms' of interaction"in a situation essentially 
defined by organisational. differentiation and associated divergencies 
in goals, orientations, attitUdes and power. The discussion will 
now turn to addressing these questions again in the light of the 
findings described above. Attention was directed specifically 
towards the norms of an 'organic' system of management, and to 
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the use o ~ ~ structural mechanisms employed to achieve integration. 
These issues will be discussed in turn before discussing in more 
detail the implications of the findings for the norm of a 'culture' 
. 
that is compatible with the requirements posed by the nature of 
the task in a project setting such as that described in this study. 
13.2.1 The 'Organic' Task Team Group 
What should have emerged from the foregoing analysis and 
discussion are the pragmatic difficulties that are encountered 
in developing and maintaining a 'team' approach to the management 
of project work in a multi-organisational setting. Clear tendencies 
were exhibited towards a more 'loosely-structured' approach to the 
management of the work across the cases. However, these coexisted 
with the (in cases) overpowering effects of the formal, contractual 
system that supplied the framework for interaction among the parties. 
Moreover, the existence of a perceived or actual external contractual 
'threat' served (in cases) to put a premium upon a more, as 
opposed to less, structured approach towards the management of the 
work internally for the organisations concerned. 
The discussion in Chapter 2 raised the prospect of these 
tendencies emerging: (a) within the single organisation, and 
contingent upon the direct impact of external dealings; and (b) 
within the multi-organisational setting, and contingent upon the 
salience of similar business system considerations. The results, 
while by no means conclusive. suggest the importance of the 
contractual dimension as an important moderating factor upon likely 
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internal and external forms and processes of interaction. With 
respect to the internal workings of a complex organisational system 
such as that found in construction, a clear tendency vas found 
for situations of (perceived, expected or actual) external 'threat' 
to be responded to by recourse to more formal, structured 
mechanisms to co-ordinate and control activity. Conversely, the 
absence of more 'obtrusive' mechanisms of co-ordination and control 
served often simply to enhance the vulnerability of the one party 
in interaction. 
From the findings, it is impossible to do other than speculate 
upon the longer-term implications for the character of internal 
structures and processes of management in these respects. However, 
the noted importance of starting assumptions and expectations 
(for instance, as it was reflected in the discretionary authority 
afforded to clerks of works) does suggest the possible appropriate-
ness of a line of argument that predicts the association of a much 
more structured approach to the management of project work over 
time,with the salience of external dealings in the mainstream of 
organisational activity. 
With respect to dealings within the project organisation as 
a whole, such starting assumptions and expectations were also found 
to be an important backdrop in defining the extent to which a more 
collaborative, flexible 'team' approach developed; or, conversely, 
the extent to which the parties acted more formally or 
'contractually' with respect to one another. The situation that 
occurred and,its development was found to be contingent upon the 
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range of contextual factors and their interrelationships in each 
case as described above. To the extent that these circumstances, 
and the reaction of the participants towards them, enhanced the 
salience of the contractual dimension, the more likely it was 
that the 'threshold' was bridged between the two approaches, and 
the more likely that 'rigidities' in interaction, as described 
by Sayles and Chandler (1971), emerged as a consequence. Perhaps 
the most important thing to bear in mind here is that it was 
somewhat more unusual in the cases described for this 'threshold' 
not to be met, than it was for interaction to arise and develop 
fully along more flexible 'team' lines from the outset and for it 
to maintain that course. 
Several specific 'norms' of interaction were discussed in the 
earlier part of this thesis for which these findings have 
implications in the context of a multiorganisational project 
setting. Firstly, the norm of authority based upon individuals' 
(or groups') knowledge and expertise proves to be difficult to 
achieve where a business relationship and associated lack of 
mutual trust underpins the relationship. Where the level of 
trust in the relationship was comparatively low (due to initial 
expectations and/or reinforced by actual events), it meant that 
efforts to contribute knowledge and expertise to problem-solving 
and decisional processes were almost bound to be interpreted as 
attempts to obtain preferred outcomes (whether they actually were 
or not). The difficulty in such a setting becomes one of 
distinguishing between 'valid' interpretations based upon technical 
(design or construction) knowledge and expertise, and 'invalid' 
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interpretations that are perceived to be based upon preferred 
solutions to the issue at hand. Given the motivational backdrop 
supplied by the contractual relationship, the baseline assumption 
tends rather to be that differences in 'cause-effect beliefs' 
(Thompson 1967) in fact represent, and are symptomatic of, differences 
informed by divergent 'preferred outcomes' (ibid 1967). For 
instance, differences between the 'design point of view' and the 
'building point of view' become difficult to distinguish from 
perceptions of 'the designer's interests' and 'the builder's 
interests' respectively. In such a situation it becomes more 
difficult to conceive of a pattern of interaction developing in 
which authority based upon knowledge and expertise is the norm, 
than it does a pattern of'interaction in which one's position under 
the contract becomes the prevalent guiding influence. 
Related difficulties emerge concerning the preference for a 
system of interaction in which decentralised decision-making authority 
and a spread of participatory influence in decisional processes 
constitute two related important features. Given the perceived 
importance of conflicting preferred outcomes in this situation, 
a premium is rather likely to be placed more upon making efforts 
to ensure that decisional processes fully reflect one's own 
organisation's interests in interaction, rather than those of one's 
contractual adversary. In other words the implicit tendency will 
be to control and influence the process of decision-making more 
directly, and to set limits to the extent to which the exercise bi 
other participants of participatory influence in decision-making 
is countenanced. Rather than a conception of one's contribution 
13.13 
being related to the part played in the process, a focus on 
contractual rights and obligations prompts rather more a conception 
of contribution based upon one's role or position within the 
administrative network established under the contract. 
Concerning the preference for a more 'loosely structured' , 
informal and network system of interaction between the parties, a 
similar tendency for these norms to be contradicted is apparent 
in the emphasis that the contractual relationship puts upon: 
documenting decisions that have been reached; following 
procedural mechanisms to ensure that one's position is 'covered'; 
dealing more directly with single, rather than multiple, points of 
contact in other organisations to ensure that 'lines of communication 
are not crossed'; creating a datafile for use in the event of 
contractual difficulties and claims; making sure that definitive 
approval is given for decisions reached; and so on. The point here 
is that such tendencies may tend to emerge as almost necessary 
prerequisites, if the participants' vulnerability in contractually-
based interaction is not to be enhanced. 
The general point here is that such responses are essentially 
rational ones, from each organisation's point of view, given the 
nature of the underlying relationship between the organisations 
involved, and their potential vulnerability in direct dealings with 
external parties in a setting defined simultaneously by the 
uncertainty of the task, and the degree of surety embodied in one's 
contractual position with respect to the performance of that task. 
The literature on the functioning of complex project organisations 
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tends to regard such f e a ~ u r e s s as essentially aberrations to the 
norm of a more 'organic' climate of interaction amongst members 
of the task team group. The argument that has been pursued here 
is that, when one broadens the focus to the features of the setting 
within which the parties are expected to interact, and if one 
accounts for the fundamental difference in the motivational bases 
underlying interaction in an external setting, it becomes rather 
more the likely achievement of this set of interactive norms 
that emerges as the aberration. Further, if one takes the 
impact of external relationships upon the internal characteristics 
of the firm engaged in undertaking project work, it becomes 
possible to view the salience of the interorganisational dimension 
as a potential factor that may help to explain common aberrations 
to these norms observed and recorded by investigators in internal 
matrix and project management settings. 
13.2.2 Integrative Mechanisms 
With respect to structural mechanisms employed to achieve 
integration in the sense defined by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), 
there are two major points here that pertain to conditions in an 
internal and external interactive setting respectively. The first, 
concerning internal systems of administration, is that the 
potential vulnerability of the organisation team in their 
external dealings puts a premium upon a more, rather than less, 
united and cohesive 'team' framework. Internal difficulties that 
compounded external problems were found to be associated with less 
direct patterns of control, greater ambiguity in patterns of 
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authority, and dual patterns of authority within the organisation. 
Conversely the more 'successful' parties in external dealings 
were able to present a more powerful and united 'front' and avoid 
attempts to exploit internal divisions. 
This external dimension has a clear relevance for defining 
the level of influence of respective internal managers over subunit 
operations in a project setting,where the organisation is linked 
with external parties. It also suggests a major problem for 
the single organisation in adopting an internal framework that 
allows for a 'balance' in the objectives to be pursued. Specifically, 
in the absence of problematic external relations in the joint 
undertaking of project work, one would expect recommendations 
concerning the appropriate 'balance of influence' exercised by, say, 
project and functional managers within the organisation to hold. 
However, in the event of problematic external dealings, it becomes 
much more appropriate to 'tip' the balance of influence (cf Knight 
1977) in the direction of project managers and the project 
objectives they represent. 
quandary. On the one hand, 
The organisation is faced with a 
if it maintains a framework in which 
the balance of objectives suggests the need for a comparative 
lack of formal influence of project managers over seconded functional 
staff involved in the team, it may be disadvantaged in external 
interaction. On the other hand, if it strengthens the position 
of the project management f u n c t i o ~ ~ to cope with external pressures, 
it does so at the possible expense of an 'imbalance' in the pursuit 
of organisational objectives with respect to the project. 
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The cases in this study have not been analysed such as to 
attempt to place a 'value judgement' concerning the appropriateness 
of respective levels of influence needed to achieve a 'balanced' 
approach towards the achievement of project objectives. Indeed, 
ever,y effort has been made to explore comparative perceptions of 
'appropriate' levels of influence attributed to the various 
parties and how these were regarded across the cases. However, it 
is difficult to come away from the findings without the impression 
that achieving such a degree of 'balance' internally for the 
o r g a n i s a ~ i o n s s involved, or resolving the dilemma of autonomy or 
control, was of some significant importance. Further that 
. 
configurations in the patterns of influence in this respect had an 
important bearing on their success in external interaction. 
Moreover, that the dilemma of achieving an appropriate balance 
between autonomy and control was a particularly problematic one 
on the three 'non-routine' cases in the sample where, in particular, 
the co-ordination of main structural and services work formed the 
focus for this -dilemma. 
The argument that is being pursued here is essentially that 
models of matrix management that seek to define the 'appropriateness' 
of a particular configuration of relationships that correspond to a 
specific balance between the objectives the f ~ r m m is to pursue, 
essentially ignore the impact that external relationships in a 
project setting may have upon the efficacy of the model employed. 
It one looks solely at the nature of the task itself, and at the 
existing situation within the organisation, one may conclude, for 
instance, that a 'co-ordination' model (Knight 1977) forms the 
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appropriate mechanism. However, if one then takes into account 
the vulnerability this may lead to for the organisational team in 
external dealings - through, for instance, the limited direct 
influence and control exerted by the project manager - then one 
may conclude that a 'secondment' model of interaction may be more 
appropriate. More generally, the organisational design issue may 
become one of striking a balance between the set of comparative 
levels of authority and influence within the organisation, and 
the set of requirements as they are affected by likely patterns 
of external dealings within the multiorganisational project 
system. 
The second major point concerns patterns of integration 
between parties within this wider system. The point has already 
been touched upon in discussing the divergent orientations associated 
with the 'design viewpoint' and the 'construction viewpoint'. 
Moreover, as noted above, t ~ e e salience of the contractual dimension 
heightens (actual, expected or perceived) goal divergencies in 
interaction, such that the degree of 'collaboration' one might 
expect to occur is heavily constrained by 'business system' 
factors. This is not entirely the case, of course. Indeed, some 
of the evidence pointed to what amounted to highly convergent 
orientations across organisational boundaries ,(cf the M & E 
services on the MTS and PDt cases); moreover, the evidence 
suggested important points of convergence in relation to the 
goals being pursued when a more complex (eg triadic) system of 
relationships was looked at (cf the main contractor - PQS collusion 
on the PDL case). 
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Nevertheless, the particular difficulty in this type of 
setting clearly stems from the heightened salience of divergent 
economic interests in interaction. In models of matrix management 
that are applied in an interorganisational setting, the tendency 
is not fully to account for the essential difference in the premises 
adopted in interaction that this factor engenders. Moreover, the 
important focus upon power differentials in interaction ill relating 
these to the technical characteristics of the task, underplays this 
important underlying dimension. When one takes this into account, 
sets of quite,different interpretations and recommendations 
potentially follow. What was a particularly prominent characteristic 
of most of the cases investigated in this study (with the exception 
of the AFU case), was that the particular configurations of 
established project objectives (time, cost and quality) were such 
that they could only really be effectively and fully achieved 
if at least one party (or group) was disadvantaged to some extent 
and in some w ~ y y with respect to achieving their own aims on the 
project. In some cases the 'balance of objectives' achieved was 
predicated upon extra financial cost or loss to the parties; in 
other cases it was predicated upon the relaxation of the standards 
of the specification and the quality objectives achieved. A 
useful analogy might be to describe the situations as those in 
which 'pressure in the system' due to i n c o m p a ~ i b l e e and contra-
dictory objectives was built up. This 'pressure' had to be 
released somewhere: the factors that influenced the respective 
vulnerability of the parties and their patterns of mutual 
dependency were those that combined to suggest where this 'pressure' 
might be released. 
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In this type of situation it is difficult to see again how 
parties' perceived contributions may be .effectively de-coupled from 
their perceived interests. Further, how a system for achieving 
integration that is appropriate to circumstances in a more 
normatively-consistent internal setting may be equally appropriate 
to circumstances in which highly divergent goal orientations are 
the norm. The position and influence exerted by the integrator 
in an internal matrix setting has received considerable attention 
in the literature. In most of the cases studied here, no formal 
system for achieving integration was observed (the constraints and 
limits upon the clerk of works as the individual most close to 
occupying this position in practice, have suggested that their 
position tended to prompt the exercise of more direct, centralised 
control, rather than allowing them the autonomy and independence 
to perform this role). In the case in which a formal mechanism 
existed (the PDt case), the inferences to be drawn are that: 
(a.) their ability to rely upon more informal bases of influence 
other than positional power within the 'management team' was 
constrained by divergent assumptions and expectations concerning 
where their 'interests' in fact lay; and (b) that the tendency 
was for their expressed 'neutrality' to be somewhat compromised 
by the close assoCiation of their own, and the client's, interests. 
Despite, in this case, an explicit mechanism ~ m p l o y e d d to promote 
collaborative working relationships, the salience of divergent 
interests meant that this aim was never really achieved on the 
project (although it was largely successful with respect to 
achieving time, cost and quality objectives). 
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In summary, if one is to look at the phenomenon of the 
performance of an 'integrator role' in a multiorganisational setting, 
one has to account for the impact of the highly divergent goal 
orientations in the performance of this role. In a situation 
where perceptions are guided by concern as to the actual 'neutrality' 
of the integrator, the baseline of trust and willingness to accept 
that integrator's influence (and, conversely, to accept the limits 
to the direct control exerted over the incumbent), make the 
effective performance of the role as defined in the matrix 
management literature, a highly problematic one. While the role in 
an internal setting m ~ ~ be a highly difficult and challenging one, 
it is argued here that, in an external setting, it may be virtually 
impossible. That is, assuming one judges the effectiveness of 
the role according to the types of criteria specified by matrix 
management theorists. 
For the incumbent of the role, the situation is fraught with 
problems of role ambiguity and conflict. Although this study has 
not directly investigated the impact of these phenomena, it is 
clear from much of the earlier discussion how those in a position 
of 'straddling' the divide between the organisations involved 
respectively in 'design' and 'construction' activities were at the 
centre of milieux of conflicting expectations and assumptions 
concerning the interests that informed their approach towards 
the management of the work. Further, those incumbents (including 
those involved in the PDL case) were imbued with comparatively 
little in the way of formal influence to 'manage' the relationship 
between the parties_ In an internal setting, the exercise of 
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influence based upon 'sapiental' authority (Patterson 1966) is 
expected to make up the shortfall. In an external setting, 
where the conditions do not necessarily exist for the acceptance 
of the validity of influence exerted upon this basis (see above), 
an exercise in 'political' manoeuvring, tact and diplomacy may 
be the more essential weapon in the integrator's armoury. Such 
a differing emphasis clearly has the potential for prompting 
the efficacy of a somewhat different 'style' of interaction of the 
integrator as leader in a multiorganisational project setting, 
where situational conditions are comparatively much less 
'favourable'. A recent article by Halsey and Margerison (1978) 
- a discussion of the situation on very large contracts - serves 
as an interesting and relevant aside to this series of points 
concerning the position and influence of ' the managing contractor 
as 'integrator' on construction projects. The discussion there 
points to the efficacy of a much more directive approach adopted 
by the integrator in interaction, based upon a recourse to, and 
emphasis upon, the sets of formal terms and conditions of contract 
that bind the parties whose activities they are attempting to 
co"',ordinate. In the cases explored in this study this more 
directive or 'authoritarian' stance was much less possible given 
the comparatively weak formal positions of those performing the 
role, and their dependence upon the parties for whom they were 
working. However. the distinction does suggest the importance of 
variability in the position and role of the integrator for 
determining the possibilities available. More importantly perhaps 
it illustrates that the appropriate dimension along which the 
integrator's influence varies consists rather more of the level 
of formal control that they can exercise - rather than their 
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exercise of 'sapiental authority' (Patterson 1966) as in an 
internal matrix setting. The general point to be made here is that 
the salience of a contractual dimension, and the pressure upon 
those performing integrator roles to follow one set of interests 
or another may combine to limit the extent to which patterns of 
influence based upon bases other than that of formal positional 
power (ie knowledge, expertise), are likely to be effective 
in 'bringing the parties together' in an external setting. 
13.2.3 'Cultural' Compatibility 
The general question was earlier addressed concerning the 
'cultural'compatibility of the antecedent organisation with that 
required in the new forms of organisation described in Chapter 1. 
What was clearly in evidence in the cases studied here was a 
'cultural' set of norms part of which was the inherently 
adversarial nature of the relationship between the parties to the 
contract. This did not necessarily manifest itself in any direct 
conflict between the parties - take, for instance, the AFU case. 
However, even here, a notably guarded and cautious approach was 
engendered. Moreover, possibilities of obtaining advantages 
stemming from internal div;.sions were recognised, if not actually 
pursued. This essentially competitive and adversarial nature of the 
relationship has been firmly associated by construction management 
researchers with the type of setting in a more 'traditional' 
form of administrative arrangement. However, what was particularly 
interesting about the PDL case, was the extent to which these 
norms were carried over into a situation which was ostensibly 
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free of that type of antagonism between the main parties. The 
'management team concept' may have been the articulated norm; 
however, it was a nor.m that proved difficult to achieve, given 
the strength of expectations and assumptions infor.med by previous 
experience of working in more 'traditional' settings. 
For those interested in the development and maintenance of 
more complex organisational for.ms, these findings present something 
of a quandary. In a multi-organisational project setting, and 
where relationships are notable for their transience, there appears 
to be neither the opportunity nor the incentive for the parties to 
develop a (project) organisational 'cultUre' which is consistent 
with the types of requirements posed by the nature of the task. 
On the contrary, the incentive is perhaps rather more for a 
cautious or competitive, adversarial approach to be adopted that 
lessens the likelihood that such a transformation will be 
achieved. Moreover, to the extent that novelty in the relation-
ship is the starting position, and brevity in the relationship is 
an important factor, it appears further unlikely that initial 
preconceptions and assumptions are likely to give way to a 
greater mutual understanding and degree of accommodation between 
the parties. Even in the absence of residual direct conflict 
between the parties, it appears still likely that a learning 
process might be involved that militates against full and open 
collaboration from the start. 
More broadly, the problem in an interorganisational setting 
is of pursuing the equivalent of an organisational development or 
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management development programme to achieve a 'cultural' trans-
for.mation that corresponds to what is required by the nature of 
the task being performed. Put simply, the ability to achieve 
an appropriate (project) organisational 'culture' is prejudiced 
against by the fact that the setting is a multi-organisational 
one (with the interesting exception in this respect of the design 
and construct situation). As described in Chapter 3 earlier, the 
possibilities for better communication and co-ordination are F ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ b ~ ~
militated against by the highly developed 'role culture' within 
the industry. The ~ r o b l e m m becomes one of generating some form ot 
consensual view of the appropriateness of certain forms and 
types of interaction in a setting essentially defined by dis sensus 
(in values, nor.ms, goals and objectives). 
Alternatfveforms of delivery system (eg management contracting, 
design and construct) may suggest an alternative strategy - of 
changing the s t r u c t ~ e e of relationships between the parties, 
rather than attempting some form of cultural transformation within 
the existing 'traditional' system of working. What the findings 
from the PDt case suggest, however, is the necessity for such 
structUral changes to be accompanied by a change in perspectives 
concerning the nature of the roles performed by those involved. 
Given the nature of the industry, however, it .seems unlikely that 
such changes may fully occur: particularly to the extent that 
such alternative methods are advocated by one group (ie builders). 
To be successfully implemented they may require fuller acceptance 
on the part of other groups (ie clients, designers) of either their 
unambiguous benefits or the unambiguous costs of continuing to 
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employ a more 'traditional' set of arrangements. The question that 
is then suggested is: what benefits and costs are entailed for the 
parties in a move towards an alternative type of arrangement than 
that 'traditionally' employed; and can one expect that attempts 
to employ such a framework that has 'costs' for one or other of the 
parties will necessarily be accepted willingly and without resistance. 
The problems that occur in their implementation (cf the PDL 
case) may arise largely due to the fact that the premises that 
underly the different forms of arrangement simply contradict those 
that underpin 'traditional' (and more extensively occurring) forms 
of arrangement in which the main parties" are, to all intents and 
purposes, contractual adversaries. For those participants 
involved)such a change to an alternative system heralds a move 
towards a differential pattern of control and influence over the 
total design and construction process. While it is clearly too 
much to generalise findings from the one case study to circumstances 
within the industry as a whole, the types of issues that were 
raised on the PDL case suggest a line of enquiry worthy of future 
investigation. Specifically, given attempts by organisations to 
control sources of uncertainty in their environment (Thompson 1967), 
and given the traditional organisational split within the industry 
between design and construction processes and the relative locations 
of professional and other groupings in the organisational 'cluster' 
that manages project activity (Riggin and Jessop 1965), it may be 
worthwhile to pursue the issue of organisational control of the 
total project processes at a more aggregated, institutional level 
within the industry. In other words, irrespective of the 'technical' 
merits of different forms of project delivery system, they have 
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implications for conditions of 'domain' dependence at an 
organisational level, and of the same for professional and other 
groupings at an institutional level. What is being suggested 
here is the potential importance of an historical a n a ~ s i s s of the 
industry that employs as its framework the notions of 
organisational domain and efforts to control contingencies. This 
may help explain past developments and current dynamics in the 
relationships between the organisations involved at a broader, 
industry-wide level. 
For those interested in the 'cultural norms' of matrix and 
project management systems, the findings' and the interpretations 
placed upon them suggest the importance of time and longevity 
as a means of approximating moves towards a consistent 'culture' 
of interaction, and'avoiding the impact of cultural 'clashes'. 
This has two components: firstly, the extent to which relationships 
amongst organisations in a project setting (and their group or 
individual representatives) are recurrent; secondly, the actual 
length of duration of the relationship. In the first case, 
mention has already been made (in Chapter 4) of the impact of 
continuing interorganisational linkages as a control mechanism for 
managing dependent organisations (Sayles and Chandler 1971). Such 
an interpretation is lent some strength by the findings reported 
here. However, perhaps just as significantly, a longer-standing 
relationship may promote conditions in which achieving some degree 
of cultural consistency is possible. In effect, recurrent experience 
in the same relationship may foster a much closer orientation 
towards managing the p r o j ~ c t t (although the NSS case shows how these 
conditions may 'break down' in certain circumstances: the consistency 
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is at best a tenuous one). At least prior knowledge and 
experience of working together may reduce the 'learning curve' 
associated with reaching a position of mutual understanding of 
others' positions. 
With respect to the longevity and duration of interorganisational 
linkages in any particular project setting, one would expect that, 
assuming the absence of problems in the relationship, a longer 
relationship would at least contribute towards a better understanding 
over time of each party's position and orientations. The findings 
reported here give no direct indication that this may be the case. 
However, the importance of continuity ana longevity has become 
increasingly recognised as a factor influencing the development of 
relationships within the construction project setting (eg Bryman 
et al 1986) and deserves fuller and further attention. This is 
particularly so in studies of matrix and project management, 
where a situation that is essentially defined by the 'cyclical' 
nature of project activity, tends to generate little direct interest 
in the potential importance of variation in the phenomenon of 
transience. As suggested above, it may be of particular interest 
in investigating the extent to which 'appropriate' cultural norms 
have an opportunity to develop. 
13.2.4 'LeadershiE in Project Systems 
A good deal of attention was directed, in the early part of 
this thesis, towards the issue of leadership processes and 'styles' 
of interaction in the type of setting studied here. The 
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particular methodology that was employed in this study did not 
allow for either a full assessment of the processes involved, or 
the ability to make full and direct comparisons with findings 
obtained in other types of setting (due to a departure from the 
more usual standardised and structured techniques extensively 
employed in leadership research). However, in the description, 
analysis and discussion of the findings, certain tendencies were 
noted to have emerged with potentially important implications for 
studying the processes involved in such complex settings. Such 
tendencies further suggest that this topic may provide a potentially 
fruitful area for further research. 
Firstly, the noted tendencies towards 'rigidities' in patterns 
of external interaction, were complemented in many cases by 
commentaries which suggested the tendency towards the adoption 
of more directive or 'autocratic' approaches (Vroom and Yetton 
1973) to the management of the work on site. Several comments were 
made wnich suggested that the tendency towards decision central-
isation within the wider project organisation was due in the main 
to manifestations of a 'stylistic' interpretation by senior 
managers of how to approach the project in order to exercise their 
influence and control over the processes of decision-making. 
These tendencies were somewhat common to both ,internal relation-
ships within organisational teams, and externally in dealings with 
other parties. In the latter instance, the experienced Uissatisfaction' 
of those at the 'receiving end' was implicit in much of their 
discussion of what they felt had been the consequences. However, 
any direct impact, one way or the other, upon the actual levels 
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of performance realised cannot be inferred from the findings. 
Furthermore, establishing the effects of such approaches contingent 
upon situational conditions (task complexity and so on) proves a 
difficult exercise given the nature of'the data presented. 
The more significant and interesting point emerges here, 
however, if one takes into account the impact of situational 
factors as conditioning influences upon the types of approach 
adopted. Specifically, the fact that the setting was an inter-
organisational one appeared to suggest that a premium was put 
upon the adoption of a more directive, instrumental and 
'authoritarian' stance in joint interaction. This tendency b e ~ o m e s s
apparent if, for instance, one compares the comments made 
concerning the (perceived) too directive 'styles' of the Project 
Managers in-the NSS, AFU and PDL cases, with the (perceived) lack 
of direction given to the design team in the MTS case, and the 
(perceived) effects of the somewhat laissez faire approach of the 
Site Agent in later stages of the RAW project. In the last two 
situations, moreover, these approaches were contrasted with the 
(implicitly) more directive approaches adopted by their counter-
parts in the other main participating organisations. 
The point that emerges here is that it was the salience of 
the contractual dimension that promoted the perceived efficacy of 
a 'style' of interaction that was geared towards maintaining more 
direct, personal control over events on the project. Given the 
earlier comments made concerning the limits to the exercise of 
p a r t i c i p a t Q r ~ ~ inf.luence in a multi-organisational setting, this 
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also tended to be expressed in the conduct of relationships in a 
somewhat more 'autocratic' manner. Those in de jure leadership 
positions had effective recourse to their power under the contract 
to secure compliance, as opposed to pursuing a more participatory 
line to create conditions for 'acceptance'. The approach was 
conditioned or engendered more directly by a reliance upon one's 
formal position power afforded under the contract, combined with 
expectations that otherwise the 'adversary' would be enabled to 
pursue their own interests in interaction. In an internal setting, 
the inference that can be drawn was that tendencies to exert 
more direct control in this way were consistent with the need to 
ensure that the goals that those participants represented were 
fully achieved and, in the context of problematic external 
relations, to ensure that any attempts made by their contractual 
'adversary' to take advantage of potential or actual internal 
divisions within the team were countered by more direct, centralised 
influence and control. 
Assuming it is possible to draw such inferences from the data 
obtained, then a further difficulty is encountered in translating 
the norms of a 'style' of leadership that generates, fosters and 
facilitates participative interaction from an internal to an external 
setting. Furthermore, to the extent that such external dealings 
affect perceptions. of the need to exert more direct and centralised 
control, the tendency may be contrary to what is perhaps needed 
internally, given the nature of the task being undertaken. 
Concerning the nature of the task and what may be an 'appropriate' 
response, given the complexity Df work and so on, these inferences 
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suggest a further quandary. Namely, that ~ ~ complex and uncertain 
conditions may create exactly the types of circumstances in which 
a ~ , , rather than less, directive approach is actually pursued. 
This to the extent that uncertainties heighten the organisation's 
vulnerability in interaction, such that it is perceived that the 
achievement of organisational objectives is potentially threatened. 
Clearly this area needs further and fuller investigation, if 
one is to draw any firmer conclusions. However, two tentative 
suggestions may be made as possible propositions worthy of specific 
study: firstly, that in an interorganisational p r o j e ~ t t setting, 
and to the extent that relationships with external parties are 
(actually or expected to be) problematic, then one's formal 
authority under the contract acts, in effect, as a 'substitute for 
leadership.'. Secondly, that in the presence of problematic 
external dealings, the response internally is likely to be a 
more directive or ~ n i t i a t i n g g structure' style of leadership. 
A second issue that bears brief mention with respect to 
leadership processes and 'styles' of interaction generally in a 
multiorganisational project setting, links back with the earlier 
points raised concerning the fact of (project) organisational 
transience, and variation between projects in this respect. 
Across the' cases an important emphasis was placed by many of those 
involved upon the 'cohesiveness' of the team, and the importance 
of interpersonal relationships within the group at the outset and 
throughout the project's development. Sufficient references were 
made to comments such as "it all depends on relationships' and 
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"personalities are very important" to suggest that the manner 
in which the 'team' developed depended importantly upon individuals' 
stances in interaction and their responses to circumstances and 
events. The comments made on the PDL case concerning the 
difficulties experienced in getting the team to IIgel" serve here 
perhaps as an illustration. Such a phenomenon is by no means 
surprising. Indeed, the importance of interpersonal relationships 
and orientations and generating a 'team' approach are important 
underlying features in all prescriptions for the extension of 
'lateral relations' (Galbraith op cit) within complex organisational 
settings. This discussion has focused considerably upon the 
contextual factors that define the conditions under which 
individuals and groups conduct lateral interaction. An important 
final two points, with implications for possible future avenues 
of research concern the impact of time asa parameter for processes 
of joint interaction. 
Firstly, such project settings are essentially characterised 
by the fact that members of the 'team' ~ u n l i k e e perhaps in internal 
settings) are likely to have little prior knowledge of one 
another and little direct experience of working together. The 
relationship is a project specific one and the 'team' is unlikely 
to be reconstituted fully in subsequent i n t e r ~ r g a n i s a t i o n a 1 1 dealings. 
Such a factor clearly helps to explain the 'learning process' 
involved in the initial stages of interaction, where preconceptions 
may form the guiding influence. What they may further help to 
explain are the interpretations noted above of tendencies towards 
a more directive 'autocratic' style. The criticality of the 
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business relationship, expectations concerning others' likely 
responses, and a desire not to take risks in this type of situation 
- which is only a temporary, transactional relationship anyway -
may engender a much more cautious and instrumental approach in 
exercising leadership. Of course, continuity in the relationships 
at an interpersonal, as well as group or organisational, level 
may well be variable (cf the situations on the RAW and AFU cases). 
Moreover, the longevity of the particular relationship with respect 
to one project may vary. What this implies though, for those 
interested in investigating such phenomena in complex and 
temporary project organisational systems is the need to more fully 
take into account variation in the time scale of interaction as 
a potential important conditioning influence upon the development 
of 'team' relationships (eg Bryman et al 1986). Further, what this 
means in contrasting internal and external matrix management 
settings/is the potential importance of the comparative timescale 
of interaction as a differentiating experiential factor. 
The second point to be raised is that it becomes more 
important, in a transient project-based setting to explore various 
paths that the development of 'team' relationships can take, set 
in this context of initial (. varying) lack of experience of 
working together at an interpersonal, as well as group or organis-
ational, level. The above inferences concerning leader orientations 
and 'styles' have been made largely with respect to the position 
of de jure 'leaders' (both internally and within the wider 
project organisation), and have presented an essentially static 
overall view of circumstances across the cases in this respect. 
13.34 
Indeed the data obtained do not allow fully for an exploration of 
the dynamics involved with respect specifically to leadership 
processes within the group at an interpersonal level. However, 
given the above, it becomes potentially of greater significance to 
explore more fully developmental aspects of the group's functioning: 
most notably patterns of interaction at an interpersonal level 
within the team that may suggest informal and emergent patterns 
and processes of leadership in a project setting. It is suggested 
generally here that a greater awareness must needs be taken of 
developmental aspects of the group's functioning - including the 
exercise of 'leadership' - in a situation defined by its novelty 
and transience, and where the parties are essentially unfamiliar 
with one another, to varying degrees, to begin with. A number of 
leads have been suggested by this study: including the importance 
of divergent starting assumptions and expectations. There is a 
need for more research in,this area if one is to fUlly understand 
the fUnctioning of complex organisational systems. 
13.3 Areas for Future Research 
A final series of points need to be made in this chapter, 
before drawing to a close, concerning a potential area of future 
research that has not already been mentioned in the previous 
section. This concerns the impact of group and organisational 
size upon extant forms and processes of interaction and relates 
back to the earlier discussion in Chapter 2. While attempts were 
made to account for the direct influence of size variables in 
this study, a discussion of the effects of size has not been 
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attempted until now due' to the difficulty in assessing the impact 
of size per se in the analysis of the data. This was due to two 
factors which confounded a direct analysis of the effects of 
size, given the small number of cases investigated. Firstly, 
problems of drawing comparisons and contrasts between the cases 
with respect to the effects of size when differences in the 
complexity or 'rlon-routineness' of the work involved also varied. 
Here, for example, comparing the RAW/AFU and MTS/NSS cases was 
made impossible due to major differences also in the nature of the 
work being undertaken. Secondly, similar problems of comparison 
when characteristics of the business relationship involved were 
profound. Here, exploring similarities and differences between 
the PDL and MITE/NSS cases was confounded by the very different 
type of contractual system employed, and also possibly by the 
fact that the latter cases were particularly noted for the problems 
that occurred in contractual dealings between the main parties. 
It is possible only really to speculate that size may have had 
an impact as a co"'V'ariable or moderating factor. However, the results 
do not allow for any firm inferences or conclusions to be drawn 
with respect to the effect of size per see 
Nevertheless, it is argued here that regard to the potential 
impact of size variables is important, for the reasons described 
in Chapter 2, in conducting future studies of the forms and 
processes of interaction in complex organisational settings. What 
characterises the research base into the workings of complex 
organisational forms (and of project organisations in construction) 
is the heavy emphasis ,placed upon investigating these phenomena 
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in large, and thereby high complex, settings (eg Sayles and 
Chandler 1971, Halsey and Margerison 1979, NEDO 1970). It is 
tempting to suggest that the scale of operations, and the 
resulting complexity in systems of management and administration 
make a rocus upon such situations the preferred approach since 
those situations become those in which the operation of such complex 
organisational rorms becomes more problematic. However, this 
should not detract from equally problematic tendencies that are 
apparent in the much smaller scale of operations typified by the 
types or project investigated in this study. More importantly, 
however, there is a need to more systematically investigate 
similarities and differences between different size ranges of 
operation, in order to allow a clearer understanding of the 
comparative impact of task characteristics and the scale of the 
task, and the potential inte.r-relationships between those two sets 
of factors. Some tentative leads may be suggested by particular 
findings from the research: notably perhaps the differential 
patterning of main contractors' site-head office involvement 
between the two smaller and three larger cases, and the extent to 
which this was associated with differences in the locus of 
discretionary authority available to members of the site team 
(although, as noted above, this was perhaps rather more as a 
response to the problems faced in external dealings). The main 
general point to make here, however, is rather that the findings 
do not invalidate the earlier call for taking into account the 
potential impact of (project) organisational size. 
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13.4 Summary 
Before concluding, it is worthwhile to briefly summarise the 
main line of discussion pursued in this chapter, following from the 
analysis of the data and the presentation of the findings of this 
study. It is essentially that the norms of interaction deemed 
appropriate to the development of an integrated, interorganisational 
relationship in a setting such as that studied here, are in fact 
the more difficult to achieve and maintain, the more that task 
circumstances heighten.their importance. The problems of 
'rigidities' in interaction that may emerge are essentially rational 
organisational responses to a problematic interorganisational 
setting. The problem is that, as the task undertaken becomes more 
complex, uncertain, fragmented and so on, these very sets of 
conditions are p r ~ c i s e l y y those that mayengender a response that 
serves to reinforce these tendencies. The discussion has then 
suggested two major implications. Firstly, that studies of complex 
organisations operating in a project environment need more fully 
to allow for the impact that such external conditions may have 
upon the internal functioning of the organisation. Secondly, that 
such studies need more clearly and systematically to address 
differences between situations in which external contractual, 
rather than internal organisational, relationships occur, since 
they imply a qualitative difference in the basis of the 
relationship underpinning lateral interaction. 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
CONCLUSION 
This study has focused upon the forms and processes of 
interaction that occur in the organisation and management of projects, 
taking as its focus of interest the case of the construction'project 
and, as its database, five illustrative case studies of projects 
undertaken in the UK construction industry. The background to the 
research has ·been the videspread interest that has developed, in 
recent years, in studying forms of organisation and processes of 
management in complex project settings. :The rationale for the 
particular line of enquiry pursued here has been the comparative 
absence of investigations of construction project activity, 
management and organisation in research undertaken into the ~ p e r a t i o n n
of complex project organisational forms; .and a belief that focusing 
upon the case of construction allows for an important contribution 
to this growing body of knowledge. The rationale underpinning the 
research strategy pursued. has been the exploratory nature of the 
research; and also a concern with examining in detail patterns and 
processes of interaction in a project management setting as they 
relate to the complexity of the situation characteristic of this 
type of setting, and the dynamic of change in these circumstances 
over time. 
In the early chapters one to four, the theory and research 
base into organisational patterns and managerial processes in 
complex project organisational settings was discussed and reviewed, 
and related to the types of situation found in the case of 
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construction. In the first half of Chapter 5, this discussion was 
gathered into a model of expected patterns and processes of 
managerial interaction, from which a series of propositions for 
empirical investigation were derived. 
The main thrust of the argument presented in this earlier part 
of the thesis, was that contradictory tendencies emerge in the 
organisation and management of project work if one takes fully into 
account the potential or actual salience of inter-organisational 
relationships in the joint management of project task work. On the 
one hand, the nature of the task may make appropriate a more 'flexible' 
responsive and adaptive approach to managing complex and uncertain 
project taskwork. On the other hand, the importance of the 
contractual basis of interorganisational relationships may engender 
a more 'rigid', cautious and possibly inappropriate response to 
the situation encountered. This argument was related to the 
earlier-discussed models of complex organisation by addressing two 
sets of implications. Firstly, that for the single organisation 
operating in a complex project organisational 'system', the salience 
of inter-organisational contractual relationships may make for an 
internal 'climate' of interaction that in fact violates many of the 
principles and norms set out by those attempting to address tlie 
most appropriate means of organising and conducting activity in 
complex and uncertain task environments. Secondly, that the 
differential basis of motivation that is associated with transactional, 
rather than organisational, relationships between participants in a 
complex project setting, must needs define a point Of departure in 
the investigation of project organisational phenomena (eg matrix 
management) as between intraorganisational and interorganisational 
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project settings. The tendency for those interested in the 
operation of complex project organisational forms not to give much 
systematic attention towards the potential impact of external 
relationships (and variation in this dimension), nor fully and 
systematically to differentiate between internal and external 
relationships in interaction, formed the backdrop to this discussion. 
In the second half of Chapter 5, details were given of the 
research strategy adopted and the methodology employed in this 
study. Particular attention was addressed towards the exploratory 
nature of the research, and its manifestation in a longitudinal, 
case s t u ~ ~ approach to the investigation'of the phenomena of interest; 
involving an extensive reliance upon the use of qualitative 
techniques for" the collection, presentation and analysis of the 
data. Chapters 6 to 10 described each of the case studies in turn 
in some detail. Following this, in Chapter 11, comparisons and 
contrasts were drawn with respect to the circumstances observed 
across the five case studies. In.Chapter 12, a more detailed 
inter-case analysis was undertaken, and a 'diagnostic' interpret-
ation of events on each case was undertaken in the context of the 
circumstances described and discussed in Chapter 11. This broadened 
out, in Chapter 13, to a discussion·of the main findings; their 
implications in the light of the discusaonin the earlier part 
of the thesis; and areas of potential future research interest. 
The main findings of this study concern the paradox that 
emerges when one considers the contradiction between: the forms 
and practices of organisation and management that are deemed 
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appropriate to the performance of a complex and uncertain task; 
and the likelihood of them actually being achieved and maintained, 
given the salience of the contractual dimension in the relation-
ships between those participants involved. The interpretation that 
has been drawn is that such complex and dynamic conditions in fact 
engender a greater likelihood that practices that are deemed 
appropriate will not occur. Several important features concerning 
the organisational participants and their relationships - notably 
patterns of goal convergence and divergence; internal patterns of 
authority, influence and control; and wider patterns of power-
dependency - were identified as important moderating factors in 
defining the extent to which this was the case. Further, attention 
was addressed to the internal implications for the individual 
organisation engaged in joint interaction in the management of 
construction project work. 
The research has been exploratory in nature, and a good deal 
more attention needs to be directed towards the factors explored 
in this study and their interrelationships in a project setting 
before firm conclusions can be drawn. However, the findings do 
suggest a number of implications for the body of theory and 
research discussed in this thesis, and a number of lines of enquiry 
that might prove fruitful avenues for further research. 
The general implications for those interested in studying 
matrix and project 'systems' of management, is the need to take 
account of interorganisational relationships in the investigation 
~ f f project organisational phenomena. As noted earlier in Chapter 
2, much of the research undertaken in this area seeks to analyse a 
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situation which is essentially defined by the articulation of 
operational constraints and contingencies by bodies (arid their 
agents) external to the focal organisation. The construction 
setting may be essentially characterised by the greater importance 
of interorganisational relationships in the management of project 
work than in other types of project setting. However, even given 
this quantitative difference, the qualitative similarity associated 
with the multi-organisational perfor.mance of project work in 
various types of project environment needs to be taken into 
account, and the (potential) impact of external working relations 
at least accounted for. 
Related to this, external relationships between 'functional' 
groupings in wider project organisational 'systems' need to be 
fully differentiated from relationships in internal situations due 
to the (potential) impact of the qualitatively distinct 
motivational basis that underlies interaction in the two cases. 
This research has lent some-strength to models of project 
organisation and management that focus upon goal and power 
differentials and disparities in interaction as fundamental under-
lying dynamics that may characterise interrelationships among 
organisational subgroupings. However, in linking these disparities 
to organisational differentiation within the project organisation 
as a-whole, the clear importance of contractual relationships in 
defining patterns and processes of interaction within a total 
project organisational 'system' has emerged as implying a 
qualitatively distinct and important factor. 
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A further general implication, is in the applicability of 
constructs and models derived from the investigation of complex 
project 'systems' to a situation such as construction project 
management. As noted in Chapter 2 earlier, the focus of research 
attention has often been upon idiosyncratic types of setting and, 
in particular, high technology, large scale undertakings. The 
findings in this study suggest that the small scale, lower 
technology setting of a construction project may provide suitable 
opportunities for the fuller exploration of project management 
phenomena. The foregoing discussion of the (potential) impact of 
external relations illustrates how findings from the study of such 
situations may provide useful insights into the phenomena of 
matrix and project management in general. 
For those concerned specifically with investigating construction 
project organisation and management, the findings suggest the 
importance of taking a broad·· view of the situation involved when 
studying the patterns and practices of management observed on 
particular sites. The problems associated with integrating design 
and construction processes, and the difficulties of overcoming the 
organisational/contractual divide have, of course, long been 
recognised (eg Riggin and Jessop 1965, Crichton 1966. Morris 1973). 
However, the moderating effects of goal dependencies and power 
relationships between participant groups, and their variation from 
case to case need also to be taken more fully into account. 
Rather than focusing solely upon perceived highly problematic 
situations (and also upon complex situations made so partly by the 
~ a c t t that the scale of operations is large to very large), a greater 
awareness of variation between cases contingent upon a variety of 
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sets of circumstances needs to be developed. 
Broader issues concern the investigation of relationships 
between professional and other groupings at the level of the industry 
as a whole - focusing upon historical developments in their positions 
within the overall 'technological matrix' (Selznick 1949) that 
defines the total design and construction process. Further attention 
might appropriately be directed towards the implication of sub-
contracting - a phenomenon that has tended to increase significantly 
in recent years (Bresnen et al 1985) - and implications for 
the complexity of patterns of authority, influence and control in 
the management of construction project work. 
Two final sets of implications need briefly to be addressed. 
Firstly, the research has illustrated the usefulness of adopting, 
in part, an interorganisational perspective in investigating the 
phenomenon of project management in a setting such as construction. 
It is hoped that this, and similar types of setting m ~ ~ prove useful 
avenues for the examination of interorganisational relations 
between business organisations, to add to and complement the growing 
body of theory and research in this area (eg Negandhi 1980). 
Secondly, the case of construction needs to be brought more 
fully into the mainstream of organisational theory and research. 
This study has focused upon a situation in which the single organ-
isation (eg designer, contractor, subcontractor) acts more closely 
in concert with other organisations involved in the performance of 
a common task. The planning and ordering of work and its meaning 
I 
I,t, 
to those involved - which are the essence of the strategic choice 
decisions made by the organisation (Child 1972) - are closely 
constrained and influenced in this case by the strategic choices 
exercised by external parties. These include decisions made with 
respect to the nature of the task being performed and the system 
of administration and management established for its performance. 
The difference this implies when compared with the relative autonomy 
of firms acting in other types of setting (eg manufacturing) can 
only lend weight to calls for the fuller inclusion of 'special 
cases' such as construction into mainstream organisational theory 
and research. This would allow for fruitful comparisons and 
contrasts to be drawn when addressing the nature and organisation 
of work activity in industrial society in general. Whether the 
case of construction is an'exception to the rule;, or whether it 
contributes towards a fuller understanding of the rules, remains 
to be seen. 
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
(Note: These questions were used as a checklist to obtain 
information about the project, its organisation and 
management, and were left open-ended. Field notes 
were taken in interviews, from documentation, and 
in direct observation, and the information obtained 
related back to the questions. The format here 
reflects the fact that the questionnaire was 
therefore not 'filled in' by respondents as such.) 
The Pro,j ect 
1. Describe the project being undertaken and the types of 
work it involves. 
2. Is the project a 'one-off' undertaking, or part of a 
wider development? 
If 'one-off': 
requirements. 
describe the particular client 
(b) If part of a development: describe the nature 
of the development, and the part in it played 
by the project. 
3. Where is the site for the works? 
(a) Describe any main features of the locality 
that have a bearing on project design/construction. 
(b) Describe any main features of the site ground 
conditions that have a bearing upon project 
design/construction. 
A.1 
4. Ca) How long is the planned duration of the project? 
(b) Describe the planned programme of operations 
during construction. 
5. -What is the estimated total cost of the works? 
6. Ca) What types of production techniques are 
involved in its construction? 
(b) Are all the works to be built in situ, or are 
some elements built off-site? Describe these 
elements. 
7. What types of plant and materials are used in its 
construction? 
The Participants 
1. Which organisation is the client for the project? 
(a) Who are the users of the facility? 
(b) From what source is the project funded? 
2. Which groups are involved in the design and planning 
of the project? 
(a) Are these groups in house or contracted agencies? 
(b) If contracted, under what terms and conditions; 
and how were they selected/appointed? 
3. Which company is the main contractor? 
(a) Under what conditions of contract are they 
employed by the client? 
(b) How was this company selected/appointed? 
A.2 
4. Are subcontractors contracted to undertake any of the 
5. 
work? YES/NO 
If YES: (a) Which sections of the work? 
(b) Are they 'nominated' or 'domestic' 
sUbcontractors? 
(c) Under what conditions of contract are 
they employed? 
Are any other organisations (eg suppliers) involved 
directly in the project? 
If YES: (a) Which organisations and what part 
do they play? 
(b) By whom are they employed, and under' 
what conditions? 
YES/NO 
6. For each of the main organisations involved: 
(a) What is their nature of business? 
What types and sizes of work do they commonly 
undertake? 
(b) What is the size of the organisation (in 
output/employment/assets)? 
What is the divisional/branch structure of 
the organisation (if appropriate)? 
(c) Describe any prior experience of working with 
other main parties involved on this project. 
(d) How significant is this project (in relation 
to turnover)? 
Does it have a significant impact upon 
organisational features? 
(e) What are the objectives of the firm on this 
project? 
What have been the considerations that have 
influenced the decision to take on the project? 
Are there any likely 'spin-offs' to successfully 
undertaking the work? 
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(f) What other types of concurrent work is the 
organisation perfor.ming? 
Is any of it with the same main parties? 
(g) How 'typical' is the type and scale' of work 
undertaken by the organisation on this project? 
Does it involve the use of any 'new' techniques 
or processes? If so, describe them. 
(h) What are the organisation's role and responsibilities 
on the project during design/construction? 
Design Activities 
1. How long was the duration of the design stage? 
2. Describe the activities that were involved in establishing 
a design for the project, and the stages at which they 
occurred. 
3. Were these activities 'routine' or'specific to this 
project? 
(a) If routine: describe the reasons for any 
divergence from 'normal practice'. 
(b) If specific: describe 'normal. practice' and the 
reasons for the divergence from it in this case. 
4. What were the major considerations taken into account in 
establishing the design? 
5. Were major design alternatives proposed at any 
stage? 
If YES: what choices were made, and why? 
A.4 
YES/NO 
Design Organisation 
1. Who determined the design team structure, the selection 
of personnel, and the assignment of tasks to 
participants? 
2. Was one individual put in charge of the total 
design effort? 
(a) I ~ ~ YES: who was this individual (eg PM) 
and to whom did they report? 
(b) I ~ ~ NO: how was the design team constituted, 
and to whom did the team report? 
3. Where was the organisational and physical location of 
the project office and groups/organisations providing 
administrative support during design? (Enclose 
organisation chart if available). 
4. Which personnel were appointed for, and involved in, 
establishing a design plan for the project? 
(a) From which departments did these personnel 
originate'! 
(b) Were they seconded to the project team 
full-time'! 
(c) Upon what basis were personnel selected and 
appointed? 
Cd) What part did they play in the design process? 
(e) To whom did they report and in what ways 
during design? 
YES/NO 
( ~ ) ) Did their involvement continue beyond the design 
stages? If so, what was their role? 
5. For each individual/group involved in design, did their 
respective functional manager(s) play any direct 
part in supervising their work on the project'! YES/NO 
(a) If YES: describe their involyement. 
(b) If NO: describe any part they played in 
providing ongoing support services, training, 
etc for staff members involved in the project 
team. 
6. Describe the patterns o.f communications and coordination 
between team members during design. 
7. What formal procedures, if any, were established for 
liaison between project team members during the design 
stage (eg briefings, meetings, etc)? 
8. Did working relationships adhere mainly to these formal 
procedures, or were more informal patterns of 
communication predominantly used (eg direct contact, 
ad hoc informal meetings, etc)? 
(a) If mainly formal: describe any instances or 
circumstances in which these channels were not 
used. 
If mainly informal: describe on what basis 
they occurred (eg ad hoc/as needed meetings, 
or more routine/regular direct informal contact); 
and describe the sorts of instances and 
circumstances in which more formal channels 
may have been used. 
9. If any problems occurred during the design process, how 
were these dealt with and by whom? 
, O. Were the design plans established submitted for 
approval at a higher level in the organisation? 
If YES: (a) Who had the job of preparing and 
submitting plans? 
(b) To whom were the plans submitted 
for approval? 
YES/NO 
(c)- What factors were taken into consideration 
in giving approval for the plans? 
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If NO: 
(d) Describe any rework of the plans that 
was involved. 
(a) Describe how any reports were submitted, 
how frequently, by whom, and in what 
manner during design. 
(b) Describe any limitations on the authority 
of team members to take decisions 
concerning the design. 
11. Describe the patterns of any communications and coordination 
between the design team and external groups (eg main 
contractor, consultants) during design. 
12. What formal procedures, if any, were established for 
liaison with external groups during the design stage 
(eg briefings, meetings, correspondence, etc)? 
13. Did working relationships adhere mainly to those formal 
procedures, or were more informal patterns of 
communication predominantly used (eg direct contact, 
ad hoc informal meetings, etc)? 
(a) If mainly formal: describe any instances or 
circumstances in which these channels were not 
used. 
(b) If mainly informal: describe on what basis they 
occurred (eg ad hoc/as needed meetings, or more 
routine/regular direct informal contact); and 
describe the sorts of instances and circumstances 
in which more formal channels may have been used. 
14. If any problems occurred in external dealings during the 
design stage, how were they dealt with and by whom? 
15. Which individual(s)/group(s) performed the role(s) of 
liaising with external bodies, and with which 
individual(s)/group(s) did they liaise during design? 
A.7 
Construction Planning Activities 
1. How long vas the duration of the construction planning 
stage? 
2. Describe the activities that were involved in 
establishing plans for the project, and the stages at 
vhich they occurred. 
3. Were these activities 'routine' or specific to this 
project? 
(a) If routine: describe the reasons for any 
divergence from 'normal practice'. 
(b) If specific: describe 'normal practice' and the 
reasons for the divergence:from it in this case. 
4. What vere the major considerations taken into account 
in planning out the work? 
Were major planning alternatives proposed at any 
stage? 
If YES: What choices were made, and why? 
The Organisation of Planning Work: 
1. Who determined the planning team structure, the 
selection of personnel, and the assignment of tasks 
to participants? 
2. Was one individual put in charge of the total planning 
YES/NO 
effort? YES/NO 
(a) If YES: Who was this individual (eg PM) and 
to whom did they report? 
(b) If NO: How was the planning team constituted, 
and to whom did the team report? 
A.S 
3. Where was the organisational and physical location 
of the project office and groups/organisations 
providing administrative support during planning? 
(Enclose organisational chart if available). 
4. . Which personnel were appointed for, and involved in, 
establishing a construction plan for the project? 
(a) From which departments did these personnel 
originate? 
(b) Were they seconded to the project team 
full-time? 
(c) Upon what basis were personnel selected and 
appointed? 
(d) What part did they play in the planning 
process? 
(e) To whom did they report and in what ways 
during planning? 
(f) Did their involvement continue beyond the 
planning stage? If so, what was their role? 
5. For each individual/group involved in planning, did 
their respective functional manager(s) play any direct 
part in supervising their work on the project? YES/NO 
(a) If YES: describe their involvement. 
(b) If NO: describe any part they played in 
providing ongoing support services, training, 
etc for staff involved in the project team. 
6. Describe the patterns of communications and coordination 
between team members during planning. 
7. What formal procedures, if any, were established for 
liaison between project team members during the planning 
stage (eg briefings, m e e t i n g s ~ ~ etc)1 
8. Did working relationships adhere mainly to these 
formal procedures, or were more informal patterns of 
communication predominantly used (eg direct contact, 
ad hoc informal meetings, etc)? 
(a) If mainly formal: describe any instances 
or circumstances in which these Channels were 
not used. 
If mainly informal: describe on what basis 
they occurred (eg ad hoc/as needed meetings, 
or more routine/regular direct informal 
contact); and describe the sorts of instances 
and circumstances in which more formal channels 
may have been used. 
9. If any problems occurred during the planning process, how 
were these dealt with and by whom? 
10. Were the 
approval 
If YES: 
If NO: 
construction plans established submitted for 
at a higher level in the organisation? 
(a) Who had the job of preparing and 
submitting plans? 
(b) To whom were the plans submitted for 
approval? 
(c) What factors ,\iere taken into consider-
ation in giving approval for the plans? 
(d) Describe any rework of the plans that 
was involved. 
(a) Describe how any reports were submitted, 
how frequently, by whom, and in what 
manner during planning. 
(b) Describe any limitations on the authority 
of team members to take decisions 
concerning the plans for the work. 
11. Describe the patterns of any communications and 
coordination between the planning team and external 
groups (eg design team, subcontractors) during the 
planning stage. 
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YES/NO 
12. What formal procedures, if any, were established for 
liaison with external groups during the planning 
stage (eg briefings, meetings, correspondence, etc)? 
13. Did working relationships adhere mainly to those formal 
procedures, or were more informal patterns of 
communication predominantly used (eg direct contact, 
ad hoc informal meetings, etc)? 
(a) If mainlY formal: describe any instances 
or circumstances in which those channels were 
not used. 
If mainly informal: describe on what basis 
they occurred (eg ad hoc/as needed meetings, 
or more routine/regular direct informal 
contact); and describe the sorts of instances 
and circumstances in which more formal channels 
may have been used. 
14. If any problems occurred in external dealings during 
the planning stage, how were they dealt with and by 
whom? 
15. Which individual(s)/group(s) performed the role(s) 
of liaising with external bodies, and with which 
individual(s)/group(s) did they liaise during 
planning? 
Construction Activities 
1. When did construction on site begin? 
2. Do design and construction phases 'overlap' in 
any way? 
If YES: (a) Which design activities were carried 
over into the construction phase? 
(b) What was the aim of these activities, 
and how ,were they likely to influence 
established plans? 
A.l1 
YES/NO 
3. 
4. 
If NO: 
(c) How was undesigned work specififed 
(eg provisional s u m s ) ~ ~
(a) How detailed were the design plans 
for the work that has to be carried 
out? 
(b) Are detailed design plans and 
specifications subject to review? If 
so, how? 
(c) Are they taken as fixed, or left subject 
to change and alteration as needed? 
(d) What are the procedures for the change 
and modification of design specifications; 
and under what circumstances are changes 
made? 
Do construction planning and construction phases 
'overlap' in any way? . 
If YES: (a) Which planning/resourcing activities 
were carried over into the construction 
phase? 
If NO: 
(b) What was the aim of these activities, 
and how were they likely to influence 
established plans? 
(c) How was unplanned work specified? 
(a) How detailed were the construction 
plans for the work that has to be 
carried out? 
(b) ,Are detailed construction plans and 
schedules subject to review? If so, 
How? 
(c) Are they taken as fixed, or left subject 
to change and alteration as needed? 
(d) What are the procedures for the change 
and modification of construction 
plans/schedules; and under what 
circumstances are changes made? 
YES/NO 
(a) What procedures are established for obtaining 
labour for the project (eg recruitment/transfer)? 
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6. 
(b) What forms the basis for these activities 
(eg monthly or weekly programme of works), 
and what other considerations are taken into 
account? 
(a) What procedures are established for resourcing 
the work on site (eg plant/materials requisition, 
hire purchase)? 
(b) What forms the basis for these activities 
(eg the programme, bill of quantities), and 
what other considerations are taken into 
account? 
(c) Does the contract in any way constrain the choice 
of types of plant or materials? If so, how? 
(a) What procedures are established for contracting 
third parties (ie subcontractors, suppliers)? 
(b) What forms the basis for these activities 
(eg programmes of work), and what other 
considerations are taken into account? 
(c) On what basis is the choice of third parties 
made (eg price, etc)? 
(d) Does the contract in any way constrain the choice 
of subcontractor/supplier? If so, how? 
7. What is (are) the procedure(s) for monitoring progress 
against the programme? 
(a) Is the review periodic or ad hoc? 
If periodic, specify the time period(s). 
If ad hoc, specify the circumstances. 
(b) What constitute(s) the subject(s), scope and 
methods of monitoring progress? 
(e) How is this data collected, processed, 
distributed and used? 
(d) How are exceptions dealt with? 
A.13 
8. What is (are) the procedure(s) for monitoring the 
quality of works against the design? 
(a) Is the review periodic or ad hoc? 
If periodic, specify the time period(s). 
Jf ad hoc, specify the circumstances. 
(b) What constitutes the subject(s), scope and 
method of inspection/quality control? 
(e) How is this data collected, processed, 
distributed and used? 
(d) How are exceptions dealt with? 
9. What is (are) the procedure(s) for the financial 
monitoring of the work? 
(a) Is the review periodic or ad hoc? 
If periodic, specify the time period(s). 
If ad hoc, specify the circumstances. 
(b) What constitutes the subject(s), scope and 
method of financial monitoring/control? 
(c) How is this data collected, processed, 
distributed and used? 
(d) How are exceptions dealt with? 
10. What procedure(s) is (are) established for monitoring 
resource requirements and resource availability 
during construction? 
(a) Is the review period or ad hoc? 
If periodic, specify the time period(s). 
If ad hoc, specify the c i r c u m s t ~ c e s . .
(b) What constitute the subject(s) (eg materials, 
plant), scope and methodes) of reviewing 
resource needs? 
(c) How is this data collected, processed, 
distributed and used? 
(d) How are exceptions dealt with? 
A.14 
Construction Organisation 
1. Who determined the site team structure, the selection 
of personnel, and the assignment of tasks to 
participants? 
2. 
3. 
(a) Which personnel continue their involvement 
from the planning stage, and what are 
their roles during construction? 
(b) Which centralised support services continue 
to provide administrative support during 
construction? 
Was one individual put in charge of the total 
construction process on site? 
(a) If YES: who is this individual, and to whom 
do they report? 
(b) If NO: how is the 'site team constituted, 
and to whom do members report? 
4. Where is the organisational and physical location of 
the project (site) office and groups/organisations 
providing administrative support during construction? 
(Enclose organisation chart if available). 
5. Which personnel were appointed to the construction 
site team? 
(a) From where did they originate (eg transferred, 
seconded, recruited)? 
(b) Are they seconded to the site t ~ a m m full-time? 
(c) Upon what basis were personnel selected and 
appointed? 
(d) What part do they play in managing the 
construction process on site? 
(e) To whom do they report, and in what ways 
during construction? 
A.15 
YES/NO 
6. 
(f) Were they involved in the project in any 
way prior to work starting on site? If so, 
describe how. 
(g) Are they involved for the full duration 
of construction? Does their involvement 
continue beyond final completion? 
If so, what does this involve? 
(h) What part, if any, do other departmental 
staff (ie functional managers) play in 
supervising their work/providing support/ 
training, etc, during construction? 
Are all site personnel directed and supervised 
by the individual in charge of the team? 
If YES: Ca) Is this individual given full 
authority to exercise control over 
the contribution of project team 
members? 
(b) If not, describe where control is 
lacking. 
(c) Axe there any limitations on the 
authority of that individual to make 
decisions with regard to the project? 
(d) Describe these limitations. 
If NO: Ca) Who is responsible within each 
department for determining project 
effort priorities? 
(b) In what areas do they have authority 
to take decisions with respect to 
the project? 
(c) Describe the limitations on the 
authority of these individuals to make 
technical and business decisions with 
regard to the project. 
YES/NO 
Construction Planning and Control 
1. (a) Who is responsible in the construction phase for 
the detailed planning of the work on site? 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
(b) To whom to they r e p o r t ~ ~
(c) Which other i n d i v i d u a ~ g r o u p s , , if any, are 
involved in the detailed planning of the work? 
(d) How are these i n v o l v e d ~ ~
(a) Who is responsible in the construction phase 
for the detailed design/specification of the 
work on s i t e ~ ~
(b) To whom do they r e p o r t ~ ~
(c) Which other individuals/groups, if any, are 
involved in the detailed design/specification 
of the work? 
(d) How are these i n v o l v e d ~ ~
(a) Who is responsible in the construction 
phase for the allocation and administration 
of resources (labour, plant, materials, third 
parties)? 
(b) To whom do they report? 
(c) Which other individuals/groups, if any, are 
involved in the allocation and administration 
of resources (labour, plant, materials, third 
parties)? 
(a) Who is responsible for identifying and 
collecting progress performance data? 
(b) To whom are reports or other progress 
information submitted, and for what 
purpose{s}? 
(c) If exceptions occur, who is responsible for 
deciding upon an appropriate coUrse of 
action? 
(d) Which other individuals/groups are involved 
in this process of deciding what action is 
to be taken'l 
(e) What part do they play in this process 
(eg give instructions, consultation, advice, 
information, other)? 
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6. 
(f) Who, if anyone, is. responsible for approving 
any schedule changes? 
(g) Who is required to act on the basis of 
decisions reached? 
(a) Who is responsible for identifying and 
collecting quality/technical performance 
data? 
(b) To whom are reports or other information 
submitted, and for what purpose(s)? 
(c) If exceptions occur, who is responsible for 
deciding upon an appropriate course of 
action? 
(d) Which other individuals/groups are involved 
in this process of deciding what action is 
to be taken? 
(e) What part do they play in this process 
(eg give instructions, consultation, advice, 
information, other)? 
(f) Who, if anyone, is responsible for approving 
any design specification changes? 
(g) Who is required to act on the basis of 
decisions reached? 
(a) Who is responsible for identifying and 
collecting financial performance data? 
(b) To whom are reports or other information 
.submitted, and for what purpose( s)? 
(c) If exceptions occur, who is responsible for 
deciding upon an appropriate course of 
action? 
(d) Which other individuals/groups are involved 
this process of deciding what action is 
to be taken? 
(e) What part do they play in this process (eg 
give instructions, consultation, advice. 
information, other)? 
(f) Who, if anyone, is responsible for approving 
any financial changes? 
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in 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
Who is responsible for identifYing and 
collecting 'data on resource usage1 
To whom are reports or other information 
submitted, and for what purpose(s)? 
If problems in obtaining resources occur, 
who is responsible 'for deciding upon an 
appropriate course of action1 
Which other individuals/groups are involved 
in this process of deciding what action 
is to be taken? 
What part do they play in this process 
(eg give advice, instructions, consultation, 
advice, information, other)? 
Who, if anyone, is responsible for approving 
any, changes to resource schedules? 
Who is required to act on the basis of 
decisions reached? 
8. Describe the patterns of communication and coordination 
between team members during construction. 
9. What formal procedures, if any, are established for 
liaison between site staff during construction (eg 
briefings, meetings, etc)? 
10. Do working relationships adhere mainly to these formal 
procedures, or are more informal patterns of 
communication predominantly used (eg direct contact, 
ad'hoc informal meetings, etc)? 
(a) 
(b) 
If mainly formal: describe any instances or 
circumstances in which these channels are not 
used. 
If mainly informal: describe on what basis 
they occur (eg ad hoc/as needed meetings, or 
more routine/regular direct informal contact); 
and describe the sorts of instances and 
circumstances in which more formal channels 
may be used. 
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11. If any problems occur within the team, how are 
these dealt with and by whom? 
12. Describe the patterns of communciations and 
coordination mechanisms between main contractor 
and external parties (designers, subcontractors) 
during construction. 
13. What formal procedures, if any, are established for 
liaison with external groups during the construction 
stage (eg briefings, meetings, correspondence, etc)? 
14. Do working relationships adhere mainly to these 
formal procedures, or are more informal patterns of 
communication predominantly used (eg direct contact, 
ad hoc informal meetings and discussions, etc)? 
(a) If mainly formal: describe any instances or 
circumstances in which these channels are 
not used. 
(b) If mainly informal: describe on what basis 
they occur (eg ad hoc/as needed meetings, 
or more routine/regular direct informal 
contact); and describe the sorts of instances 
and circumstances in which more formal 
channels may be used. 
15. If any problems occur in external dealings during 
the construction stage, how are they dealt with, 
and by whom? 
16. For each organisation, Which individual(s)/group(s) 
perform the role(s) or liaising with external groups, 
and with which individual(s)/group(a) do they 
liaise during construction? 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
(Note: This schedule formed the basis for loosely-structured 
interviews held with those involved on site. The 
questions were left broad and open-ended. and prompts 
were used to obtain more detailed responses. These 
prompts varied a good deal due to variation in the 
lines of response. And the order of asking these broad 
questions also varied as a function of the particular 
direction the conversation took. These questions 
should, therefore, be taken only as broadly indicative 
of the issues addressed. While these questions were 
asked, the manner and sequence of asking and the-ro-rm 
of the response, made the process of interviewing 
highly idiosyncratic. The interviews were recorded 
manually, in the form of field notes.) 
B.1 
1. Can you describe your own job and your role on this 
project? 
2. Have you had previous experience of doing this type 
of work before? 
3. How long'have you been with the company, and what sort 
of experience have you had working for the firm? 
4. Can you describe the type of work involved on this 
project that you are responsible for? 
5. Can you describe the parts played by yourself and other 
members of your team in managing the work on this site? 
6. Can you describe the direct dealings you have Cln a 
day to day basis with other members of your own team? 
7. Can you describe any direct dealings that you or other 
members of the team have with your head office staff? 
8. How would you describe the way in which this project 
is run' and managed: for example, is the site e. 
'self-contained one', are dealings formal or fairly 
informal, is everything written down, and so on? 
9. Can you describe any direct dealings that you or other 
members of the team have with the subcontractors 
employed on site? 
10. How would you describe the way in which these dealings 
are conducted (eg formal/informal)? 
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11. Can you d e s c r ~ b e e any direct dealings that you or other 
members of the team have vith members of the design 
team/main contractor's team on site? 
12. Do you (or these others) deal directly with staff at 
site level? Do you have any dealings at all with 
staff at a 'head office' level (in other organisations)? 
13. How would you describe the way in which these dealings 
are conducted (eg formally/informally)? 
14. How detailed and appropriate do you think have been the 
design plamestablished for the work (ie drawings, 
specifications)? Have the plans changed at all during 
construction? 
15. How detailed and appropriate do you think have been the 
construction plans (ie programme, estimate) drawn up 
for the work? Have the plans changed at all during 
construction? 
16. What part do you personally play in planning out in 
detail the work to be done on site? 
17. Who do you mainly deal with in drawing up these plans? 
18. What part do you personally play in monitoring the 
work that goes on on site? 
19. Who do you mainly deal with in monitoring the work On 
site? 
B.3 
20. Are you satisfied with the performance levels achieved 
on this project? 
21. What sorts of problems, if any, have cropped up in 
performing the work on site, and how have they been 
dealt with? 
22. How do you think the management of this project has 
been handled? 
23. How do you think the design team/main contractor have 
handled.their approach to the project? 
24. What sorts of implications, if any, has performance 
on this 'project had for your firm/organisation? 
B.4 
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